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Abstract 
 
In recent years, a new approach to studying the relationship between democracy 
and peace has emerged within the field of International Relations. The Reversed 
Second Image Theory (ReSIT) argues that the arrow of causality in democratic peace 
research should run from conflict behaviour to regime type. More specifically, 
Gibler (2010) argues that participation in territorial disputes makes all regimes less 
likely to become democratic because salient threats to their survival reduce the 
bargaining power of the opposition within the country. Nevertheless, the theory is 
too general and it does not engage with related fields of research. 
By reviewing the most recent developments from the field of Comparative Politics, 
the thesis argues that ReSIT is compatible with the literature on elite-ruler dynamic 
in autocratic regimes. By narrowing the scope of the theory to autocracies, the 
thesis argues that territorial dispute involvement has a positive impact on 
autocratic regime survival and negative impact on the likelihood of 
democratisation. Furthermore, the thesis argues that the relationship between 
territorial dispute and regime survival and democratisation is likely to be affected 
by the structural features of the autocracy. The propositions are tested on a 
disaggregated sample of 314 autocracies between 1951 and 2008 using survival 
analysis. The analysis suggests that while territorial disputes have a significant 
positive impact on the survival of military and single party regimes, they have little 
or no effect on multiparty and monarchic regimes. Furthermore, a history of 
territorial dispute involvement decreases the likelihood of democratisation in all 
types of autocracies, and the effects are moderated by the structural features of 
the regime. The thesis has important implication on policy making, suggesting that 
democratic regime change in conflict-ridden regions is unlikely to reduce the 
likelihood of war. Efforts to stabilise conflict-prone areas should be re-focused on 
peaceful resolution of territorial conflict.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
On September 22nd 1980, Iraq launched a military attack on Iran in an act of 
aggression that instigated one of the longest and bloodiest wars of the 20th century 
(Willett, 2004: 4). Lasting almost eight years, the conflict destroyed much of the 
Iraqi infrastructure, and resulted in devastating casualties on both sides (Ibid.). 
However, in addition to crippling the Iraqi state, the war also had a profound 
impact on its domestic politics, and constituted a significant turning point for the 
Ba’ath regime which assumed power in 1968 (ICG, 2002: 6, Gibler and Miller, 2014: 
635). Over the course of the war, the party leadership used the conflict with Iran as 
an opportunity to strengthen their position within the state. Namely, all major 
political opposition to the Ba’ath Party was neutralised through systematic purges, 
a nationalist ideology replaced the Pan-Arabic rhetoric of earlier years, and the 
public was successfully mobilised in a concerted war effort that established a cult of 
personality within the regime (Tripp, 1989: 62; ICG, 2002: 6). By appealing to 
patriotism, Saddam Hussain, the then leader of the Ba’ath regime, managed to 
secure the support of the population even within the oppressed Shiite majority, 
despite the fact that the war resulted in the forced displacement of almost a 
quarter of a million Shiites of Iranian origin (ICG, 2002: 7). Many scholars believe 
that the Iraqi-Iranian war of 1980-1988 made a significant contribution to the 
survival of the Iraqi regime, until it was forcefully toppled by the US invasion in 
2003 (Gibler and Miller, 2014).  
The link between power centralisation and military conflict, like the one described 
above, has been a constant feature of the discourse on the relationship between 
the war-making and state-making within the social sciences (Gourevitch, 1979; Tilly, 
1985; Migdal, 2001). For example, much of the most influential sociological 
research on the formation of states in medieval Europe suggests that wars 
strengthen the capacity of states because external conflict justifies oppressive 
structures (Tilly, 1985). As seen in the example of the Iraqi regime above, leaders 
who defend their citizens from international threats can often be seen as more 
16 
 
legitimate by both regime elites and the population. The state of emergency caused 
by the possibility of defeat in war gives leaders scope to extend their power beyond 
what is typically accepted in times of peace. It is often argued that when faced by 
the prospect of foreign invasion, few will question the means by which the survival 
of the state is to be achieved (Machiavelli, 2003 [1532]). As a result, the authorities 
may find it easier to demand that individuals sacrifice their freedoms or provide 
access to crucial resources in the name of preserving the integrity of the country 
(Thompson, 1996). Granted with more domestic power as a result of war-making, 
state leaders proceed to strengthen their newly found powers. This ‘state-making 
through war-making’ does not only consolidate power (Tilly, 1985), but also makes 
its de-centralisation more difficult, potentially hindering the process of 
democratisation within affected states (Gourevitch, 1978). In recent years, this 
discussion has evolved into a brand new sub-field of International Relations theory, 
what has come to be known as the Reversed Second Image Theory (ReSIT),1 which 
questions the prevailing debate on the relationship between regime type and 
international conflict. Before explaining how ReSIT fits into the broader IR literature 
on the subject, it is important to explain the context in which it gained its 
prominence.  
The traditional perspective on the relationship between interstate conflict and 
regime type has traditionally been confined to research on the causes of war within 
the IR second image tradition, as explained in more detail in Chapter 2. The 
dominant view, what is known as Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), argues that 
democracies rarely go to war with one another. Many researchers consider this 
proposition to be ‘the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of 
international relations’ (Levy, 1988: 88, see also Lee Ray, 1988; Russett, 1993; 
Owen, 1994). The ‘perpetual peace’ between democracies is usually seen as a result 
of public aversion to wars, which are both costly and destructive (Doyle, 1983a). 
Alternatively, peace can also be a result of the special relationship between 
democratic regimes, whose leaders treat each other with a great deal of respect 
                                                          
1
 Thank you to Garrett W. Brown for coming up with this abbreviation.  
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and mutual accommodation. While this dominant view has been challenged by a 
number of rival theories in the past, these critiques, as will be argued in Chapter 2, 
are unconvincing and fraught with theoretical and methodological shortcomings. In 
contrast to these critiques, ReSIT presents a unique and original alternative to DPT.  
Based on historical insight from a number of qualitative studies (Thompson, 1996; 
Rasler and Thompson, 2004), ReSIT challenges DPT by suggesting that the causal 
arrow between democracy and peace should be reversed. Instead of viewing peace 
as a result of a special relationship between democracies, ReSIT suggests that 
democratic systems develop because of stable security relations between 
neighbouring groups of states, regardless of their regime type. If conflicted regions 
tend to result in more centralised and authoritarian state structures, then peaceful 
regions should have the opposite effect. In the absence of interstate disputes in the 
region, oppressive power structures might be harder to legitimize, and states are 
liable to become more open and liberal over time as a result of internal demands 
for democratisation. Hence, some regions develop into so-called ‘zones’ or ‘niches’ 
of peace (Thompson, 1996). This proposition has important and far reaching 
consequences for liberal theories of International Relations, because it explains why 
democracies tend not to engage in war with one another. As observed in much of 
the quantitative conflict studies literature, international disputes tend to occur 
between neighbouring states. If democracies tend to be a result, rather than the 
cause of peace, then it is not surprising that democracies do not fight one another. 
After all, the sole reason they are democratic in the first place is the fact that they 
are peace with their immediate neighbours. This alternative theory of the 
democracy-peace nexus has on many occasions been praised for its intuitive 
theoretical foundations (Gates et al., 1996; Rosato, 2003). That said, until recently, 
despite growing interest in the theory, there was still relatively little quantitative 
evidence that would support its claims (Midlarsky, 1995; James et al., 1999; 
Mousseau and Shi, 1999).   
However, in the last decade, a major contribution to the theory by Gibler and 
colleagues (Gibler, 2007, 2010, 2012; Gibler and Tir, 2007, 2014) suggested that the 
18 
 
lack of conclusive quantitative findings can be attributed to the overly general 
conception of external threats adopted by previous ReSIT studies; Gibler (2007) 
claimed that not all international conflicts are equally likely to elicit strong 
centralising effects. Grounding his research in the study of interstate rivalries, his 
theory proposes that territorial conflicts between neighbouring countries are much 
more likely to be perceived as threatening than conflicts over other, non-territorial 
issues.2 Most importantly, territorial disputes do not have to result in a military 
confrontation between states for the centralising effect to occur: the mere threat 
of foreign occupation or loss of vital territory is likely to enable leaders to rally 
support from the general population and regime elites (Gibler, 2010). In autocratic 
regimes, the presence of a territorial dispute with a neighbouring country means 
that leaders will acquire a much better bargaining position vis-à-vis the regime 
elites and their opposition. This means that they can reorganize the regime in a way 
that strengthens their position permanently, and centralise power in the hands of a 
much smaller group of individuals – a process explained in more detail in Chapter 3.    
Despite the fact that this branch of the theory has generated strong empirical 
support, this thesis argues that Gibler’s (2007, 2010) proposition suffers from a 
number of significant underdevelopments. In order for these results to be valid and 
reliable, they need to rest on more solid theoretical and methodological 
foundations. Up until now, most of the research within the ReSIT tradition focuses 
explicitly on explaining why some states are likely to be more democratic, while 
others more autocratic. This is a direct result of the theory’s continuous 
engagement with the democratic peace research project in an attempt to explain 
the curious phenomenon of democratic peace. The polemic relationship between 
ReSIT and DPT has meant that the theory rarely engaged with other 
democratisation research in associated fields of study. For example, many of the 
methodological and theoretical aspects proposed by ReSIT operate within the 
framework of International Relations, yet fail to account for methodological and 
                                                          
2
 Non-territorial causes of disputes and military conflicts might include policy or regime disputes 
(Vasquez and Henehan, 2016). 
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theoretical developments in the field of Comparative Politics. This is problematic for 
ReSIT in a number of ways, as explained below. 
Unlike much of the current Comparative Politics literature, ReSIT focuses on 
domestic structures within states rather than regimes. This means that the only 
distinction between different units of analysis is between democratic and autocratic 
forms of governance. However, this simple distinction means that different forms 
of authoritarianism are expected to react to external threats in exactly the same 
ways, despite the striking differences between them (Geddes, 2003). This also 
means that a period of authoritarianism – a spell of authoritarianism - is typically 
treated as a single regime, even if major power shifts and transitions occur within 
that state. Due to the explicit focus on states, autocratic instability is often 
incorrectly equated with democratisation, despite considerable Comparative 
Politics research suggesting otherwise (see for example Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a; 
Geddes et al., 2014; Wright et al., 2014). Finally, the lack of engagement with the 
Comparative Politics literature means that key predictors of regime change are 
often not accounted for, despite their importance in explaining both regime 
stability and democratisation. 
Furthermore, in order to demonstrate that external threats hinder democratisation, 
traditional ReSIT studies often use continuous measures of democracy as their 
dependent variable. As will be explained in Chapter 4, while these measures can 
often be useful as independent variables in IR research, they are not appropriate as 
dependent variables in regime change studies.  The main problem with the use of 
continuous measures of democratisation as dependent variables is the fact that it 
makes the exact moment of democratisation difficult to establish. This is because 
continuous measures of democratisation conceptualise democracy as a scale, 
rather than a dichotomy. This means that a regime can be democratic to a certain 
degree, without having to meet essential criteria for undergoing a full transition. As 
a result, authoritarian regimes which include some liberal features such as 
multiparty elections or freedom of speech might be confused for democracies, even 
if they do not satisfy essential criteria contained in well-established definitions of 
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‘democracy’.3 Such omissions significantly decrease the validity and reliability of 
quantitative studies of democratisation. 
In response, this thesis aims to address the shortcomings outlined above by 
developing a theoretically and methodologically reformulated ReSIT framework. In 
doing so, it argues that in order for ReSIT to become a serious explanatory 
framework of regime stability and democratisation, it must present solid theoretical 
reasoning that applies beyond the discipline of IR. For this reason, rather than 
merely attempting to discredit the propositions and conclusions of DPT, this thesis 
will instead focus on extending the theoretical and empirical scope of current ReSIT 
studies. It will not argue that ReSIT should become a substitution for the DPT, but 
rather that it can exist as an independent field of research, providing that it 
continues to further engage with the field of Comparative Politics so as to sharpen 
its analytical and heuristic properties.  
 
Original contribution of the thesis 
 
This thesis offers a number of original theoretical and methodological contributions 
to the fields of IR and Comparative Politics that improve on the shortcomings 
outlined above. The most important contribution is the emphasis on the distinction 
between regime change and democratisation. In doing so, this thesis demonstrates 
that the factors that decrease autocratic stability do not necessarily lead to 
democratisation – a distinction not currently made in the ReSIT literature. In fact, 
many autocratic regimes transition to a different form of autocracy upon regime 
change. This has serious implications for ReSIT, which tends to assume that if 
peaceful state relations destabilise autocratic regimes, they must necessarily lead 
to democratisation. This confusion stems from the state-centric approach of much 
of the IR literature, which rarely makes a distinction between autocratic spells and 
autocratic regimes.  A spell of autocracy is the period of non-democratic rule within 
                                                          
3
 These criteria might include level political playing field, or ex ante uncertainty over the outcome of 
the elections (see for example Przeworski et al., 2000).  
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a given country. This logic dictates that when a spell of autocracy ends, the state 
will naturally become democratic.4 Hence, the processes of democratisation and 
regime change have become synonymous in the IR literature. This state-centric 
approach conceals the fact that most autocratic spells contain within them a 
number of authoritarian regimes. In this way, it is often ignored or forgotten that 
states go through a series of violent and disruptive structural changes before they 
become democratic. These power shifts from one type of autocracy to another are 
often accompanied by a series of drastic economic, social, political, and cultural 
transformations. Given that these changes often have a very profound negative 
impact on the citizenry, they are an important phenomenon to study and 
understand, in which this thesis takes into account.  
Furthermore, if the assumptions of ReSIT are correct, and territorial disputes result 
in power centralisation within autocracies, autocratic regimes should not only be 
less likely to democratise, but also to transition to any other form of regime. This 
thesis tests the proposition that territorial disputes strengthen autocratic regimes 
by applying it to the wider Comparative Politics research on the stability of 
authoritarian regime types (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a; Boix and Svolik, 2012; Wright 
and Bak, 2016). Hence, the first research question of the thesis asks: how do 
territorial disputes affect the stability of autocratic regimes? This question will be 
answered in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
The second major contribution concerns the original proposition of ReSIT, which 
claims that participation in territorial disputes makes democratisation more 
difficult. By making a distinction between regime change and democratisation, this 
thesis is able to investigate two arguments. The first argument is that territorial 
disputes might increase autocratic stability, and therefore decrease the chances of 
regime change of any kind. The second argument is that territorial disputes 
additionally lower the likelihood of democratic transitions more specifically, and 
that the mechanism involved in the dispute-regime change nexus is different for 
                                                          
4
 Sometimes, the autocracy might end without democratisation occurring, but this is usually only the 
case in the instance of state failure of foreign occupation, and the state structures cease to exist 
altogether. 
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regime change, and different for democratic transitions. These arguments have 
never been previously investigated by the ReSIT literature, and offer significant 
theoretical contribution to the current literature on the subject.  
The second original contribution of this thesis is the adoption of dichotomous 
measures of democratisation in Chapter 7. As mentioned earlier, previous studies 
investigating the connection between international threats and domestic regime 
change used continuous measures of democratisation. As a result, the analysis 
focused on the impact of conflict on small changes on the democracy-autocracy 
scale, rather than the impact of conflicts on complete regime transitions  (see for 
example James et al., 1999; Mousseau and Shi, 1999; Rasler and Thompson, 2005). 
The focus on small institutional changes within autocratic regimes rather than 
instances of complete democratisation weakens the theoretical argument of ReSIT 
and prevents the study of democratisation that is methodologically compatible with 
well-established Comparative Politics research. In other words, traditional ReSIT 
frameworks that use continuous measures of democratisation limit the theory’s 
ability to gain interdisciplinary insights. Therefore, this thesis will make a 
methodological contribution to ReSIT and use a dichotomous measure of 
democracy to investigate whether territorial threats hinder the process of 
democratisation. This contribution achieves two things. First, it improves the 
construct validity of the dependent variable in this thesis. By adopting a set of 
essential criteria of democratisation (discussed in detail in Chapter 4), the thesis will 
limit the likelihood of type II error, where non-democratic regimes are classified as 
democratic ones. This is especially important, given that many autocratic regimes 
adopt liberal features such as genuinely competitive elections, and can be easily 
mistaken for democracies. Second, the use of continuous measures of 
democratisation improves the theoretical strength of ReSIT. If territorial disputes 
hinder the process of democratisation, this is much better illustrated by using a 
strict definition of democracy, rather than by measuring small, institutional changes 
within regimes that may not indicate genuine structural changes. By adopting these 
strict criteria for measuring the impact of territorial disputes on democratisation, 
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the stud will aim to provide evidence that is more robust and convincing. Finally, 
the use of dichotomous measures of democratisation makes the study of ReSIT 
more compatible with well-established and methodologically superior research on 
regime change, increasing its interdisciplinarity. Hence, the second research 
question of the thesis asks: How do territorial disputes affect the process of 
democratisation in autocratic regimes? This question will be answered in Chapter 7.  
The third significant contribution of this thesis is its vast incorporation of 
Comparative Politics research on autocratic regimes into the field of IR. Apart from 
few notable exceptions (Chiozza and Goemans, 2004; Weeks, 2012), IR research 
tends to approach all autocratic regimes as structurally and operationally similar, 
purely by virtue of being non-democratic. This is a major theoretical oversight, 
especially when investigating regime stability and democratisation. Accounting for 
structural features of autocracies is important because much of the current 
research suggests that they have a significant impact on autocratic stability as well 
as the likelihood of leaving power via negotiated settlement that results in a 
democratic transition. The nature of the interaction between leaders and their 
elites is not universal across autocratic regimes, but is instead context specific - a 
fact overlooked by Gibler (2010) and other theorists.5 For example, while splits 
between elites are particularly threatening to military regimes, they rarely pose a 
threat, and can even be advantageous, to single-party autocracies (Frantz and 
Ezrow, 2011a). Accounting for structural features of autocracy should become a 
standard feature not just of Comparative Politics, but all theories interested in the 
study of domestic structures of states. Hence, two additional research questions 
are posed in this thesis: How do structural features affect the relationship between 
territorial disputes and regime stability in autocracies?, and; how do structural 
features affect the relationship between territorial disputes and democratisation in 
autocratic regimes? 
The fourth and final contribution is the application and test of ReSIT that is limited 
to autocratic regimes. Although it is possible that all regimes centralise as a result of 
                                                          
5
 See Chapter 2 for this discussion.  
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territorial threats, the current theoretical underdevelopments within ReSIT warrant 
a more focused approach. Previous ReSIT work assumed that the impact of 
international conflict on power centralisation is the same for democracies and 
autocracies. For example, researchers assumed that territorial conflict can make 
both democracies and autocracies less democratic. This was facilitated by the use 
of continuous measures of democracy, which allowed researchers to study small 
institutional changes in domestic structures of regimes in democracies and 
autocracies alike. As a result, the causal link between territorial disputes and 
democratic transitions was difficult to establish. Moreover, this approach 
completely ignored the possibility that autocratic regimes might transition from one 
form of autocracy to another form of autocracy, and that the severity of these 
changes might not be reflected on continuous measures of democracy. Hence, in 
order to improve the study of ReSIT and demonstrate a causal link between 
territorial disputes and genuine regime change (rather than simply small structural 
changes in the regime), this thesis will focus solely on autocratic regimes. This is 
important, because autocracies are structurally different from democracies. 
Current ReSIT research attempts to explain too much variation with the use of one 
theory. As a result, ReSIT must diversify in order to better explain specific regime 
changes in autocracies, and specific changes in democracies. This thesis will aim to 
explain regime transitions in autocratic regimes only, recognising that the 
complexity of autocratic rule requires a separate set of explanations. Moreover, it is 
possible that the overly general approach of previous attempts to test ReSIT might 
be one of the reasons for its inconclusive and contradictory empirical results. 
All of the propositions of this thesis are tested using a quantitative, large-N analysis 
of regime duration data for 314 autocratic regimes between 1951 and 2008. The 
sample consists of all available independent autocratic regimes with a population of 
500,000 citizens or more. The main data sources include Magaloni et al. (2013) 
regime change and regime duration dataset, Gibler and Miller (2014) dataset on 
territorial dispute involvement, and Maddison data on economic performance (Bolt 
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and van Zanden, 2014).6 The thesis employs two types of regression analysis to test 
whether territorial disputes have an effect of regime duration and time-to-
democratisation in the sample: the non-parametric Cox Proportional Hazards 
survival analysis and the semi-parametric Royston-Parmar regression analysis. Both 
of these regression techniques provide considerable advantages over the standard 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression commonly used in political 
science.  First, unlike OLS regression, survival analysis does not require residuals to 
be normally distributed. Given that the risk of regime failure is unlikely to be evenly 
distributed throughout the existence of a regime, violations of this assumption in 
duration data are very frequent. Moreover, while logistic regression can only 
provide information on odds of an event taking place, survival analysis can provide 
an additional insight into the length of time it takes for regimes to transition. Given 
that (eventually) most regimes come to an end, survival analysis can provide a 
wealth of information which is unavailable using the standard logistic regression 
techniques. For example, it allows the researcher to compare of the length of time 
it takes for a transition to occur in autocratic regimes under different external 
conditions.  Further discussion on the advantages and limitations of survival 
analysis can be found in Chapter 4. The effects of territorial dispute involvement 
will be tested on two dependent variables: time to regime change (Chapters 5 and 
6) and time to democratisation (Chapter 7). A fuller explanation of the methodology 
will be presented in Chapter 4. 
 
Summary of findings 
 
The findings of the thesis are encouraging, and partially support the main 
assumptions of the thesis. The overall aim of this work is to demonstrate that the 
impact of territorial disputes on autocratic regimes goes beyond that presented by 
past research on this subject. Territorial disputes not only reduce the chances of 
                                                          
6
 A very limited number of regimes were excluded from the analysis due to issues of missing data. 
These cases are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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democratisation, but also reduce the likelihood of transitions from one type of 
autocracy to another. By narrowing the scope of the theory to autocracies, the 
thesis argues that territorial dispute involvement has a positive impact on 
autocratic regime survival and negative impact on the likelihood of 
democratisation. Furthermore, by engaging in interdisciplinary research, the thesis 
argues that the relationship between territorial dispute and regime survival and 
democratisation is likely to be affected by the structural features of the autocracy. 
Overall, territorial dispute involvement had a significant effect of the durability of 
certain autocratic regimes, and a significant effect on the chances of 
democratisation. More specifically, Chapter 5 demonstrates that when no 
consideration is given to autocratic regime structures, all autocracies are 
significantly less likely to transition into either autocracy or democracy if they 
depend on petroleum production as a considerable part of their GDP. However, 
once the structural characteristics of regimes are taken into account in Chapter 6, 
military regimes were significantly less likely to transition regardless of their 
dependency on natural resources. Chapter 6 further demonstrates that when a 
country is not dependent on oil, single-party regimes were also more durable as a 
result of territorial dispute involvement. Furthermore, different types of 
autocracies are affected by wealth, oil dependency, and a host of other important 
variables in strikingly different ways, emphasizing the need to, where possible, 
disaggregate the analysis of regime stability.   
In addition, Chapter 7 provides evidence in support of traditional arguments 
presented by ReSIT – that territorial dispute involvement has a negative impact of 
democratisation. In summary, Chapter 7 demonstrates that time-to-
democratisation is significantly extended for regimes that took part in territorial 
dispute involvement. Nevertheless, the results are not robust, and depend on the 
type of regression model used. That said, the findings are clear, robust and 
statistically significant when an alternative measure of dispute involvement is 
included, especially in the form of prior territorial dispute involvement in the 
regime’s history. There is strong statistical evidence that regimes which were 
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involved in territorial disputes at some point during their rule take significantly 
longer to democratise than regimes that were never involved in territorial disputes. 
Finally, Chapter 7 provides strong empirical support that economic development 
makes democratisation more likely, despite the finding in Chapter 6 that economic 
development reduces the chances of all types of regime change in some types of 
autocracy. The results of this thesis thus warrant further investigation into the 
relationship between wealth, regime survival and democratisation, which ideally 
should be conducted separately for each of the autocratic types. In this way, this 
thesis is original in setting out foundations for a future research agenda, which can 
more appropriately capture the relationship between economic development, 
regime stability, and democratisation. 
 
Implications of the thesis: academic contribution 
 
The findings of this thesis have serious implications for the IR and Comparative 
Politics literature. They emphasize the need to take ReSIT propositions seriously, 
and conduct further studies that could cross-validate the results using alternative 
data, measures and methodologies. The most important finding of the thesis is that 
territorial dispute involvement reduces the likelihood of regime change in some 
types of autocracy, and reduces the likelihood of democratisation in all types of 
autocracy. Moreover, as the theory outlined in Chapter 3 assumed, the factors that 
affect regime change in autocratic regimes more generally do not necessarily 
impact their chances of democratisation. While territorial disputes significantly 
reduce both the likelihood of regime change and democratisation, the causal 
mechanism for each is different. While territorial disputes affect both regime 
durability and time to democratisation, the effects are not the same, and depend 
on a wide range of other predictors of regime survival and democratisation.  
These results provide initial confirmation that when testing ReSIT, the effects of 
territorial disputes on regime stability and democratisation are not synonymous, 
and should be studied separately.  This is the first ReSIT study to demonstrate that 
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territorial disputes hinder democratisation without relying on the assumption that 
regime instability and democratisation are causally related. This means that a more 
comprehensive theoretical inquiry into the relationship between external threats 
and democratisation must be explored by future researchers. It is also worth noting 
that the statistically significant link between democratisation and territorial 
disputes has been present despite the fact that criteria for democratic transitions 
used in this thesis are much stricter than those usually employed by IR scholars 
testing ReSIT, and even when structural differences between autocracies have been 
taken into account (see for example: James et al., 1999; Rasler and Thompson, 
2005; Giber, 2010). This indicates that the relationship between external threats 
and regime stability and democratisation is strong and robust. It further indicates 
that ReSIT has serious potential to become a major explanatory theory which could 
aid future researchers in explaining autocratic regime stability and democratisation. 
In addition to the above, a number of other important findings can be reported. 
One of the primary findings of Chapter 6 demonstrated that involvement in 
territorial disputes has a significant impact on the stability of military autocracies. 
Military regimes often adopt the rhetoric of ‘guardianship’ in order to prolong their 
rule. In other words, elites in military regimes often claim that the regime is 
justified, because it provides order in times of domestic or international instability. 
The finding that territorial dispute involvement increases stability of military 
regimes is important, because it suggests that external threats to territorial 
integrity of the state increases the credibility of military rhetoric.  It is therefore 
crucial to conduct further qualitative research into whether territorial disputes are 
used as part of the justification for military rule, and under which conditions this 
rhetoric tends to be more successful.  As a result, the thesis provides an important 
contribution to the literature on the survival of military regimes.  
Moreover, the thesis provides an important contribution to the study of the 
relationship between oil rents and regime survival. The thesis demonstrates that 
single party with no access to petroleum rents are also much less likely to transition 
as a result of territorial dispute involvement. This finding has far reaching 
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implications for the literature linking petroleum rents to regime survival. In the 
existent literature, it is often assumed that petroleum rents decrease the likelihood 
of regime change, because they allow the regime to fund its operations and buy-off 
the oppositions without the need to tax their citizens. Nevertheless, this thesis 
demonstrates that single party regimes are only affected by territorial disputes 
when they are not reliant on petroleum revenues. This suggests that oil rents can 
serve as a stabilising force against external threats, most likely through their ability 
to instantly increase military spending and provide a sense of security within the 
country despite existing external threats. Further research should focus on 
establishing why the relationship between petroleum, territorial disputes, and 
regime change is particularly prominent in single party regimes.  
Finally, the findings in Chapter 7 demonstrate that territorial dispute involvement, 
as well as a history of dispute involvement has a significant effect on all types of 
autocratic regimes. While this finding is somewhat limited by a small sample of 
democratic transitions in single party and monarchic regimes, it provides strong 
support for the claims that even when a strict, dichotomous measure of 
democratisation is used, territorial  disputes still reduce the chances of 
democratisation in autocratic regimes. This is an important implication to both IR 
and Comparative Politics literature, which so far has not seriously considered the 
possibility that external threats to the regime might be causally related to 
institutional changes at the domestic level. Having summarised the main findings of 
this work, the section below will now outline the main implications of this thesis.  
 
 Implication of the thesis: policy-making 
 
If the findings of this thesis are confirmed by further replication studies, it will have 
a major impact on the policy-making arena. So far, the discussions about how best 
support transitioning states in their efforts to democratise has been focused on 
foreign aid and market liberalisation in line with the assumption that economic 
wealth is the main factor which can help incentivise these changes. The finding of 
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this thesis - that unstable security environments may have been overlooked as a 
cause of autocratic stability and unsuccessful transitions - is important because it 
suggests that major efforts should be placed on stabilising border relations 
between the regime in question and its neighbours. However, this approach, as 
shown in Chapters 5 and 6, is a double-edged sword. While increasing the territorial 
security of autocratic regimes might lead them to eventually democratise, it might 
also result in autocratic breakdown that is followed by the introduction of yet 
another autocratic regime. As will be discussed in the initial sections of Chapter 5, 
such changes can be very disruptive to the social and economic fabric of the 
society. For example, when the Sandinista movement overthrew the Samoza 
military dictatorship in Nicaragua in 1979, the country underwent a series of drastic 
economic, social, political, and cultural transformations; while structural changes 
within autocratic regimes have major impact on the social and economic fabric of 
the country, they are often overlooked by Comparative Politics and IR scholars 
(Wright et al., 2015). A more detailed study of the effect of territorial disputes on 
such changes can bring social scientists one step closer to determining what causes 
them.  
Moreover, although the thesis does not explicitly aim to disprove the assumptions 
of the DPT, it is undeniable that the results of this thesis have called the policy 
prescriptions of DPT enthusiasts into question. The main assumptions of DPT state 
that democracies tend to be less prone to engage in international conflict. As a 
result, a number of policies have focused on interfering with autocratic regimes in 
an effort to encourage democratisation in conflicted regions such as the Middle 
East and Africa. This is often done by providing financial aid and support to civil 
society organisations, encouraging more liberal market policies, and even forceful 
regime change. It is possible that instead of focusing on changing regime structures 
within non-democratic states by force or other means - as done in the cases of Iraq 
and Afghanistan – policymakers could aim to design policies that help stabilise 
border relations in conflict-ridden regions. This thesis suggests that in some types of 
autocratic regimes, territorial dispute involvement hinders the likelihood of such 
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transitions. Hence, attempts to bring democracy to areas which do not have the 
security conditions necessary for such changes may not only be futile, but may also 
further destabilise an already fragile relationship between neighbours. This is 
because, as previous research suggests, transitioning and unconsolidated regimes 
tend to be more conflict prone than older regimes (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). As 
a result, this work has serious implications for policymakers working in the area of 
conflict resolution and democracy promotion.  
 
The structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is composed of seven extensive chapters. Chapter 2 will review 
International Relations literature on the relationship between regime type and 
conflict behaviour and explain the theoretical and empirical context in which the 
modern version of ReSIT emerged. By demonstrating inherent problems in second 
image approaches to the study of the democracy-peace nexus, Chapter 2 will 
contextualise the need for alternative perspectives within International Relations. 
By examining the tradition of regime studies within IR, it will demonstrate the need 
for the discipline to incorporate progress from other fields of research such as 
Comparative Politics, and become more interdisciplinary in its enquiry into the 
democracy–peace nexus. The review will demonstrate that ReSIT offers new 
insights into the dynamic between regime type and international conflict, and 
provides a genuine alternative to the liberal and realist IR traditions. The chapter 
will also outline the main assumptions of ReSIT, and the contribution made by 
Gibler (2010), who proposed that territorial disputes have a much more centralising 
effect on regimes than other types on conflict because they affect the bargaining 
dynamic between the regime leader and regime elites.  
Chapter 3 will make a detailed examination of Gibler’s (2010) theory of the changes 
to elite-leader interaction within autocratic states as a result of territorial threats. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section will focus on how 
territorial disputes affect autocratic stability, and propose some new theoretical 
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directions for the theory. The section will present Giber’s (2010) argument that 
territorial disputes diminish the bargaining position of regime elites and regime 
opposition in autocratic regimes, increasing the power of the regime leadership. 
This is because the threat to territorial integrity of the state is likely to be perceived 
as extremely threatening, and all efforts to topple the current regime are likely to 
be suspended. Moreover, any anti-regime activities in times of highly threatening 
conflict are likely to be perceived as treason. The weakening of the bargaining 
power of opposition groups reduces the likelihood of leadership turnover, and 
makes a transition to any other type of regime (autocratic and democratic) less 
likely. The original contribution of that section will be to demonstrate that Gibler’s 
(2010) argument applies to autocratic regime survival, rather than democratisation, 
and framing it in the context of more recent research on autocratic regime survival. 
This new framework is important, because, as mentioned previously, when 
autocratic regimes end, they do not always end in democratic transitions. Hence, 
Gibler’s (2010) argument only applies to the study of regime stability, but not 
necessarily to the study of democratisation. Finally, one of the most important 
contributions of this section will be the application of Gibler’s (2010) framework to 
the specific context of each autocratic regime type investigate in this thesis. The 
distinction between military, monarchic, single-party and multiparty regimes will be 
made, and different theoretical expectations for each regime category will be 
made. The section will explain why Gibler’s (2010) framework is likely to apply to 
multiparty and military regimes, but not to monarchic and single party regimes. The 
proposition put forward in the first section of Chapter 3 will be tested in empirical 
Chapters 5 and 6.  
The second section of Chapter 3 will review the theoretical propositions of ReSIT in 
relation to democratisation and place it in the context of wider democratisation 
studies within the Comparative Politics literature. The section will demonstrate why 
territorial disputes, apart from stabilising autocracies, additionally reduce the 
likelihood of democratisation. It is theorised that involvement in territorial disputes 
divides civil society opposition groups which are pushing for regime liberalisation. 
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This is because threats to territorial integrity of a country are likely to be perceived 
as a security emergency. Because democratic systems can often be perceived as 
slow and inefficient when it comes to dealing with external threats, any efforts to 
liberalise the regime might be suspended. The section will further demonstrate 
importance of accounting for autocratic regime type when discussing 
democratisation, as well as other influential factors such as economic development 
and petroleum dependency. The theoretical assumptions of the second section will 
be tested in the empirical Chapter 7.  
Having explained the main theoretical contributions in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 will 
outline the methodology and methods used to answer the research questions of 
this thesis. The chapter will justify the use of large-N, quantitative comparative 
approach, along with the choice of the unit of analysis and independent and 
dependent variables. Chapter 4 will further discuss the sources, reliability, and 
limitations of data used throughout the thesis. Finally, the appropriateness of 
survival analysis regression technique will be addressed, along with the main 
assumptions of the regression, its limitations, as well as steps taken to ensure that 
all assumptions of the models are met in analytical chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
In line with this methodology, Chapter 5, 6 and 7 will address the research 
questions of this thesis. Chapter 5 will test the assumption that autocratic regimes 
are more stable as a result of territorial dispute involvement, while controlling for 
the effects of wealth, oil dependency, political instability, as well as ethnic and 
religious fractionalisation. Chapter 6 will test the same assumption, but will split the 
sample into separate smaller sub-samples, which are based on the structural 
characteristics of the autocracies. In summary, Chapter 6 will investigate whether 
the findings of Chapter 5 are still applicable when autocratic regimes are 
disaggregated and re-categorised based on their power structures. Finally, Chapter 
7 will test the proposition that autocratic regimes are less likely to democratise as a 
result of territorial dispute involvement as well as prior history of dispute 
involvement. Chapter 7 will also account for the moderating effects of structural 
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characteristics of autocratic regimes, wealth, oil dependency, the effects of Cold 
War, and the history of prior regime changes.  
Finally, the conclusion of the thesis will present the findings and restate the 
importance of the research conducted in this thesis, emphasizing the original 
contribution of the findings, and propose new directions for further inquiry. 
However, one of the most important aspects of the chapter will be the discussion of 
the main theoretical and methodological limitations of this work. Bearing in mind 
potential biases and shortcomings, the chapter will also discuss the wider 
implication of this thesis to the international policy making, especially in relation to 
transitioning regimes and peace building efforts in heavily conflicted areas.   
To begin, the next chapter will contextualise the importance of ReSIT to current 
literature on the democracy-peace nexus, and explain the importance of reversing 
the causal arrow between regime type and conflict involvement.  
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Chapter 2:  Previous research 
 
Introduction 
 
The following chapter will review the literature on the association between 
international conflict and regime type in the field of International Relations (IR) in 
order to contextualise the emergence of Reversed Second Image Theory (ReSIT). As 
briefly discussed in Chapter 1, the IR literature on the regime type – conflict nexus 
has been largely dominated by research projects relating to the empirical 
observation that unlike authoritarian regimes, democracies never engage in war 
with one another: a phenomenon known as the dyadic peace. The following 
chapter will review the dominant approaches within the IR literature in order to 
demonstrate that the empirical debate on the existence of democratic peace has 
been largely limited to the liberal and realist explanations. The chapter will first 
review the second image propositions of the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) and 
Selectorate theories. It will then outline the third image neo-realist critique of the 
second image arguments. The chapter will demonstrate that neither the second nor 
third image approach to the democracy – peace relationship is very convincing, 
explaining the emergence of the Reversed Second Image Theory of power 
centralisation as a better way of capturing the effects of external threats to the 
state’s integrity.  
While many other attempts to explain the dyadic peace exist, among them Marxist, 
constructivist, and postmodernist approaches, to name but a few, this review will 
concentrate on appraising the positivist paradigms within the IR discipline.7 The 
review of the debate on how best to explain the dyadic peace phenomenon is 
important, because it contextualises the framework in which ReSIT originated. This 
is especially important when reviewing the theoretical claims of the DPT, because, 
                                                          
7
 This is done not because other approaches are seen as less valuable, but rather due to the explicit 
empirical focus of this thesis. Hence, only approaches concerned with the scientific study of the 
regime-conflict relationship are discussed. 
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as mentioned in Chapter 1, many of the problems this thesis aims to address are a 
direct result of the polemic nature of ReSIT, which emerged because it largely saw 
itself as having to give a direct response to the DPT.  
In addition, the analysis of the literature outlined in this chapter will demonstrate 
that ReSIT presents a convincing and theoretically original approach to explaining 
the association between peace and democracy. Namely, as a theoretical 
framework, it shows much scope for further scientific and theoretical developments 
on the relationship between external threats and domestic power centralisation. 
Unlike other theories on conflict studies, ReSIT literature offers a clean break from 
theoretical mono-directionality of the ‘images of war’ approach to conflict studies 
still dominant within the field of IR (Waltz, 1959).  As this chapter will argue below, 
this mono-directionality, so prevalent in the current literature on the subject, is one 
of the main reasons that, with the exception of ReSIT, no convincing theoretical 
arguments have been made that could explain the empirical association between 
conflict and regime structure.  As will be shown below, neither the liberal DPT, nor 
realist theories have successfully theorised the association between regime type 
and conflict engagement. Finally, it will also be argued that both DPT and realist 
theories have been too preoccupied with normative arguments about whether 
democracies are, or are not more peaceful than autocracies, which greatly limits 
the score of their analysis.  
In response, the final section of this chapter will further argue that there is much 
more to the democracy-peace nexus than exploring the question of democratic 
pacifism. Because it is less normative than other IR theories, ReSIT offers further 
scope for future studies and thus shows promise as an alternative to liberalism and 
realism. Nevertheless, while the ReSIT literature is one of the most original 
contributions to the field of IR in the past two decades, it is still largely 
underdeveloped, and suffers from theoretical and methodological limitations that 
can only be addressed by engaging with other fields of political science. As will be 
demonstrated in this chapter, the IR explanations of the democratic peace from the 
second, third, and reversed-second image perspectives rarely draw on literature 
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and insights from Comparative Politics, making the interdisciplinary contribution of 
this thesis heuristically salient. While these shortcomings in the IR literature will be 
contextualised and outlined in this chapter, their detailed assessment in relation to 
ReSIT will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. What is 
important here is to emphasize why ReSIT is a valuable and original approach to the 
study of the democracy-peace nexus.   
This chapter will proceed as follows. First, it will give a very brief introduction to the 
three images of war developed by Kenneth Waltz. By doing this, it will contextualise 
the debate on conflict and regime type that has dominated the empirical study of 
international relations over the past 50 years. Second, it will present and scrutinise 
the main arguments of the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) and Selectorate Theory, 
along with a detailed review of the empirical findings of wider DPT research. With 
the help of related IR critiques of the DPT, the chapter will identify inconsistencies 
and theoretical weaknesses within the liberal paradigm, and argue that the 
explanation of the dyadic peace is not fully convincing, despite the strong empirical 
finding of no wars between democracies. Third, the chapter will scrutinise the 
realist critique of the DPT and argue that to date, the realist literature has not come 
up with a convincing explanation for the puzzles in which democratic peace claims 
to answer. Once the dominant approaches to the democracy–peace nexus are 
outlined, the final section of this chapter will demonstrate that ReSIT presents a 
genuine and convincing alternative to current debates. However, it will also be 
argued that ReSIT suffers from similar limitations to the standard second image 
liberal approach, which will be improved upon by this thesis in Chapter 3. The 
chapter concludes by outlining the implications of this review, and set the 
discussion for Chapter 3, which will outline the original theoretical contributions of 
this thesis: namely, the thesis proposes that territorial dispute involvement reduces 
the likelihood of any type of transition, democratic and autocratic. Furthermore, 
the thesis puts forward an original theoretical argument which demonstrates that 
the impact of territorial disputes on regime stability and democratisation is likely to 
vary depending on the type of autocracy under investigation.    
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Waltz’s ‘three images’ framework for studying the causes of international conflict 
 
Within International Relations literature, the study of war and international conflict 
has been traditionally confined to three levels of analysis as conceptualised by 
Kenneth Waltz (1959). The first image, realism, typically views human nature as the 
primary cause of interstate disputes, and came to prominence shortly after the 
outbreak of the First World War (Carr, 1939; Morgenthau, 1948; Jervis, 1976). 
Unlike the first image, the second image distanced itself from individual-level 
explanations of international conflict, which were seen as tautological, and instead 
considered the domestic organisation of states as the primary source of 
international conflict (Waltz, 1959). Finally, the third image, formulated and 
adopted by Waltz himself, sees conflict as a result of interstate competition in 
conditions of international anarchy. In the absence of explicit central authority at 
the international level, states fight for resources and position in order to secure 
their survival (Waltz, 1959; Mearsheimer, 1983). Over time, the importance of the 
first image decreased, and it now mainly serves as a compliment to the dominant 
second and third image approaches (Goldgeier and Tetlock, 2008).8 The following 
literature review will use these dominant image narratives as a framework for 
reviewing the literature on the dyadic peace. More specifically, the chapter will 
outline the position each approach takes to the study of the conflict-regime nexus, 
and explain why these dominant approaches are limited in their understanding of 
this relationship. Finally, it is proposed at the end of the review that through 
breaking with the three images approach, ReSIT offers key theoretical and scientific 
developments to the study of both international conflict and domestic organisation 
of states.   
The section below will review the two parts of the democratic peace literature – the 
audience costs literature, which claims that democracies are more likely to be 
peaceful in relation to all states within the international system (monadic peace), 
and the normative constraints argument, which claims that democracies tend to be 
                                                          
8
 For examples, see Christensen and Sneider (1990) and Taliaferro (2004).  
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at peace with other democracies (dyadic peace). Additionally, an alternative version 
of the audience costs argument, the Selectorate Theory, will be reviewed and 
appraised. It will be argued that the propositions put forward by DPT and 
associated theories do not provide convincing theoretical argument for why 
democracies do not go to war with each other, instead positing that a new, more 
interdisciplinary approach is needed in order to fully understand the association.   
 
The audience costs literature 
 
The proposition that representative governments are less violent stems from an 
argument proposed by Immanuel Kant in his essay on Perpetual Peace (Kant, 1903 
[1795]). Although, like Hobbes, Kant saw the natural condition of the international 
system as a state of war, he believed that a republican organization of states would 
provide a long-lasting solution to the problem of international violence (Kant, 1903 
[1795]: 117-128).  He claimed that the general population is naturally war averse 
because it is the public, and not the leaders, who bear the financial and physical 
costs of war (Kant, 1903 [1795]: 122-23). On the other hand, as the first image of 
conflict studies would suggest, the state leaders tend to be naturally more violent 
for personal or financial gain (Kant, 1903 [1795]; Paine, 1945 [1776]; de Tocqueville, 
1988 [1835]) Therefore, it follows that representative republics, whose definition is 
congenial with the modern notion of democracy, are inherently peaceful because 
the ruling elites rely on their citizens support for re-election (Rousseau et al., 1996: 
513). Democracies will be less likely to engage in wars because their leaders are 
afraid that unpopular foreign policy decisions might cost them their seat. 
Additionally, the pacifying effect of public opinion on foreign policy behaviour is 
further enhanced in democracies by their respect for rights and freedoms of their 
citizens.  The respect for freedom of speech, opinion or assembly, ‘protect[s] 
citizens from persecution for their opinions’, and decreases the costs of monitoring 
and rating the performance of their leaders (Lake, 1992; Faeron, 1994: 577). Aware 
of the war-averse nature of their voters, democratic leaders tend to avoid 
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international conflict that could escalate to war and adopt strategies that are based 
on diplomacy and peaceful conflict resolution (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 
1993; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003). This notion of democratic 
accountability as the core of modern democratic peace research is widely known as 
the audience costs literature (Fearon, 1994).  
In contrast, it is argued that authoritarian regimes lack all of the above features, 
making them more likely to engage in predatory behaviour that ultimately leads to 
war. It is typically assumed that removing autocratic leaders from office comes at a 
great cost, and therefore guarantees immunity to those in power. The lack of public 
accountability means that all actions are in reference to the benefit of elites, and 
not to please the war-averse public. The inherently aggressive nature of the 
executive guarantees a continuous involvement in international disputes. Since the 
leaders do not bear the physical costs of war, they are more willing to engage in 
them for personal gain.  
The audience costs argument has become particularly popular in the aftermath of 
the Second World War and the portrayal of the conflict as a battle between the 
democratic West and the aggressive fascist Axis. These studies resulted in the 
conviction that democracies are inherently more peaceful than autocracies and that 
Western nations could serve as a model for the world (Babst, 1972; Rummel, 1983; 
Waltz, 1991). The theory was further reinforced and consolidated by the discovery 
of the puzzling phenomenon of enduring peace between democracies, which will 
be discussed later in this chapter (Babst, 1964, 1972; Doyle, 1983a; 1983b, 1986; 
Rummel, 1983). In a nut shell, this argument suggests that the public is opposed to 
their government getting involved in interstate conflict because wars tend to cost 
money and lives. Since elected officials rely on public approval in order to get re-
elected, they will avoid getting involved in international conflict. Despite the 
popularity of these claim in the current literature, DPT has attracted a great deal of 
criticism over the past two decades, with many scholars claiming that the 
theoretical arguments to not live up to critical scrutiny.  
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A critique of the audience costs literature 
 
Although holding a great deal of appeal as an intuitive claim, the audience costs 
argument outlined above is problematic. The main problem with the dominant 
approach to the conflict-regime nexus comes from the fact that the theory did not 
revise its assumptions in line with theoretical progress from other fields of political 
science. For example, the bulk of the claims made by the audience costs literature 
rest on the assumption that only democratic leaders can be held to account for 
their policy choices. Nevertheless, the findings within the field of Comparative 
Politics demonstrate that this is not the case (Svolik, 2009; Weeks, 2012; Croco and 
Weeks, 2016). In response, the section below will demonstrate that while 
autocratic rulers might not always be liable to the general public, they often 
respond to regime elites on whose support they rely to stay in power (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 2003).  
First, the proposition that heads of autocratic states are not culpable for 
unfavourable policy choices stems from a faulty assumption that all autocracies 
operate in a similar manner purely by virtue of being non-democratic. Drawing on 
the history of violence by Adolf Hitler, Idi Amin or Kim Jong-Il, most researchers 
make a faulty inference that all autocratic rulers have a blank cheque to initiate 
foreign and domestic violence and face no consequences for their actions (Weeks, 
2012: 326). However, with the exclusion of rulers in highly centralised, personalist 
regimes, and some non-dynastic monarchies, a great number of autocratic leaders 
depend for their survival in office on the regime elites, making them extremely 
cautious in foreign policy dealings (Geddes, 2003: 50; Weeks, 2008: 45; Croco and 
Weeks, 2016). This is demonstrated by the fact that a vast majority of autocratic 
rulers are overthrown in coup d’états staged by their immediate support group, 
rather than civil uprisings or revolutions (Svolik, 2009: 478). The relative strength of 
the elites comes from their control over certain features of state apparatus or 
bureaucracy. For example, in some regimes, elites assume control over various 
security organs, making it exceedingly difficult for the leaders to punish them for 
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dissent, and providing them with means of staging a potential coup (Weeks, 2008: 
41; Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a). Additionally, many of the Middle Eastern dynastic 
elites like in Bahrain, Kuwait or Qatar distribute key family members among a range 
of crucial economic and military posts, making them extremely resilient to any 
internal power shifts, including the change of the monarch (Herb, 1999: 8-10). 
Finally, in some regimes, elites have relative autonomy from the leaders. As a result 
of these various designs, many elite groups in autocratic regimes are strong and 
largely independent from the leader (Herb, 1999; Weeks, 2008, 2012; Frantz and 
Ezrow, 2011a). This means that they often have the power and the political will to 
remove unfavourable candidates from office or to question foreign policy decisions 
that threaten their interests. 
Second, the assertion that the public is naturally war-averse finds little support 
outside of the DPT literature. Although it is assumed that democratic voters are 
naturally more peaceful, it has often been shown that foreign conflict significantly 
raises the chance of widespread nationalism, leading to the so-called ‘rally around 
the flag’ phenomenon (Mueller, 1973; Levy, 1988; Morgan and Cambell, 1991).  
This has been shown both in the case of historical disputes (Levy, 1988: 664), as 
well as more recent conflicts (Schubert et al., 2002). According to Diversionary War 
Theory, the surge in nationalism in response to foreign conflict results in 
widespread support for the leaders in power, contradicting the assumption that 
democratic politicians are likely to face disapproval when opting for war 
involvement (Mueller, 1973). The sense of common interest and the shared 
commitment to the states’ well-being are some of the factors thought to be 
responsible for the phenomenon (Levy, 1988: 665). It is often speculated that the 
lower the poll ratings and the closer the date of the presidential re-election, the 
more likely U.S. presidents are to become involved in a foreign military conflict to 
boost performance ratings (Stoll, 1984; Ostrom and Job, 1986; Mintz and Geva, 
1993: 487-488). In fact, it became anecdotal that in the United States to suggest 
that the only way to secure a re-election at home is to start a war abroad. These 
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observations hardly correspond to the proposition of a peaceful public offered by 
the democratic peace research. 
In summary, the section above demonstrated that the two main assumptions of the 
audience costs literature – the uniqueness of democratic accountability and the 
public aversion to war - do not find consistent support in reality and thus cannot be 
assumed as given. The first assumption is unconvincing because most dictators are 
responsible to regime elites who have the means to oust them from power. Since 
getting involved in war might be costly for authoritarians, they should avoid 
international conflict in the same way democratic leaders do. The second 
assumption of the audience costs literature also lacks merit because the public can, 
and often does, support international conflict.  Furthermore, the above analysis of 
the existing literature on autocratic and democratic accountability demonstrates 
that DPT should become more interdisciplinary, and accommodate more research 
from other fields of political science. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 3, ReSIT 
literature has inherited some of these flaws due to its direct engagement with DPT.  
 
 
A new version of the audience costs argument: the Selectorate Theory 
 
As a result of shortcomings of the audience costs research, Bueno de Mesquita and 
colleagues (1999, 2003) developed a new theory whose aim was to capture the 
complexities of autocratic governance. It was built on the empirical finding that 
democracies tend to only get involved in wars if they have a chance to succeed and, 
as a result, usually win them (see for example Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 
1995; Bennett and Stam, 1998; Gelpi and Griesdorf, 2001). It addresses the criticism 
levelled against the audience costs argument that authoritarian leaders are to some 
extent accountable for their actions. According to the theory, autocratic leaders are 
accountable to a small portion of the population who put them in power – the 
autocratic elite, or ‘selectorate’. However, unlike the electorate in democratic 
regimes, which is large, the autocratic ‘selectorate’ is relatively narrow. The primary 
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idea behind the theory is that all leaders need resources to stay in power. They use 
these resources to ‘buy’ support from their winning coalition in instances when the 
public (in democracies) or the elites (in autocracies) are dissatisfied with their 
policies. Therefore, to win support, democratic leaders must implement successful 
and popular public policies that redistribute the nation’s wealth to the general 
population. The support of the selectorate, on the other hand, can be bought by a 
small network of private goods provisions, such as one-off payments and private 
rents.  
When democracies and autocracies engage in war and are defeated, democratic 
leaders are more likely to lose office than autocratic leaders, because as a result of 
a loss, they will have much fewer resources available to redistribute in the form of 
public goods to their wide base of supporters. On the other hand, autocrats are less 
affected by war loses, because very few resources are needed to buy-off the 
‘military cronies’ (de Mesquita et al., 1999; 2003; de Mesquita and Smith, 2012). As 
a result, when getting involved in a war, one is likely to lose more in democracies 
than in autocracies, thus making war a more costly risk for democratic leaders 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). 
Although the theory provides a more theoretically sound account of the reason why 
some democracies might not be willing to get involved in potentially risky 
international conflict, while at the same time avoiding normative theoretical claims, 
it has faced both theoretical and empirical criticism. In terms of empirical 
challenges, much of the recent quantitative literature demonstrates that losing or 
winning a war explains the length of tenure for autocratic leaders, but not 
democratic leaders (Chiozza and Goemans, 2004). Furthermore, some more recent 
empirical studies have suggested that regime type has very little explanatory power 
when it comes to the outcome of international conflict, calling into question the 
suggestion that democracies are more likely to win wars (Desch, 2008).  
From a theoretical point of view, although Selectorate Theory should be credited 
with the effort to engage with Comparative Politics literature on authoritarian 
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regimes, its assumptions are often simplistic and unsupported by empirical 
evidence. For example, the proposition that autocratic leaders are safe from being 
overthrown because they can simply ‘buy-off’ their supporters with private goods 
can be easily brought into question. First, although Selectorate Theory claims that 
elites can be easily swayed by private goods, as discussed above, the control of the 
state apparatus by the elites can often put a check on the despot’s private 
expenditures, thus making it difficult to ‘buy off’ the establishment (Weeks, 2008: 
41, Croco and Weeks, 2016). Second, autocratic rulers are far more likely than 
democratic leaders to be severely punished as a result of unfavourable policy 
outcomes (Goemans, 2000; Rosato, 2003; Escribá-Folch, 2013; Frantz et al., 2014). 
According to Escribá-Folch (2013: 160), almost half of all dictators between 1946 
and 2004 have faced death, imprisonment or exile as a direct result of being 
removed from office. Since losing war is an extremely unpopular policy outcome, it 
is worth considering the diverging effects of failing in conflict across various 
regimes. Given that the severity of punishment is much higher in authoritarian 
regimes, their leaders have far more incentives than their democratic counterparts 
to avoid potential conflict (Rosato, 2003; Escribá-Folch, 2013). Furthermore, if 
buying off regime elites with private goods were an easy fix for unpopular foreign 
policies, dictators would rarely be removed from power, and certainly would not 
face death as a result of it. Hence, the Selectorate Theory, although offering a 
valuable contribution to the field, fails to sufficiently account for the way 
autocracies operate at the domestic level, demonstrating the need to further 
interdisciplinary research between the fields of IR and Comparative Politics. This 
critique of Selectorate Theory is also important because it plays a considerable role 
in Gibler’s (2010) ReSIT explanation of the democracy-peace nexus discussed in 
Chapter 3. Having appraised the audience costs and Selectorate theory, the section 
below will critically review the normative constraints arguments of the DPT.  
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The normative constraints literature 
 
In order to strengthen the structural constraints logic that underpins DPT, or 
perhaps to rescue it from the overwhelming empirical evidence against it, a second 
form of argument was developed by researchers within the last two decades. The 
normative constraints argument claims that the interaction between democracies is 
governed by values of mutual respect and accommodation, resulting in peace that 
exists between democracies, but which does not necessarily extend to autocracies 
(this is sometimes referred to as ‘the separate peace theory’). At its core, the 
normative constraints argument claims there exists a set of socially acceptable rules 
on what is and what is not acceptable within democracies. These rules stem from 
the liberal respect for individual rights and freedoms, and as a result, create an 
overt condemnation of the use of force. For political leaders, this means that 
physical violence or oppression of opposition is never acceptable as means of 
furthering one’s agenda (Dixon, 1994: 16). Since democratic leaders rule by consent 
of the people, it is seen as unjust and illegitimate to abuse their position by 
resorting to violence to solve domestic problems (Russett, 1993). The rules 
governing the interaction between conflicting groups on a domestic level are then 
externalized to the international domain (Doyle, 1986; Maoz and Russett, 1993; 
Russett, 1993; Dixon, 1994). When two democracies clash over a potentially 
dangerous issue, the expectation that the other state will also externalize their 
peaceful means of conflict resolution leads to a greater degree of respect and 
accommodation. Furthermore, since elected governments are seen as ‘just’, they 
are perceived as having a right to remain free from any form of intervention into 
their domestic affairs (Doyle, 1983a: 230). For this reason, any coercive action 
against a democratic rival would be seen by the country’s elites as illegitimate and 
unacceptable. Since these perceptions are mutual, democracies are more willing to 
assume that their democratic opponent is willing to cooperate and solve the 
conflict without resorting to violence.  
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On the other hand, it is argued that authoritarian regimes do not operate using the 
same set of rules. In fact, political elites in authoritarian regimes are free to 
liquidate or imprison their political opposition, or even turn against their own 
citizens (Maoz and Russett, 1993: 625; Oneal and Russett, 2015). The lack of respect 
for human dignity and freedom makes them appear unjust and unworthy of 
accommodation in the eyes of democratic leaders (Doyle, 1983b). Furthermore, 
aware that the rival might take advantage of its ‘naïve’ and ‘dovish’ democratic 
values, democracies are likely to become suspicious and therefore more hostile 
when confronted with authoritarian states, resulting in more, rather than less, 
conflict (Doyle, 1983a, 1983b, 1986, Clifton Morgan, 1993: 198; Owen, 1994; 
Rosato, 2003: 586). Hence, while the normative constraints argument assumes 
peace between pairs of democratic states (dyadic peace), it does not assume that 
democracies are more peaceful towards all types of regimes, including autocracies 
(monadic peace).  
 
A critical appraisal of the normative constraints literature 
 
Although democracies are expected to externalize and then expand their norms of 
peaceful conflict resolution from the domestic to international level, they rarely live 
up to this standard of conduct. Historical analyses demonstrated that when 
confronted over highly salient issues, democracies tend to resort to measures that 
are consistent with a realist, rather than liberal, state behaviour. In his analysis of 
four major near-misses of war between democracies, Layne (1994) demonstrated 
that strategic interests and realpolitik considerations were more important than 
upholding democratic values. In all four cases, at least one democracy was ready to 
go to war on the contested issue (Layne, 1994: 38). A peaceful resolution was 
achieved not through mutual accommodation or through pacific negotiations, but 
because one of the sides decided to back down from the dispute. One of the most 
contested of these clashes was the Franco-German Ruhr crisis of 1923. The military 
intervention of liberal France into an equally democratic Germany has clearly 
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shown that grievances over the Versailles treaty and overdue war reparations were 
more important than mutual accommodation and the spirit of ‘live and let live’ 
(Layne, 1994: 33-38). According to this research, the only reason for the peaceful 
resistance to war on the side of Germany was France’s relative power, since 
Germany was a recently defeated state struggling with the economic costs of war 
reparations. The remaining three examples by Layne provide equally compelling 
cases against the ‘norms and values’ argument of the democratic peace, which in 
turn undermines the theoretical presuppositions of DTP.9 
Moreover, democracies have a long history of applying double standards in the way 
in which they conduct their foreign affairs. The widespread use of covert and overt 
interventions in legitimate democracies (Forsythe, 1992; Lilley and Downes, 2010) is 
highly inconsistent with the mutual ‘trust and respect’ expectation forwarded by 
DPT scholars (Doyle, 1986; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993; Dixon, 1994; 
Owen, 1994). For example, the United States government has a longstanding 
history of forcibly intervening in other state’s affairs, many of them highly 
functioning republics (Forsythe, 1992; Kinsella, 2005). The U.S. has forcibly removed 
elected officials from Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1950s) Chile (1973) 
and Nicaragua (1980s) in an effort to gain substantial strategic and economic 
interests (Forsythe, 1992: 385; Rosato, 2003: 590; Lilley and Downes, 2010: 267). 
Given that all the above states were a form of representative government (yet to 
varying degree), it is clear that realpolitik and anti-communist sentiments play an 
important role and that these concerns can tamper other commitments such as 
freedom or democracy (Forsythe, 1992).  
Thus, these interventions pose a major threat to the consistency of the ‘norms and 
values’ argument, which asserts that democracies, as legitimate regimes, ought to 
be free from foreign intrusion and war (Doyle, 1986: 230). Reiter and Stam (2002: 
160) assert that in order for the normative theory of liberal peace to hold true, 
                                                          
9
 Apart from the Franco-German Ruhr crisis of 1923, Layne (1994) reviews the events following the 
outbreak of the 1
st
 Anglo-American crisis (1861), the 2
nd
 Anglo-American crisis (1895-96) and the 
Fashoda crisis between France and England (1898).  
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democracies should never use any form of coercion, overt or covert, in order to 
replace a democratically elected government. Given that liberal states have used 
covert action against legally elected leaders, the peace between democracies can 
no longer be attributed merely to respect for legitimate domestic structures. 
Although liberal peace proponents have argued that most of these states were not 
ideal type liberal democracies at the time of intervention (Doyle, 1986: 335; 
Forsythe, 1992: 393; Russett, 1993: 121), it is important to note that the 
international community and the U.S. government still recognised them as fully 
functioning representative governments at the time (Lilley and Downes, 2010). 
Furthermore, the fact that U.S. actions have intentionally hindered the 
development of liberal institutions abroad hardly supports the notion that 
democracies will always value liberal norms of behaviour.  
In most cases, the structures installed forcefully by the U.S. have resulted in far 
more oppressive regimes (Forsythe, 1992: 387; Rosato, 2003: 591). In fact, in the 
case of Indonesia in 1957, ‘at least some of the concern by the U.S. stemmed from 
Sukarno’s implementation of proportional democracy, which would grant the 
communist parties a representative share in the decision-making process (Forsythe, 
1992: 388). Here, it is clear that democratic values were seen as secondary to the 
strategic interests dictated by the Cold War reality. It is more likely that the 
privilege of non-intervention and peaceful co-existence is granted to political allies 
rather than democracies more generally.  
It is clear from the analysis above that the normative constraints argument is 
equally unconvincing as the structural proposition of the democratic peace thesis. 
The ‘trust and respect’ argument, resting on the right of non-intervention into free 
and democratic states, is not fully supported by empirical evidence. A range of 
covert actions performed by the paragon of liberal democracy, the United States, 
against other representative states clearly demonstrates that respect is in many 
cases granted according to geopolitical considerations rather than purely on the 
mutual recognition of just regimes.  
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Therefore, a review of audience costs, Selectorate Theory, and the norms and 
values literature has demonstrated that the main theoretical arguments in favour of 
the democracy – peace nexus are unconvincing and largely uncorroborated by 
empirical evidence when compared to other fields of study. While the Selectorate 
Theory successfully engages with the Comparative Politics literature to address the 
theoretical limitations of the audience costs literature, the scope of engagement 
remains very limited. Yet, despite these shortcomings, DPT has remained one of the 
most influential empirical theories of IR to date. As will be shown below, this is due 
to the strong empirical finding that despite the theoretical flaws of DPT, 
democracies do tend to avoid being involved in war and militarised disputes with 
one another.  
Having reviewed the main theoretical assumptions of the second image theories 
within the field of IR, the chapter now turns to critically evaluating the empirical 
evidence for the theory, and the appraisal of this quantitative evidence by the third 
image literature.  
 
 
The review of the quantitative evidence 
 
Democratic Peace Theory is one of the most frequently tested propositions within 
the field of IR.  It has been investigated on several levels of analysis (Gleditsch and 
Hegre, 1997), and the results are exceptionally robust despite the remaining 
theoretical and empirical challenges put forward by rival theories. While some 
limited number of studies found support for the monadic peace proposition, the 
general consensus within the literature is that democracies are significantly less 
likely to engage in militarised interstate disputes on a dyadic level. The summary of 
evidence gathered in support of the theory is given below. 
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The dyadic peace proposition 
 
The peacefulness of democracies has been accepted as axiomatic long before 
sophisticated statistical measures were available to test the theoretical 
assumptions of the DPT (Small and Singer, 1976: 50). The quantitative study 
exploring the war-proneness of democratic states conducted by Babst (1964: 55; 
1972), utilizing Wright’s (1965) data on conflicts, was the first one to confirm that 
‘no wars have been fought between independent nations with elective 
governments between 1789 and 1941.’ His work has sparked a range of research 
testing both monadic and dyadic versions of the Kantian argument. Most have 
found that democracies are neither more, nor less, war-prone than other regimes 
(Wright, 1965; Russett and Monsen, 1975; Small and Singer 1976; Chan 1984; 
Weede 1984; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Clifton Morgan 1991; Russett, 1993; Dixon, 
1994; Chan, 1997; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999, 2003). Although Rummel (1983) 
found statistically significant evidence that monadic peace indeed exists and 
democracies were less likely to engage in war than other regimes, it was heavily 
criticised at the time for excessively narrow temporal domain (1976-1980), as well 
as idiosyncratic definitions and operationalization of key variables with the 
inclusion of libertarianism as a key feature of democratic systems (Chan, 1984; 
Weede, 1984; Benoit, 1996). Further studies by Weede (1984) and Chan (1984) 
have disproved his claims and discouraged further studies from pursuing evidence 
for the monadic peace proposition (Benoit, 1996). Since then far more attention 
was given to uncovering the nature of the dyadic, rather than monadic peace.  
Some studies found that 'pairs of democracies are much less likely than other pairs 
of states to fight or to threaten each other in militarized disputes less violent than 
war' (Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Weede, 1994; Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Russett 
and Oneal, 2001: 46), while others asserted that disputes between democracies run 
a lower risk of escalating into violent conflicts (Bennet and Stam, 2004). Therefore, 
a consensus on the dyadic nature of the democratic peace has emerged: 
democracies virtually never fight one another (Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Clifton 
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Morgan and Campbell 1991; Maoz and Russett 1992, 1993; Clifton Morgan and 
Schwebach 1992; Weede 1992; Dixon, 1994).  
Given the inconsistencies within the audience costs literature, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the monadic peace proposition has found weak empirical support. 
Although accountability to a peaceful electorate as well as the will to stay in office 
should reduce the military ambitions of political leaders, quantitative IR literature 
largely rejects the propositions of monadic peace: while democracies are highly 
unlikely to fight one another, they are just as likely to engage in war with 
authoritarian regimes as authoritarian regimes are to engage in war with each 
other. Since the main purpose of a theory is to explain occurrences in the real 
world, the lack of such occurrences renders the theory unconvincing (Minzberg, 
1979; Shah and Corley, 2006). Thus, all of the features outlined in the previous 
sections imply that democracies should be less aggressive than autocracies in their 
relations with other regimes, suggesting the existence of monadic, rather than 
dyadic peace.  
 
Reactions to the lack of support for monadic peace theory 
 
To counter the empirical claims of these and similar studies, some theorists have 
suggested that democracies might be more likely to fall victim to predatory attacks 
by authoritarian regimes. According to Weede (1984: 652-53), democracies, by 
favouring policies of appeasement, might project an image of weakness and 
indecision, inviting potential exploitation and attacks. The diffused executive power 
and the need to convince the public that war is necessary make democracies slower 
in their response to an attack. It follows that representative regimes, despite being 
generally pacifistic, are more likely to fall victims to offensive attacks from non-
democratic regimes, a process which explains their more frequent involvement in 
international conflict, while preserving the possibility of monadic peace. Although 
the claim that authoritarian regimes are more likely than democracies to initiate 
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) finds some empirical support (Reiter and 
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Stam, 2003), it has also been shown that democracies are more likely to initiate 
disputes against autocracies than autocracies are to initiate disputes among each 
other (Quackenbush and Rudy, 2009). These results suggest that states are more 
likely to begin conflict with a nation they have less in common with, rather than 
authoritarian regimes behaving in a predatory manner. This finding is further 
supported by the dictatorial peace literature, which suggests that personalist 
dictatorships are less likely than other forms of autocracy to go to war with one 
another (Peceny et al., 2002). Alternative studies have even suggested that a 
monadic version of authoritarian peace might hold some research potential, but 
was quickly discredited (Ishiyama et al., 2008).  Furthermore, Small and Singer 
(1976: 66) have found that out of 19 wars between 1815 and 1965, 53% of them 
were initiated by democracies. Similarly, Gleditsch and Hegre (1997), examining the 
1816-1994 period, show that democracies start 73% of all wars they take part in. It 
is therefore highly unlikely that democracies fall ‘victims’ to predatory behaviour of 
authoritarian rulers. 
The current state of the literature in support of DPT is in agreement that while 
democracies are much less likely to get involved in militarised disputes or wars with 
one another, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that they are more 
peaceful in general. To a large extent, the empirical finding that democracies tend 
not to fight one another is the main reason why the DPT literature has remained 
the dominant explanation of the dyadic peace despite the fact that its theoretical 
arguments are so unconvincing. Due to this discrepancy between theoretical 
inconsistencies and strong empirical findings, third image theories called the above 
findings into question, generating a separate body of quantitative and empirical 
research devoted specifically to discrediting DPT findings. However, as will be 
demonstrated in the section below, the realist statistical critiques of DPT are 
equally unconvincing. Hence, as will be explained later in the chapter, ReSIT fills an 
important gap in the IR literature. This is because it provides a theoretically 
plausible explanation of the dyadic peace. ReSIT not only accepts the empirical 
findings of DPT, but it also accepts the role of regime type as an explanatory factor.  
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The realist critique of quantitative evidence in favour of the DPT research project 
 
Given that the third image approach does not distinguish between states based on 
their domestic organisation but views them purely in terms of their strategic 
position, it is perhaps unsurprising that the main form of engagement of neorealist 
theory with the democracy-peace nexus literature is the attempt to discredit it on 
statistical grounds. Nevertheless, despite minimal theoretical contributions to the 
understanding of how regime type might impact international behaviour, it is 
important to understand the arguments put forward by its proponents. The fact 
that neither of the dominant theories could provide a strong explanation for the 
dyadic peace creates a theoretical void in the literature, which ReSIT has 
successfully filled, and which this thesis refines further. Yet, in order to 
demonstrate that the realist approach to the existence of the dyadic peace is 
equally problematic as the liberal approach, its main assumptions must be critically 
analysed. In order to demonstrate the problems inherent in the realist critique of 
DPT, the section below will outline its main propositions. Namely, it will address the 
argument that absence of wars between democracies is nothing more than a 
combination of the Cold War and statistical artefacts (Mearshimer, 1990; Spiro, 
1994; Faber and Gowa, 1997; Gartzke, 1998; Gowa, 1999, 2011). However, this 
critique cannot explain why, despite the fall of the Soviet Union, the dyadic peace 
persisted in the age of unipolarity (Park, 2013).  
 
The statistical artefact argument 
 
The realist critics of the separate peace thesis claim that the lack of violent conflict 
between democracies should not be interpreted as significant, because the 
distance between the very few existing democracies prior to 1945 meant that 
states had no plausible physical threats / reasons / means to engage in war with 
one another. Although this critique has raised some serious concerns about the 
significance of results of many major quantitative studies dealing with the pre-1945 
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temporal domains, it does not account for the continuous lack of conflict between 
democracies in the age when more and more free nations share their borders, 
which under realist logic would provide new rationales for a potential dispute.  
The first objection to the theory forwarded by sceptics is an argument that the lack 
of conflict between democracies is not surprising given that war is a relatively rare 
occurrence (Mearshimer, 1991; Spiro, 1994). As explained by Weede (1992: 377), 
the chances of war between two randomly chosen nations within a ten-year period 
are close to zero. As a result, it is hard to conceive that particular feature, like 
regime type, could reduce that likelihood even further. The reason for such a low 
probability of conflict between two randomly selected nations is the fact that very 
few of them have common borders. Given that having a shared neighbourhood 
accounts for at least two thirds of all interstate disputes between 1816 and 1976 
(Grochman, 1990: 8), it is not surprising that democracies, rarely in close proximity 
before 1945, do not fight one another. According to critics, the liberal peace should 
not be treated as statistically significant for the above reasons, despite the evidence 
(Mearshimer, 1990: 50-51; Spiro, 1994; Walt, 1999).  
Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, contiguity as a control variable in model 
testing the DPT has been accounted for by many quantitative studies of the field, 
which had nevertheless yielded negative relationship between democracy and war 
involvement on a dyadic-level (Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Bremer, 1992; Weede, 
1994; Maoz and Russett, 1993). Furthermore, although the chances of two 
democratic states at war are low to begin with, it is the cumulative probability that 
really matters. In other words, although a low chance of conflict in a given year is 
not surprising, the zero observation is highly significant if it occurs every year over 
extended periods of time (Russett, 1995: 171; Chan, 1997: 72). Finally, the criticism 
does not apply to the post-Cold War period.  The fall of the Berlin Wall caused a 
sudden spike of democratization across the world, resulting in a growing number of 
representative regimes sharing borders (Marshall and Cole, 2011: 12). If the small, 
politically irrelevant sample critique were correct, the increasing incidence of 
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democratisation should have discredited, not strengthened, the democratic peace 
proposition.  
 
The Cold War artefact argument 
 
Although many separate peace scholars agree that the small number of 
democracies prior to the Second World War might have provided questionable 
support for the dyadic peace (Small and Singer, 1976; Chan, 1997), it is undeniable 
that that the ‘zero wars’ proposition became more compelling with the rise of 
incidence and proximity of liberal democracies in Europe and the world after 1945. 
New data available to scholars have revealed that democracies, despite their 
growing number and increasing contiguity, are yet to engage in war with one 
another.  
Notwithstanding, the realists criticise the theory for its failure to account for the 
effects of bipolarity on state behaviour (Farber and Gowa, 1995, 1997). According 
to sceptics, the lack of war between democracies in the First World can be easily 
accounted for by the perceived common threat of communism from the East 
(Waltz, 1991; Gartzke, 1998; Gowa, 1999, 2011; Schwartz and Skinner, 2002).  In 
face of danger, the ideologically similar free nations entered alliances against what 
was the foreign and unknown threat of communism. While a number of democratic 
peace advocates have included alliance as a confounding variable in their analysis, 
still reporting significant effects of regime type on dyadic peace (Maoz and Russett, 
1993; Gelpi and Griesdorf, 2001; Ray, 2003; Oneal and Russett, 2005), their efforts 
have been heavily criticised by realist scholars. According to Schwartz and Skinner 
(2002: 166), most truces are no more than ‘pieces of paper containing joint 
declarations of nonenmity’, and should not be viewed as genuine alliances. Polish 
non-aggression pacts with both Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia prior to the Second 
World War are a case in point, demonstrating the meaninglessness of most 
international non-aggression treaties. According to realists, there should be a clear 
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distinction between controlling for non-enmity alliances and controlling for NATO 
membership, for the latter was ‘an armed, integrated, semi-mobilized organization 
under U.S. political leadership and military command’ (Schwartz and Skinner, 2002). 
Thus, according to realists, most studies on the democratic peace fail to include 
NATO membership as a potential explanatory variable and are therefore unable to 
recognize that it is common interests and goals, not regime type, that account for 
the separate peace phenomenon (Waltz, 1991; Faber and Gowa, 1995, 1997; 
Gartzke, 1998; Schwartz and Skinner, 2002).  
Despite the above claims, the ‘common interests’ argument forwarded by realist 
scholars fails to account for a number of puzzles. First, the communist states have 
faced a threat of similar magnitude from the Free World, yet there were many 
instances of armed conflicts between them (Ray, 2001). If strategic interests and 
ideological similarities account for a lack of conflict, then communist nations should 
have been equally peaceful towards each other. However, both Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia were invaded by the USSR during the Cold War, which 
demonstrates that a shared ideology is not a guarantee of peace. Furthermore, had 
the realist claims been correct, the democratic peace should have ceased to 
continue past the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Although Gowa (2011: 169) 
argues that the ‘dispute and war rates by dyad type converge after the collapse of 
the bipolar system’, her research was criticised for numerous omissions. For 
example, she did not include a direct measure of common interests between dyads, 
and did not distinguish between established and young democracies; this is 
important, given that the latter tend to be more conflict-prone (Park, 2013: 180). A 
recent study including the above measures and controlling for the lagged effect of 
democracy on conflict has shown that separate peace persists despite the collapse 
of the Soviet Union (Park, 2013). With more recent data available for the post-Cold 
War period, it is yet to be established whether democratic dyads continue to be 
significant predictors of conflict proneness, although most robust studies of the 
phenomenon post-1989 to date suggest that they do (Dafoe, Oneal and Russett, 
2013; Park, 2013). Furthermore, even if the effects of alliance will in fact explain the 
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scarcity of conflict between democracies in the unipolar system, it is yet to be 
explained why republics are more likely to ally together, and why those alliances 
tend to last longer (Siverson and Emmons, 1991; Gaubatz, 1996; Simon and 
Gartzke, 1996; Bennett, 1997). 
As demonstrated above, the realist critique of the DPT findings remains 
underwhelming and unconvincing. Yet, despite the large body of quantitative work 
indicating a link between democracy and peace, both realist and liberal approaches 
do not offer a convincing account for this empirical anomaly. The structural 
constraints argument makes hasty and incorrect assumptions about the differences 
in the level of accountability in democratic and autocratic states. Equally, the 
normative constraints argument is regularly contradicted by empirical evidence, 
and cannot explain the many instances of both overt and covert actions between 
democracies, which counters the assumption of mutual trust and respect. 
Moreover, the realist explanations of the statistical anomaly of the democratic 
peace, as demonstrated above, have proven to be equally unconvincing. This is 
largely because the peace between democratic states has persisted despite the 
growing number and proximity between democratic states following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. With the two most influential perspectives on the origins of 
conflict incapable to fully account for the dyadic peace, the field on International 
Relations is in need of an alternative account. The final section of this literature 
review will demonstrate that Reversed Second Image Theory (ReSIT), which 
reverses the causal arrow between conflict and regime type, offers a genuine 
alternative to the DPT project, which can overcome many of the theoretical hurdles 
faced by liberalism and realism - the two most dominant empirical IR theories.  
 
Reversed Second Image Theory 
 
As a result of failures of the two dominant approaches to the study of IR, the 
Reversed Second Image Theory (ReSIT) has in recent years gained a substantial 
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following, drawing increased attention from realist and liberal scholars (Ungerer, 
2013; Hegre, 2014). As mentioned in Chapter 1, ReSIT challenges the assumption 
that the causal arrow should go from democracy to peace, and suggests instead 
that it is equally likely that peace provides conditions for democratic regimes to 
develop. In other words, it is conflict behaviour that explains regime type, rather 
than the other way around (Hintze, 1994; Gourevitch, 1978; Thompson, 1996; 
Gibler, 2010). The originality of the theory lies not only in reversing the direction of 
causality, but also in moving beyond the traditional, and unavoidably mono-
directional levels of analysis, provided by Waltz’s approach to conflict studies 
(Waltz, 1959).  
As mentioned above, the notion that the causal arrow between peace and 
democracy should be reversed in not new. Over the past two decades, a number of 
scholars have suggested that external factors might have a substantial impact on 
the degree of power centralisation within certain types of states. Some of the 
earliest and most influential attempts have focused on the causes of 
authoritarianism. In his seminal work on hydraulic civilizations, Karl Wittfogel 
(1957) proposed that severe resource scarcity might have contributed to the 
development of some of the first autocratic states. The need to manage irrigation 
waters in areas characterised by extreme aridity has resulted in highly centralized 
forms of resource redistribution, ultimately leading to the responsibility for such 
redistribution being concentrated in the hands of the most powerful elites. 
Subsequently, the inability of the population to influence resource distribution 
networks allowed the ruling classes to impose oppressive governing structures and 
exclude their citizens from the decision-making process.  
Building on Wittfogel’s (1957) work, Midlarsky (1995) has drawn attention to a 
number of additional environmental factors which might aid power centralisation 
by investigating the link between the number of sea borders and the likelihood of 
democratic development in Sumer, Mesoamerica, Crete and China. The most 
crucial part of the study was the finding that a high proportion of sea borders 
minimises the threat of war from rival settlements. In earlier analyses, some 
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peninsular and island states such as Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Greece, Ireland or Malaysia 
had exhibited levels of democracy too large to be predicted by domestic variables, 
such as economic development, trade, land scarcity levels or lack of domestic 
violence. Coincidentally, the high proportion of sea borders was also correlated 
with low international conflict participation and a relatively low size of the army 
(Midlarsky, 1995: 237). The conclusion offered stated that that low levels of military 
threat in states insulated by large bodies of water somehow contribute to their 
democratic development. This point is supported by Thompson (1996), who later 
suggested that zones of peace, likely to be enforced by extensive sea borders, often 
preceded democratic progress in early European states. This research suggests that 
these cooperative niches were insulated from aggressive regional geopolitics and 
therefore were less likely to be threatened by war (Thompson, 1996: 142). An 
example of this dynamic is offered by Gourevitch (1978), who juxtaposed two 
contrasting geopolitical environments faced by England and the historical state of 
Prussia: 
‘As the English Channel sharply lessened the chances of invasion, England was 
spared the necessity of constituting a standing army and mobilizing national 
resources to sustain it. […] England's international security environment thus 
facilitated the development of a liberal, constitutional political order 
(Gourevitch, 1978: 896).’  
Conversely, Prussia, effectively a garrison state, was shaped by an entirely different 
security environment: 
‘It was surrounded by a flat plain, here and there carved by easily fordable 
rivers. There was nothing natural about its borders, indeed nothing natural 
about the very existence of the country. It emerged in response to war, which 
also shaped its internal organization. […] The continual importance of military 
concerns gave the army and the Crown far greater influence than would have 
been the case had security-power issues mattered less (Gourevitch, 1978: 896).’ 
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In the wake of criticism directed at the democratic peace theory in the 1990s, some 
scholars have attempted to test ReSIT premises empirically. In their extensive study 
of democracy, democratisation and war, Crescenzi and Enterline (1999) have found 
that while all these processes are to some extent endogenous, the relationship is 
not as strong as expected, and highly dependent of the spatial and temporal 
domains in which they are analysed. Furthermore, an empirical study by Mousseau 
and Shi (1999) has found that states are just as likely to become autocratic as they 
are to become democratic in the period leading up to interstate war, suggesting 
that the reverse causality studies should be abandoned in favour of the DPT.  
Due to the mixed findings of quantitative research projects keen to support the 
reversed causality hypothesis, the theory had not gained much traction within the 
field of IR, that is until the theoretical developments offered by Gibler and 
colleagues (Gibler, 2007, 2010; Gibler and Tir, 2010, 2013). While the original 
proposition of ReSIT states that international conflict, especially war, causes states 
to become more centralised and autocratic, Gibler (2010) proposed that certain 
types of conflict are more likely to result in cartelisation than others. More 
specifically, he claimed that territorial disputes are more likely to lead to power 
centralisation than disputes over trade, diplomatic, or any other type of issue 
(Gibler, 2010)  
According to Gibler (2007) territorial conflict results in extreme security 
emergencies that reduce the level of political polarization on both the public and 
government levels. On the public level, the ‘rally around the flag’ effect heightens 
the feelings of nationalism, leading to a spike in support for the ruling party or elite. 
On the government level, the presence of a salient threat provides strong 
incentives to back the incumbent leader, since surviving the emergency is 
temporarily more desirable than solving domestic rivalries (Gibler, 2010: 520-524). 
Given that the debilitated bargaining position of the opponents results in weaker 
checks on the executive power, opportunistic political leaders are likely to take 
advantage of their newly acquired autonomy and increase their influence (Gibler, 
2010: 526; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). While most of the above changes are 
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ordinarily reversed once the conflict is over (Trumbore and Boyer, 2000), 
continuous war-making might lead to consolidation of authoritarian models of 
governance (Gibler, 2010; Thompson, 1996; Gourevitch, 1978). Correspondingly, 
the resolution of disputes and a stable security environment means that a unified 
national and political front are no longer needed. In the long-term, in the face of 
absence of salient threats, the opposition might proceed to question the raison 
d'être of centralized political power and attempt to increase their bargaining 
position. If the opposition is successful, and given that other necessary conditions 
are satisfied, these changes might lead to a process of democratization. Although 
the absence of exogenous threat cannot be seen as a guarantee of democratic 
transitions, it might be a prerequisite for its occurrence (Thompson, 1996: 144).  
Despite its increasing popularity within the IR community, the ReSIT framework 
outlined above is subject to the charge of endogeneity. For example, territorial 
conflicts and non-democratic regime occurrence could be correlated only because 
democracies are more likely to settle territorial disputes with their neighbours in 
the first place. Nevertheless, some of the most recent empirical ReSIT research has 
tested the proposition, finding little evidence for such claims. For example, Gibler 
and Owsiak (forthcoming) examine all contiguous dyad-years between 1919 and 
2001, and find no empirical evidence suggesting that democratic regimes are more 
likely than other types of regimes to settle their borders. Democratic regimes are 
also no more likely than any other type of regime to keep their borders settled, or 
be ‘more peaceful during settled-border years’ (Gibler and Owsiak, forthcoming: 1). 
In addition, throughout the 1919 to 2001 period, democratisation of both countries 
in a dyad very rarely preceded the first border settlement or peaceful border 
transfer between them (ibid.). Other studies examining the endogeneity of the 
reversed second image proposition have found similarly little evidence that 
democracies are more likely to settle their borders peacefully (see for example 
Owsiak et al., 2017; Owsiak and Vasquez, forthcoming). As a result, the correlation 
between territorial disputes and domestic power centralisation is unlikely to be 
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caused by the fact that some types of regimes are more skilled at managing and 
preventing territorial conflicts with their neighbours than other regimes.   
Gibler’s new theoretical framework for the relationship between democracy and 
peace has found empirical support in large-N quantitative studies (Gibler, 2007, 
2010; Gibler and Braithwaite, 2012; Gibler and Tir, 2013). This recent reformulation 
of ReSIT has also gained some significant traction in the most recent appraisal of 
the democratic peace research project (see for example Ungerer, 2012, Hegre, 
2014, and Park and Colaresi, 2014). This is not surprising, given the important 
theoretical contributions of this proposition.  
Apart from breaking with the mono-directional nature of most IR approaches, the 
theory offers a more eclectic approach to the study of the regime-conflict nexus. 
For the first time within the DPT debate, a theory escapes the paradigm wars, 
which are dogmatically persistent within the field of IR (Levy, 1998: 145). Much of 
the current debate on the causes of democratic peace tries to fit either within the 
liberal or the realist framework, and explanations that do not fit their theoretical 
core are often discounted or ignored by the research community. Moreover, ReSIT 
escapes the charge of Eurocentrism that is inherent in many traditional approaches 
to the study of IR. Liberalism, the dominant explanation of the absence of conflict 
between democracies, is explicitly Western-centric (Hobson, 2012). It attributes 
normative qualities to democracies by assuming that all autocratic regimes are 
unable to solve international disputes peacefully. In other words, they are yet able 
to develop necessary norms and values inherent in Western democracies (Maoz 
and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993; Dixon, 1994).  
Furthermore, liberal approaches to International Relations assume state 
perfectibility and see democratic transition as a linear learning process. This belief 
is equally Eurocentric as it portrays Western liberal democracies as more advanced 
and developed than other regimes. ReSIT, on the other hand, seeks to explain 
democratic transitions as a side effect of states’ peaceful relations with their 
immediate environment. Issues such as territorial conflict arise not because states 
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are naturally violent due to their regime type, but because the border between 
them might be relatively new, and likely to significantly raise interstate tensions 
(Gibler, 2007). Finally, Reversed Second Image theory perceives the development of 
democratic values and its institutional processes as a side effect of the absence of 
external pressures. All states are equally likely to develop into democracies given 
sufficient external conditions and a stable geopolitical environment. More 
importantly, countering the linear vision of progress within the field of IR, it is 
implicit within ReSIT that democracies are by no means immune from the 
centralising effects of territorial disputes. For the above reasons, as well as its 
ability to address existing shortcomings in liberal and realist models, this thesis will 
adopt ReSIT as its main theoretical framework.  
Nevertheless, while ReSIT provides a compelling explanation of the dyadic peace 
that breaks with established theories, it originated within the field of IR, and as such 
reproduces many of the IR literature’s shortcomings. These issues are particularly 
pertinent to reSIT, because by reversing the causal arrow between democracy and 
peace, it directly engages in the study of regime change and democratisation. 
Hence, it is crucial that ReSIT draws on advances in the field of Comparative Politics, 
which has generated a wealth of methodological and theoretical material on the 
study of regime centralisation and democratic transitions. These current 
shortcomings of ReSIT, as outlined in the Introduction and that will be addressed in 
Chapters 3 and 4, include equating regime change with democratisation, focusing 
on autocratic spells rather than autocratic regimes, and the use of continuous 
measures of democratisation. In response, the main aim of this thesis is to present 
a more interdisciplinary theory of ReSIT that draws heavily on some of the most 
recent developments in the field of comparative authoritarianism, and to test its 
assumptions using robust mechanisms found in Comparative Politics, rather than 
using existing IR methodologies alone. This augmentation is important, particularly 
if ReSIT is to become a stand-alone explanation of regime stability and 
democratisation, rather than simply yet another usual response to the theoretical 
failings of the DPT.  
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Conclusion 
 
The review above has demonstrated how the Reversed Second Image theory, used 
as a primary theoretical framework for this thesis, situates itself within the wider 
research on the relationship between regime type and conflict. The theoretical 
appeal of ReSIT emerges as a response to the continuing relevance of the empirical 
association between democracy and peace, despite many attempts by realist 
scholars to discredit these findings. Despite many empirical challenges, the 
observation that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other than other 
types of regimes remains one of the most important empirical findings in the IR 
discipline. Nevertheless, while the realist critique of the findings does not hold up 
to scrutiny, neither do the explanations put forward by Democratic Peace 
researchers. The audience costs literature suffers from serious theoretical 
underdevelopments and lacks interdisciplinary focus, while the normative 
constraints literature rests on overly normative assumptions about the nature of 
democracies, which do not find confirmation in the way they tend to behave in the 
international arena. Finally, even more interdisciplinary approaches, such as the 
Selectorate Theory, suffer from major theoretical weaknesses through a lack of 
interdisciplinary engagement with the Comparative Politics literature.  
In the context of these above issues within the field of IR, ReSIT offers a genuinely 
new approach to studying the relationship between peace and democracy. By 
reversing the causal arrow between regime type and conflict engagement, the 
ReSIT literature offers a convincing explanation for why democracies tend to be less 
involved in violent conflict with one another. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that 
ReSIT approaches to the regime-conflict nexus are still relatively underdeveloped. 
Similarly, not unlike the liberal approaches, they are also lacking an interdisciplinary 
focus. This is a charge that is especially pertinent to ReSIT because its main 
theoretical assumptions encroach upon the field of regime change studies in 
Comparative Politics.  
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Given the wealth of literature currently available in Comparative Politics on 
theoretical and methodological approaches to democratisation and authoritarian 
stability, it is surprising that to date the study of ReSIT has failed to take into 
account a more dynamic approach to regime change study. The following thesis will 
aim to fill this gap in the literature by developing a more interdisciplinary approach 
to the Reversed Second Image Theory. More specifically, the thesis will draw upon 
the most recent literature on democratisation and autocratic stability to date, and 
apply theoretical and methodological improvements to the study of territorial 
conflict and regime change. These will be addressed in Chapters 3 and 4 
respectively.  
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Chapter 3: Theoretical framework: Territorial disputes, regime 
stability, and democratisation 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter provided an overview of the main theoretical contributions of 
the Reversed Second Image Theory (ReSIT) to the study of the democracy-peace 
nexus. In summary, ReSIT offers new insights into the dynamic between regime 
type and international conflict, claiming that external threats have the propensity 
to centralise power within states (Gourevitch, 1978; Thompson, 1996). As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, ReSIT proposes that states which are more peaceful in 
their foreign relations are, over long periods of time, more likely to develop 
democratic structures. This challenges the assumptions of Democratic Peace Theory 
(DPT), which claims that the dyadic peace can be explained by peaceful dispositions 
of democracies. According to ReSIT, democracies tend to be at peace with one 
another because of existing ‘zones of peace’, which developed independently of 
regime type, and tend to promote democratisation. Furthermore, the opposite also 
holds true: states which are frequently involved in military disputes are more likely 
to remain autocratic, or become more autocratic over time. It is this inverse logic of 
ReSIT that will become the main focus of this chapter as well as the thesis more 
generally. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the most important contribution to the 
ReSIT literature is that provided by Gibler (2010), who proposed that territorial 
disputes have a much more centralising effect on the regime because they affect 
the bargaining dynamic between the leader and other elites. This chapter will 
outline Gibler’s (2010) theoretical contributions in more detail and highlight space 
for potential improvement. In particular, although Gibler’s (2010) theory aims to 
explain long-term democratisation, it does not make a distinction between 
autocratic instability and democratisation. As a result, it is assumed that if 
autocracies do not democratise, they must also be stable and centralised. This 
chapter will demonstrate that the study of regime stability and democratisation 
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needs to be conducted in separation, and proposes that territorial disputes affect 
both regime stability and democratisation.  In order to do this, the chapter will be 
split into four sections.  
The first section will provide a detailed outline of Gibler’s (2010) contribution to the 
field, and outline its main shortcomings, which were already contextualised in 
Chapter 2. The second section will demonstrate why autocratic instability does not 
always lead to democratisation, and that this confusion stems from the focus on 
autocratic spells rather than autocratic regimes. The third section will apply ReSIT to 
the literature on the ruler-elite bargaining dynamic within autocratic regimes with 
the help of recent comparative authoritarianism literature. It will demonstrate that 
territorial disputes are likely to have a stabilising and centralising effect on 
autocratic regimes. The section will also explore how other factors, such as regime 
type, wealth, petroleum national resource dependency, or ethnic and religious 
fractionalisation, might affect this relationship. The fourth section will focus 
explicitly on how territorial disputes might affect the chances of democratisation in 
autocratic regimes, and argue that the effects are separate from those on 
autocratic stability. It will also explore how other factors commonly discussed in the 
democratisation literature might affect this relationship, with a particular focus on 
autocratic regime type, wealth, and petroleum dependency. Throughout the third 
and fourth section, particular attention will be paid to the way in which autocratic 
regime type (military, monarchic, single party or multiparty) affects the relationship 
between territorial dispute and autocratic stability, and territorial dispute and 
democratisation.  
As a result, the chapter will set out the four main research questions to be tested in 
this thesis: How do territorial disputes affect the survival of autocratic regimes? Are 
there significant differences in how various types of autocratic regimes respond to 
territorial disputes? Are autocratic regimes less likely to democratise as a result of 
territorial dispute involvement? And finally, are the chances of democratising as a 
result of territorial dispute involvement different in various types of autocratic 
regimes? 
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This chapter makes a number of important theoretical contributions to the ReSIT 
and Comparative Politics literature. First, it makes the crucial distinction between 
autocratic spells and regimes, which is often overlooked by IR literature. It also 
provides a robust theoretical justification for maintenance of this distinction as its 
usefulness as an analytical heuristic. Second, this thesis represents the first time a 
ReSIT study accounts for the type of autocratic regime – military, single party, 
monarchic or multiparty – when explaining the changes in the leader-elite 
interaction as a result of territorial threats for both autocratic stability and 
democratisation. Third, it is the first study to look explicitly at the links between 
territorial disputes and regime stability, and to provide a theoretical framework 
that explains this relation. This will hopefully spark further research on the 
relationship between territorial threats and regime change in the Comparative 
Politics and IR literature.  
 
Territorial disputes and power centralisation: an appraisal of Gibler’s contribution 
 
Unlike previous explanations of how interstate conflict affects domestic institutions, 
as discussed briefly in the previous chapter (Gourevitch, 1978; Thompson, 1996; 
Rasler and Thompson, 2005), the account developed by Gibler’s (2010) focuses 
explicitly on the leader – opposition interaction within the country. He analyses 
both democracies and autocracies, concentrating on the ‘rally around the flag’ 
effect, which is defined as a rise in patriotism and sense of national unity that arises 
in all states as a result of involvement in highly salient disputes. He then argues that 
these ‘rally effects’ lead to institutional centralisation at the level of national 
governance. By resting part of his argument on the diversionary theory of war, he 
argues that elites within all types of regimes are likely to temporarily suspend their 
opposition against the incumbent in an event of salient military threat. In 
authoritarian regimes, this happens for two reasons. First, as proposed by the 
Selectorate Theory discussed in Chapter 2, the ruling elites tend to benefit from 
private goods provision networks introduced and controlled by the incumbent, and 
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any threat to the state is also a threat to these networks (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 
1999). Second, external threats such as war ‘can force an imposed leader on the 
elites, lead to occupation of the country and the overthrow of their elite status, or 
cause chaos in the country after a defeat’ (Gibler, 2010: 524). Since elites do not 
want to lose their political influence and economic rents, they tend to rally behind 
the leader and allow them much greater access to resources in times of war as 
means of preserving the status quo. Because regime elites tend to be the greatest 
check on a leader’s power, the leader is likely to take advantage of the situation and 
try to further institutionalise powers granted during wartime conditions. Once the 
conflict is over, the opposition will find it much harder to return to their previous 
bargaining dynamic within the ruling coalition.  
There are a number of innovations Gibler’s (2010) theory offers to current ReSIT 
theories. As part of his main contribution, he develops the notion of salient threats, 
distinguishing between standard militarised disputes and territorial conflicts, and 
argues that the latter is more likely to result in the rally effect among the political 
opposition. Building upon previous theories of international conflict (Vasquez, 
1995, 2004; Senese and Vasquez, 2003; 2008), Gibler (2007; 2010) Gibler argues 
that territorial disputes tend to be more threatening than other types of conflict, 
even in the absence of mass casualties. After all, land is critical to a nation’s 
identity, security and prosperity (Gibler, 2007: 510). In fact, as Gibler (2012: Ch.5) 
demonstrates, dispute involvement predicts an increase of over 10,000 troops in 
states targeted by territorial claims, while no similar effect was observed in states 
involved in other types of disputes with their neighbours. Additionally, as Giber 
points out, research suggests that border disputes have the propensity to result in a 
higher log of casualties than those resulting from other forms of disputes (Senese 
and Vasquez, 2003) and are less likely to be settled without resorting to violence 
(Gibler, 2010: 521; Vasquez, 1995). Because of their high salience, territorial 
disputes result in greater efforts to demonise the rival state and mobilise the 
general public and the elite to work with, not against, the current regime. This in 
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turn makes it more difficult for the opposition to voice nonconformist attitudes, 
lowering the position of the adversaries within the state (Gibler, 2010: 521).  
However, it is important to note that for territorial disputes to have the centralising 
effect on autocratic regimes, the states involved in the dispute must be contiguous. 
Territorial threats made by an overseas or non-neighbouring state are not only rare, 
but also less likely to incite the same degree of national anxiety and domestic 
centralisation (Gibler, 2012). This is consistent with the realist literature reviewed in 
Chapter 2, which claimed that international conflict happens predominantly 
between contiguous states. This contribution to ReSIT studies is of particular 
importance, given that many previous works which did not make a distinction 
between types of disputes found little or no evidence to support reversed second 
image hypotheses (Crescenzi and Enterline, 1999; Mousseau and Shi, 1999, James 
et al., 1999). In addition, Gibler and Miller (2014) recently suggested a further 
extension of the theory, demonstrating that territorial conflict is likely to result in 
much higher state capacity, effectively increasing the oppressive powers of the 
regime, and reducing the likelihood of intrastate conflict.  
 While the theory provides an original and important contribution to the field of IR, 
it has a number of limitations, which stem from its engagement with DPT. The first 
of these, addressed below, is that even though, for the first time, the theory 
distinguishes between democratic and autocratic responses to territorial disputes, 
it is limited by its state-centric approach. As mentioned in Chapter 2, it is key to 
engage with Comparative Politics literature on regime change studies when a 
theory is attempting to explain changes in domestic structures of states. Second, 
while Gibler’s (2010) argument focuses on the interaction between the ruler and his 
opposition, it does not engage with the extensive Comparative Politics literature on 
the bargaining dynamic within authoritarian regimes. This is understandable, as 
Gibler’s (2010) theory is meant to apply to both democratic and autocratic states. 
Nevertheless, to achieve its full explanatory potential, it is necessary to devote 
more attention to the bargaining dynamic specific to authoritarian regimes, 
especially the processes that might lead to the incumbent consolidating their power 
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within the polity vis-à-vis the elites. For this reason, this thesis will focus on 
authoritarian regimes only. This is because concentrating on a single type of polity 
makes for a more in-depth analysis, allowing for disaggregating authoritarian 
regimes into sub-categories and testing how different forms of autocracies (e.g. 
military, monarchic or party based regimes) might respond to various forms of 
salient threats. By developing a theoretical framework for how different forms 
autocracies might respond to territorial disputes, the thesis will hopefully 
demonstrate that the inconclusive results of previous ReSIT studies have been a 
result of making a false assumption that all autocracies operate in the same manner 
purely by virtue of being non-democratic. Disaggregating despotic regimes into sub-
categories will add theoretical depth not only to ReSIT, but also other mainstream 
approaches like democratic peace theory, paving the way to improved standards of 
regime analysis. Moreover, focusing only on authoritarian states allows for a better 
test of the theory, since non-democracies have a greater potential for institutional 
change. The mechanisms which facilitate centralisation are already present. 
Namely, the government is likely already controlling a much larger portion of 
material and political resources than elites in other regimes. Whereas all leaders 
seek to expand their power (Gibler 2010; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), dictators 
are likely to face less disincentives in extending their influence than democratic 
rulers.  
In summary, Gibler’s (2010) arguments build upon the previous body of ReSIT 
literature, focusing specifically on the effects of salient conflict on the power 
dynamic between ruling elites. Furthermore, Gibler’s innovations has is made ReSIT 
more specific and testable by focusing on territorial disputes, which tend to be 
more threatening than standard interstate conflicts (Gibler, 2007; Gibler and Tir, 
2010, 2013). Nevertheless, as stated above, the theory lacks intediciplinary focus 
and theoretical depth. This thesis will develop Gibler’s (2010) theory to explore new 
ways of testing it propositions.  
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The importance of distinguishing between autocratic spells and autocratic 
regimes 
 
Unlike the IR scholarship, Comparative Politics literature makes a crucial distinction 
between regime instability and democratisation, acknowledging that even if an 
autocratic regime fails, it does not necessarily mean it will democratise. Hence, the 
Comparative Politics literature makes a key distinction between autocratic spells 
and autocratic regimes. Autocratic spell, congenial with the standard IR definition of 
autocratic states, refers to the total number of years a given regime, or a succession 
of autocratic regimes, has ruled in a particular country without interruption. In the 
IR literature, with the exception of state failure or foreign invasion, autocratic spells 
end exclusively in democratisation. In comparative authoritarianism studies, on the 
other hand, autocratic regimes are often defined as a set of un-democratic rules for 
choosing leaders and policies in a given period of time in a particular state, rather 
than periods of undemocratic rule (Geddes et al., 2014). When autocratic regimes 
end, they can end in democratisation, but they are even more likely to simply 
transition into another form of autocracy (Wright et al., 2015). This means that an 
autocratic spells can contain a number of successive autocratic regimes within it. 
This distinction between autocratic regimes and autocratic spells is particularly 
pertinent to ReSIT, given that the theory assumes that disputes make autocracies 
more stable, focusing only on the rate or the likelihood of democratisation limits 
the scope of analysis. For example, if one is only looking at autocratic spells, the 
period of autocracy in Sierra Leone between 1971 and 2007 might appear relatively 
stable, with 37 years of uninterrupted authoritarian rule. However, a closer look at 
the durability of particular regimes reveals a different image: within this period, 
Sierra Leone transitioned 6 times into 7 different types of autocracy, with the 
average duration of each regime lasting just over 5 years.10 If an autocracy is meant 
to become more stable as a result of territorial conflict, one would expect that it 
would also be more resilient to internal coups and elite turnovers. However, the 
                                                          
10
 Source: Autocracies of the World dataset, Magaloni et al. (2013) 
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situation in Sierra Leone reveals that durable autocratic spells do not necessarily 
reflect regime stability and autocratic resilience.  
Following the discussion above, it is one of the main theoretical contributions of 
this thesis that assumptions put forward by ReSIT, especially in reference to 
autocratic states (Gibler, 2007, 2010), are applicable to autocratic regimes. In fact, if 
the theory is correct, not only should autocratic regimes be less likely to 
democratise – they should also be less likely to transition into any other form of 
regime. In summary, any form of regime transition should be less likely under the 
conditions of salient international threat. Furthermore, as will be outlined in the 
sections below, this proposition is also supported by some of the most recent 
literature on autocratic regime stability. Furthermore, it is crucial to note that the 
literature on the survival of a singular leader and the survival of a regime overlaps, 
and similar factors often cause each to be overthrown (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a). 
For example, when a leader is overthrown, a democratic or autocratic regime 
change is likely to happen, but at times the internal opposition might simply replace 
the ruler with an alternative and the regime will continue uninterrupted (Geddes et 
al., 2014). Hence, while leadership changes often end in regime change, the ousting 
of a leader can happen without it. Therefore, it is important to not only review the 
mechanism that causes territorial threats to centralise the power of the leader, but 
also some evidence which suggests that territorial disputes affect three other 
factors crucial to regime survival: elite loyalty, mass support, and a weak and 
fractured opposition (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a).   
The section below will first briefly review the Comparative Politics literature on this 
subject, and then demonstrate that the main propositions put forward by ReSIT 
clearly overlap with some of the most recent theories in Comparative Politics on 
autocratic leader and regime survival.  
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Comparative Politics literature on the stability of autocratic regimes: 
The ruler-elite interaction 
 
Despite common misconceptions about authoritarian regimes inherent in the field 
of IR, autocracies are rarely controlled by a single individual with an unlimited cap 
on power. In fact, upon establishing their rule, leaders tend to rely on the support 
of the elites, who, ‘jointly with the dictator, hold enough power to be both 
necessary and sufficient for survival’ (Svolik, 2009). An incumbent’s authority is, 
therefore, always delegated to a certain extent. Leaders must maintain stable 
support from the elites, or risk facing a rebellion, which could result in the 
incumbent being immediately ousted from power (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; 
Magaloni, 2008). Given that the majority of regimes are ‘overthrown by the 
government insiders such as other government members or members of the 
military or the security forces’ in what is commonly known as a coup d’état 
(Geddes, 2003; Haber, 2006; Svolik, 2009: 478), leaders have strong incentives to 
prevent elite dissatisfaction. Hence, maintaining elite loyalty is one of the most 
important elements in prolonging the rule of a given regime.  Leaders and ruling 
cliques have two major instruments available to them to mobilize elites in their 
favour and maintain elite loyalty: they can either make policy concessions, or 
distribute rents (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006: 2). In the first scenario, leaders 
might either make sizeable compromises on crucial policy issues, or commit to 
power-sharing by allowing the elites to stake out high-level positions, such as in the 
security forces or in key decision-making bodies (Boix and Svolik, 2013). 
Additionally, they might be encouraged to become members of a unifying 
institution, such as a party or the military, to allow them to bargain collectively, 
rather than individually (Geddes, 2003; Magaloni, 2008). In the second scenario, the 
leaders might distribute resources in the form of rents to maintain continuous 
loyalty from their supporters (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). The second scenario 
will be discussed later the in the chapter.  
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Assuming that ruling cliques and leaders are self-interested power maximisers, they 
will always try to acquire more power at the expense of the ruling coalition (Svolik, 
2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). This tension between the leader and 
the elites is the ‘central problem of authoritarian governance’ (Svolik, 2009: 480). 
As described by Svolik (2009: 480-482). When power is first delegated to the leader, 
they emerge as the ‘first among equals’, their powers checked by the ruling 
coalition. However, with time, the leader might attempt to increase her power vis-
à-vis the elites. Equally, the elites might be concerned that the ruler will divert the 
economic or military resources away from them, and use it to strengthen the 
leader’s position and violate the initial power-sharing agreement. Once the leader 
accumulates enough power and weakens the elites to the point that the threat of a 
coup is no longer credible, the leader can enjoy an undivided, and unchecked, rule. 
Although the elites can follow a similar path and try to strengthen their position vis-
à-vis the ruler, certain qualities of authoritarian regimes make this move rather 
unlikely. Namely, the executive bodies are usually controlled by the leader, placing 
them in a more advantageous position for power-grabbing.  
 
In the case that a coup staged by the internal opposition is unsuccessful, its 
organisers are likely to face imprisonment or death, making it a very costly 
operation. For this reason, elites are extremely unlikely to stage a coup when the 
power-sharing agreement is not directly violated. Similarly, if the elites are too 
weak and disorganised to conduct a successful plot, they will most likely prefer to 
stay at the mercy of the leader instead of organising a rebellion. 
 
In summary, the credibility of a threat of rebellion depends largely on the strength 
of the elites relative to the leader. If the internal opposition is weak, the leader can 
comfortably increase their power, making any potential coup even less likely to 
succeed. On the other hand, if it is the leader who is weak, a smaller proportion of 
allies are required to stage an effective plot (Boix and Svolik, 2013). The next 
section of the chapter will put forward the original claim of this thesis that 
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territorial dispute involvement has a strong influence on the leader – elite 
interaction within autocratic regimes, weakening the bargaining position of the 
elites, and strengthening the position of the leader, as originally suggested by Gibler 
(2010). This, in turn, increases the stability and longevity of autocratic regimes.  
 
Territorial disputes and the ruler-elite interaction in autocratic regimes 
 
Having outlined the importance of the ruler – elite interaction for the centralisation 
of power within authoritarian regimes, the chapter will now apply Gibler’s (2010) 
framework to further evaluate how the credibility of rebellion threat might be 
influenced by territorial dispute involvement. It is argued that the rally effects of 
territorial dispute involvement leads to fractionalisation of opposition groups within 
the ruling coalition, making it more difficult for potential plotters to organise. 
Furthermore, the large presence of army troops as a result of territorial conflict 
allows the leader to conduct purges in the name of increasing state security, and to 
eliminate potential opposition more easily. Moreover, the section will argue that 
economic hardship as a result of war efforts, coupled with fractionalised 
opposition, makes it easier for the leader to redirect the resources away from the 
elites. All of the factors above contribute to smaller checks on the incumbent’s 
power, which are unlikely to return to their normal level immediately after the 
conflict has been resolved.   
 
As outlined previously in this chapter, the presence of salient threats is likely to 
result in a ‘rally effect’, meaning that previously polarized opposition groups within 
the ruling elites will either begin to support the leader, or temporarily suspend their 
plotting activities for the duration of that threat. According to Gibler (2010) and 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), any foreign intervention will seem far less 
desirable than the current status quo. In line with empirical research on decision-
making under conditions of potential risk, individuals tend to greatly exaggerate the 
chances of catastrophic outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1978; Levy, 1998). Even 
if the likelihood of foreign invasion as a result of territorial conflict is relatively 
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small, the elites are likely to perceive them as real. Given that potential invaders are 
hostile towards the incumbent regime, they are also likely to actively purge the 
newly acquired territories from the leader’s supporters – the current elites. The 
prospect of losing one’s position, freedom, or life as a result of conflict provides 
additional incentives for the elites to make all the efforts necessary to allow the 
leader to solve or win the dispute. Because state survival is treated as a priority, 
nonconformist attitudes and actions are less likely to be tolerated (Gibler, 2010). 
Any efforts to co-opt the elites against the incumbent are likely to be subsequently 
compromised. The tension within elite groups is likely to be heightened as a result 
of splits, with some former opposition members deciding to side with the regime. 
Due to a lack of transparency and a high level of secrecy within authoritarian 
regimes, especially among opposition groups, this change of preferences is unlikely 
to be visible to potential coup plotters. As a result, the chances of mistakenly co-
opting government informants increase significantly. Organising a successful 
rebellion becomes much more costly, and elites are likely to abandon their anti-
regime activities until the threat has passed. 
 
The mechanism outlined above make it easier for the incumbent to ‘divide and 
conquer’ the opposition within regime elites. The more fragmented and 
disorganised a leaders opponents, the less likely they are to credibly threaten them 
with a successful rebellion. Knowing this, the incumbent is likely to capitalise on 
their short gained power and institutionalise their newly acquired position (Gibler, 
2010). Once the conflict is over, and the elites are significantly weakened, the 
leader is unlikely to voluntarily decrease their standing and restore the previous 
balance of power. Hence, territorial dispute involvement makes autocratic regimes 
more centralised and, as a result, less likely to be overthrown by in favour of any 
other regime. Correspondingly, the absence of territorial disputes and a stable 
security environment reduces the need for a unified national and political front. In 
the long-term, in an absence of salient threats, the opposition might proceed to 
question the raison d'être of centralized political power and as a result attempt to 
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slowly increase their bargaining position. If the opposition is successful, and given 
that other necessary conditions are satisfied, these changes might lead to a process 
of challenging the incumbent. Although the absence of exogenous threats cannot 
be seen as a guarantee of power decentralisation, it might be a factor that 
significantly increases the likelihood of its occurrence (Thompson, 1996). Therefore, 
one of the primary hypotheses of this thesis is that involvement in territorial 
disputes makes autocratic regimes more stable. This hypothesis will be empirically 
tested in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
 
Nevertheless, although territorial disputes are typically thought to have a similar 
impact on all types of autocratic regimes within the ReSIT literature, this 
assumption is likely to be informed by an overly reductionist approach to the study 
of autocracies. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the wider IR literature often 
presupposes that all autocracies operate in the same manner purely by virtue of 
being non-democratic. However, one of the most important findings of the 
comparative authoritarianism research in recent years is the fact that structural 
features of autocratic regimes have a significant impact on their stability and 
longevity (Geddes, 2003; Magaloni, 2008; Wright et al., 2015). Therefore, the 
second crucial theoretical contribution of this thesis is the application of the 
Comparative Politics literature to the ReSIT framework outlined above. The relevant 
literature and theoretical assumptions will be discussed below. However, before 
moving on to discussing in detail how territorial disputes might affect stability in 
each autocratic regime type, it is worth briefly considering a number of other 
potential threats to autocratic regime longevity commonly discussed in the 
literature, and how they might be affected by the presence of territorial threats.  
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Additional factors increasing stability of autocratic regimes 
 
While territorial disputes are likely to change the nature of the leader-elite 
interaction in a regime in favour of the ruler, there are a number of other ways in 
which territorial disputes contribute to regime stability. Autocratic stability is 
enhanced by territorial conflicts in three ways: by increasing elite loyalty in the 
regime, by keeping the external opposition to the regime weak, and by increasing 
popular support for the regime. The text below will first briefly outline the 
importance of these three elements, before the thesis addresses how territorial 
disputes might affect them in later sections. 
 
Elite loyalty 
 
 As commonly discussed in the literature and as mentioned above, elite loyalty is 
one of the most important factors in guaranteeing regime survival. In order for the 
ruling clique to survive in power, they need to maintain elite loyalty. In essence, the 
more loyal the elites, the less likely they are to organise a coup. Apart from keeping 
the ruler in power, autocratic elites additionally perform a range of functions that 
guarantee the survival of the regime: they might mobilise public support in favour 
of the regime, intimidate political opposition, or perform important security roles 
within the regime (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a: 57-58; Magaloni, 2008; Brownlee, 
2007). As Frantz and Ezrow (2011a) point out, the decision to support the regime is 
a cost-benefit calculation: if the benefits of supporting the regime (economic rents, 
political career, policy influence) outweigh the costs, then the elites are likely to 
remain loyal and continue providing their support to the regime. Elites are likely to 
defect from the regime if the economic rents are not satisfactory, and if the regime 
opposition presents a challenge so significant that the likelihood of regime failure 
or democratisation seems imminent (Ibid.). If the elites are dissatisfied, they are 
likely to defect to the opposition, increasing its strength and the possibility of a 
successful coup or other form of power turnover.  
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Weak external opposition 
 
Another factor contributing to long-lasting and stable autocratic regimes is a weak 
and fractured external regime opposition. Its weakness relative to the regime is 
crucial, mainly because the opposition poses a major threat to the elites currently 
in power. A strong opposition can co-opt crucial members of the ruling elite, 
organise public rallies against the government, and mobilize the public to vote for 
opposition parties where elections are a key part of the regime structure (Frantz 
and Ezrow, 2011a: 56). The greater the influence of the opposition on the public, 
the more likely the regime is to collapse. A good example of a capable opposition 
movement mobilising civil society against the regime and co-opting the elites are 
the Arab Spring protests in Egypt where the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood 
group and their allies ultimately led to a substantive regime change and the 
overthrowing of Hosni Mubarak (Nepstad, 2011). 
 
Public support for the regime 
 
In terms of public support, most political scientists agree that autocratic leaders rely 
on popular support from their citizens at least to some extent (Frantz and Ezrow, 
2011a). The absence of public support makes ruling elites susceptible to mass 
protests, and strengthens the opposition who are likely to take advantage of the 
anti-establishment mood in the regime. In order to maintain public support, leaders 
usually distribute public and private goods to the population. As a result, one of the 
largest threats to public support for the dictatorship are financial crises and 
economic downturns. If regimes are no longer able to redistribute private and 
public goods, they might either lose the support of the population, resort to 
repression, or rely on legitimation strategies in order to maintain support 
(Gerschewski, 2013).  
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The effects of territorial threats on elite loyalty, opposition strength and popular 
support within autocracies 
 
As mentioned previously, territorial threats are likely to have impact on elite 
loyalty, opposition strength and mass support for the regime. Hence, it is crucial to 
outline the main mechanism that allows it to happen. While there are a number of 
factors that can influence the above, the elements most relevant to the theoretical 
premises of this thesis include access to rents, control of the security apparatus, 
and the presence of a unifying ideology. They are briefly described below, followed 
by the analysis of how the effects of territorial disputes on regime stability might be 
affected by them.  
 
Access to rents 
 
Access to rents is particularly important to the survival of autocratic regimes. As 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) point out, private goods provision is one of the 
most important factors allowing rulers to maintain the loyalty of the elites. Through 
supporting the regime, elites have access to a number of financial benefits typically 
unavailable to the opposition or the general public – these include tax relief, direct 
money transfers, bribery, investment opportunities, or economic policy influence. If 
the government is unable to continue private goods transfers to their elites, or the 
opposition is strong enough to provide such transfers themselves, elite members 
might begin to defect because the costs of supporting the regime are no longer 
outweighed by financial benefits.  
 
Additionally, public and private goods provision also significantly contributes to the 
mass support for the regime. For example, in order to maintain government 
popularity and prevent mass unrest in face of the Arab Spring protests, Bahrain 
offered one-off hand-outs to its citizens in the form of $2,500 per family, while 
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Kuwait offered up to $4,000 per family (The Economist, 2011). More often, regimes 
provide incentives in the form of public goods, through services such as healthcare, 
childcare, or education (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011: 56). As a result, one of the largest 
threats to public support for the dictatorship are financial crises and economic 
downturns. If regimes are no longer able to redistribute private and public goods, 
they might lose the support of the population. This is an important factor to bear in 
mind when discussing the impact of military disputes on regime stability. After all,  
presence of a territorial dispute might lead the regime to increase its spending on 
the military and divert resources away from public goods provision. Similarly, 
territorial conflicts that lead to war might put such a strain on financial stability of 
the regime that even rents to the elites could be temporarily withheld. Hence, 
serious economic crises caused by war can have a devastating effects on regime 
stability. 
 
On one hand, Gibler (2010) argues that war effort should make it easier for political 
rulers to centralise control over resources and justify tax increases and resource 
extraction on the basis of grave national emergency. On the other hand, interstate 
conflict is likely to make resource extraction more difficult for the regime. This is 
likely because losing control over some part of the country’s territory is likely to 
influence the regime’s ability to collect taxes. For example, while China planned to 
centralise resources and fund its war effort in the Third Sino-Japanese War through 
increased tax collection, the indiscriminate Japanese bombing of Chinese territory 
made extraction too difficult to carry out (Zielinski, 2016: 19). Hence, the problems 
caused by military conflict might have little to do with the opposition from the 
taxpayers. Instead, they are likely to be complicated by damaged infrastructure and 
logistic difficulties. In addition to the above, it is also important to consider that 
war-making might result in financial crisis due to extensive and prolonged war 
expenditure, as well as additional destruction of the country’s economic 
infrastructure.  
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Despite the argument above, the risk of financial crisis as a result of territorial 
conflict increases only if the dispute escalates to a full-scale, prolonged military 
confrontation. While territorial disputes do indeed run a high risk of escalating to 
war, a vast majority of them never do (Gibler, 2012). Hence, in most cases, the 
process of resource extraction might actually be easier, because of the ‘rally around 
the flag’ effect discussed earlier.  It is likely that in the presence of direct threats to 
territorial integrity of the country, the public and the elites will be more likely to 
allow the regime to centralise control over the economy for the benefit of national 
security. Hence, increases in taxation are more likely to be tolerated by the public, 
leading to more resources being controlled by the government. Similarly, much of 
the current literature suggests that greater military spending in face of external 
threats might actually increase economic growth: this is because military 
expenditure leads to the development of new infrastructure and provides a more 
secure climate for future investment in the country (see for example Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (2004), Shieh et al. (2002), and Yildirim and Öcal (2016)). Hence, this 
thesis assumes that territorial disputes will not pose any significant danger to the 
regime’s ability to buy support from the elites and the public. This is because the 
thesis investigates the effects of territorial disputes rather than rare instances of 
interstate war. 
 
 
Control of the security apparatus 
 
The control of the security service, military and police is crucial for the regime to 
contain the external opposition to the regime and prevent public unrest. During a 
period of territorial conflict, it is likely that rulers will proceed with increased 
spending on the military, and enact greater degree of central control over the 
security apparatus within the country. For example, increased spending on military 
and police forces can help increase harassment and prosecution of the opposition 
members, while being justified on national security grounds. A similar situation 
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took place in the People’s Republic of Poland in 1981. Faced with the threat of a 
military intervention by the USSR, the leader of the Polish Communist Party 
Wojciech Jaruzelski introduced martial law, justifying it as the only effective means 
to prevent Russian invasion; this ensured that the opposition members were 
contained, and no public demonstrations were allowed to take place between 1981 
and 1983 (Mastny, 1999). The greater the penetration of the society by the military 
and security services, the easier it is to eliminate potential opposition and prevent 
anti-regime plots. Hence, it is assumed that territorial threats lead to the 
strengthening of the regime by providing it with a justification to use force against 
the opposition. 
 
 
Unifying ideology 
 
Finally, territorial disputes can help regimes maintain ideological unity, and 
maintain elite and public support for the government. For example, some scholars 
argue that nationalism can serve a unifying function in many regimes, or amplify 
the existing ideology within the regime (Baum, 2006). Hence, nationalism can serve 
a similar function to that performed by ideology (e.g. communism in USSR or China) 
or religious and dynastic mythologies (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nepal). For example, 
many colonial states in Africa used nationalism not only in their fight for 
independence and subsequent state building, but also to justify single party rule 
and suppress opposition (Kissane, 2014: 11). The ‘rally around the flag’ effect 
discussed earlier in the chapter is a case in point: faced with the possibility of loss of 
territory and foreign invasion, individuals are more susceptible to idealise the 
historical and cultural heritage of their nation. Since regime elites are often seen as 
symbols of the state, any anti-government and anti-regime action is likely to result 
in accusation of treason. Actions which can be justified by preservation of territorial 
and cultural integrity of the nation will often be met with support from the general 
population and the elites. This includes aforementioned collection of taxes, anti-
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opposition activities, and banning public demonstrations and protests. An example 
of ideology where nationalism is a major contributor to the sustenance and 
legitimation of the regime is North Korea. Since 1950s, the Juche ideology of self-
reliance in the communist single-party regime has been strengthened by 
nationalism arising from a real or perceived threat from western imperialist power 
attempting to overthrow the regime. The territorial nature of the dispute between 
North and South Korea, and the US military interference in the diplomatic efforts 
since the ceasefire in 1953, has made it easier for the regime to legitimise tight 
security measures, strict border control, and food rationing (Chen and Lee, 2007). 
Hence, it is assumed that regimes find it easier to sustain high levels of elite and 
public support when they are faced with a territorial claim from another country. 
 
 
Disaggregating autocratic stability 
 
The previous section of this chapter has demonstrated how Gibler’s (2010) theory 
of the relationship between territorial dispute involvement and power 
centralisation in autocratic spells can be applied to the survival and stability of 
autocratic regimes. Territorial disputes decrease the bargaining power of the elites, 
reducing the credibility of the rebellion threat in autocratic regimes. They are also 
likely to allow the regime to weaken political opposition and maintain stable 
support from the public due to nationalist sentiment. Nevertheless, comparative 
authoritarianism literature suggests that certain forms of autocracy are more likely 
than others to have structural characteristics that result in the regimes being strong 
even in the absence of territorial disputes. Therefore, it is likely that the 
relationship between territorial dispute involvement and autocratic survival might 
not be observed in all types of autocracy. The section below outlines some of the 
most prominent research in the field, and explains why territorial dispute 
involvement is likely to have a significant stabilising effect on military and 
competitive authoritarian regimes, but not on dominant-party regimes or 
monarchies.  
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Some of the most influential literature on autocratic survival demonstrates that 
certain power-sharing agreements make autocratic regimes less centralised. As 
mentioned above, autocratic leaders might often enter into these power-sharing 
agreements with the elites in order to demonstrate their commitment to 
redistribute power and rent to their supporters. In a bid to guarantee elite loyalty, 
leaders might allow the elites better channels for collective bargaining through 
membership in a unifying institution such as a political party or the military. While 
there are many different typologies of autocracies commonly used in the 
Comparative Politics literature, most studies distinguish between military, 
monarchic, and party-based autocracies.11 However, the literature rarely makes the 
distinction between competitive party regimes, which allow genuine, although 
often unfair, political competition (Magaloni et al., 2013); and dominant, or single-
party regimes, where only one political party is allowed to exist within the political 
arena. Because competitive or multiparty regimes have been shown to be much 
less stable than single party regimes, this chapter will distinguish between them, 
and formulate separate theoretical assumptions on their response to territorial 
dispute involvement. The section below will discuss how regime structures affect 
the relationship between territorial dispute and regime stability. 
 
Military regimes 
 
As demonstrated by Geddes (2003), military regimes are one of the least stable 
autocratic regime types. This is because military juntas frequently use the rhetoric 
of ‘guardianship’ in justifying their rule, presenting it as a critical transitory period 
that restores order and much needed stability (Loveman, 1994). As it is frequently 
witnessed in the case of military coups, the army often presents itself as the only 
institution capable of temporarily restoring order in times of instability. This has 
often been the case in Turkey, where the military legitimized its violent take-over of 
                                                          
11
 Many other typologies exists, and a detailed justification for the use of this particular typology in 
the thesis can be found in Chapter 4.  
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power with a constitutionally granted authority to step in if a democratically 
elected government becomes less democratic, or the regime goes against the 
principle of secularism outlined in the Ataturk constitution (Jenkins, 2007).  Given 
the fact that military regimes present themselves as interim regimes, every 
additional year in office makes them more susceptible to the erosion of trust from 
both the public and the political class (Graf, 1988). This problem is magnified by the 
fact that unlike elites in all other types of autocracy, military personnel, including 
the highest ranking members of the junta, are primarily interested in the survival of 
the military rather than remaining in power (Geddes, 2003). As a result, the military 
is likely to prefer to step down and relinquish control of the state if they perceive 
the integrity of the military to be threatened by internal splits or factionalism 
(Ibid.). In this sense, they are different than other types of autocratic elites, because 
the end of rule does not necessary mean the end to one’s career. This is because 
most military elites simply return back to the barracks in the event of a regime 
failure (Ibid.) In addition to valuing the integrity of the military organisation over 
other concerns, members of the junta are also socialised to possess a number of 
other unique preferences. For example, they tend to place very high value on the 
regime’s independence from civilian control, territorial cohesion of the state, 
internal discipline, hierarchy, and order (Ibid.: 54).  
 
Given that the military is primarily concerned with the survival of the army and the 
protection of the territorial integrity of the state, territorial disputes are likely to 
increase the cohesion within military regimes because the involvement of the army 
in the civilian sphere is likely to increase significantly. While this might be helpful to 
a number of autocracies if the military is loyal to the regime, only in military regime 
- where the regime and the military are practically synonymous – this is expected to 
always result in stronger rule by the junta. In addition, nationalism might also make 
it much easier for military regimes to punish any potential defections from the 
regime on the grounds of treason. This, in turn, is likely to discourage regime elites 
from defecting to the opposition. 
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Additionally, the heightened sense of national unity resulting from the perceived 
threat from outside will likely increase the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of 
the public, strengthening the ‘guardianship’ rhetoric of military autocracies, and 
effectively prolonging their lifespan. An example of this in practice is the adoption 
of nationalist ideology by Soekarno in Indonesia during the period of Japanese and 
Dutch occupation (Rudolph, 2006: 21). To legitimise his rule, Soekarno defined the 
Indonesian nationalism against the persistent threat from the colonial powers: by 
nationalising Dutch businesses, pursuing ‘territorial integrity’ through annexing  
Dutch West Papua in 1963, and legitimising his rule against the persistent spectre of 
neo-colonial imperialism (Winet :17). By adopting the rhetoric of guardianship that 
was intrinsically linked to the nation’s territorial integrity, Indonesian military 
regime managed to increase its internal legitimacy and ensured regime continuity 
(Aspinall, 2015). In a similar fashion, other military regimes are also likely to be 
successful in spreading nationalist ideology that legitimises their rule As a result, 
military autocracies are expected to last much longer as a result of territorial 
dispute involvement. 
 
 
Monarchic regimes 
 
Unlike military regimes, monarchies are some of the most stable forms of 
autocracy, with the most unified and loyal elites, and so are unlikely to be strongly 
affected by territorial disputes. Most monarchies are characterised by a dynastic 
style of rule where the ruling elites are members of the same family. This means 
that a vast majority of state security apparatus – including the military apparatus - 
are directly controlled by the members of the same family, who all have a stake at 
upholding the power of the current regime (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011: 243). Regimes 
in which the rule is non-dynastic, on the other hand, tend to be characterised by an 
extremely centralised system of power, with almost absolute and unchecked power 
given to the monarch (Ibid.). In both types of monarchies, the threat of rebellion or 
coup is unlikely to be very credible: in dynastic regimes, a rebellion would involve a 
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change of leader, rather than a change of regime because all members of a family 
have strong incentives to maintain the status quo; in non-dynastic regimes, on the 
other hand, the power is so centralised in the hands of one person that a successful 
coup is very unlikely. The centralised power means that the government has direct 
control over most resources, allowing the ruler or the ruling family to ‘buy off’ any 
member of the elites tempted to defect to the opposition more easily than in other 
regimes (Gause III, 1994). Additionally, it is worth noting that most monarchies are 
currently located in the Middle East – a region particularly rich in natural resources. 
As a result, most Arab monarchies are also rentier states, able to provide large 
sums of money to both the elites and the general population, as in the case of 
Kuwait and Bahrain mentioned in the previous section of this chapter. The number 
of elites in monarchies also tends to be particularly small (Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith, 2010) which means that monarchs find it easy to maintain continuous 
support even in less wealthy regimes which rely on foreign aid or tourism to ‘fund’ 
their support (Escribá-Folch and Wright, 2010). Moreover, monarchies are normally 
characterised by particularly high levels of oppression which ensures that 
opposition stays weak and fragmented (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a). Hence, the 
penetration of the society by security personnel is already high, making it unlikely 
that the regime will benefit from additional military involvement in society and 
state offices.   
 
Finally, the dynastic or religious aspect of many monarchies guarantees strong elite 
loyalty due to blood ties and the frequent incorporation of historical and religious 
mythologies into their legitimation strategies (Schlumberger, 2010). For example, 
Saudi Arabia has used the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam as a powerful 
legitimation tool which portrays the history of the Al-Sa’ud tribe as closely 
connected to that of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011: 
247). This portrayal of ruling dynasties as symbols of ancient glory allows 
monarchies to maintain support from both the general public and the elites 
themselves. Coupled with unlimited access to rents and strong family ties among 
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the elite means that monarchic regimes such as Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are remarkably resilient to 
external and internal shocks. In fact, the resilience of monarchies is so strong that 
that they were the only type of autocracies to survive the Arab Spring without a 
single regime transition (Yom and Gause, 2012; Bank, Richter, and Sunik, 2015).  
 
As a result of the above, it is unlikely that monarchies will be particularly 
susceptible to a unifying effect of territorial threats. This is not because territorial 
threats do not affect the elites or the opposition, but rather because the regime 
elites are already loyal and extremely unlikely to defect to the opposition due to 
strong family ties. Furthermore, the religious and mythological legitimation 
strategies along with strong redistributive capabilities mean that the general 
population is already strongly in favour of the regime.  
 
 
Single party regimes 
 
Similarly to monarchies, single party regimes also enjoy a great deal of regime 
stability (Geddes, 2003; Frantz and Ezrow, 2011b). According to the literature, 
single party regimes in many ways resemble monarchic regimes because of 
sustained regime loyalty, and the ability to maintain support through the use of 
unifying. The elite unity is usually guaranteed because the party is usually in control 
of the wealth within the regime, and serves as the only source of patronage for the 
elites (Magaloni, 2008). This monopoly on political and economic privileges means 
that elites typically have very few incentives to defect to the opposition, who is 
excluded from participating in politics (Brownlee, 2007; Hess, 2013: 3). Although 
elite numbers are much larger in single party regimes than in monarchies, the party 
additionally serves as an arbitrator to all internal splits and disputes, ensuring that 
those who have lost out today will be rewarded in the future by distributing crucial 
party positions to loyal members of the political class (Brownlee, 2007). The above 
features mean that factionalism poses significantly less threat to single party 
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autocracies, and on occasion, can even benefit the regime because institutionalised 
intra-party bargaining can help identify and address conflict (Frantz and Ezrow, 
2011a). Strong and unified elites, which rarely defect to the opposition, contribute 
greatly to the strength of the party leaders, allowing them to exert their influence 
over much longer periods of time than in military or multiparty regimes (Brownlee, 
2007). Additionally, the longevity and unity of elites in single-party regimes is 
guaranteed by the process of power succession which is organised in a way which 
allows the regime to survive even after the death or abdication of the party leader 
(Frantz and Ezrow, 2011). The smooth process of power turnover is one of the main 
reasons for the continuous survival of the single-party regime in China despite the 
economic and ideological transformation the country has undergone since the 
1950s (Zeng, 2014). Finally, the adoption of a unifying ideology such as communism 
in China or Vietnam can serve as a tool for increasing popular support and elite 
unity. Hence, single party regimes might not benefit from nationalism to the same 
extent as military or multiparty regimes. It is possible, however, that foreign threats 
might enhance the ideology already in place, as it is done in North Korea, where 
aspects of protectionism, nationalism and communism serve to stabilise a regime if 
it is struggling economically or undergoing a serious internal crisis of legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, due to the internal cohesion of most single-party regimes, and the 
ability to address conflict through intra-party bargaining, involvement in territorial 
disputes is unlikely to have much effect on the longevity of single party regimes. 
Similarly to monarchic regimes, elites in single party regimes are already relatively 
unified and pose very little threat to the leadership. In essence, a single institution 
in the form of a party makes the power sharing commitment between the ruler and 
her elites more credible, and a coup less likely (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011b). Hence, 
like in monarchies, territorial disputes are unlikely to further help centralise power 
within single-party regimes.  
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Multiparty regimes 
 
Finally, multiparty regimes, like military regimes, are expected to become more 
centralised as a result of territorial dispute involvement. As explained earlier, 
multiparty regimes are a type of autocracy where a ruling party allows opposition 
to exist in the public sphere, where the opposition can form political parties or 
participate in elections and the legislature. These types of regimes usually arise 
when the incumbent elites are weak and unable to maintain political power 
through media, controlling elections, or maintaining elite unity (Way, 2005: 233). A 
good example of such regimes were the newly independent former members of the 
USSR, where the sudden collapse of the Soviet state has deprived the ruling elites 
of the organisation, training and tools necessary to maintain a high degree of 
political control; even in the absence of a strong civil society or opposition, the 
ruling elites in multiparty regimes of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus were not strong 
enough to contain frequent challenges to their power (ibid.). As a result, while 
politics in multiparty regimes are still biased in favour of the incumbent, the threat 
from opposition is real, and the ruling elites are often easily removed from power. 
This was the case in Ukraine, where pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovytch was ousted in a 
series of uncoordinated and mainly disorganised protests led by a weak political 
opposition during the Euromaidan crisis of 2014 (Onuch, 2014). Given the relative 
weakness of the ruling elites, and the status of the opposition within multiparty 
regimes, the competition during government elections is unfair, but often real 
(Magaloni et al., 2013: 8), with electoral fraud often exposed and contested by the 
public and the opposition. A good example of elections being successfully contested 
in multiparty regimes is the so-called ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine, where the 
perception of vote rigging in 2004 led to widespread protests and the subsequent 
revote in 2005.  
 
Although definitions vary, the concept of a multiparty regime closely corresponds 
with ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Schedler, 2013), ‘competitive authoritarianism’ 
(Levitsky and Way, 2002), or ‘semi-democracy’ (Knutsen and Nygård, 2015). In 
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multiparty regimes, like in military regimes, splits among elites are a particularly 
frequent phenomenon, although for a different reason. Given that regime 
opposition is institutionalised, it is likely to be significantly stronger than in other 
forms of autocracy. Like in democracies, governments can change often, and tend 
to have a very limited grip on power (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). Although 
elections do not make multiparty regimes more democratic, they do open the 
political arena to a wide range of actors usually excluded from the political process 
in other autocracies. This has the potential to weaken the coalition government and 
strengthen the opposition. Given that multiple parties are allowed to operate, the 
elites can, and frequently do, change sides. Unlike in other regimes, however, they 
usually do so openly. For example, many high-profile figures within Venezuela were 
able to openly criticise and defect from the ruling party due to widespread 
accusations of corruption and right-wing politics that were holding back the 
Bolivarian Revolution (Handlin, 2017: 161). All of this makes for fractured and weak 
government elites, and a capable, if fragmented, opposition. The strong opposition 
and weak leadership mean that, similarly to military regimes, multiparty 
autocracies are usually short lived and unstable (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). 
However, these institutional weaknesses of the regime are also what makes the 
effect of dispute involvement more pronounced. 
 
While multiparty regimes are naturally unstable and short-lived as a result of their 
structural design outlined above, territorial conflict has the capacity to centralise 
power in a way that strengthens the leader and weakens the opposition. For 
example, if the regimes territorial integrity is threatened, then it is likely that the 
incumbent will be allowed to go beyond what is typically accepted in order to 
consolidate their power within the regime. The rally around the flag effect 
described in previous section will empower the weak ruling elite, and provide a 
theme that can unify them in face of opposition. If the ruling party takes the 
opportunity to strengthen their position through nationalist rhetoric, then the 
fragmented opposition is unlikely to present a strong challenge to the incumbents.   
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The recent events in Ukraine provide a good example of this mechanism in practice. 
While Ukraine emerged as a relatively weak and fragmented regime after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the recent annexation of Crimea by the 
Russian Federation in 2014 had given the elites the scope to extend their power. As 
the Ukrainian-Russian tensions rose, the Ukrainian elites proceeded with a series of 
legislation passed behind closed doors; these laws prohibit street protests, 
criminalize anti-government "slander”, and require organizations with foreign 
funding to register as "foreign agents" (Applebaum, 2014). Since 2016, the ruling 
clique has established itself even more powerfully in Ukraine, with the 
presidentialisation of politics, and most major institutions such as law-enforcement 
agencies, the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government, the 
electoral commission and the media falling under the direct rule of President Petro 
Poroshenko (Minakov, 2017). It is clear that the institutional weakness of the 
Ukrainian multiparty regime was the very feature that allowed it a greater scope for 
political centralisation since 2014. The ruling elite, finding itself in a newly acquired 
position of power has the opportunity to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the weak 
and fragmented opposition. A similar process is expected to take place in other 
multiparty regimes faced with direct claims to their territorial integrity. 
 
In summary, it is assumed that military and multiparty regimes will become more 
centralised as a result of territorial dispute involvement than either monarchic or 
single party regimes. Although many more classifications of autocracy exist in the 
comparative authoritarianism literature, Chapter 4 will demonstrate that the above 
classifications provide the greatest methodological advantage for testing the 
assumptions of this thesis. The hypothesis that certain types of autocracies are 
more likely to become centralised as a result of territorial dispute involvement will 
be empirically tested in Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
The section below will briefly review additional theoretical literature on regime 
stability. This is done to ensure that all major explanatory factors have been taken 
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into account when designing quantitative tests of the assumptions outlined in this 
chapter. It is important to ensure that the relationship between territorial disputes 
and regime stability cannot be better explained by other factors, such as economic 
development or petroleum dependency.  
 
Additional factors affecting autocratic stability 
 
Apart from regime type, a number of other factors that affect regime stability have 
been identified by the comparative authoritarianism literature. These include 
wealth, economic reliance on petroleum revenues, and societal divisions within the 
country. The section below will briefly review how these factors are likely to 
contribute to the stability and longevity of autocratic regimes.  
As mentioned throughout this chapter, access to rents plays a crucial role in the 
ability of the ruler to buy the support of the key elites in the country (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 2003). Overall, the literature on the impact of wealth on the leader-
elite interaction suggests that higher levels of economic prosperity increase the 
stability of autocracies, and makes them less likely to transition. As previously 
mentioned, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) proposed that the level of economic 
development is likely to reflect the amount of financial resources available to the 
leadership that would help ‘buy’ the loyalty of the elites and silence the opposition. 
Furthermore, high GDP levels are likely to legitimise the regime in the eyes of the 
public, which is unlikely to oppose a government that promotes the wealth of its 
citizens (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). Finally, extremely low levels of GDP per 
capita are a likely indicator of a financial crisis, a well-known factor increasing the 
likelihood of regime change (Gasiorowski, 1995). Hence, it is expected that high 
levels of wealth are likely to reduce the likelihood of autocratic regime failure.  
Moreover, rents might be more accessible to elites if they are obtained from 
resources that do not require additional taxes being imposed on the general 
population and regime elites. Being able to redistribute public and private goods 
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without the need to disenfranchise the tax-payer is of great advantage to autocratic 
rulers. While autocracies can obtain non-tax revenues in a variety of different ways, 
by obtaining greater levels of foreign aid (Ethiopia), monopolising access to private 
sector finance (Taiwain) or receiving contributions from proxy-owned private sector 
businesses (Russia) (Levitsky and Way, 2010: 10-11), the vast majority of literature 
focuses on the importance of petroleum extraction for the stability of authoritarian 
regimes (Ulfelder, 2007; Ross, 2012; Wright et al., 2015). As Wright and colleagues 
(2015: 289) point out, revenues drawn from petroleum production allows the 
leaders to protect themselves from a potential coup or rebellion by providing 
extensive benefits to their citizens, supporters and even opposition. An example of 
this can be easily observed in oil-rich Gulf States where, in the wake of the Arab 
Spring protests, Bahrain’s ruling family distributed as much as 2,650 US dollars to 
every Bahraini family in order to stop dissent (Al Jazeera, 2011). Although some 
studies question the finding that oil-rich regimes are more stable (Lucas and 
Richter, 2016), the bulk of empirical research generates strong support for the oil-
autocratic stability nexus (Ulfelder, 2007; Andersen and Ross, 2014; Wright et al., 
2015). Hence, it is expected that autocracies that rely on petroleum for a large 
portion of their income will be more stable. 
Finally, many researchers suggest that societal divisions have a destabilising effect 
on both autocratic and democratic regimes. For example, ethnically and religiously 
diverse countries are thought to be at a higher risk of internal conflict due to ethnic 
nationalism or religious intolerance (Ignatieff, 1993; Huntington, 1996), produce 
political institutions that are of much poorer quality (Alesina et al., 2003), and lower 
state capacity (Gibler and Miller, 2014). Hence, following other Comparative Politics 
studies (e.g. Escribá-Folch and Wright, 2010), this thesis will assume that ethnic and 
religious fractionalisation increases the likelihood of autocratic regime failure.  
Having discussed how territorial dispute involvement might impact the durability of 
autocratic regimes in the context of a much wider literature on autocratic stability, 
this chapter will now explain how territorial threats might affect democratisation in 
authoritarian regimes. Most importantly, the section below will demonstrate that 
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research on democratic transitions cannot be conducted in isolation from the 
extensive Comparative Politics literature on the determinants of democratic 
transitions. The focus of the section below will thus be on the importance of 
accounting for autocratic regime type when discussing the relationship between 
territorial disputes and democratisation. The discussion on the methodological 
contributions of this thesis to the study of democratisation form an IR perspective 
will be discussed further in Chapter 4.12 
 
 
Territorial dispute involvement and democratisation 
 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, one of the most important contributions of ReSIT 
to the current IR literature is the suggestion that external threats, and recent 
territorial disputes, are likely to result in a lower likelihood of democratisation. 
While the section above demonstrated that the theory can be successfully applied 
to autocratic regime survival, this part of the chapter will explore the theoretical 
contribution of this thesis in relation to the study of ReSIT and democratisation, as 
well as how this contribution can be understood in the context of current 
democratisation research. Most importantly, this chapter will demonstrate the 
importance of accounting for the structural features of autocratic regimes when 
explaining democratisation. In this regard, this thesis aims to improve the standard 
of research on regimes change by incorporating the most recent theoretical 
developments from Comparative Politics research. The theoretical assumptions 
outlined in the section below will be tested in Chapter 7.  
Previous sections of this chapter have demonstrated that ReSIT can be applied to 
the study of autocratic survival as well as democratisation.  However, the original 
formulation of the theory stated that power centralisation, which follows dispute 
involvement, will make the transition to democracy less probable. Just as the 
                                                          
12
 The main methodological contribution to ReSIT in relation to democratisation is the use of 
dichotomous rather than continuous measures of democratic transition. 
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autocratic opposition within a regime is likely to become more divided, so should 
the civil society opposition and interest groups pushing for liberalisation. Naturally, 
if the regime is centralised and strong, it is not only less likely to transition, but also 
less likely to transition to a highly decentralised regime form, such as a democracy.  
Moreover, territorial disputes will also make democratisation the least favourable 
option if regime change is to occur at all. As many scholars have previously 
suggested, this is because democracy is often associated with a weak executive and 
a slow decision making process. These are two factors that make it appear as highly 
disadvantageous if the regime is involved in a highly threatening territorial dispute. 
The system of checks and balances, as well as the need for public support when 
deciding on war participation, makes democracies less likely to react to threats in a 
timely fashion and therefore less likely to emerge victorious in war (Levy, 1988; 
Russett, 1993: 38-39; Rosato, 2003: 587). The long reaction time inherent in 
democratic decision-making processes makes them appear ‘unfit’ for war (Levy, 
1988: 659-60). While little empirical support for these claims exist in the academic 
research (Desch, 2008; Bausch, 2015), the perception of democratic systems as 
weak and incapacitated has often appeared as a theme in the discussion of war and 
regime type (de Tocqueville, I975: 234-235; Morgenthau, 1967: 241; Kennan, 1977: 
3-4, all cited in Levy, 1988). Therefore, it is not only expected that territorial 
disputes will increase autocratic stability, but that they will also hinder the process 
of democratisation in autocratic regimes. This proposition will be tested in Chapter 
7.  
However, as with autocratic stability, there is a host of other crucial factors that 
might affect the chances of democratisation within autocratic regimes. While some 
of them have been incorporated into previous ReSIT research, others, like 
autocratic regime type, have not. An additional theoretical contribution of this 
thesis is the claim that democratisation as a result of territorial dispute might 
depend on the structural features of autocracy. Due to time and space limitations, 
only general expectations will be outlined below, and a further study of the 
moderating effects of regime type will be needed in the future. Nevertheless, to the 
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best of my knowledge, no study to date has disaggregated authoritarian regimes 
when testing the propositions of ReSIT. Hence, the analysis in Chapter 7 provides a 
genuine contribution to the field.  
 
Disaggregating democratisation 
 
As mentioned previously, in the past two decades the Comparative Politics 
literature made extraordinary progress in relation to our understanding of how 
autocratic regimes operate, and the processes involved in democratisation. While 
the section on autocratic survival made explicit assumptions about how each 
autocratic regime will respond to democratisation, the same set of assumptions will 
apply to democratisation. It is expected that regimes most likely to transition to 
democracy will also be most likely to be affected by territorial disputes. This is 
because the highest occurrence of democratisation occurs in regimes whose power 
structures are relatively decentralised, and leaders rarely enjoy a firm grip on 
power. 
For example, in military regimes, power is often distributed among members of the 
junta, and leaders and elites are rarely preoccupied with power-grabbing, given 
that the survival of the army is often valued more than political influence. Hence, 
military regimes are thought to be one of the most likely regime types to leave 
power via negotiated settlement that results in democracy (Geddes, 2003, 2007). 
However, as mentioned previously, military rulers are also very unlikely to step 
down if they perceive a threat to the territorial integrity of the state. While leaders 
might refrain from centralising power for personal reasons, they might do so for 
national security reasons. As mentioned before, territorial integrity of the state is, 
after the institution of the military itself, one of the most important motivations for 
the junta. Therefore, while military regimes are likely to democratise in times of 
peace, they will be unlikely to democratise under conditions of territorial threats.  
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Similarly to military regimes, multiparty regimes are also considered to be more 
likely to transition into a democratic system. In fact, the majority of transitions from 
competitive autocracies to another form of regime have resulted in 
democratisation (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007: 152). This is because the addition of 
limited competition introduced by the incumbents can, and often does, lead to a 
more substantial positive change in the long run (Howard and Roessler, 2006; 
Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Donno, 2013). Hence, power is relatively decentralised 
because the opposition is much stronger and more organized than in other types of 
autocracies. While not entirely free from persecution and harassment, it is 
nonetheless allowed to operate in the open. Given how decentralized the relations 
between the rulers and the opposition are in multiparty regimes, it is not surprising 
that they are much more likely to democratise. However, this decentralization gives 
the leaders more scope to strengthen their position in the face of territorial 
disputes. Like in military regimes, the relatively decentralised and pluralistic 
distribution of power puts the leader in a position to increase their influence. 
Overall, the effects of territorial dispute involvement on democratic transitions are 
expected to be more pronounced in military and multiparty regimes.  
On the other hand, no such regularity is expected to occur in single-party regimes 
and monarchies. As mentioned previously, both types of regime are usually highly 
centralised, and tend to be followed by another form of autocracy (Hadenius and 
Teorell, 2007). Hence, given that the likelihood of democratisation is already 
extremely low, it is possible that single-party and monarchic regimes might be less 
affected by territorial disputes than military and multiparty regimes. This is not to 
say that they will not be affected at all. What this simply suggests is that their 
response will be much less pronounced than that of military and multiparty 
regimes.  
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Other factors affecting democratic transitions 
 
Having discussed how each autocratic type might respond to territorial disputes, it 
is important to consider a number of additional factors important to the study of 
democratisation. Two of them are usually cited as particularly important: economic 
development and reliance on petroleum revenues. Unfortunately, due to time and 
space constraints, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to paint a full picture of the 
debate and the links between economic prosperity and democratization. Given the 
wealth of research within the area, and the strong empirical link between wealth 
and democracy, the influence of wealth on democratization will be accounted for in 
Chapter 7. However, for theoretical reasons, wealth will be expected to have no 
real impact on the chances of democratisation. This is because while the classical 
version of Modernisation theory assumes that higher levels of economic 
development make democratisation more likely due to various societal changes 
within the country,13 the theory is at odds with the assumptions made earlier about 
the stabilising effects of wealth on autocratic regimes. Given that wealth is 
expected to make autocracy more stable, it is highly unlikely that the same factor is 
likely to make democratisation more likely at the same time. In essence, wealth 
increases the stability of all types of regimes – autocratic and democratic. 
Fortunately, Przeworski and colleagues (2000) provide a convincing account of how 
the relationship between wealth and democracy can be reconciled with the 
relationship between wealth and autocratic survival. Their empirical work 
demonstrates that while wealth does not lead to democratisation, it might help 
young democracies survive, explaining the association between democracy and 
wealth observed in so many empirical studies (Przeworksi and Limongi, 1997).  
                                                          
13
 For example, economic development is said to lead to a higher rate of urbanisation, better 
standard of education, the development of the middle class and an increased rate of political 
participation. The newly transformed society can eventually no longer be supported by centrally 
governed structures, leading to a collapse of dictatorial regimes and the development of democracy 
(Lipset, 1959; Rueschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, 1992). Simply put, the better-off the citizens, 
the less likely they are to tolerate oppressive regimes (Epstein et al., 2006). 
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Additionally, the impact of petroleum revenues will also be controlled for in 
Chapters 6 and 7, with the expectation that oil-dependent autocracies will be less 
likely to democratise. In the past, many scholars theorised that the rents produced 
by petroleum extraction would slow down or even stop the process of 
democratisation altogether (Ross, 2001). While the empirical research on the links 
between oil dependency, regime stability and democratisation often overlaps (see 
for example Ross, 2012), the premise guiding the relationship between oil 
dependency and democratisation is somewhat different from the one guiding the 
relationship between oil dependency and regime stability. For example, while 
petroleum revenues are expected to strengthen the position of autocratic leaders 
by allowing them to ‘buy off’ the opposition, there is a separate mechanism 
involved in the oil-democracy relationship. More specifically, it is often claimed that 
when regimes depend on oil revenues rather than taxation for their income, they 
will be less likely to respond to the demands for greater representation from their 
citizens.  If the government imposes taxes on assets that are mobile, citizens will 
often choose to hide them or move them abroad. Hence, if leaders want to keep 
extracting taxes from their population, they need to commit to protecting their 
interests by creating representative institutions that help the citizens hold the 
leader to account (North and Weingeist, 1989).  However, when states are rich in 
natural resources such as petroleum, they rarely need to enter into such agreement 
with the population, generating enough income from the extraction itself (Ross, 
2001). Without the possibility of withdrawing their financial support for the regime, 
the citizens lose important political leverage vis-à-vis the ruling class (Herb, 2005; 
Ross, 2011). In summary, the presence of oil is likely to result in lower chances of 
democratisation (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Wiens, Poast and Clark, 2011; and 
Ross, 2012).  
 
Finally some scholars have speculated that societal divisions in the form of ethnic 
and religious fractionalisation might make democratisation less likely. As mentioned 
previously, ethnic and religious fractionalisation are likely to lead to less stable 
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autocratic regimes. However, some scholars additionally propose links between 
ethnic and religious fractionalisation and democratic transitions (Horowitz, 1985; 
Dahl, 1989). Despite these claims, ethnic and religious fractionalisation is not 
expected to make democratisation less likely. This is because most of the 
theoretical claims put forward by scholars relate to factors making regimes less 
stable and therefore more likely to fail generally rather than just democratise. 
Furthermore, this is because the empirical evidence linking societal divisions and 
democratisation is mixed at best (Gasiorowski, 1995; Bernhard et al., 2004; Wright, 
2008; see also the discussion in Coppedge, 2012: 292-95). Instead, it is expected 
that other factors, discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 will make increase the 
likelihood of democratisation. These include the withdrawal of financial and 
political support for autocratic regimes after the end of the Cold War (Levitsky and 
Way, 2010), a prior history of democracy in the country (Escribá-Folch and Wright, 
2010), and the prior number of regime changes within the country (Przeworski et 
al., 2000; Gassebner et al., 2009), all of which are expected to have a significant 
impact on the likelihood of democratisation in autocratic regimes. Therefore, while 
ethnic and religious fractionalisation scales are used as independent variables in 
Chapters 5 and 6, which relate to autocratic stability, they are not used as 
dependent variables in Chapter 7. 14 
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, the theoretical analysis of the IR and Comparative Politics literatures 
above demonstrated that the main assumptions of ReSIT can be applied to the 
study of both autocratic regime survival and democratisation. By demonstrating the 
importance of shifting the unit of analysis from autocratic spells to autocratic 
regimes, this chapter has demonstrated that territorial disputes are just as likely to 
                                                          
14
 Although fractionalisation scales will not be included as independent variables in Chapter 7, 
separate survival regressions models were built to ensure that neither ethnic fractionalisation nor 
religious fractionalisation significantly influenced democratisation. As expected, there was no 
statistically significant relationship between ethnic fractionalisation and democratisation, and 
religious fractionalisation and democratisation. 
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affect the stability of singular autocratic regimes as they are to affect autocratic 
spells. This is an important contribution of this thesis, because the focus on 
autocratic spells and democratisation can conceal internal instabilities within 
autocratic regimes. As discussed above, many long-lasting and apparently stable 
autocratic spells contain a number of short-lived and volatile authoritarian regimes. 
However, for theoretical claims of ReSIT to hold true, territorial disputes should 
prolong the life of autocratic regimes, not spells. The analysis above demonstrates 
that there is wealth of theoretical literature within the field of comparative 
authoritarianism to support such a claim.  
The second original contribution of this chapter was to apply ReSIT’s theoretical 
framework as developed by Gibler (2010) to the discussion of leader-elite 
interaction within autocratic regimes. Hence, this thesis will test the proposition 
that autocratic regimes are less stable as a result of territorial dispute involvement 
(Chapter 5). It will also test the postposition that territorial dispute involvement has 
a greater impact on military and multiparty regimes, but has less of an impact on 
single party regimes (Chapter 6).  Finally, Chapter 7 will test the standard ReSIT 
proposition that states that territorial disputes are less likely to democratise as a 
result of territorial disputes, while at the same type controlling for the effects of 
structural features of various types of autocracies.  
Yet, before engaging these research aims, the next chapter will outline the 
methodological contributions of this thesis, as well as the procedures used to test 
the hypotheses outlined in this chapter. It will present the rationale for using 
quantitative methods and regime change as the unit of analysis.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology and methods 
 
Introduction 
 
In order to test the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter, the thesis will use 
a large N quantitative study of all autocratic regimes between 1951 and 2008. The 
main tool of analysis is survival analysis and specifically the Cox Proportional 
Hazards regression model. The study employs two dependent variables: the time to 
regime change (Chapters 5 and 6) and time to democratisation (Chapter 7). The 
main independent variables used are: a) territorial dispute involvement, b) the 
structural characteristics of the autocracy, c) wealth, and d) petroleum dependency. 
While the four main independent variables are the most crucial predictors of 
regime transitions, a number of other control variables are also employed, based 
on insights from previous research on the determinants of regime change and 
democratisation. They will be discussed briefly later in this chapter. 
The thesis uses an interdisciplinary approach to testing the propositions put 
forward by the Reversed Second Image Theory (ReSIT) scholarship, and applies a 
new and innovative methodology – survival analysis – which is still under-utilised 
within the field of International Relations, despite its many advantages. The main 
original contributions outlined in this chapter are methodological rather than 
theoretical in nature, yet they are no less crucial than the contributions outlined in 
Chapter 3. The single most important contribution is the use of methodology that 
goes beyond the current standards of the IR discipline, and thus improves on the 
dyadic research design, continuous measures of democracy, and the traditional 
blanket approach to autocratic regimes. More specifically, the thesis places its focus 
on singular regimes as units of analysis, in contrast to pairs of states or singular 
countries. This allows it to account not only for the determinants of 
democratisation, but also for the determinants of regime transition more generally. 
Furthermore, the focus is placed on regimes, rather than states, and their domestic 
structures are studied independently from those of their rivals. Unlike all of the 
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ReSIT studies conducted to date, it uses a theoretically-driven dichotomous 
distinction between democracies and autocracies, thus greatly improving the 
standards of regime measurement in IR. Finally, to the best of my knowledge, this 
thesis is the first ReSIT study to disaggregate autocratic states and acknowledge 
structural differences between the four main autocratic types (military, monarchic, 
multiparty and single party). The choice of autocratic regime typology (Magaloni et 
al. 2013) allows the analysis to distinguish multiparty regimes, which are becoming 
one of the most prominent autocratic types, but which are still often unaccounted 
for in other typologies (Cheibub et al., 2010; Geddes et al., 2014).  
The chapter is divided into six parts, all of which will focus not only on the 
advantages of the methods and measurements used, but also their limitations. 
With this in mind, this chapter aims to explain, in detail, all of the procedures 
employed to answer the research questions posed in this thesis, and identify 
potentially problem areas that could bias the conclusions of the analytical chapters. 
All strategies adopted for minimising bias will be detailed in what follows, and their 
shortcomings will also be addressed.  
In the remainder of this chapter, the first part will justify the quantitative, 
longitudinal design of this study. The second part will describe the theoretical and 
operational definitions of the main concepts applied in the study, along with a 
careful justification for the definitions and measurements used. The third part will 
outline the premises of survival analysis and discuss the main reasons it was 
selected to address the research questions of this thesis. The fourth section will 
discuss the final sample, the process of merging and transforming the datasets, and 
the issue of censored and missing data. Section five will then describe how the 
models used to test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3 were developed. Finally, 
the conclusion will outline potential directions for further research, while discussing 
the strengths and limitations of the methods used in this thesis.  
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Research design 
 
A large-N quantitative study 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this chapter, the thesis employs a quantitative 
research design in order to test the assumptions made in Chapter 3, namely, that 
some autocratic regimes are likely to be more durable, and less likely to 
democratise as a result of international conflict engagement. Before moving to 
discuss the methods used to analyse the data in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, this section 
will briefly justify the use of an empirical approach to the fields of International 
Relations and Comparative Politics, and explain why a quantitative research design 
is the most appropriate approach for answering the research questions of this 
thesis.   
The choice of quantitative methods over qualitative analysis is especially pertinent 
to the study of regime change and territorial dispute involvement for a number of 
reasons (Braumoller and Sartori, 2004). First, it allows for aggregating data from a 
large number of cases. This is particularly important for this study, given that ReSIT 
claims that territorial threats will have an effect on all autocratic regimes. In order 
to test this, all available cases of autocracies need to be subjected to the same 
process of investigation. Due to time and space restrictions, this process is only 
feasible using a large N quantitative study.  
Second, the use of quantitative analysis helps to establish whether evidence for the 
theory under test is significant, or merely a result of chance, allowing for better 
generalizability of results. In the context of the discussion in Chapter 3, the effect of 
territorial disputes on different types of autocracies is assumed to be universal 
across all groups of cases.15 In order to confirm that the observed relationships are 
not a result of chance, the research must be designed with the intention of 
generalizability. Case studies and small-scale comparative research design, although 
                                                          
15
 Although Chapter 3 proposes that different types of autocracy will respond to territorial disputes in different 
ways, these responses are still assumed to apply across all regimes within a given category. For example 
although military regimes are assumed to respond to territorial disputes in a different way than military 
regimes, all single party regimes are still expected to react in a similar manner.  
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extremely useful in theory-building, or to answer alternative research questions, 
are limited when it comes to testing theories that claim to explain general patterns 
and regularities. Statistical analysis with large samples allows for establishing 
whether the effects of territorial threats on regime durability can be seen to be 
simply the result of chance or whether effects are more regular and predictable, 
giving this sort of approach a major advantage for testing theories of regime change 
over other alternatives. Third, given the multitude of causal mechanisms at play 
when accounting for regime change and democratisation, it is important to be able 
to determine whether territorial threats have a real impact on regime transition, or 
whether the relationship can be explained by some other intervening or control 
variable. The major advantage of the scientific method over other types of design is 
the fact that it can control for the impact of alternative explanations of regime 
change.  
Finally, apart from being suitable for testing ReSIT, quantitative methodologies 
have further advantages in the social sciences. The evidence gathered does not only 
serve to provide support for the hypotheses of this thesis, but it also functions as a 
tool for evaluating competing theories and propositions, such as modernisation 
theory discussed in Chapter 3. Research is conducted in a rigorous and consistent 
manner, with a reflexive approach to the limitations of the conclusions drawn from 
the analysis. All units of analysis are subject to the same measures and processes, 
making selection bias less likely, and increasing the potential validity of the study. 
Detailed coding procedures make concepts explicit, leading to a greater 
understanding of what, and how, it is being measured. The research can then be 
replicated and evaluated by other social scientists. This is especially pertinent given 
that the majority of studies testing the propositions of ReSIT have used a scientific 
approach.16 The transparency of quantitative research allows one to establish why 
the results in this thesis might differ from those of other studies, and how exactly 
the present research improves upon them. Moreover, the methodological clarity 
allows other scientists to evaluate the results of analytical chapters of this thesis 
                                                          
16
 See for example James et al. (1996), Crescenzi and Enterline (1999), Mousseau and Shi (1999), Rasler and 
Thompson (2005), Gibler (2007), Gibler (2010), Gibler and Tir (2013), Gibler and Miller (2014).  
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and suggest potential drawbacks, leading to greater quality of future scientific 
research within IR and comparative politics.  
Nevertheless, the scientific method is not without shortcomings. Naturally, the data 
is subject to availability, and due to many uncontrollable factors some cases might 
be omitted or rejected, causing the potential for biased results. Moreover, even in 
longitudinal studies, data is only available for particular periods of time. In this 
thesis, the timeframe is 1951-2008, meaning that the conclusions drawn from the 
analytical chapters cannot be reliably generalised beyond this period. Finally, while 
the use of the scientific method in the social sciences allows for testing general 
proposition on a wide range of data, it naturally results in a great deal of 
reductionism because of the large amount of information being classified into a 
relatively small number of categories. Undoubtedly, the use of the scientific 
method has its advantages and disadvantages, but the careful collection, 
classification and analysis of data driven by strongly developed theoretical and 
practical arguments can reduce the bias significantly. A great deal of reflexivity and 
caution mean that potential mistakes and grey areas can be identified, and their 
impact minimised or accounted for.  
  
Longitudinal design 
 
Given that the aim of this thesis is to uncover patterns of regime transition over 
time, a longitudinal design will be used to test the hypotheses. This study aims to 
uncover not only whether territorial dispute involvement is associated with time to 
regime change and democratisation, but also whether this time is affected by time-
varying covariates, such as territorial dispute involvement, wealth or dependency 
on oil in the current year. For this reason, a longitudinal design has a number of 
advantages over the alternatives. For example, a cross-sectional study could not 
account for the effect of time-varying factors, because the data in cross-sectional 
studies only captures the relationship between variables within a very short time 
period (a month or year) (Blossfeld et al., 2014: 14). It would also have been 
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impossible to determine whether the relationship between variables varies across 
different temporal domains, for example the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. 
Given the research questions and the widespread availability of longitudinal data in 
both International Relations and Comparative Politics, the thesis will adopt a 
longitudinal design with the years between 1951 and 2008 as its temporal domain.  
 
Unit of analysis 
 
Although many ReSIT studies have tested the theory’s propositions on pairs of two 
countries (dyads), this study will use the regime as the sole unit of analysis. This is 
so for two reasons. First, the dyadic design is mainly useful in attempting to 
determine the causes and processes of international conflict between a pair of 
states or regimes in the second image approach. When time to democratisation or 
regime survival is the dependent variable of study, a dyadic approach makes little 
sense. While some resit studies attempted to measure time to joint 
democratisation within a dyad of conflicted countries, this approach, is guided by 
the desire to conform to the standard IR practices rather than sound 
methodological and theoretical reasons. Many recent scholars have noted that 
even within the confines of the second image of the causes of conflict, the 
discipline of IR of has tested dyadic relationships to such an extent that little 
original and interesting information can be brought to existing debates (Enia and 
Jones, 2015), and even the standard DPT research begun to move toward a 
monadic approach (see for example Caprioli and Trumbore, 2006; Souva and Prins, 
2006; Boehmer, 2008). For these above reasons, more recent studies of ReSIT have 
begun to adopt a more appropriate unit of analysis, looking at the longevity of an 
autocratic spell within a single country, rather than a par of conflicted countries 
(Gibler, 2010; Gibler and Tir, 2013). Unlike other ReSIT studies, and as explained in 
Chapter 3, the unit of analysis is an autocratic regime, as opposed to autocratic 
spell. It is worth noting that there are usually multiple autocratic regimes within a 
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country, and each regime is treated as a separate subject.17 Through its use of 
regime as its unit of analysis, this thesis improves on the already existing research 
by adopting a new, interdisciplinary methodology, which does not merely aim to 
refute the results of previous dyadic studies of DPT or ReSIT, but develops an 
alternative, more theoretically informed, mode of enquiry. Having outlined the 
main features of the research design, the chapter will now move to discuss the 
operationalization of the dependent and independent variables used in the 
analytical chapters, including a more detailed definition of the term ‘regime’.  
 
Operationalization of key variables 
 
Dependent variables: defining and measuring regime change and democratisation 
 
In order to operationalize the terms regime change and democratisation, some 
definitions need to be established. The term regime in the most basic way was 
defined by Geddes and colleagues (2014: 1) as a ‘set of formal and/or informal rules 
for choosing leaders and policies’. This thesis will follow a more specific definition 
developed by Magaloni et al. (2013: 6) who further describes regimes as a ‘source 
of policy making, institutions or rules that structure intra-elite interaction and 
competition, and composition and selection of the executive and political leaders’. 
Regimes can be both autocratic and democratic, although the thesis only analyses 
regime change from one autocratic regime to another type of regime (autocratic or 
democratic). Once the regime undergoes democratisation, the resulting democratic 
regime is excluded from the sample. If the new democracy undergoes an autocratic 
reversal, it is included back into the sample. It is worth noting that because this 
thesis focuses on autocratic regimes only, autocratic reversals and democracy–to-
autocracy transitions will not be examined this thesis.  
 
 
                                                          
17
 Although the regime spells within each country are treated as separate cases, their risk of transition is not 
considered independent from one another. The issue of interdependence will be addressed later in the chapter. 
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Specifying Regime Transition in Chapters 5 and 6 
 
A regime transition is hereby defined as an event that occurs when a given regime 
ceases to exist and is replaced by another regime. This means that the current set 
of rules that govern that particular regime changes to another set of rules (Geddes 
et al., 2014). Nevertheless, to count as a transition, the change of rules has to be 
accompanied by a significant change to the structure of intra-elite competition and 
interaction, as well as the manner of selection of the executive and political leaders, 
as defined by Magaloni and colleagues (2013). This means that regimes are only 
treated as having undergone a transition when the regime change is serious enough 
for one type of autocracy to be coded as structurally different from the original 
regime, i.e. when a single party regime transitions to a military regime or a 
democracy.18 However, if a state undergoes a change from one type of military 
regime to a different type of military regime, even if significant policy-making and 
leadership changes follow, the regime is coded as not having transitioned.  
 
As a result, it is important to note that a regime might undergo a number of coups 
and leadership changes, which are merely designed to oust the current leader 
without changing the overarching regime structures. Such changes do not count as 
regime change in this study. This distinguishes regime transitions from leadership 
transitions, which are a separate field of inquiry in the IR and Comparative Politics 
research community (see for example Goemans et al., 2009, and Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith, 2010). It is also important to note that this definition differs 
greatly from many operational definitions provided within the framework of 
international relations, which often defines ‘regime change’ as any substantial 
change to the Polity or Freedom House score. However, because IR studies of 
regime change are primarily interested in democratisation, these differences will be 
discussed in the section below.  
 
                                                          
18
 The thesis recognises four different types of autocracy: military, monarchic, single party and multiparty 
regimes. For more discussion see the section on the operationalisation of independent variables in later 
sections of this chapter.  
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In the Magaloni et al.  (2013: 8) data, the date of regime transition is marked by the 
first set of elections, the date of a coup d’état, or the date on which multiple parties 
are banned or allowed, provided that these changes lead to a genuine structural 
regime change. Finally, regimes which end but do not result in a transition to 
another country (for example North Yemen, Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia) are not 
coded as having transitioned, and are instead coded as censored. A detailed 
discussion of censoring can be found in the later sections of this chapter. 
 
Specifying continuous versus dichotomous measures of democracy in Chapter 7 
 
While the definition of regime change is a relatively straightforward issue in 
Comparative Politics, the definition of what constitutes a democratic transition is 
far more problematic, mainly because of the discrepancies in the operational 
definitions of a democracy. As mentioned earlier, this thesis will make an original 
methodological contribution to the IR literature investigating democratisation by 
using a dichotomous measure of democratisation. Moreover, newly transitioned 
regimes will have to meet essential criteria in order to be classified in accordance 
with the definition provided by Przeworski et al. (2000) and Magaloni et al. (2013). 
This means that states either fully democratise or remain autocratic, depending on 
whether they meet the set out criteria. However, before moving to discuss the 
measurement of democracy used in this thesis, the section below will explain why 
the use of dichotomous and theory driven operationalization of democratic 
transition is a major contribution and improvement on the current standards of 
democracy measures within the existing literature. 
 
In the discipline of IR, and, until recently, in the field of Comparative Politics, the 
operational distinction between democratic and autocratic regimes has been based 
on a small number of continuous indicators such as Freedom House, Vanhanen, or 
Polity IV scales. This is the case despite the fact that methodological literature 
within IR has concluded that operational definitions of democracy based on 
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continuous measures produce unreliable and often heavily biased results (Gleditsch 
and Ward, 1997; Munk and Verkilen, 2002; Treier and Jackman, 2008; Vreeland, 
2008; Cheibub et al., 2010), Polity IV and other democracy-autocracy scales remain 
the gold standard for measuring regime change in the field of IR (Plümper and 
Neumayer, 2010), and, as a result, also within the ReSIT tradition.19 Unfortunately, 
due to limitations of space, not all criticism of continuous measures can be listed in 
this chapter. As a result, the section below will focus on three limitations in 
particular. Namely, their lack of content validity, their lack of construct validity, and 
the incorrect assumptions they make about the nature of democratic transitions.  
The first criticism of continuous measures of democracy is their lack of construct 
validity. Regimes are considered democratic based on the value they had scored on 
some particular scale, rather than because they conform to some pre-specified 
criteria of what constitutes a democracy.  For example, Polity IV has two separate 
regime scales, one measuring the degree of democracy, and one measuring the 
degree of autocracy within a given state, ranging between 0 and 10 each. For a final 
Polity score, the autocracy score is subtracted from the democracy score. The 
resulting scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic) 
(Marshall et al., 2014: 16). As pointed out by the authors themselves, there are ‘no 
necessary conditions’ for characterizing a political system as democratic or 
autocratic (Marshall et al., 2014: 15). Although Marshall and colleagues (2014) have 
not established a threshold themselves, many researchers agree that in order to be 
considered democratic, a state needs to meet a certain score, which usually falls 
between the values of 6 and 7.5. Because it is a score, and not a particular regime 
feature that determines the regime type, a regime can be considered to be a 
democracy even if it does not meet essential criteria for being democratic. Given 
that what classifies a state as a democracy is an arbitrary change on the scale, 
continuous measures of democracy lack essential construct validity. To improve on 
the current methodology within IR and some Comparative Politics literature, the 
                                                          
19
 See for example: Mousseau and Shi (1999), James et al. (1996), Gibler (2007), Gibler (2010), Gibler and Tir 
(2010), or Gibler and Braithswaite (2012). 
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thesis adopts a strict set of criteria for deciding what constitutes democracy, 
making sure all states that are defined as democracies share the same essential 
features and therefore preserving basic construct validity.  
Second, in order to construct a continuous scale of democracy, a wide variety of 
indicators is usually used, reducing the essential content validity of the measure, 
and increasing the likelihood of measurement errors (Cheibub et al., 2010). For 
example, Freedom House (2016) uses a number of arbitrary democracy indicators, 
which stretch the concept beyond the minimal definition and include features such 
freedom of speech, civil rights, and economic equality. Polity IV, on the other hand, 
uses components such as party fractionalisation or the presence of civil war in a 
country (Vreeland, 2008; Cheibub et al., 2010). These indicators correlate with, but 
are not necessarily determinants of, democracy. This has negative implications for 
research because it inhibits the scope of analysis. For example, if one includes a 
measure of inequality in the definition of democracy, the potential links between 
social justice and democratic institutions are no longer available as a subject of 
empirical research (Munk and Verkilen, 2002: 9). Similarly, including the presence 
of civil war as a determinant of democracy makes it difficult to establish a genuine 
relationship between domestic conflict and regime type. Instead, it is far more 
desirable to define democracy narrowly and study its causes and consequences, 
rather than resolve such issues by a ‘definitional fiat’ (Alvarez et al., 1996: 18). 
Dichotomous measures do not define democracy broadly, and, as a result, do not 
suffer from these limitations. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the use of continuous measures of regime type has a 
significant impact of the theoretical assumptions that underpin the studies that use 
them. Polity IV, Freedom House and Vanhanen scales imply that the path from an 
open to closed polity is linear: as states become less autocratic, they simultaneously 
come closer to becoming a democracy. Nevertheless, this is not necessarily the case 
in practice, and the likelihood of democratisation is often independent of the initial 
level of competitiveness in the state (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a: 11). In fact, many 
autocracies have been shown to adopt democratic institutions and processes as a 
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means of survival, rather than in an effort to democratise (Gandhi and Przeworski, 
2008; Boix and Svolik, 2013). Hence, the adoption of ‘democratic’ institutions, 
which would position a state higher on the scale of democracy in reality, often 
consolidates autocratic regimes making them less likely to democratise. 
Dichotomous measures of democracy, on the other hand, make no baseline 
assumptions about how close a given state is to democratising. 
By steering away from continuous measures of democracy such as Polity IV or 
Freedom House, the thesis will improve upon methodology used by other 
researchers not only in the field of IR generally, but also specifically within the ReSIT 
tradition, where all of the research conducted to date relies on democracy-
autocracy scales to operationalize democratic transitions (James et al., 1996; 
Mousseau and Shi, 1999; Reiter, 2001; Gibler, 2007; Gibler and Tir, 2010, 2013). 
Given the popularity of unreliable measures of democracy within the field of IR, the 
choice of dichotomous measures is a particularly important methodological 
contribution of this thesis.  
 
Specifying Democratisation in Chapter 7 
 
The following section will briefly outline the conditions that must be met by an 
autocratic country in order to undergo a democratic transition. Although 
democratic transition is a dependent variable in Chapter 7 only, the 
operationalization has serious implications on the thesis in general, because only 
regimes that do not conform to these criteria are included in the study. Hence, the 
operational definition of democracy is important in the sense that it defines the 
entire sample of this study. As mentioned previously, the study employs the criteria 
for democracy used by Magaloni et al. (2013), which are in turn based on the work 
of Przeworski et al. (2000). In order to classify as a democracy, a regime must 
include (Magaloni et al., 2013: 6): 
a) A civilian government as the main source of policy making; 
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b) Competitive political parties that interact and run the government through a 
legislature; 
c) An executive that is institutionally constrained or checked by other parts of the 
government; 
d) Largely open, competitive, fair and free elections, which are used to select the 
political leadership.  
In addition, Magaloni et al. (2013) do not use the alteration rule for classifying 
democracies, meaning that a regime can be coded as having transitioned to 
democracy, even if the incumbent leader has not yet had the chance to lose power 
in popular elections. This is an important improvement, because other datasets, 
such as Cheibub et al. (2010), use alteration rules to classify all ambiguous cases as 
autocracies. Hence, they effectively skew the sample through a non-random 
selection process (Ulfelder, 2006). To minimise the likelihood of type II errors, 
Magaloni et al. (2013) supplant the alternation rule with the requirement of 
constraints on the executive power (Magaloni et al., 2013: 6-7). This means that the 
leader cannot be able to overrule a potential loss in free and fair elections. For 
more details, and for specific examples, see Magaloni et al. (2013).  
 
Independent variables 
 
External threats 
 
The impact of external threats on a state’s domestic organisation has been at the 
heart of ReSIT theory and research (Hintze, 1994; Gourevitch, 1978; Thompson, 
1996; Gibler 2007, Gibler and Tir, 2010; Gibler and Miller, 2014), and as such is 
intrinsically linked to a wider body of scholarship in IR, including DPT research, all of 
which have set accepted standards for measuring international disputes, conflicts 
and disagreements. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 3, the focus of this thesis is purely on disputes that are 
territorial in nature. This is because territorial issues are more important than other 
forms of disputes or armed conflicts in predicting regime stability and 
democratisation. Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 3, territorial threats are so 
significant that they have an effect on regime stability and regime transition even if 
they are never realised, for example, the claiming party never uses military power 
in order to seize the target’s territory. As a result, the operational definition of 
territorial dispute is as follows: participation in any military or non-military dispute 
over the possession or control of some part of a contested territory (Gibler and 
Miller, 2014). It is important to reiterate that unlike with studies conducted prior to 
Gibler’s (2007; 2010) research, territorial disputes do not refer to armed conflict, 
but simply disagreements over territory that may, or may not, be military. Hence, 
the term ‘dispute’ differs significantly from that adopted by James et al. (1999) or 
Reiter (2001), who use militarised interstate disputes (MID) from the Correlates of 
War data as their independent conflict variable to test ReSIT. It also differs from 
other studies (Crescenzi and Enterline, 1999; Mousseau and Shi, 1999; Reiter, 2001) 
in that it does not capture war participation. For more discussion on why territorial 
disputes are a more suited measure of threat than international militarized conflict 
or even wars, see Chapter 3.  
 
In order to code for the presence or absence of territorial threats, this thesis uses 
replication data from Gibler and Miller’s (2014) External Territorial Threat, State 
Capacity, and Civil War study. Gibler and Miller (2014: 639) use the Huth and Allee 
(2002) original territorial claims dataset which examines all territorial disputes 
(armed and un-armed) between all pairs of states in the international system 
between 1919 and 1995. They then extend the dataset to 2007 by examining all 
territorial claims that were on-going in 1995 and determining whether they had 
ended by 2007 in accordance with Huth and Allee’s coding procedures (ibid.). The 
data is then coded so that the state, rather than a pair of states, is the unit on 
analysis. Finally, the territorial dispute variable is lagged one year in order to ensure 
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that it is the territorial dispute involvement variable that increased the likelihood of 
regime change or democratisation, rather than the other way around. Hence, 
although Gibler and Miller’s data only extends until 2007, the dataset used in this 
thesis extends to 2008.  
 
In addition to the above, Gibler and Miller’s (2014) data differs from Huth and 
Allee’s (2002) original dataset by limiting the observations to territorial claims made 
by neighbours (contiguous states). This distinction between claims made by 
contiguous and non-contiguous claims is important, because, as explained in 
Chapter 3, the argument that territorial threats may have an impact on domestic 
organisation of states only applies to neighbours. While the use of Gibler and Miller 
(2014) data limits the observation in this dataset from the original 62 years (1950-
2012) to 57 years (1950-2007, and, after lagging of the territorial variable, to 1951-
2008), the resulting temporal domain of the dataset is still superior to other 
currently available datasets using similar measures of territorial claims. For 
example, the aforementioned and widely acclaimed Huth and Allee (2002) dataset 
extends only to year 1995. Similarly, the Issue Correlates of War (Hensel, 2001; 
Hensel and Mitchell, 2015), which records territorial, maritime and river claims 
currently only extends to year 2001.  
 
Limitations 
 
Although the Gibler and Miller (2014) replication data is the most suitable one for 
this study, it has a number of limitations that must be acknowledged. First, it does 
not distinguish between the target and the initiator of a territorial dispute, making 
it difficult to determine which regime is experiencing a sense of greater threat from 
the disagreement. However, this is a limitation that is specific not just to Gibler and 
Miller’s (2014) data, but all monadic conflict datasets. When states or regimes, not 
dyads, are the units of analysis, they can be both targets and initiators at the same 
time, especially if they take part in multiple disputes at the same time. For example, 
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the monarchy in Saudi Arabia has been subject to a very large number of claims 
from other states (Iraq, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iran, Oman and 
others). At the same time, it has also initiated many of its own claims towards the 
same or different countries (Qatar, Iraq, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, 
Jordan, Kuwait and others). Such a situation is not rare, given that when one state 
makes a claim to another state’s territory and then seizes it, the target state often 
responds with making its own claim to that territory, making it very difficult to 
determine when a state stops being initiator and becomes a target instead. Hence, 
identifying the target is very difficult except for a very limited number of non-
reciprocated territorial conflicts, making such measurements unfeasible. Instead, it 
is more useful to simply identify a territorial dispute as a threat both parties.  
 
The second potential problem with this data is the fact that the ‘territorial dispute’ 
variable is a dummy variable and as such, it cannot measure the intensity or the 
severity of threats. One, if a regime is engaged in a dispute, it is always coded as 1, 
even if for that given year it was engaged in multiple disputes. For example, 
Tanzania was involved in a military dispute with Uganda between 1974 and 1979, 
but was not involved in any other disputes with any other state for that period. 
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, was involved in a number of disputes with Iran, 
Kuwait, Oman, Iraq or United Arab Emirates throughout the observation period. 
However, both states are coded in the same way (1 for the presence of a dispute, 0 
for lack of dispute) despite Tanzania having only 1 rival, while Saudi Arabia has 
multiple. As such this data cannot capture the intensity or potential multiplicity of 
the territorial threat. Although this data could be coded by looking at Huth and 
Allee’s (2002) disputes on an individual basis, this would be extremely time-
consuming and goes beyond the scope of the present investigation, and thus must 
be relegated to future research. Two, as mentioned before, this variable would be 
coded 1 for a regime involved in a diplomatic dispute over a territory, but also 1 for 
a regime that went into war over that territory. As such, the severity of conflict is 
also not differentiated. 
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Finally, some cases from the original Huth and Allee (2002) dataset are lost due to 
both parties in the dispute needing to be contiguous. For example, while 
Indonesia’s claim to the Malaysian islands of Sipadan and Ligitan between 1980 and 
2007 is coded as a dispute, the Philippines’ claim to the Malaysian Sabah region, 
which started in 1962, is not coded at all because the two states do not share a land 
border. As a result, Malaysia is coded as conflict-free between 1962 and 1980 
despite being involved in a territorial dispute. However, as reiterated by Gibler 
(Gibler, 2012; Gibler and Miller, 2014), his theory applies to contiguous states only, 
hence the loss of data should not have a significant impact on the conclusions of 
the study. 
 
Despite the limitations above, the Gibler and Miller (2014) dataset is still the most 
suitable data for answering the research question of this thesis, given that it is the 
only dataset which codes all territorial disputes, records them in a monadic format, 
and extends them as far as the year 2007. Given that the issues discussed above 
cannot be easily addressed due to limitations in time and space, their impact will be 
considered throughout the following Analytical Chapters (Chps. 5, 6 & 7) and the 
Conclusion of this thesis. Having considered the strengths and weaknesses of the 
measure of territorial threats, the chapter will now move to discussing the typology 
of autocratic regimes used in this thesis. 
 
Regime typology 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, the following thesis will distinguish between various 
types of autocracies based on their structural characteristics. The following section 
will explain why the Magaloni et al. (2013) (hereafter MCM) typology is used to 
distinguish between autocracies in analytical Chapter 5, 6 and 7. The discussion will 
be divided into two parts. The first part will explain the importance of using only 
one typology in data analysis by expounding the dangers to research validity and 
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reliability of alternating multiple regime classifications. The second part will outline 
the reasons the MCM datasets in best suited for the thesis by comparing it to other 
data collections in the field. MCM is considered more fitting for answering the 
research questions of this thesis because it includes multiparty regimes in the 
typology, and because it does not include residual categories for mixed and hybrid 
regimes (Magaloni et al., 2013). 
The datasets discussed along with the MCM in the upcoming section are: 
- GWF: the Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2013) data, which is based on the Geddes 
(2003) typology; 
- WTH: Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius (2013) dataset based on the Hadenius and 
Teorell (2007) typology; and  
- CGV: Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) dataset based on the typology by the 
same authors.  
For ease of comparison, see Table 1 below, which includes a list of all major 
differences between the datasets.  
 
The importance of using only one typology 
 
Before justifying the choice of typology of autocratic regimes, it is worth noting that 
only one typology will be used throughout the thesis. This is an important point 
given that many researchers use autocratic regime typologies interchangeably,20 in 
order to demonstrate the robustness of their results, despite the practice being 
strongly criticised by much of the methodological literature within Comparative 
Politics (Casper and Tufis, 2003; Cheibub et al., 2010; Wilson, 2014). This is often 
done for three reasons. First, different typologies often use similar language to 
                                                          
20
 See for example Charron and Lapuente (2011), Cornell (2013), and Hankla and Kuthy (2013). Cornell (2013) is 
a good example of the practice: in order to test her claim that democracy aid has a varying effect on rulers 
across different types of dictatorships, she tests her assumptions using Hadenius and Teorell (2007). To check 
for robustness, she then uses the CGV dataset with a similar typology. 
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describe a particular regime, referring to military regime, monarchies, or party-
based autocracies. Second, they often use similar criteria to classify regimes. Third, 
certain measures in the datasets often strongly correlate with each other. These 
apparent similarities lead many scholars to wrongly believe that they can be treated 
interchangeably (Casper and Tufis, 2003: 196). Nevertheless, autocratic typologies 
diverge substantially in both theoretical and methodological terms. The problems 
of using these datasets interchangeably are outlined below. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of major Comparative Politics datasets with categorical regime typologies 
Typology Dataset Temporal domain Autocratic types Hybrid categories 
       
Geddes, Wright, 
and Franz (2013) 
 
 
Autocratic 
Breakdown and 
Regime 
Transition 
 
1945 – 2010 
 
Monarchy 
Military 
Single-party 
Personalist 
 
Party-personal 
Military-personal 
Party-military 
Party-personal-military 
Indirect military 
Theocracy 
Oligarchy 
  
   
   
 
Wahman, Teorell, 
and Hadenius 
(2013) 
 
 
The 
Authoritarian 
Regimes Dataset 
 
1972 – 2010 
 
 
Monarchy 
Military 
No-party 
Single-party 
Limited multi-party 
 
Party-less 
Military-multiparty 
Military no-party 
Military one-party 
One-party monarchy 
No-party monarchy 
Multiparty monarchy 
Theocracy 
  
   
   
Cheibub, Gandhi, 
and Vreeland 
(2010) 
 
Democracy and 
Dictatorship 
Revisited 
1946 – 2008 
 
Monarchic  
Military  
Civilian  
 
- 
  
Magaloni (2008) 
Magaloni, Chu 
and Min (2013) 
 
Autocracies of 
The World,  
1950-2012 
1950 – 2012 
 
Monarchy 
Military 
Single-party 
Multiparty 
 
- 
 
 
First, the datasets+, although similar, contain irreconcilable typological differences. 
Some datasets chose to code all party and civilian regimes in a similar way (GWF, 
CGV), while others tend to distinguish between different types of party 
governments such as competitive (multiparty) and dominant (single party) systems. 
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Because some typologies do not recognise ‘multiparty’ regimes, no meaningful 
comparisons of results can be made, because the datasets do not measure the 
same concepts.1 Furthermore, for the same reason, some datasets like GWF code 
some multiparty regimes as democracies and exclude them from their dataset.21  
Second, all datasets vary in their treatment of ambiguous cases. When particular 
governments meet the requirements of more than one category, some dataset use 
residual categories to classify them. Some use the ‘hybrid’ classification (GWF and 
WHT), while others (CGV and MCM) code contentious cases based upon the 
features that are most prominent in the polity. This means that in a number of 
cases, in which regimes were classified as ‘hybrids’, the same datasets were 
classified as ideal types by others, making it impossible to compare the predictions 
generated with the use of different datasets.  
Third, all datasets employ different operational definitions of democracy. Some 
datasets have a strict set of criteria that a polity must meet to be classified as 
democratic (MCM, GWF, CGV), while some use continuous measures discussed 
earlier, such as Polity and Freedom House data, to distinguish between free and un-
free states (WTH). The datasets that use strict criteria vary greatly in respect to 
features they consider essentially democratic. Although measures of democracy 
often correlate strongly, they have been shown to produce divergent results 
(Casper and Tufis, 2003).  
Finally, all of the datasets are subject to biases, which lead to further coding 
discrepancies. While biases are an inherent part of any large-scale data collection 
and classification, they are usually consistent within the dataset because they stem 
from the same conceptual and theoretical background. For example, some datasets 
might consistently over-emphasize the role of the military when deciding upon 
ambiguous cases that display both military and civilian features.  Others might tend 
to focus less on the mode of power maintenance and more on how the incumbent 
has been removed from power when deciding on how to code controversial 
                                                          
21
 The regime in Bosnia since its inception in 1992 is a good example. Magaloni et al. (2013) code it as a 
multiparty autocracy, while Geddes et al. (2013) exclude it altogether by coding it as a democracy. 
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polities. They will also vary in their interpretation of historic events. For example, 
CGV codes Poland between 1981 and 1988 as a military regime due to martial law 
imposed by General Jaruzelski in mid-1983. GWF and MCM, on the other hand, 
code it as a single-party regime because the Polish United Workers’ Party was 
considered by them to have had a much greater influence on Polish politics that the 
army within that period (Magaloni et al., 2013: 27). Wilson (2014) further cites 
Nicaragua, Colombia and Brazil as other cases where researchers do not agree on 
the way the regimes should have been coded as a result of different interpretations 
of historic events. As discussed below, these biases have serious implications for 
research results, and as a result, the typologies should and will not be used 
interchangeably. 
While there are many more discrepancies between the datasets mentioned above, 
they will not be considered here due to limitations in time and space.22 The above 
points have clearly illustrated that apparent similarities between the datasets turn 
into irreconcilable differences upon closer examination. Due to conceptual and 
technical differences, the categories within each dataset will contain a moderately 
different set of cases. Although most unambiguous observations will be coded in a 
similar manner by all of the datasets, the occasional discrepancies make the 
predictions of a study that uses them interchangeably extremely sensitive to 
outliers (Wilson, 2014). This in turn reduces the external validity of research. 
Furthermore, using differing measures to test hypotheses is likely to produce 
inconsistent findings, threatening the construct validity of the studies. For these 
reasons, as stated previously, only one dataset will be used in the study.  
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 The reader might have already noticed, for example, that the datasets differ in terms of ‘start’ and ‘end’ 
dates of the same regimes, because the critical points during which regime change occurs is subject to 
interpretation. 
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The typology: military, monarchic, multiparty and single party autocracies 
 
It was previously discussed that most major datasets in Comparative Politics have a 
similar basis for judging autocratic regimes. These include the institutional make-up 
of governments, the ruler selection and replacement mechanisms as well as the 
mode of political power maintenance. To some degree, they also all have a similar 
mechanism for distinguishing between military and civilian governments (Wilson, 
2014). Nevertheless, depending on the research questions the datasets aim to 
answer, they use different categories for classifying cases.23 
The typology used in this thesis comes from the Magaloni et al. (2013) dataset. It is 
considered to be superior to other datasets for two reasons. First, it includes a 
category for multiparty regimes, unlike GWF and CGV. This is important, because as 
mentioned previously, multiparty regimes had replaced single-party and military 
states as the most common form of autocracy after the Cold War (Magaloni, 2008: 
2). Ignoring this major shift in authoritarian politics would put the research at risk of 
being out of touch with current events. Furthermore, it has become evident in 
recent years that multiparty regimes are idiosyncratic (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). 
Although many researchers used to think of electoral dictatorships as merely 
‘façade democracies’ (Crespo, 2004) or transitional states that would eventually 
become democratic, competitive authoritarianism is now widely regarded as a 
unique type of autocracy, with distinct power arrangements (Diamond, 2002; 
Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Magaloni, 2008; Levitsky and Way, 2010). Although 
elections remain unfair and the executive is often unconstrained, the nature of 
elite-leader interaction in multiparty regimes is strikingly different from that in 
single-party states. Not accounting for these discrepancies is a serious flaw in the 
any research wishing to account for structural differences between autocracies. 
The second major advantage of MCM is its exclusion of ‘hybrid’ and ‘mixed’ regimes 
from its typology. While some datasets like GWF or WTH provide categories for 
regimes that do not meet positive criteria for identification, MCM follows CGV in 
                                                          
23
 See Table 1 for a comparison of typologies. 
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asserting that creating residual categories is never an effective solution (Cheibub et 
al., 2010: 197; Magaloni et al., 2013: 2). Firstly, residual categories decrease 
external validity of scientific research. Hybrid class represents cases that do not fit 
any particular type of regime, meaning that no unifying feature can describe this 
group of regimes. Lumping them together makes it difficult, if not impossible, to 
draw meaningful conclusions from observed relationships. Secondly, residual 
categories created by some datasets constitute a large proportion of the overall 
typology. For example, WTH include 14 different categories of regime 
combinations,24 6 of which are a combination of two different regime types. Some 
of these categories include only a handful of cases within them. There is only one 
polity that fits WTH description of one-party monarchies,25 2 polities that fit the 
description of theocracy26 and 3 polities that fit the criteria of a multiparty 
monarchy (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007).27 Similarly, GWF have 10 distinct categories 
despite having only 4 ideal types of regimes. One of them, the party-personalist-
military category includes only 4 cases (Geddes et al., 2014).28 Categories including 
a handful of cases have a sample size so small that meaningful analysis can be 
difficult, if not impossible.  
The MCM dastaset, on the other hand, provides only 4 different types of 
authoritarian regimes and does not create residual categories for regimes with 
mixed or uncertain characteristics. As Magaloni and colleagues (2013: 2) 
emphasize, seemingly hybrid regimes are often categorised as ‘mixed’ due to 
certain ‘window-dressing institutional features’. That said, the authors of MCM do 
make an effort to uncover the essential, underlying regime characteristics behind 
those façade practices. For example, if the access to the positions of power is 
controlled by the military, yet the state also displays some features of a party 
                                                          
24
 A full list of authoritarian regime types in Hadenius and Teorell (2007) includes: Multiparty traditional, 
partyless, dominant party, military multiparty, military traditional, military no-party, no-party traditional, 
military one-party, one-party traditional, one-party monarchy, traditional monarchy, no-party monarchy, 
multiparty monarchy and theocracy. Additional types in the dataset include rebel regimes, occupied states, 
states at civil war, states in transition, democracies, and the ‘others’ category.  
25
 Islamic Republic of Iran 1975-1978. 
26
 Afghanistan 1996-2000 and Islamic Republic of Iran 1979-2003. 
27
 Jordan 1989-2000, Morocco 1977-2003 and Tonga 1996-2003. 
28
 Egypt 1953-2010, Indonesia 1967-1999, Syria 1964-2010. 
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system, it will be classified as a military regime because the effective control is held 
primarily by the armed forces (Magaloni, 2008: 731; Magaloni et al., 2013: 8). This 
technique allows for determining the true nature of a regime and avoiding the 
‘hybrid’ classification. See table 2 for the information on how each regime type was 
operationalized by Magaloni et al. (2013), along with examples.  
Table 2. Summary of the authoritarian regime type operationalisation in Magaloni et al. 
(2013) 
Autocratic type Definition                     Examples 
 
Monarchy 
 
The incumbent is selected among the 
members of a royal or dynastical family who is 
in charge of principal decision-making, 
including the choice of a potential successor. 
The monarch or the royal family must be in 
effective control of policy making and it cannot 
be delegated to the legislature, the party or 
the military. 
 
 
Nepal                 
Saudi Arabia     
Oman                 
  
 (1951 – 2008*) 
 (1769 – 2006) 
 (1932 – 2008*) 
Military The principal positions of power are controlled 
by the military, and the power is shared 
through the institution of the armed forces, as 
opposed to party or the royal family. It is not 
sufficient for the incumbent to merely have a 
military background or be the leader of the 
armed forces at the same time to classify as a 
military regime – the effective control over 
positions of power must reside with the armed 
forces in general. 
 
Argentina         
Somalia            
Myanmar   
(1976 – 1983)  
(1962 – 2008*)  
(1969 – 1990)  
 
Single-party 
 
All politics within the state must be conducted 
under the banner of a single, civilian party, 
and, for the most part, the presence of another 
political party must be constitutionally 
prohibited. The legislature must be composed 
of the ruling party members only.  
 
China 
Malawi 
Tunisia 
 
(1949 – 2008*) 
(1966 – 1994) 
(1963 – 1987) 
 
Multiparty 
 
The ruling party must allow other political 
parties to compete in the elections. The 
competition is unfair and biased in favour of 
the ruling party, but it is real. More than one 
party has to be represented in the legislature 
in order for the state to be considered 
‘multiparty’. 
 
Bosnia                                 
Central African 
Rep.     
Lebanon 
 
(1992 – 2008*)   
(1979 - 1981)  
 
(1975 – 2008*) 
  
 
* - Ongoing (right-censored) regimes 
 
Source: Magaloni et al. (2013: 8-9) and Magaloni (2008: 731-33). 
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Resources 
 
In order to measure the effects of wealth on regime transition and democratisation, 
the thesis employs one measure of tax revenue income, and one measure of non-
tax revenue income. The operationalization of those concepts, along with data 
sources used, is discussed below.  
Wealth 
 
In order to measure tax-generated wealth, this thesis follows benchmark and 
methodologically acclaimed studies in the area (Przeworski et al. 2000, Przeworski 
and Limongi, 1997) in utilising GDP per capita converted to international dollars 
using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates.  
In the standard approach to measuring wealth, most researchers typically use 
unadjusted GDP for each country or regime, and then converted these rates to a 
single currency - typically US dollars- using standard exchange rates for ease of 
comparison. Although relatively straightforward, such a method is hardly reflective 
of the amount of goods that can be bought with that currency within each country. 
After all, the prices of food, accommodation, or services vary depending on region 
and particular countries. An individual earning 20,000 US dollars a year would have 
a much lower standard of living in Norway, where goods and services are 
expensive, than in Bolivia, where goods and services are cheap. For this reason, the 
measure of per capita GDP will be adjusted to account for how much the currency 
would be worth within each of the countries under investigation (purchasing power 
parity), measured in 1990 Gheary-Khamis international dollars (Bolt and van 
Zanden, 2013). 
Two sources of data were used in order to cover the temporal domain of the thesis, 
as well as all regimes classified in the MCM typology of autocracies. In a vast 
majority of cases, the thesis used data from the Maddison Project, which is 
available between 1950 and 2007. Other datasets on GDP figures have a much 
more limited observation period. For example, the IMF and World Bank records 
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start in 1980, Eurostat data is mostly unavailable until the mid-1990s, and the Penn 
World Tables, despite having a temporal domain of 1950-2009, does not begin 
records on certain states until quite late, or excludes them altogether. 
Unfortunately, these states are often autocratic regimes such as Cuba, North Korea, 
USSR or Yugoslavia, and as such are of particular interest of this study. Excluding 
them from the analysis would most likely bias the results, given that the data would 
not be missing at random. Because the Maddison Project data includes these states 
and covers the observation period used in this thesis, it is considered the most 
suitable source for data on regime wealth. 
Finally, in the rare cases where Maddison Project data was missing (see section 4.5. 
of this chapter), it was supplemented with data from Total Economy Database 
(TED), which uses a number of highly reliable sources such as the OECD, Eurostat, 
United Nations, and Asian Development Bank databases, and adjusts their figures 
to 1990 Geary-Khamis international dollars (De Vries and Erumban, 2015). This 
makes the two datasets particularly compatible, and reduces the potential for 
additional errors with manual conversion. 
 
Limitations 
 
While some scholars are sceptical of the data provided by Maddison (2007), this 
criticism is mainly directed at the estimates which extend back beyond the year 
1820, and reflect the wider scepticism referring to whether data on economic 
performance of states before that time can ever be reliably collected (Clark, 2009). 
Given the temporal domain of this thesis (1951-2008) the risk of data being based 
on incomplete data or assumptions is minimal.  
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Oil dependency 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, recent research suggests that petroleum dependency has 
a particularly strong effect on autocratic regime stability (Ulfelder, 2007; Ross, 
2012; Wright et al., 2015) and democratisation (references needed). While there 
are different ways to measure reliance on non-tax revenues, in order to determine 
the impact of oil dependency on dependent variables in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the 
thesis will use a measure supplied by Gibler and Miller (2014), which is based on the 
Fearon and Latin (2003) dataset. As a general rule, a state is considered to be 
reliant on oil as a major source of non-tax revenues if fuel exports ‘constitute more 
than a third of total merchandise exports’ (Gibler and Miller, 2014, appendix: 3). 
This is a time-varying variable, meaning that regimes are only recorded as 
dependent on oil (coded 1) in the period where their exports constitute a third of 
their total exports, but recorded as non-dependent on oil (coded 0) in time periods 
when this share drops below 30%.  
Limitations 
 
The measure of petroleum dependency as the only source of non-tax revenues is 
not without its limits. Although oil is certainly one of the major sources of revenues 
for some autocracies, it is certainly not the only one. Diamonds, foreign aid, or even 
tourism can add a considerable amount of income into to the coffers of some 
autocratic regimes (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Nevertheless, such income is 
particularly difficult to measure, because the information on money received in 
donations or coercively extracted by the state is rarely recorded and shared. For 
these reasons, and because the impact of economic indicators on regime stability is 
of secondary concern in this study, the thesis will be limited to controlling for oil 
dependency only.  While the time and space limitations of this thesis make it 
difficult to include more measures on non-tax revenues, future studies could focus 
on foreign aid and alternative natural resources as additional indicators of wealth.  
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Additional control variables 
 
A number of additional control variables have also been used in analytical chapters 
of this thesis and the rationale for their inclusion and details of their composition 
are briefly discussed below. In Chapters 5 and 6, where the dependent variable is 
time to regime change, additional control variables include ethnic fractionalisation 
and religious fractionalisation measures. In Chapter 7, where time to 
democratisation is the main independent variable, additional control variables 
include the presence of Cold War, history of democracy, and the sum of all past 
regime transitions in the country between 1951 and 2008. Finally, all three 
analytical chapters will include a measure of political instability.  
 
Specifying additional control variables in Chapters 5 and 6 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, much of the literature suggests that religious and ethnic 
fractionalisation is likely to be a good indicator of poor quality of political 
institutions (Alesina et al., 2003), the onset of civil war (Horowitz, 1985; Huntington, 
1996; Ignatieff, 1993) and lower state capacity (Gibler and Miller, 2014). Given that 
all of the above factors are likely to decrease the stability of autocratic regimes, the 
fractionalisation measures are designed to capture some of these effects. These 
measures are used to establish whether more diverse countries result in more 
unstable autocracies similar to other Comparative Politics studies (e.g. Escribá-Folch 
and Wright, 2010). The data on fractionalisation is obtained from Gibler and Miller 
(2014) who base them on the measures developed by Alesina et al. (2003). The 
separate ethnic and religious fractionalisation indices reflect the probability that 
two randomly selected individuals belong to two different ethnic or religious groups 
(Alesina et al., 2003: 158-59). Hence, the higher the score on the scales, the more 
fractionalised is the state.  
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Specifying additional control variables in Chapter 7 
 
History of democracy 
In Chapter 7, three control variables typically thought as important predictors of 
democratisation are used in addition to territorial dispute involvement, wealth, and 
oil-dependency. These are the history of democracy variable, the sum of past 
transitions variable, and a variable indicating the presence of the Cold War. First, it 
is assumed that autocratic regimes in countries that have previously experienced 
democratisation might be more likely to transition to democracy again (Przeworski 
et al., 2000; Smith, 2004). It is likely that these regimes have stronger pro-
democracy civil opposition to the current elite than regimes in states that have 
never been democratic (Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2010).  
 
Sum of past transitions 
Furthermore, the sum of past transitions variable is meant to denote a level of 
political instability in a country that might be indicative of a future transition to 
democracy. The sum of past transitions measure is calculated by counting the 
number of transitions (democratic or non-democratic) which have taken place in a 
given state since 1951 for each of the autocratic regimes in a sample. The 
expectation is that the more regime transitions occurred in the past, the more likely 
the current regime is to undergo the process of democratisation.  
For most autocratic countries analysed in the thesis, the history of previous 
transitions is complete because they were not independent or recognised as 
independent prior to 1951. However, a number of countries begun before 1951 and 
have undergone an unspecified number of transitions that cannot be observed in 
the dataset. For example, the earliest record for Thailand starts in 1951 (for a 
regime that started in 1932) and continues through to 2008. Since 1932, Thailand 
has undergone a total of 8 regime transitions. In its entire history as a nation state, 
Thailand might have undergone many more transitions, but this information is not 
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available. For this reason, transition history refers to the history of transitions 
between the inception of the regime that enters the analysis in or after 1951, and 
the end of analysis time in 2008.  While not entirely accurate, this information can 
still help generalise about the level of regime stability within the country.   
 
Cold War 
In line with previous research, the Cold War variable will be used as an indicator of 
Western support for autocratic regimes around the world (Escribá-Folch and 
Wright, 2010, Gibler, 2010). Much of the literature suggests that prior to 1989, 
autocrats enjoyed financial and political support from the West, and with the 
advent of the post-Cold War era, this support has been withdrawn in favour of an 
increasing pressure to democratise (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Buraczynska, 2016). 
Current literature suggests that many of the democratic transitions in the post-Cold 
War era were a direct result of mounting foreign pressure to develop 
representative structures (Levitsky and Way, 2010; 2013) making this a particularly 
important control variable.  
Political instability 
Finally, in all three analytical chapters of this thesis, an additional measure of 
political instability is used. The political instability measure is taken from the Gibler 
and Miller (2014) replication data, and measures institutional and political changes 
within the regime, which do not necessarily lead to a regime transition, but might 
suggest political instability and institutional uncertainty. The data used to calculate 
political instability comes from the Unified Democracy Scores measure, which 
incorporates Freedom House, Polity IV and Vanhanen (2000) data on a state’s 
democracy level. Although such continuous measures have been criticised earlier in 
the chapter, this referred to their usefulness for measuring democracy, rather than 
indicating political changes within the regime. As the latter, the continuous 
measure does not measure any complex concepts or a critical juncture in the state’s 
history, but rather changing rules and norms of political behaviour, and does not 
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make inferences about the meaning or implications of such changes. A state is 
operationalized as politically unstable ‘if it experiences a two-standard-deviation 
change in its UDS democracy score in the three years prior to the observation year’ 
(Gibler and Miller, 2013: 641). List of all variables used in the dataset can be found 
in Table 3 below.  
Table 3. List of all variables used in the thesis (chapters 5-7) 
Variables Variable type Notes 
Dependent variables   
Regime transition Dummy variable indicating a transition to 
another form of regime in a given month 
Coded 0 for all months when the regime has 
not experienced a transition, and 1 for the 
month in which the transition has occurred.  
Democratisation Dummy variable indicating a transition to 
democracy form of regime in a given 
month 
Coded 0 for all months when the regime has 
not experienced a democratic transition, and 
1 for the month in which the democratic 
transition has occurred.  
Independent variables   
Territorial threat Dummy variable indicating involvement in 
a territorial dispute 
 
Democracy Dummy variable for democratic regimes  
Military Dummy variable for military regimes  
Monarchy Dummy variable for monarchic regimes  
Multiparty Dummy variable for multiparty regimes  
Single party Dummy variable for single party regimes  
GDP per capita Gross Domestic Product per capita,                      
PPP adjusted 
Measured in constant 1990 international 
Gheary-Khamis dollars 
Oil dependency Dummy variable indicating a substantial 
petroleum dependency in a country in a 
given year 
 
Political instability Indicator variable for political change 
on the Unified Democracy Scores scale 
Coded as one if a state experienced a two 
standard deviations change in their USD 
score in the past 3 years  
Ethnic fractionalisation Continuous variable Based on Alesina et al. (2003) 
Religious fractionalisation Continuous variable Based on Alesina et al. (2003) 
History of democracy A dummy variable indicating a past history 
of democracy in the country  
Only democracies included in the dataset by 
Magaloni et al. (2013) are considered 
Sum of past transitions Variable indicating the number of past 
regime transitions (democratic and non-
democratic) in the country  
 
Cold War Dummy variable for the presence of the 
Cold War 
Coded 1 for any time between January 1951 
and December 1989 
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Data 
 
Having operationalized all of the concepts used in the analysis in the empirical 
chapters, this section will briefly discuss all potential issues and limitations of the 
dataset compiled for the purposes of this thesis. The following section will discuss 
data transformations, the treatment of missing values, as well as cases that were 
excluded from the analysis. As mentioned previously, three separate datasets have 
been used to produce the final dataset for this study. See Table 4 for the summary 
of the temporal domain of each dataset, as well as the variables that were drawn 
from it.  
 
Table 4. Table summarizing the datasets used in the thesis (chapters 5-7) 
Dataset Temporal domain Variables 
    
Magaloni et al. 2013)  
Autocracies of the World 1950-2012 
1950-2012 Regime type 
Regime transition 
 
Gibler and Miller (2014)  
External Threats, State Capacity, and Civil War 
replication data 
 
1946-2007 Territorial threat 
Ethnic fractionalisation 
Religious fractionalisation 
Political instability 
 
The Maddison Project Database AD 1-2010/ 
1950-2008  
 
GDP per capita (PPP) 
Total Economy Database 1950-2014 GDP per capita (PPP)  
 
 
 
The observation period (1951-2008) 
 
Table 4 clearly demonstrates that the common temporal domain of all datasets is 
the time period between 1951 and 2008 (the temporal domain was 1950-2007 
before lagging the territorial dispute variable by one calendar year). Given that 
most ReSIT and democratic peace studies have employed a much longer 
observation period to test their propositions, usually spanning between 1817 and 
the 21st century, the temporal domain of this thesis might appear restricted and 
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insufficient. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that most IR studies of the second 
and reversed second image hypotheses employ the Polity IV data to test their 
hypotheses. As a result, while their observation periods might be much longer, the 
reliability of their conclusions and the validity of their research design might be 
negatively affected by their choice of regime change measures. In the context of 
the discussion of regime type and regime transition measurements discussed 
above, the shorter time frame of this study is a necessary limitation. As such, it is 
comparable to other studies of democratisation and regime transition within 
comparative politics,29 and recently, also research from the ReSIT tradition, which 
employs the monadic approach to studying regime change and domestic structure 
changes.30 Finally and most importantly, there exists, to my knowledge, no reliable 
source of data for the classification of regimes that extends before the year 1946. 
As a result, a study concerned with disaggregating the effects of territorial threat on 
various types of autocracies must constrict the lower band of its observation period 
to the middle of the 20th century. It is also worth noting that one advantage of the 
1951-2008 observation period is that it extends 18 years beyond the fall of the Iron 
Curtain, and as such allows this thesis to test for the competing effect of the Cold 
War on the process of democratisation, as mentioned in the Literature Review 
Chapter 2.  
 
The sample 
 
Within the 1951-2008 time period, the dataset records 314 regimes as autocratic. 
Table A1 in Appendix A lists all autocratic regimes in the sample, with their exact 
start and end date. Three distinct problems are apparent when looking at Table A1. 
First, it is clear that some regimes (marked in bold) are yet to undergo a transition 
as of 2008. Second, some regimes (marked with an asterisk) end before 2008, yet 
                                                          
29
 For example, Magaloni (2008): 1950-2000, Escriba-Folch and Wright (2015): 1977-2006; Wahman 
et al. (2014):   
30
 For example, Reiter (2001): 1960-1992, Gibler and Tir (2013): 1950-2001; Gibler (2010): 19750-
2000 
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are still coded as not having transitioned. Finally, many regimes are recorded as 
having begun before 1951, for example, Mexico, whose multiparty regime starts in 
1917. The first two issues are known as right-censoring, while the third issue is 
known as left-truncation (delayed entry). The section below will explain which 
regimes are affected by these issues and why, as well as discuss the potential 
implications they might have on the analysis in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.   
 
Right-censoring 
 
Right censored regimes are those autocracies which have not yet failed by the time 
of the last observation in the dataset (end of 2008), or which have ceased to exist, 
but are not coded as having transitioned. In the first case, it is assumed that the 
regimes will eventually transition, but there is no information on when such a 
transition might occur. As a result, they pose a problem of missing data in standard 
regression analysis, and their risk of transition is impossible to assess. This type of 
right-censoring is the most common reason for regimes being coded as not having 
transitioned. Examples include Saudi Arabia (monarchy), Chad (multiparty regime), 
Mauritania (military regime), and China (single party regime).  
The second cause of right-censoring happens when a regime simply creases to exist, 
without being coded as having transitioned. This is a much less common case of 
censoring in the data, constituting only 9.1% of all censored cases (6 out of 77). The 
6 cases include: 
- The military regime in Somalia, which ceased to exist in December 1990, but 
which did not transition to another form of regime due to the severe spell of 
anarchy which ensued in the country;  
- Single party regime in Yugoslavia, which disintegrated in 1992, without an 
identifiable ‘successor’ regime; 
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- Single party regime in Czechoslovakia which disintegrated in 1992 into two 
separate political regimes: democratic Czech Republic and democratic Slovakia, 
once more, without an identifiable ‘successor’ regime; 
- Single party regime in East Germany, which ceased to exist as a result of its 
unification with West Germany; 
- Military regime in North Yemen, which ceased to exist as a result of its 
unification with South Yemen; 
- Military regime in Syria, which ceased to exist due to Syria joining the United 
Arab Republic with Egypt in 1968. Syria re-enters the dataset as a separate military 
regime once the United Arab Republic disintegrates 1962.  
 
It is worth noting that although Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are coded as 
censored because the entire political apparatus changed or shifted as a result of the 
political changes, the break-up of USSR is treated as a transition, rather than a right-
censored event. The breakup of USSR signified a serious political change 
accompanied by a significant loss of territory, but a historical and cultural continuity 
between Russia and USSR meant that the break-up of USSR was treated as a 
transition from a single-party regime to a multiparty regime. In Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia, however, the multinational element was a crucial part of the 
system, with all countries actively taking part; hence, it would be too great a leap to 
identify Serbia as the natural successor of Yugoslavia, or Czech Republic/Slovak 
Republic as a successor of Czechoslovakia. The nations lost by the USSR (e.g. 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia or Belarus) are coded as distinct political regimes that 
emerged between 1991 and 1993. 
 
Left-truncation 
 
In addition to the above, some regimes which exist and enter the observation 
period in January 1951 have begun prior to 1951, a problem otherwise known as 
left-truncation, or delayed entry. Left-truncation occurs when the regime enters the 
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analysis after it has already begun. This means that the regime was at a risk of 
transition even before it entered the observation period, and as a result no 
information is available on why it had survived this long. Examples include the 
multiparty regime in Mexico, which begun in 1917, or the military regime in the 
Dominican Republic, which begun in 1930.   
There is a possibility that there is something specific about regimes that have 
survived so long as to be included in the study in 1951, while all other regimes have 
failed. As such, regimes that originate prior to 1951 might be significantly more 
durable, and therefore bias the sample. Unfortunately, this is a serious yet 
unavoidable limitation of this type of data. It will be discussed in more detail further 
in the thesis and should be borne in mind when considering the results.  
To address the issue of censoring and delayed entry in the data, the thesis employs 
survival analysis as a main modelling tool. Survival analysis has been designed 
specifically to help minimise the biases introduced by these issues. Both delayed 
entry and censoring will be discussed in more detail in the later section of this 
chapter, which discusses survival analysis as the most appropriate tool for dealing 
with this type of data.  
 
Data transformations 
 
In order to merge the data from the four distinct datasets (see Table 4) certain 
transformations were made, which are described in detail below. First of all, the 
data on regime type and regime transition in Magaloni et al. (2013) was originally 
recorded in the ‘one observation per year per regime’ format. Given that all 
remaining datasets were coded in the ‘one observation per country per year 
format’, there were no significant issues with merging the datasets, because all 
datasets contained the variables recording date (year) and country identifiers (the 
Correlates of War country code), there were no significant problems with merging 
the data.  
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The data has further been transformed to regime-month period instead of the 
original regime-year format. This was done for two reasons. First, the Magaloni et 
al. (2013) dataset records the exact date of a regime start and end. Hoverer, 
because the data is coded in a regime-year format the start and end dates are 
rounded. In other words, the year of the transition is coded as the antecedent 
regime if the change has occurred on the 1st of July or later, and as the subsequent 
regime if the change has occurred before the 1st of July (ibid.: 10). Unfortunately, 
because of that rule, the exact start and end of a regime is imprecise, and this 
makes a particular difference with regimes that last less than a year. 
 
Second, states that have existed for less than 18 months are all considered to have 
lasted 1 year, i.e. one unit of time. This poses a significant problem for the analysis. 
In survival analysis, subjects who transition within the same year of entering the 
observation period (t=0) are excluded from the analysis, because they are 
considered to not have been exposed to a risk of transition for any length of time 
(the subject has transitioned at the same time it has entered the observation). From 
the survival analysis standpoint, no time has passed between the entry and the 
transition event, and the subjects are therefore excluded from the analysis. This 
problem could be solved by adding a small constant c (e.g. 0.001) to the total 
duration of all regimes which were coded as lasting one year. However, this would 
mean that all regimes coded in this way would be exposed to the risk of failure for 
exactly the same amount of time (the value of the constant) despite actually lasting 
different amount of time (e.g. 3 months and 9 months). A more time consuming, 
but a more reliable option, was simply to transform the dataset into a regime-
month format, and manually adjust the start and end dates of all regimes in the 
dataset (Cleves et al., 2010). Because only yearly data is available for all other 
independent variables, they have been left unchanged, and their values for a 
specific year have been copied to reflect all 12 months within the regime. See Table 
2A in Appendix A for an example of how this was done for Sierra Leone.  
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Recording the date of regime transition 
 
The date of regime transition is usually marked as the exact day, month and year of 
change. Given that the data used in this thesis is recorded in monthly format, some 
rounding had to be applied. For example, in 1985, Nicaragua has transitioned from 
a single party regime to a multiparty regime. The multiparty regime is coded to 
have begun on the 10th of January 1985, so the beginning of the regime in the 
dataset has been recorded as January 1985. As a result, the end of the previous 
single party regime is coded as December 1984, even though the regime really 
ended in on the 9th of January 1985.  
 
In some cases, when a regime begins after the 20th day of a given month, its 
beginning is coded as the following month. For example, Azerbaijan, which became 
independent as a result of the breakup of USSR, is recorded as starting on the 25th 
of December 1991. However, because it started so late in the month, it is recorded 
in the dataset as having begun in January 1992 instead. The rounding-up results in 
loss of detail, however, it nevertheless provides a major improvement on datasets 
that apply the yearly rounding rule, which sometimes results in accuracies as large 
as 6 months (see for example Cheibub et al., 2010; Magaloni et al., 2013; Geddes et 
al. 2014; Wahman et al., 2014). 
 
Loss of data 
 
Finally, some cases had to be dropped from the analysis due to complete lack of 
data availability. This data includes all regimes in countries with population smaller 
than 500,000 people, which are not recorded in the Magloni et al. (2013) dataset. 
Because these states are included in the Gibler and Miller (2014) data, they had to 
be dropped. Examples include Bahamas, Barbados, St. Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, 
and St. Kitts and Nevis. As discussed in the previous parts of this thesis, categorical 
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classifications of autocratic regimes should not be applied interchangeably. Hence, 
no alternative source of data was available to classify these small states.  
 
This poses considerable problems for the analysis, given that small states tend to 
often be islands, and island regimes should be considered relatively more secure 
from territorial claims than land-based regimes, given that they rarely share land 
with their neighbours. Some research has demonstrated in the past that from a 
historical perspective, island states were more likely than other states to develop 
democratic regimes in a historical perspective (Thompson and Rasler, 2004). Given 
that no regime classification for such small states exists, this has to be considered 
as an unavoidable limitation of this study. Future research should obtain 
information on the structural classification of regimes within small states, and 
attempt to establish whether the conclusions of this study can extend beyond the 
current sample of 314 large autocracies. 
 
Missing data 
 
Given that the final dataset has been created using various sources, not all 
information in the dataset was complete. When that was the case, an effort has 
been made to obtain the relevant data from alternative sources. Fortunately, the 
only variable with missing data was the GDP per capita from the Maddison Project. 
No information on GDP per capita was available for the entire observation period in 
East Germany, China, Argentina and Cyprus, as well as Bosnia between 1992 and 
1994. To correct this, data from the Total Economy Database was used. As the 
operationalization section described, wealth in both datasets is measured in the 
same units, making such substitutions relatively easy. The only time data was not 
substituted was the case of the single party regime in East Germany, where the only 
accessible information on wealth was available from 1960 onward. As a result, East 
Germany is excluded from the analysis for 120 months between the beginning of 
1951 and the end of 1960.  
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Having outlined all major data transformations, reductions and limitations, the 
chapter will now justify the use of survival analysis as the main modelling tool in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. As mentioned previously, it is the best method of dealing with 
a large proportion of censored or delayed entry cases in the dataset, but it also 
possesses a number of other useful advantages, which are described below.  
 
Methods 
 
Survival analysis: advantages and limitations 
 
In order to determine the relationship between international conflict and regime 
transition, the thesis will utilise survival analysis as its primary method of 
investigation. Survival analysis is a statistical tool that allows calculating the 
average time it takes for a certain event such as war, revolution or regime change 
to occur under varying conditions (Mills, 2011: 1). An event history is a record of 
events that have happened to a specific sample of cases – in this case, a sample of 
all available autocratic regimes.31 Survival analysis, also known as event history 
analysis in social sciences, was originally used in engineering to record the time it 
took for machinery to stop working, and investigated different conditions that 
would influence how long a given piece of equipment would last. In social sciences, 
events consist of a qualitative change that occurs at some specific point in time, 
including divorces, deaths, wars, riots, regime changes or economic crises (Allison, 
1984). In Survival analysis, one estimates how long it should take for an event to 
happen by examining the conditional probability of the event occurring within a 
given time interval (Mills, 2011). This type of analysis can help to answer a number 
of questions about events, among them questions about how long it normally takes 
for a regime to change to another form of autocracy, or transition to democracy, 
and how particular circumstances increase or decrease the probability of that 
                                                          
31
 The following section will focus solely on the justification for the use of survival analysis as a main analysis 
tool, and does not discuss sampling and data. Sampling and data is discussed later in this chapter. 
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change happening. In short, survival analysis helps answer not only the question of 
whether the event has occurred or not, but also when it occurred, providing much 
analytical leverage over other methods of comparative analysis of longitudinal data 
(Box- Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004: 183).  Given that this thesis asks about the 
determinants of the time-to-regime transitions (Chapters 5 and 6) and time to 
democratisation (Chapter 7), the specific time to event will be referred to as 
autocratic regime survival in Chapters 5 and 6, and democratisation in Chapter 7. 
This important distinction will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
When discussing regime or spell duration, the thesis will also often use terms such 
as survival or durability. All three terms refer to the same concept, namely, the time 
it takes for a given regime to end (transition to another regime) or democratise. All 
empirical chapters will aim to determine how involvement in territorial disputes 
influences the time it takes for those events to occur in structurally different types 
of autocracies. It is worth noting that while it is generally seen as a separate group 
of methodologies, survival analysis is really just another form of a regression model 
which uses different likelihood estimators than a standard OLS regression (Mills, 
2011).  
 
The survival function 
 
In simple terms, a survival function reports the probability of a unit – here, a regime 
– surviving beyond a certain time t. Assuming T to be a non-negative variable 
denoting the time-to-regime transition, a survival function stands as follows: 
𝑆(𝑡) = 1 𝐹(𝑡) = Pr (𝑇 > 𝑡)     (1) 
As seen above, a survival function is simply the reverse cumulative distribution 
function of time-to-regime transition (T). A survival function describes the 
probability that there is no regime change prior to time t. At the inception of the 
regime (t=0), the probability of survival is always 1, and this probability decreases 
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towards 0 as t approaches infinity. As a result, the survival function is a monotone, 
non-increasing function of time.  
Another crucial function in survival analysis, derived from the survival function, is 
the hazard rate function h(t). A hazard rate at t equals the ratio of the probability 
density function at t to the survivor function at t: 
ℎ(𝑡) = lim𝑛→∞
Pr (𝑡+ ∆𝑡>𝑇>𝑡|𝑇>𝑡
∆𝑡
=  
𝑓(𝑡)
1−𝐹(𝑡)
=
𝑓(𝑡)
𝑆(𝑡)
                (2) 
In other words, a hazard rate is the instantaneous rate of failure, or the (limiting) 
probability that a regime transition occurs in a given interval, conditional upon the 
regime having survived this long. The hazard rate is always equal or greater than 0 
(no risk of transition), and can extend into infinity (certainty of failure at that 
instant).  
From the hazard function (and, therefore, from the survival and the cumulative 
density and the probability density functions), one might in turn derive the 
cumulative hazard function, which measures the total amount of risk accumulated 
by a regime up to time t: 
𝐻(𝑡) =  ∫ ℎ(𝑢)𝑑𝑢 =  ∫
𝑓(𝑢)
𝑆(𝑢)
𝑑𝑢 =  −
𝑡
0
∫
1
𝑆(𝑢)
{
𝑑
𝑑𝑢
𝑆(𝑢)} 𝑑𝑢 = −𝑙𝑛{𝑆(𝑡)}
𝑡
0
𝑡
0
       (3) 
To determine the mean and median regime duration given a random failure time T 
with a probability density function f(t), the following functions are used: 
Mean = 𝜇𝑇 =  ∫ 𝑡𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
0
 = ∫ 𝑆(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
0
    (4) 
                                                     Median = 𝜇𝑇 = 𝑄 (0.5)      
  (5) 
Thus, the median is defined simply as the 50th percentile of the failure time 
distribution, and signifies the time at which 50% of all regimes have failed. The 
median is often a much more useful descriptive tool for survival statistics, given 
that the distribution of survival times tend to have particularly long tails, making 
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the values of the mean misleading and unreliable. As a result, this thesis will mostly 
refer to the median survival time for autocratic regimes in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
 
The Semi-Parametric Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
 
Although there are various types of survival analysis models, each with its distinct 
set of advantages, discussing all of them in detail is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Instead, this section will briefly explain the particular modelling techniques used, 
and why they are the most suitable for the type of data used in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
In order to perform the majority of data analyses in the empirical chapters, the 
thesis will employ the Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) model, which asserts that for 
every j-th subject in the dataset, the hazard rate is: 
ℎ(𝑡|𝐱𝑗) =  ℎ0(𝑡) exp (𝛽1𝐱1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝐱𝑘)     (6) 
With the 𝛽1 … 𝛽𝑘, the regression coefficients, to be estimated from the data.  
The main benefits of the Cox model, which is widely applied in the social and 
biomedical sciences alike (Cleves et al., 2010; Alison, 2014), are derived from the 
fact that it uses the partial likelihood estimation method. This, in turn, has three 
main advantages (Guo, 2010): 
First, unlike other models,32 the Cox regression makes no assumptions about the 
distribution of the hazard rate over time and the baseline hazard function, ℎ0(𝑡), 
can be left un-estimated (Cleaves et al., 2011). This means that the hazard rate can 
take on any shape, for as long as that shape is similar for all subjects: for any two 
regimes at any point in time, the ratio of their hazards is a constant (Ibid., Alison, 
2014). Hence, no prior knowledge of the shape of the hazard function for autocratic 
regimes is needed. This is a considerable advantage on alternative modelling 
strategies, given that misspecification of the shape of the hazard function can lead 
to misleading results about the regression coefficient (Cleaves et al., 2011: 130). 
                                                          
32
 For example, the Gompertz-Makeham or Weibull models (see Rodríguez, 2010). 
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Furthermore, while the proportionality of the hazard function seems to be a trade-
off for the semi-parametric approach to estimating the baseline hazard function, it 
can be easily extended to accommodate for non-proportional hazards (ibid.)  
Second, the estimates of the model depend only on the ordering of the events, 
rather than the times at which the events have actually occurred (Guo, 2010). More 
specifically, the results of the regression are based on forming, at each event-time, 
the collection of subjects which are at risk of that event occurring, and then 
maximising the conditional probability of failure (Cleves et al., 2010: 145). Because 
of that, monotonic transformations of the event times make no substantial 
differences to the coefficient estimates (Guo, 2010). Finally, it should be noted that 
models estimated using Cox PH regression lack intercepts, which is simply 
incorporated into the baseline hazard function ℎ0(𝑡).   
 
Advantages of survival analysis 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this chapter, quantitative analysis methods can 
pose a wide variety of challenges due to the assumptions that need to be satisfied 
in order for the results to be fully reliable. While there are a number of reasons why 
survival analysis is the most appropriate tool for analysing regime duration, the 
single most important reason is that, unlike in OLS regression, the assumption of 
normally distributed residuals does not have to be met.  
This means that, unlike in OLS, the distribution of differences between the 
predicted value of the dependent variable (ŷ), and the actual value of the 
dependent variable (y) are not assumed to be random. This assumption is 
particularly useful for the data at hand. When it comes to regime transition, it 
would be unrealistic to assume that the risk of regime change or democratisation 
changes proportionally over time. Regimes might, for example, be at the greatest 
risk of failing within the first 5-10 years of existence before they ‘consolidate’, and 
at a low risk of failure thereafter. Alternatively, they might face the greatest risk of 
failure in the first 10 years of their existence, experience a period of consolidation, 
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and once more, be at a higher risk of failure after a given period of time has passed. 
The distribution of failure times is almost always non-linear, and can often be 
exponential, curvilinear, or even bi-modal: as a result, it cannot be reliably handled 
by standard OLS regression (Cleaves et al., 2011). As mentioned above, in survival 
analysis the distribution of the baseline hazard rate can take on any shape, and 
what is more, that shape does not have to be pre-determined before the analysis. 
This means that the analysis does not rest on unrealistic assumptions.  
The second big advantage of survival analysis is that it extracts meaningful 
information from data that would typically be lost during logistic regression. While 
logistic regression can estimate the likelihood of an event occurring, this rarely 
constitutes a particularly insightful piece of information in regime change studies. 
While many states might eventually become democratic, we know nothing more 
than the fact that the event has eventually occurred. For example, if half of 
autocracies in the sample eventually become democratic at the end of the 
observation period, all one knows are that the probability of the transition was 
50%. Survival analysis, on the other hand, can provide insight into how long it took 
for the states to democratise. As a result, one obtains information not only about 
the probability of democratisation, but also when it has occurred relative to other 
transitions, and which factors might have facilitated the process. This is especially 
important given that most regimes do, eventually, undergo some form of a regime 
change. Simply relying on the likelihood of that event adds relatively little to the 
existing knowledge. In addition to the above, there are three specific features of 
the survival analysis, and the Cox model more specifically, that will improve the 
validity of the analysis in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. They are discussed below. 
 
Handling right-censored and delayed entry regimes 
 
First, unlike OLS or logistic regression, survival analysis can handle missing data with 
ease, with a much lower likelihood to produce biased estimations. This is 
particularly important given that by the end of the observation period in 2007, 
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many regimes have not yet transitioned to another form of regime. This means that 
the information on the final outcome of the duration period is unknown, creating a 
problem of right-censoring in statistical analysis discussed earlier in this chapter. In 
standard regression, right-censored cases are coded as missing data and produce 
highly biased estimations (Mills, 2011; Allison, 2014). As a likelihood-based 
approach, survival analysis adjusts the model for the instance of event non-
occurrence (right-censoring) in each of the observations, making the bias much less 
likely to ensue (Prinja et al., 2010). Similarly, survival analysis is better equipped to 
handle delayed entry cases. In semi-parametric models like the Cox model, one can 
simply omit the regime from the analysis during the truncation period. This is 
because the regime cannot be treated as if it was at risk prior to 1951, because the 
only reason it is observed to begin with was because it survived until 1951 (Cleves 
et al., 2010: 35).  
 
Time-varying covariates 
 
Second, the Cox model is the first of its kind to allow time-varying covariates in 
survival analysis, making it especially pertinent for this thesis. Most independent 
variables in this thesis, including the presence of a territorial threat and GDP per 
capita, change their value over the lifetime of a particular regime. The Cox model 
can account for those with the following adjustment to equation (6) above: 
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp {𝛽1𝐱1 + ⋯ 𝛽𝑘𝐱𝑘 + 𝑔(𝑡)(𝛾1𝐳1 + ⋯ + 𝑦𝑚𝐳𝑚)}   (7) 
Where 𝑧1 … 𝑧𝑚 are the time-varying covariates, and where the estimation has a net 
effect of estimating regression coefficients (𝛾1 … 𝛾𝑚) for a covariate 𝑔(𝑡)𝑧𝑖, which 
is a function of the current time (StataCorp, 2013: 129). Given that the data is in a 
regime-month format, with a different yearly value for each time-varying covariate, 
no further action was needed to accommodate the variables (Ibid., Cleves et al., 
2010: 193).  
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Within-country correlation of regime transition and democratisation 
 
Finally, the Cox model can adjust the estimations for a possible correlation within 
each country. After all, certain countries are more prone to regime change than 
others for various historical, socioeconomic and cultural reasons that cannot be 
accounted for with reductionist methods of inquiry. For example, countries like 
Thailand or Turkey have a particularly prominent history of regime transitions, 
increasing the hazard of transition for each regime in a way that cannot be 
explained with the data at hand. In order to account for this possible within-country 
interdependence, the regime will be clustered within countries. Clustering adjusts 
the standard errors to account for the within-country interdependence, and will be 
performed and discussed throughout Chapters 5-7.  
 
Limitations of the Cox model and diagnostic tools used in analytical chapters 
 
As a result of the features discussed above, survival analysis is the analytical tool of 
choice for a large number of social scientists interested in the determinants of 
regime change and democratisation (Ghandi and Przeworski, 2008; Ulfelder, 2007; 
Magaloni, 2008; Geddes et al., 2014; Knutsen and Nygård, 2015). Nevertheless, 
despite its many advantages from the study of regime transitions, survival analysis 
has certain limitations which must be borne in mind when analysing the data and 
drawing conclusions.  
Informative censoring 
 
One of the most important limitations to consider is the assumption of non-
informative censoring. For example, regimes that did not experience the event 
when the study has ended, or have for some reason dropped out from the sample 
are assumed to be at the same risk of regime transition or democratisation as all 
other regimes that have experienced them. If, for some reasons, there is something 
distinctive about them (informative censoring), the estimates produced by survival 
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analysis might be biased. Unfortunately, no tests exist that could determine 
whether the censored population is, or is not, informative (Allison, 2010). 
In case of all censored countries, which have not yet failed by 2007, the reason is 
the unavailability of data for the period after the year 2007, rather than an inherent 
feature of the surviving regimes. However, when it comes to regimes that were 
censored prior to 2007, there is no guarantee that these regimes are not 
substantially different from the rest of the sample. The regimes in question are the 
single party regimes in Yugoslavia, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, and the 
military regimes in Somalia, Syria, and North Yemen, as discussed previously in this 
chapter.  
However, the important aspect of the coding to bear in mind when discussing 
informative censoring is that all of the regimes listed above do indeed meet the 
practical criteria for a regime failure. The only reason they are not coded as having 
failed, is because they do not meet the theoretical criteria for a transition. Typically, 
survival analysis would not distinguish between a failure that results in a transition, 
and a failure that results in the regime ceasing to exist. The regimes were coded as 
censored due to theoretical considerations (no identifiable ‘successor’ regime, or 
unification with another regime), rather than something inherently different 
(informative) about them. In purely practical terms, all of the regimes have not 
survived. Because of this, and because these cases constitute less than 2% of the 
entire sample, informative censoring is not considered a problematic issue for the 
data analysis performed later in the thesis.  
 
Tied failures 
 
As mentioned previously, the estimates of the Cox model depend on ordering the 
events rather than the actual times at which the events occurred (Guo, 2010). 
Because sometimes two or more regimes are likely to transition at the exactly same 
moment in time (tied failures), it may be difficult to calculate the probability of that 
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transition, given that the probability of a transition is conditional on the number of 
regimes that have not transitioned at that given time. There are many methods of 
handling ties within the data; among them are the Efron and Breslow 
approximation methods.  While both are relatively accurate, Efron approximation 
can sometimes bias the regression coefficients when many ties are present within 
the data (Li, 2010). As a result, the thesis will use the Breslow approximation 
method across the models in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. This approximation is also a 
standard method for handling tied failures for many types of statistical software 
(see for example: Stata Corp, 2013).  
 
Model building and diagnostic tools 
 
The thesis employs step-wise models, introducing one variable at a time, based on 
their theoretical importance. Theoretically relevant covariates will be retained in 
the model regardless of whether they produce significant results or not. This is 
done to observe the impact each additional covariate has on the effect of the 
previously introduced covariates, and to make sense of the underlying patterns 
within the data. Some data will be transformed to ensure a linear relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables, and all the details of these 
transformations will be discussed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, a number of 
diagnostic tests will be conducted on all of the models included in Chapters 5, 6 and 
7.  
The relative contribution of each variable in the model will be established using the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1973).  AIC will also help determine fit of 
the final models relative to the other models for a given regime type. In general, the 
lower the AIC score, the better the quality of the model relative to each of the 
other models. AIC estimates the trade-off between the goodness of fit of the model 
and the relative complexity of the model. Once a model containing all covariates is 
built, it will be compared to the model that contains all covariates with the addition 
of important interactions between the main predictors. AIC will be used to 
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determine whether the interactions help improve model fit. The model with the 
lower AIC score will then be chosen, and all further analysis will be based on that 
model. AIC is preferred to the BIC as it includes a penalty for the number of 
variables included in the model (Atkinson, 1981; Posada and Buckley, 2004).  
The functional form of all continuous variables included in the models with the 
lowest AIC scores will be tested by plotting their Martingale residuals. This is done 
to establish whether the variable has a linear effect in the model as expected, or 
whether it should be transformed to fulfil the assumptions of a Cox regression. In 
addition, all models will be tested for the essential assumption of proportional 
hazards based on the Schoenfeld residuals. The detailed results of these tests, as 
well as individual plots for all covariates in the best fitting models will be included in 
the appendices for each chapter. 
Finally, a link test (Pregibon, 1980) will be performed on all models throughout the 
analysis to determine whether the models have been specified correctly. In case of 
the link test producing significant results (indicating a misspecification of the 
model), covariates responsible for the misspecification will be transformed 
accordingly, and separate tests will be performed to ensure that the new models 
are also specified correctly. More details on all of these tests and their 
interpretation can be found in Chapter 5.  
 
Multicollinearity 
 
Since multicollinearity can be a serious problem in Cox regression models, all 
variables used in this thesis have been subjected to a multicollinearity test using the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in order to ensure that the predictors used in this 
thesis are not highly correlated with one another. In order to perform the tests, a 
standard OLS regression been run for each subset of the independent variables 
used in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The dependent variable for models testing for 
multicollinearity in Chapter 5 and 6 was time to regime change, while the OLS 
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regression testing for multicollinearity in Chapter 7 used time to democratisation as 
its dependent variable. The interaction terms between variables that are included 
in the main models of this thesis have not been part of the regression models build 
for the purpose of these tests. This is because interaction terms are likely to cause a 
high degree of multicollinearity between the original terms and the interaction 
term, while not actually indicating any serious correlation problems between the 
main predictors. In general, VIF scores that are below 10 (or sometimes 5) are 
considered to indicate acceptable level of multicollinearity between independent 
variables (Chatterjee and Price, 1991). As can be seen in Tables A4-A11 in Appendix 
A, all scores range above 1 but below 2, indicating no serious issues for the models 
used in this thesis. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted a number of crucial methodological debates within the 
field of IR and Comparative Politics, highlighting the methodological improvements 
of this research on previous work in the same area. It is clear that while the 
scientific approach to measuring the impact of territorial threats on domestic 
change is one of the best approaches to discerning patterns of change over time in 
a large number of autocratic regimes, it still has a number of potential limitations. 
The most important ones include the fact that while the results of the analytical 
chapters might be generalizable, they can only be generalised to large autocracies 
that took part in a territorial dispute with a neighbouring state. Furthermore, the 
results only apply to the time period under investigation of this study, namely, the 
years between 1951 and 2008.  
Every effort has been made to identify all theoretically important predictors of 
regime change and democratisation available. Future studies could also aim to 
control for the impact of economic crises or economic growth as opposed to 
wealth, to investigate whether these relationships could change the relationship 
between territorial threats and whether regime transition is affected by them.  
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Although the methods employed in this thesis are not without their limitations, 
they are the best available methods and the state of the art in the field, thus 
contributing to the current ReSIT literature in three main ways. The first 
contribution is made by employing a dichotomous measure of regime transition 
and democratisation. This improves the standards of measurement of IR due to it 
having a much greater level of content validity. Second, the thesis distinguishes 
between various types of autocratic regimes, as discussed in Chapter 3, and 
includes multiparty regimes as a distinct, idiosyncratic regime type. The thesis 
investigates not only democratic transition, but also transition to other types of 
regimes, investigating general regime longevity and stability. Finally, the thesis 
employs a state of the art methodology, the Cox proportional hazards regression to 
investigate its claims. It is in the next three chapters this methodology will be used 
to demonstrate that territorial disputes have a significant impact on the duration of 
autocratic regimes, and their chances of democratisation.  
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Chapter 5: Territorial disputes and autocratic regime survival 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As outlined in Chapter 3, this thesis addresses four research questions: how do 
territorial disputes affect the survival of autocratic regimes? Are there significant 
differences in how various types of autocratic regimes respond to territorial 
disputes? Are autocratic regimes less likely to democratise as a result of territorial 
dispute involvement? And finally, are the chances of democratising as a result of 
territorial dispute involvement different in various types of autocratic regimes? 
The following chapter will address the first research question. More specifically, it 
will test whether territorial disputes affects the stability in all types of autocratic 
regimes, without distinguishing between autocracies based on their structural 
characteristics. The specific effects of each type of autocracy on this relationship 
will be instead discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 will investigate whether 
territorial dispute involvement has a significant impact on regimes’ likelihood of 
democratisation, and explore the how this relationship changes depending on 
structural features of autocratic regimes. 
The main findings of this chapter suggest that as it was expected in Chapter 3, 
dispute involvement made autocratic regimes more stable and less likely to 
transition into any other form of regime – democratic or autocratic. However, this 
relationship was only significant for regimes that do not depend on petroleum 
production for part of their income. This is an interesting and novel finding, which 
suggests that rentier states are less prone to the centralising effects of territorial 
disputes. It is possible that salient threats might increase the stability of regimes 
which do not have easy access to funding (such as petroleum wealth) which can be 
immediately spent on enhancing the strength of the military. Chapter 6 will further 
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explore whether the same relationship is observed when structural features of 
autocratic regimes are accounted for in the models. 
This chapter provides an original and important contribution to both the IR and 
Comparative Politics literatures. It is the first study to date to demonstrate that the 
premise of ReSIT is correct in relation to the stabilising effects of external threats.  
By utilising some of the most recent Comparative Politics literature, the chapter 
makes a crucial distinction between regime change and democratisation, and tests 
the proposition that territorial disputes affect regime stability, rather than spell 
stability. Finally, the results of this chapter demonstrate that the theoretical 
assumptions made by the ReSIT literature ought to be considered by mainstream 
Comparative Politics scholars. This chapter provides empirical support for the 
proposition that territorial disputes helps explain regime stability when the regimes 
are not dependent on oil production, demonstrating the need to further develop 
research in this area.  
This chapter will proceed as follows. First, the main aims and purposes of the 
analysis will be set out, along with a brief summary of the main theoretical claims 
outlined in Chapter 3. The section will reiterate the main assumptions about the 
expected linkages between territorial dispute involvement and autocratic regime 
stability. Furthermore, the section will also outline the theoretical reasons for the 
inclusion of other crucial predictors of regime stability typically considered in the 
Comparative Politics literature. The chapter will then move on to discuss the main 
methodological procedures, and the data analysis section, which begins with 
descriptive statistics and diagnostic tests, followed by detailed testing of the 
hypotheses. The conclusion section will discuss the main findings of this chapter, 
and discuss their implications for the wider literature and the thesis more generally.  
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Theory 
 
Distinguishing between autocratic spells and autocratic regimes 
 
As explained earlier in the thesis, autocratic spells are the total number of years an 
autocratic regime, or a succession of autocratic regimes, have ruled in a given 
country without interruption. An autocratic regime is defined here as a set of 
undemocratic rules for choosing leaders and policies in a given period of time 
(Geddes et al., 2014). As noted in Chapter 3 the theoretical assumptions of ReSIT 
can be applied to both autocratic spells and autocratic regimes, given that the more 
durable the regime, then the more durable the spell of autocracy.  
Given that most research on the implications of external threats for the domestic 
organisation of states focuses primarily on democratisation, this chapter makes an 
original contribution by examining the issue from an alternative perspective. This is 
important, because this thesis takes into account the fact that regime failure in 
autocratic states does not always end in a democratic transition. In fact, upon 
transition most autocracies are followed by another form of autocracy, and, the 
implications of this type of regime change are often overlooked by political 
scientists (Wright et al., 2015). Nevertheless, autocracy-to-autocracy regime 
changes have serious implications for transitioning states. For example, when the 
Sandinista movement overthrew the Samoza military dictatorship in Nicaragua in 
1979, the country underwent a series of drastic economic, social, political, and 
cultural changes. Similarly, the long history of regime instability in Thailand has had 
a major impact on Thai society and economic development. And while regime 
instability in Thailand has made it possible for two short spells of democracy to 
occur between 1951 and 2012, 75% of transitions were from one autocratic regime 
to another,33 resulting in a number of prosecutions, elite turnovers, expropriations, 
                                                          
33
 In the Magaloni et al. (2013) dataset used in this thesis, between 1950 and 2012, Thailand has 
transitioned 8 times, with 6 of those changes being and autocracy-to-autocracy transitions: in 1973, 
Thailand’s military regimes transitioned into a multiparty regime, to democracy in 1975, to military 
regime in 1976, to multiparty regime in 1979, to military regime in 1980, to democracy in 1992, to 
military regime in 2006, and back to democracy in 2008.  
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as well as legal, social and political turmoil (see for example Morell, 1976 and Case, 
1995).  
Understood in this way, autocratic regime stability is a double-edged sword. On one 
hand, it increases the chances of democratisation because a democratic transition 
can only occur once an autocratic regime has failed. On the other hand, it also 
increases the chances of a transition to another form of autocratic regime. The 
impact of autocratic regime change is unpredictable, but certainly real.  Given that, 
to the best of my knowledge, all of the current literature on ReSIT focuses on 
autocratic spell durability rather than autocratic regime stability, it is crucial to 
address this important gap in the literature by investigating whether territorial 
dispute involvement prolongs the longevity of autocratic regimes, shielding them 
from coups and political plots, and thus preventing both democratisation and 
autocracy-to-autocracy transition. And indeed, as discussed in Chapter 3, much of 
the theory on the centralising impact of conflict engagement in political regimes 
focuses on the same elements traditionally viewed as increasing regime stability 
more generally, rather than simply protecting them from democratisation. The next 
section turns to examining the effects of territorial disputes on autocratic regime 
transitions.  
 
The effects of territorial disputes on autocratic regime transitions 
 
As discussed in the Chapter 3, the biggest threat to authoritarian regimes comes 
from the inside. The opposition as well as certain factions within the elites might 
have strong incentives to oust the current leadership and install their own 
candidates in their stead. This threat of rebellion, inherent in all autocracies, serves 
as a bargaining chip between the rulers and the elites. Its magnitude is likely to 
have a significant influence on the distribution of power within the state. The 
strength of the threat depends on a number of factors, but the three identified as 
the most vital are usually: the strength and the unity of the opposition, the loyalty 
of the elites, and the support from the general population (Frantz and Ezrow, 
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2011a). If the opposition is weak, elites remain loyal, and the masses relatively 
content, the chances of a regime change, unless it is executed by some external 
force, are relatively small.  
By drawing on the ‘rally around the flag’ literature, ReSIT emphasizes the effects a 
threat to national security is likely to have on the interaction between the leaders 
and the elites. First, highly salient territorial disputes are likely to unify polarised 
elites. Even if the ruling factions disagree with the leadership, they are likely to 
unify in face of a significant threat in order to prevent it from materialising. 
Preventing the breakdown of state authority, at least temporarily, is expected to 
take priority over factionalism. In most cases, any significant loss of territory and 
state integrity are going to be seen as less desirable than the current status quo. 
Second, the ‘rally’ effect is likely to make the costs of actively plotting against the 
leader too high for the potential opposition. As argued in the Chapter 3, the high-
risk context of territorial disputes might severely weaken and fracture the 
opposition, who will in turn find it much harder to co-opt other members of the 
elite.  Finally, the ‘rally’ effects make it more likely for the general population to 
support the current regime due to the increased feeling of nationalism, which often 
accompanies international disputes, especially the ones that are territorial in 
nature. All of the above factors are expected to significantly strengthen the position 
of the leader vis-a-vis the elites by discrediting the threat of rebellion. It is worth 
noting that territorial disputes only have temporary effects on elite structures 
within autocracies, and it is up to the leadership to attempt power consolidation. 
Whether this is possible depends on a number of factors that are highly contextual, 
and beyond the scope of this quantitative analysis. If the opportunity is seized, the 
regime is likely to become more centralised, and the chances of the elites to 
overthrow the current leadership decrease significantly. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis of this thesis states that:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Autocracies facing territorial threats are at less risk of regime 
transitions than regimes that are not facing such threats. 
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Other factors affecting regime durability 
 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in Chapter 3, other factors affecting regime stability are 
also considered in this and the next chapter. While the literature on the effects of 
economic development and regime stability is mixed, this chapter will assume that 
wealth has a stabilising effect on autocratic regimes. The limited discussion on the 
impact of wealth on the leader-elite interaction suggests that that higher level of 
economic prosperity increases the durability of autocracies, making them less likely 
to transition. Most prominently, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) have proposed 
that the level of economic development is likely to reflect the amount of financial 
resources available to the leadership that would help ‘buy’ the loyalty of the elites 
and silence the opposition (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Furthermore, high GDP 
levels are likely to legitimise the regime in the eyes of the public, which is unlikely 
to oppose a government that promotes the wealth of its citizens (Haggard and 
Kaufman, 1995). Finally, extremely low levels of GDP per capita are likely an 
indicator of a financial crisis, a well-known factor increasing the likelihood of regime 
change (Gasiorowski, 1995). Hence, it is expected that wealth is likely to reduce the 
likelihood of autocratic regime failure.  
Moreover, this chapter will also assume that petroleum dependency and assume 
that oil-dependent autocracies are at less risk of transition than autocracies, which 
are not relying on oil. The rationale for this assumption was explained in more 
detail in Chapter 3.   
Finally, some scholars have argued that ethnic and religious fractionalisation might 
have a significant effect on the level of political polarisation within the state 
(Easterly and Levine, 1997), potentially affecting overall regime stability (Escribá-
Folch and Wright, 2010). As such, both types of fractionalisation are expected to 
increase the likelihood of regime transitions within autocracies.  
In summary, the literature and theory section above has emphasised the main 
factors likely to contribute to the survival of autocratic regimes outlined in Chapter 
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3. It has demonstrated how the ReSIT theory fits within the Comparative Politics 
literature, and demonstrated that its assumptions can be used to investigate the 
impact of territorial disputes on the longevity of autocratic regimes. Furthermore, 
the above section has engaged with other theories of regime transition within the 
Comparative Politics literature, including those on economic development, oil 
dependency, and ethnic and religious fractionalisation. This combination of 
perspectives has helped establish that all variables used in the analysis have clear 
theoretical reasons to be included in the models and are likely to produce 
significant results. What follows below is a description of the methods used to 
conduct the analysis in the current chapter. The first part of the methodology will 
briefly review the unit of analysis, as well as the main transformations performed 
on the predictor variables used in the models. The methods used are briefly 
summarised, along with all diagnostic tools used to investigate the robustness of 
the results.  The chapter then moves on to the wider analysis of results, and 
concludes with the implications for the overall thesis and wider scholarship in 
general.  
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
Data 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the dataset employed in this chapter is a custom made 
file compiled from three separate data sources. The ‘Autocracies of the World’ 
(Magaloni et al., 2013) dataset, discussed at length in the previous chapter, is used 
to distinguish between various types of autocracy (military, monarchic, multiparty 
and single party), as well as to differentiate between democracy and 
authoritarianism. For definitions as well as operationalization of those and other 
crucial concepts, see Chapter 4. The dataset contains a total of 90,850 regime-
months, with 54.774 (60.3%) of those being authoritarian. The unit of all univariate 
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and multivariate analyses of this chapter is the hazard ratio of regime transition at a 
particular moment in time, although certain descriptive statistics include the regime 
itself as a main subject of investigation. The transition is understood as regime 
change regardless of whether the change was peaceful or violent. Furthermore, the 
transition is understood to have occurred only if the overarching regime type has 
changed. In the rare instances where a country has undergone a transition without 
changing the structures of the state (i.e. transitioned from one type of multiparty 
regime to another multiparty regime), the regime is understood as not having 
transitioned. The temporal domain of the data spans from 1951 to 2008, and in 
order to minimise the bias resulting from left-truncation of the data, all regimes are 
treated as if they originated in 1951 (Cleves et al., 2010).   
 
Variables 
 
While the typology adopted in this thesis distinguishes between five different 
regime types (democracy, military, monarchic, multiparty and single party regimes), 
this chapter will focus on the very broad understanding on autocracies as regimes 
that do not fit the criteria of being democratic, according to the minimalist 
definition of democracy discussed in Chapter 4. While this chapter aggregates all 
autocratic regimes and treats them as if they responded to territorial threats in a 
similar manner, the next chapter (Chapter 6) will explore how structural features of 
autocracies affect the relationship between territorial threat and regime transition.  
 
Dependent variable: regime transition 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, transition is a binary indicator variable, coded 1 in the 
last month of the regime existence if a country transitions, or 0 in all other 
instances. States that begun before or after 1951 and have not yet transitioned by 
2008 are always coded as 0. The transition variable includes both autocracy-to-
autocracy transitions (for example, a transition from a military to a single party 
regime) as well as democratic transitions (for example, a transition from multiparty 
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regime to a democratic regime). Once a regime becomes a democracy, it is 
excluded from the analysis. If the democracy within the excluded regime breaks 
down, it is included back into analysis.  
 
Independent variables: transformations 
 
The section below will briefly discuss the functional form of the continuous 
variables used in this chapter, as well as any transformations applied to them for 
the purposes of this chapter.  
Out of all of the variables available for analysis in this chapter, only three are 
continuous. To reduce the impact of extreme values on the relationship between 
the predictors and the dependent variable, the functional form of the GDP per 
capita, ethnic fractionalisation and religious fractionalisation variables had to be 
explored.  
 
 
GDP per capita 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the variable measuring the level of economic 
development within autocracies is recorded in yearly GDP per capita, adjusted for 
purchasing power parity, and measured in 1990 international Gheary-Khamis 
dollars. Like the territorial dispute variable, it is lagged 12 months given that the 
effects of development on regime transitions is likely to be somewhat delayed. 
Because the distribution of GDP per capita is not even among autocracies, with a 
vast majority of states having a relatively low level of income, and a very small 
minority having a disproportionately high income, the data is right-skewed, and 
requires a logarithmic transformation to ensure that the relationship between 
regime duration and economic development is linear. Figure 1 demonstrates the 
distribution of income before and after the logarithmic transformation. In order to 
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transform GDP, the common logarithm with the base 10 has been applied to the 
data. This means that while interpreting the models in this chapter, every single 
unit increase in the log(GDP per capita) variable should be interpreted as a tenfold 
increase in GDP per capita in each of the regimes.  
In addition, Figure 2 shows the relationship between log(GDP per capita) and 
analysis time is linear after the transformation. For comparison, Figure 2 also 
includes the graphical representation of the relationship between the non-
transformed GDP per capita and time.  
 
 
Ethnic fractionalisation and religious fractionalisation variables 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates the distribution of values on the ethnic and religious 
fractionalisation scales as constructed by Alesina et al. (2003). It is clear from both 
histograms that the data is normally distributed among the sample of autocracies, 
with no major right- or left-skew. Given that ethnic and religious fractionalisation 
values do not vary over time, there is no need to investigate their distribution over 
time using a scatterplot or a linear prediction.  
 
Additional variable transformations 
 
In order to estimate the baseline survival, hazard and cumulative hazard functions 
for the best fitting model, all predictor variables in the models have to be set to the 
value of zero. While typically the purpose of the baseline functions is to estimate 
the function given the minimal risk of regime transition, this and future analytical 
chapters of this thesis will estimate baseline functions based on average values of 
predictors. This is  done,  because  a  minimal  risk  of  transition  is  often  based  on 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The distribution of GDP per capita before and after the logarithmic transformation 
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Figure 2. A scatterplot of the relationship between GDP per capita and analysis time before and after the logarithmic transformation 
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Figure 3. The distribution of the ethnic fractionalisation and religious fractionalisation variables 
 
 
unrealistic values of the main predictors and can be hard to interpret in a way that 
would make a meaningful contribution to what does, and what does not, increase 
the likelihood of regime failure.  Hence, all of the baseline models in this chapter 
will be set for regimes with no territorial disputes, an average GDP per capita 
income, no recent history of political instability, no oil-dependency, and a minimal 
value of both ethnic and religious fractionalisation. Given that most autocratic 
regimes fit these criteria, the estimation of the above baseline function is more 
realistic, and more helpful in understanding the impact of territorial disputes on the 
hazard of regime change. 
In order to aid the estimation of baseline functions, the original untransformed GDP 
per capita variable was centred on its mean, before being logarithmically 
transformed.  A mean score for the untransformed GDP per capita was estimated at 
2,869 GK$, and then log transformed (𝑙𝑜𝑔10(2869) = 3.70). All of the log(GDP) 
scores were then subtracted with 3.70, meaning that when the centred log(GDP) is 
set to 0 when estimating baseline functions, it is set to its original, untransformed 
mean. This assures that while their value is equal to 0, it is actually indicating a 
mean income among autocratic regimes. 
 
Methods 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, all three quantitative chapters in the thesis will employ 
survival analysis to investigate the effects of conflict on authoritarian regime 
duration. This is a particularly suitable method given the numerous issues that arise 
in regime duration data, which were discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The sections 
below will address each of the methods used in order to address these issues.  
 
Relaxing the independence assumption 
 
Typically, in most regression analyses, including survival analysis, it is assumed that 
all units of analysis are independent from one another. However, as discussed in 
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Chapter 4, it is likely that regime transitions might be more likely in some states and 
less likely in others. For example, due to some unobservable factors, some states 
might be particularly prone to multiple regime transitions (Turkey and Thailand) 
while others might be exceptionally stable (Malaysia and China). To account for 
this, the assumption of independence will be relaxed in the analysis by clustering 
the observations within countries. Thus, while autocratic regimes are assumed to 
be independent from one another between countries, they are assumed to be inter-
dependent within countries, and the standard errors are adjusted accordingly to 
reflect this (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). This relaxation of the independence 
assumption ensures that the results from this and further analytical chapters are 
more valid and reliable.  
 
Model building and comparison 
 
In this and future chapters, models will be built using the stepwise forward 
selection method process using only one regression type, namely, the Cox 
Proportional Hazards analysis. Unfortunately, global and absolute measures of 
model fit are typically unavailable for survival analysis models, and as a result, only 
the relative fit of the model can be used to compare individual models (Allison, 
2010: 422). Furthermore, standard likelihood ratio tests used to compare relative 
model fit are also unavailable for models with relaxed assumption of independence 
(Stata Corp, 2011). Nevertheless, this is not a major problem, given that the 
stepwise forward selection method is used in this thesis to understand how the 
relationship between predictors and the dependent variables change as more 
predictors are added to the model, rather than to determine whether particular 
variables significantly improve the model fit.34 To aid the selection of the final 
model, the analysis will be guided by Akaike Information Criteria scores and p-
values of individual predictors, rather than directly comparing model fit.  In general, 
                                                          
34
 As an exception to this, Wald tests for model fit improvement in a nested model will be performed 
to confirm that the addition of an interaction between time and a variable with time-varying effect 
significantly improves model fit. 
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the lower the AIC score, the better the quality of the model relative to each of the 
other models. AIC is in many ways superior to other measures of model fit, such as 
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) because it includes a penalty for the 
number of variables included in the model. As a result, all theoretically important 
variables will be retained regardless of their contribution to the model, unless 
stated otherwise.35  
 
Testing the proportional hazards assumption 
 
Given that the Cox survival analysis assumes that the hazard of regime transition 
does not vary over time, each variable in the model will be investigated for the 
violation of the proportional hazards assumption using: 
- The graphical ‘log-log’ plot for dummy variables; 
- The graphical examination of the Martingale residuals for continuous variables; 
and  
- The Schoenfeld residuals test for all types of variables (both graphically and 
non-graphically) to seek violation of the PR assumption globally (across the entire 
model) and individually (among singular variables).  
 
In the instance of the ‘log-log’ plot, if the PH assumption is met, the survival lines 
plotted for each value of the variable are expected to be parallel to one other. In 
the case of Martingale residuals, residuals are plotted against the values of the 
continuous variables with the expectation that the local linear regression (LOWESS) 
is parallel to the x-axis. Finally, in the case of Schoenfeld residuals, it is expected 
that the global test for the PH assumption is insignificant. That is, the hypothesis 
that the PH assumptions are violated can be safely rejected. If the p-value is below 
0.05, the PH assumption has been violated. In the graphical representation of the 
                                                          
35
 At times, variables that are not of crucial theoretical importance, and whose effect is not 
statistically significant, might be dropped from the models. This will happen if there are concerns 
over the proportion of predictors in the model relative to the failure count. This is particularly likely 
in later chapters, where less failure events will be available for analysis in the models.  
174 
 
Schoenfeld test, it is expected that the overall distribution of values will be linear 
and parallel to the x-axis, akin to the Martingale residual test.  
In case of a PH violation, a number of solutions will be applied to account for the 
time-varying effects of the predictors. First, the problematic variables will be 
identified. Second, a Cox proportional hazards model with an interaction between 
the problematic variable and time will be fitted, and a Wald test will be performed 
to investigate whether the model fit improves significantly. If the interaction with 
time is significant, and the model fit improves as a result of including time varying 
covariates, it will be retained in the model. Once all time-varying effects of 
predictor variables are established, an additional model including all of the 
standard covariates and covariates with time-varying effects will be fitted using a 
Royston-Parmar flexible parametric analysis. This is done because unlike Cox PH 
regression, Royston-Parmar regression makes it easier for time-varying effects to be 
accommodated in the analysis, while at the same time allowing for greater 
flexibility of the hazard function, which is much smoother and easier to interpret 
than the results of a Cox model with time-dependent effects (Royston and Lambert, 
2011). Royston-Parmar models split the time scale of the function at points known 
as knots, and allow the coefficients to vary according to data distribution in each of 
the sections. It then re-joins them at the knots, resulting in a function which is more 
true to the data, and much smoother, than that produced by parametric and non-
parametric models. The use of Cox and Royston-Parmar models to test the 
assumptions outlined in the beginning of the chapter will increase the overall 
robustness of the analysis.  
In addition, given that the Royston-Parmar model is in many ways superior in 
graphically representing survival, hazard and cumulative hazard functions (Rosyton 
and Lambert, 2011), it will be used throughout this and future analytical chapters as 
the method of choice for visualising the results of the models. This can be done, 
because the results of the Royston-Parmar models do not tend to differ in terms of 
effect significance and magnitude from standard Cox non-PH models (Royston and 
Lambert, 2011).  
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Additional diagnostic tests 
 
In addition to testing for the crucial PH assumption, a number of diagnostic tests 
will be performed to ensure that the results are valid.  
First, for every model built using the Cox analysis, a link test (Pregibon, 1980) will be 
performed on all models throughout the analysis to determine whether the models 
have been specified correctly. In case of the link test producing significant results 
(indicating a misspecification of the model), covariates responsible for the 
misspecification will be transformed accordingly, and separate tests will be 
performed to ensure that the new models are specified correctly. A separate test 
will be performed for each model, and if the addition of a predictor causes 
concerning results, a further investigation into the continuous form of the variable 
will be performed, including an addition of potential transformations of the 
variable.  
Finally, the functional form of all continuous variables included in the models with 
all covariates will be tested by plotting their Martingale residuals. This is done to 
establish whether the variable has a linear effect in the model as expected, or 
whether it should be transformed to fulfil the assumptions of a Cox regression.  
 
Data analysis 
 
 
The data analysis section will test the hypothesis put forward in the initial section of 
the chapter. To reiterate, these hypothesis state that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Autocracies facing territorial threats are at less risk of regime 
transitions than regimes that are not facing such threats. 
 
Additionally, a number of other assumptions are made about the remaining 
predictors in the models. Overall, it is expected that the wealthier the regime, the 
176 
 
less likely it is to transition to another form of regime. Additionally, autocracies that 
depend on oil will also be less likely to fail. The factors likely to reduce the 
likelihood of transition include high levels of ethnic and religious fractionalisation, 
as well as a recent history of political instability.  
Before moving onto testing the main hypothesis, some basic descriptive statistics 
are performed to investigate the underlying patterns and trends inherent in the 
data that might have an effect on how the model results are interpreted. The 
analysis section will then move to test the hypothesis and other assumptions in 
Models 1-8, which are built using the forward selection process. The proportional 
hazard assumption will be tested, and the implications of these and other 
diagnostic tests will be discussed. Finally, the conclusion will discuss the 
implications of the findings for this chapter, as well as the relevant literature and 
the thesis more generally.   
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
The aggregated autocracies in the dataset had a median duration time of 10.8 
years. This means that 50% of all non-censored regimes in the sample have failed 
by the time they reached 10.8 years. Given this short median duration, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that autocratic regimes have a high occurrence of regime transitions, 
with 77.3% of all 314 regimes within the sample transitioning at some point 
between 1951 and 2008.  
Due to the frequent occurrence of regime failures in the sample, it is curious that 
only about 50.4% of all regimes that have eventually transitioned experienced a 
serious spell of instability in the year before (Table 5). This proportion increases 
when the censored and non-censored regimes are considered separately, with 
almost 71% of all regimes that have eventually transition experiencing some type of 
instability throughout their history, compared to only 48.6% of regimes which were 
yet to fail by 2007, or ceased to exist without transitioning. This demonstrates that 
177 
 
although most regimes that transition experience some form of instability within 
their lifetime, this is not always the case. Furthermore, instability is more likely to 
occur a number of years before the transition, rather than immediately before it. It 
indicates that regime transitions can often be sudden and unpredictable, and 
measures such as Polity IV or Freedom House (which comprise the final instability 
scale) might not reflect such changes particularly well. However, this does not mean 
that instability is not strongly associated with the likelihood of regime transition, 
and this relationship will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter. Table 5 
also demonstrates that even amongst those states which have not transitioned by 
2007, or have disintegrated (as in the case of regimes in Syria and Yugoslavia), 
almost a half of all regimes (48.6%) have experienced some form of instability, 
demonstrating that sudden institutional or political changes are not synonymous 
with regime change.  
 
Table 5. Autocratic transitions and instability in different contexts 
The experience of instability 
Proportion 
(N) 
Total 
 
One year before the transition, if eventually failed  
50.4% 
(122) 
242 
At some point during regime duration, if eventually failed 
70.7% 
(171) 
242 
At some point during regime duration, if never failed 
48.6% 
(35) 
72 
At some point during regime duration, all regimes 
64.6% 
(203) 
314 
 
 
Figure 4 summarises the territorial dispute, oil-based economy and instability 
statistics for all autocratic regime-months in the sample, as well as the percentage 
of all autocratic regimes that have experienced territorial disputes, instability, and 
oil-dependency. As seen in Figure 4, only 44% all regime-months have been spent 
within the context of territorial disputes, experienced by less than half of all 
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autocracies in the sample. It appears that although autocracies tend to be 
considered particularly conflict prone by the International Relations research 
community, less than half of the regimes in the sample have ever been involved in 
any type of dispute over a territory in their entire lifespan. Either territorial disputes 
are not as frequent as other types of conflict among autocracies, or their tendency 
to get involved in disputes might often be overestimated. Given that territorial 
disputes have been found to be one of the most dangerous type of disagreement, 
with the highest propensity for hostilities escalation (Senese and Vasquez, 2003), 
the latter is more likely to be true.  
Unsurprisingly, only a small number of autocracies within the sample are oil-rich, 
with less than a 5th of the regime-months were spent in the condition of oil-
dependency, and only 14% of all autocracies in the sample ever exporting 
significant amounts of petroleum.  
Only 14% of autocracies in the sample have relied on oil for revenues. It was 
expected that oil-reliant regimes would also tend to be wealthier than other forms 
of autocracy, which is confirmed below in Figure 5. Finally, Figure 4 expands on 
some of the claims made when analysing Table 5. While 65.6% of all regimes in the 
sample have experienced instability at some point in their existence, only 4.9% of 
all regime-months have been spent experiencing instability. This suggests that 
instability, although relatively frequent among autocracies, tends to occur in short 
spells of time.  
Unsurprisingly, GDP per capita among autocracies in the sample is very unevenly 
distributed, with a disproportionally large standard deviation and a relatively low 
median value (see Table 6, also Figure 1). Per capita income is in fact so unevenly 
distributed that 75% of all autocracies earn less than 8.4% of what the top earning 
autocracies do. Among the richest nations in the sample are the Middle Eastern 
monarchies such as Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates, as well as Singapore. 
The above regimes have frequently reached over 20,000 GK$ dollars in GDP per
 
 
Figure 4. Summary statistics for territorial dispute, oil dependency, and political instability variables as proportions of regime-months, and proportion of all 
autocracies affected 
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Figure 5. Mean untransformed GDP per capita income in oil dependent autocracies 
 
 
 
capita income over their duration. Unsurprisingly, the autocracies with oil-based 
economy are more likely than other regimes to have high GDP per capita, as shown 
in Figure 5, emphasizing the importance of controlling for the influence of oil on the 
relationship between economic development and regime transitions.  Some of the 
countries with the longest history of petroleum-based economy (50 or more 
regime-years of oil-dependency) include Syria, Libya, Venezuela, Egypt, Kuwait, 
Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. However, the mere fact of oil-dependency might not be 
a good predictor of the country’s wealth, given that the measure does not 
distinguish between countries whose economies are mostly based on oil from those 
whose oil production reaches only 30% of domestic exports. Similarly, the length of 
oil-dependency is not always an adequate measure. For example, some regimes, 
like the monarchy in the United Arab Emirates, have only been oil-dependent for a 
relatively short time, yet still managed to reach the position of the wealthiest 
autocracies in the sample. As a result, the measure of oil should only be tested in 
conjunction with the level of GDP per capita, given that it is the income generated 
from oil that is likely to be the true predictor of regime transition, rather than oil 
itself.  
Table 6. Summary statistics for the untransformed GDP per capita measure 
  Statistic GDP per capita (GK $) 
Mean  2868.8 
Median 1704.0 
Standard deviation  3481.8 
75%  (3
rd
 quartile)      3581.0 
Minimum value 203.0 
Maximum value 42916.0 
 
Regimes reaching the lowest levels of GDP per capita in the sample (less than 400 
GK$) are mainly found in the Sub-Saharan Africa, and include those in Congo 
Kinshasa, Chad, Guinea, Ethiopia and Malawi.  
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Figure 6 below demonstrates the box plots for the distribution of values of the 
ethnic and religious fractionalisation variables. As discussed above, both measures 
have a relatively normal distribution, without any skews to the data. However, as 
seen in Figure 6, there are some differences when it comes to the distribution of 
scores between the two scales. The median for ethnic fractionalisation (0.48) is 
higher than that for religious fractionalisation (0.43), suggesting that higher scores 
on ethnic fractionalisation scale are more common than on the religious 
fractionalisation scale.  Furthermore, although the scores are distributed fairly 
evenly across the scale, the maximum scores set out by the upper whisker on the 
religious fractionalisation scale are lower than those on the ethnic fractionalisation 
scale, once again suggesting that ethnic fractionalisation might tend to be more 
severe than religious fractionalisation within the sample. 
 
Similarly to the geographical distribution of the low-income regimes, the most 
ethnically and religiously fractionalised regimes can also be found in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, partly to their colonial history, and partly due to other causes such as lower 
levels or urbanisation, or tropical location (Green, 2013). The most ethnically 
divided countries (over 0.9 score on the fractionalisation scale) include Liberia and 
Uganda, while the most religiously divided countries (over 0.8 on the 
fractionalisation scale) are Malawi and South Africa.  
 
Having discussed some of the most common trends among autocratic regimes, the 
analysis section will now move to testing the proportional hazards assumption of 
Cox survival regression using univariate analysis.  
 
Results of univariate diagnostic tests 
 
As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, the models are built using a 
forward selection process. However, before fitting the models, the proportional 
hazard  assumption  was  tested   using  the  graphical   ‘log - log’   plots,  Schoenfeld
 
 
Figure 6. A box plot summarising the distribution of ethnic fractionalisation and religious fractionalisation variables 
 
 
 
 
residuals and Martingale residuals described earlier. A univariate Cox survival 
model has been fitted for each variable, and a graphical and non-graphical 
representation of the diagnostic Schoenfeld residuals test was created for each of 
the predictors separately (Figure A1 and Table A1 respectively, Appendix B). It 
should be noted that these results are likely to change when the variables are 
entered into final models all at once, and these results should be compared with 
those from the final Cox proportional hazard model discussed later in the chapter 
(Table A2 and Figures A4-A6). As such, the initial figures are merely indicative of 
potential problems with the variables, and should not be treated as final. 
Additionally, non-adjusted and adjusted ‘log-log’ plots discussed in the section 
above have been plotted in Figures A2 and A5 (Appendix B) respectively. In the first 
test, the smoothed Schoenfeld residuals are plotted against analysis time for each 
covariate. To pass the test, the line should be parallel to the x-axis. The graphical 
tests in Figure A1 demonstrate that the proportional hazards assumption is most 
likely violated for the political instability variable, whose effects on regime 
transitions vary over time.  No other variable has shown a consistent violation of 
the test in Table A1 and Figure A1.   
 
Nevertheless, the results of the ‘log-log’ plot PH tests are concerning: neither of the 
dummy indicator variables considered in this chapter meets the conditions needed 
to pass the test. In order to meet the proportional hazard assumption, the lines for 
each level of the covariate (0 and 1) in Figure A2 must be parallel to one another. 
Neither the territorial dispute nor oil dependency indicators have passed this test, 
which means that their effect on autocratic survival rates might not be proportional 
over time. In fact, the survival curves for both variables cross at least once (oil 
dependency) or on a number of occasions (territorial dispute). The survival curves 
for the political instability variable do not cross, but they are visibly not parallel to 
one another, and as such do not pass the test.  
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Finally, the Martingale residual test of the continuous covariates examines the 
functional form of the variables (Figure B4 in Appendix B). In order to pass the test, 
the Lowess (locally-weighted scatterplot smoother) smoothed regression line 
should be parallel to the constant at y=0. Unfortunately, just as in case of 
categorical predictors, the effect of continuous predictors on the hazard of regime 
transition seems to vary over time. The Lowess function is clearly not parallel to y=0 
neither for log(GDP per capita). This suggests potential problems with both the 
proportional hazards assumption, as well as the functional form of this predictor.  
 
Given the violations observed in the graphical and non-graphical tests, the results 
must be treated with caution, and a separate Royston-Parmar model with time 
varying effects is fitted in the final stage of the analysis (Model 8 in Table 9). 
However, given that the results of these tests are not yet final, the hypotheses will 
be tested using the proportional hazards Cox model, and the time varying variables 
will be finally identified by including the interaction between analysis time and the 
covariate into the models, and testing for an improvement in model fit, as well as 
statistical significance of these interactions. As mentioned in the methods chapter, 
only covariates whose interaction with time has significantly improved model fit will 
be included in the final Royston-Parmar Model 8 (Table 9).  
 
 
Multivariate analysis: testing the hypothesis 
 
Models 1-6 in Table 7 below are standard PH Cox survival analysis models built 
using the forward selection process. As seen in Model 1, territorial dispute 
involvement, when tested on its own, has no effect on the hazard ratio of regime 
transition in autocratic states, showing little support for Hypothesis 1.  In Model 2, 
the addition of GDP per capita does not influence the relationship between 
territorial disputes and regime transition, but it appears, initially, that the higher 
the GDP per capita of the autocracy, the less likely it is to transition to another form 
of regime. This initially confirms the assumption that wealth reduces the risk of 
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regime failure. As expected, the addition of oil dependency indicator in Model 3 
does influence the relationship between wealth and transitions, with oil 
dependency rendering the effects of log(GDP per capita) on transitions insignificant. 
Model 3 demonstrates that regimes that are relying on petroleum production are 
almost 50% less likely to undergo a regime transition than states that do not rely on 
petroleum production. In Model 3, the previously significant effects of GDP per 
capita are no longer significant, suggesting that oil dependency explains the 
relationship between wealth and transition better than log(GDP per capita). The 
results indicate that countries rich in oil tend to also have a high GDP per capita, but 
it is the oil production, and not the income, that leads to autocratic stability. 
Nevertheless, this effect disappears once regime instability is accounted for in 
Model 4, and the effects of oil on transitions remain insignificant once more 
variables are included in the model.  
 
In fact, the addition of the political instability variable appears to have an effect on 
a range of relationships in Model 4. Accounting for political instability seems to re-
introduce the significance of the effects of GDP per capita on regime transitions, 
where a tenfold increase in per capita income results in a regime being 57% less 
likely to transition than without the hypothetical income increase. Furthermore, the 
effects of oil dependency have largely diminished and are no longer significant. 
What these results suggest is that the instability variable is most likely highly 
correlated with both the independent predictors (territorial dispute, log(GDP per 
capita) and oil dependency) and the independent variable (regime transition). To 
clarify these relationships, Table 8 presents a correlation matrix for all variables 
included in Models 1-6. It is clear from Table 8 that instability is in fact strongly 
correlated with all independent variables apart from ethnic fractionalisation. This is 
not surprising, given that typically, some degree of correlation usually exists in non-
experimental data. However, it is the direction and strength of the correlation that 
is important in this particular case.  
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Table 7. Multivariate Cox regression estimates for all types of autocratic regimes 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model  4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
Territorial disputes 
0.782 
(0.11) 
0.783 
(0.11) 
0.813 
(0.12) 
0.710** 
(0.09) 
0.716* 
(0.09) 
0.718* 
(0.09) 
Log(GDP per capita)   
 
0.536* 
(0.13) 
0.638 
(0.16) 
0.565** 
(0.12) 
0.622* 
(0.13) 
0.619* 
(0.13) 
Oil dependency 
  
0.573* 
(0.13) 
0.683 
(0.15) 
0.637 
(0.15) 
0.635 
(0.15) 
Political instability 
   
21.467*** 
(3.31) 
21.550*** 
(3.29) 
21.370*** 
(3.22) 
Ethnic fractionalisation 
    
1.565* 
(0.34) 
1.637* 
(0.38) 
Religious fractionalisation 
    
 
0.848ꭞ 
(0.21) 
Proportional hazards test  
χ² = 2.31         
df (1) 
p = 0.129 
χ² = 8.01        
df (2)          
p = 0.018 
χ² = 9.67        
df (3)          
p = 0.022 
χ² = 6.17        
df (4) 
p = 0.003 
χ² = 14.83 
df (5) 
p = 0.011 
χ² = 15.63        
df (6) 
p = 0.016 
Link test 
  
β =0.605      
p = 0.417 
β =0.264   
  p = 0.627 
β =-0.278   
p< 0.000 
β =-0.239 
p=0.001 
β = -0.234    
p = 0.001 
Partial log likelihood -1198.53 -1192.94 -1189.68 -990.22 -988.71 -988.54 
AIC  2399.063 2389.878 2385.354 1988.434 1987.42 1989.08 
 
Notes: 
Models estimated using a sample of 314 regimes in 125 countries, with 242 regime failures. 
Breslow method for handling ties.  
RP model is fitted using 4 degrees of freedom for time-constant effects.  
RCS – restricted cubic spline 
ꭞ     0.05 ≤p < 0.1 
*     0.01≤ p < 0.05 
**   0.001 ≤ p < 0.01 
*** p < 0.001 
  
  
 
Surprisingly, while political instability is negatively and significantly correlated with 
most variables associated with regime stability, it is positively correlated with the 
territorial dispute variable. This means that while the territorial dispute variable 
(after the addition of political instability in Model 4) is negatively correlated with 
the hazard ratio of regime transition, it is positively correlated with instability. This 
suggests that while regimes involved in territorial disputes are more likely to 
experience sudden bouts of instability, they are less likely to transition into another 
form of regime. 
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Table 8. Correlation between predictor variables and the independent variable included in Models 
1-8 in Table 7 
Variables 
Territorial 
dispute 
Log(GDP) Oil Instability 
Ethnic 
fract. 
Religious 
fract. 
Transition 
Territorial dispute   1.000 0.010* 0.119*** 0.022*** -0.008 0.004 -0.009* 
 
Log(GDP)  0.010* 1.000 0.376*** -0.012** -0.235*** -0.094*** -0.018*** 
 
 
Oil 
 
0.119*** 
 
0.376*** 
 
1.000 
 
-0.029*** 
 
0.083*** 
 
-0.114*** 
 
-0.016** 
 
 
Instability 
 
 
0.022*** 
 
-0.012** 
 
-0.029*** 
 
1.000 
 
0.007 
 
-0.038*** 
 
0.137*** 
 
Ethnic fract. 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.235*** 
 
0.083*** 
 
0.007 
 
1.000 
 
0.193*** 
 
0.010* 
 
 
Religious fract. 
 
0.004 
 
-0.094*** 
 
-0.114*** 
 
-0.038*** 
 
0.193*** 
 
1.000 
 
-0.004 
 
 
Transition 
 
-0.009* 
 
-0.018*** 
 
-0.016** 
 
0.137*** 
 
0.010* 
 
-0.004 
 
1.000 
 
 
It is possible that the lack of significant relationship between territorial dispute 
involvement and the hazard ratio of regime transition is due to the fact that 
regimes experiencing instability are also likely to experience territorial disputes, but 
both variables affect the likelihood of transition in different ways. Accounting for 
instability, however, reveals the true relationship between territorial disputes and 
transitions. As seen in Model 4, and in Models 5-8 afterwards, autocracies involved 
in territorial disputes experience between 28% and 30% less risk of transition than 
those not involved in territorial disputes, providing support for Hypothesis 1. 
Moreover, apart from the fact that instability has an impact on the relationship 
between the initial predictors and the dependent variable, it also has a particularly 
strong effect on the hazard of regime transition. Autocracies that have experienced 
instability in the year before were almost 21.5 times more likely to undergo a 
transition than those that have not experienced instability. This effect is highly 
significant (p<0.001) and remains consistent in Models 4-8, although the magnitude 
of the effects decreases when the time-varying effects of the instability are 
accounted for in Models 7 and 8.  The consistently strong, positive and significant 
effect of instability on regime transition suggests a considerable support for the 
189 
 
initial assumption that an episode of political instability the year before is likely to 
increase the likelihood of regime change. 
 
Finally, in Models 6 and 7, ethnic and religious fractionalisation variables are added 
to test the assumption that divided societies are more likely to experience regime 
failures. Nevertheless, it appears that while ethnic fractionalisation has a significant 
impact on the hazard ratio of autocratic transitions, religious fractionalisation does 
not increase the hazard ratio of transitions. The effects for ethnic fractionalisation 
are strong and statistically significant, with one unit increase on the scale making an 
autocracy as much as 57% more likely to transition, and 64% more likely to 
transition when ethnic fractionalisation is also accounted for in Model 7. Although 
the results from Models 5 and 6 do not support the initial assumptions, they are 
somewhat consistent with some of the suggestions put forward by Alesina et al. 
(2003: 158), who found that religious fractionalisation might not have the same 
effects on political regimes as ethnic fractionalisation. However, unlike Alesina et al. 
(2003), who claim that religious fractionalisation might actually be positively 
correlated with good quality of political institutions because it serves as a proxy of 
tolerance and freedom in a country that allows its citizens to practice the religion of 
their choice, no such positive effect was observed in Models 6-8. The impact of 
religious fractionalisation on the hazard of regime failure is not statistically 
significant.  
 
Having included all covariates in Model 6, it is crucial to re-examine the 
proportional hazards tests. As seen in Table 7, the global proportional hazards test 
based on Schoenfeld residuals is significant to the p<0.05 level. The detailed test 
results included in Appendix B (Table A2) show that instability is the only variable 
showing significant deviation from the assumption. The graphical test of Schoenfeld 
residuals in Figure A4 (Appendix B) confirm that only the instability variable appears 
to be violating the proportional hazards assumption. Furthermore, the Martingale 
residuals test of indicates no issues with the functional form of the three 
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continuous variables included in Model 6: log(GDP per capita), ethnic 
fractionalisation, and religious fractionalisation. Nevertheless, the log-log plot test 
of adjusted categorical predictors included in Model 6 demonstrates that even 
when the survival curves are adjusted for other covariates in the model, the 
proportional hazards assumption is still violated for all three variables (see Figure 
A5 in Appendix B). Just as in the log-lop plots for the unadjusted predictors, the 
survival curves cross for territorial dispute and oil dependency variables, and are 
visibly non-parallel for the political instability variable. 
 
As a result of these violations, separate models will test whether any significant 
interaction between time and the effects of each covariate in the model exists, 
introducing one interaction at a time, and assessing model fit using Wald tests and 
AIC scores. The analysis has indicated that the effects of instability do in fact 
significantly interact with time, and its inclusion in the model lowers the AIC score 
and improves relative model fit (Wald test χ²=13.75, df(1), p<0.001). Surprisingly, 
the interaction between the effects of religious fractionalisation and time were also 
significant, and were the only other interaction which has increased model fit 
significantly (χ²= 7.14, df(1), p=0.008) and lowered the AIC score. The addition of all 
other possible interactions has resulted in no improvement, and has in fact 
increased the AIC scores. This is surprising, given that territorial dispute and oil 
dependency variables have crossing survival curves, suggesting disproportionate 
effects over time. However, their interaction with time is clearly insignificant, and 
reduces model fit. As a result, the interactions between those variables and time 
were not retained in Models 7, 8 and 9. Instead, because the territorial dispute 
variable is the most theoretically important predictor in all models, its non-
proportional effect will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter.  
 
Finally, Models 7, 8 and 9 present the last models of the chapter.  Model 7 is a Cox 
proportional hazards model with the inclusion of the political instability - time and 
religious fractionalisation - time interactions, Model 9 includes all significant 
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interactions between the predictors, and Model 9 is a Royston Parmar flexible 
parametric model which is estimated in a similar way to Model 8, but allows the 
relationship between variables to vary more easily than Cox model, improving 
model fit. The results in Model 7 are fairly similar to that from Model 6 in Table 7, 
but the AIC score is lower. This suggests that controlling for the time-varying effects 
of religious fractionalisation and political instability improves model fit. Model 8 
presents the results of a full model that includes all interactions between the 
predictors, which also lowers the AIC score.  
 
The interaction term between wealth and political instability was statistically 
significant. Model 9 in Table 9 suggests that the effects of instability increase with a 
tenfold increase in wealth. Comparing two regimes which did not experience any 
instability the year before, an tenfold increase in GDP per capita while all other 
variables are held constant yields a hazard ratio equal to 0.277, and therefore the 
rate of regime change is decreased by (100%-27.7%) = 72.3% with every tenfold 
increase in income. However, when comparing two regimes which did experience 
instability the year before, a tenfold increase in income while holding all other 
variables constant, yields a hazard ratio equal to exp(-1.284 + 1.444) = exp(0.16) = 
1.17. This is an increase of 17%, meaning that autocracies which experienced 
instability become only 17% more likely to transition to another regime with a 
tenfold increase in wealth. Both relationships were statistically significant. 
 
Furthermore, the interaction between religious and ethnic fractionalisation was 
also statistically significant. Model 9 in Table 9 suggests that the effects of ethnic 
fractionalisation increase with the increase in religious fractionalisation. Comparing 
two regimes that did not experience a theoretical increase in religious 
fractionalisation, one unit increase in ethnic fractionalisation while all other 
variables are held constant yields a hazard ratio equal to 0.801, and therefore the 
rate of transition is decreased by 20, but the relationship is not statistically 
significant. This means that ethnic fractionalisation only has an effect on the 
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likelihood of regime transition when coupled with religious fractionalisation.  
Comparing two regimes experience one unit increase in religious fractionalisation, 
an additional one unit increase in ethnic fractionalisation while holding all other 
variables constant, yields a hazard ratio equal to exp(-0.212 + 1.793) = exp(1.581) = 
4.860. This is an increase of 486%, meaning that autocracies which experienced one 
unit increase in both ethnic and religious fractionalisation at the same time were 
almost five times more likely to fail than regimes that only experienced an increase 
in ethnic fractionalisation. 
 
Moreover, the relationship between oil dependency and territorial dispute 
involvement was also statistically significant, and has considerable implications for 
the findings of this thesis. For regimes that do not have oil, the effects of territorial 
dispute while all other variables are held constant yields a hazard ratio equal to 
0.69. This means that the rate of regime change is decreased by (100%-69%) = 31% 
at times directly following territorial disputes for states not dependent on oil. This 
relationship is statistically significant. Comparing two regimes which are dependent 
on oil, participation in territorial disputes while holding all other variables constant, 
yields a hazard ratio equal to exp(-0.371 + 0.756) = exp(0.385) = 1.470. This is an 
increase of 47%, but this relationship is not statistically significant, meaning that the 
relationship between territorial disputes and regime failure only holds for regimes 
that do not depend on oil. This important finding will be discussed in the conclusion 
section of this chapter. 
 
Finally, the results in the RP Model 9 and Cox Model 8 are comparable, with the 
exception of minimal changes to the values of the territorial dispute - oil 
dependency interaction, and the significance of the political instability predictor. 
The first one is a result of minor changes to the p-value, which are to be expected, 
while the latter are a result of better accounting for the time-varying effects of the 
political instability variable.  
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Table 9. Multivariate Cox and Royston Parmar regression estimates for models with time-varying 
effects 
Variables Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 (RP) 
 
  HR 
(S.E.) 
  HR 
(S.E.) 
  HR 
(S.E.) 
Territorial dispute 0.713* 
(0.10) 
0.648**          
(0.092) 
0.690**  
(0.10)    
Log(GDP per capita)   0.619* 
(0.13) 
0.279***                
(0.075) 
0.277*** 
(0.07)    
Oil dependency 0.625 
(0.16) 
0.405** 
(0.11) 
0.427**  
(0.12)    
Political instability 10.682*** 
(2.36) 
0.074* 
(0.09) 
0.174    
(0.22)    
Ethnic fractionalisation 1.579ꭞ 
(0.37) 
0.751 
(0.29) 
0.809    
(0.27)    
Religious fractionalisation 0.469* 
(-0.16) 
0.183** 
(0.10) 
0.241**  
(0.12)    
Political instability * time 1.006*** 
(0.00) 
1.004** 
(0.00) 
--- 
Rel. fractionalisation * time 1.005* 
(0.00) 
1.004ꭞ 
(0.00) 
--- 
Log(GDP per capita)* political instability --- 
5.045* 
(2.00) 
 4.239*** 
(1.73)    
Territorial disputes * oil dependency --- 
2.322ꭞ 
(1.04) 
 2.130    
(0.99)    
Rel. fractionalisation * ethnic fractionalisation --- 
6.342* 
(5.37) 
6.006* 
(4.43) 
RCS 1 --- --- 
2.965*** 
(0.52) 
RCS 2 --- --- 
1.445* 
(0.26) 
RCS 3 --- --- 
0.892 
(0.07) 
RCS 4 --- --- 
1.000    
(0.03)    
RCS1 (Political instability) --- --- 
1.525**  
(0.24)    
RCS2 (Political instability) --- --- 
1.078    
(0.17)    
RCS3 (Political instability) --- --- 
0.933    
(0.07)    
RCS1 (Religious fractionalisation) --- --- 
1.383    
(0.33)    
RCS2 (Religious fractionalisation) --- --- 
0.821    
(0.21)    
RCS3 (Religious fractionalisation) --- --- 
1.119    
(0.15)    
Constant --- --- 
23.542*** 
(19.79)    
Proportional hazards test 
χ² = 4.01  
df (8) 
p = 0.856 
χ² = 3.81  
df (11) 
p = 0.975 
    --- 
Link test 
β =-0.035 
 p = 0.292 
β =-0.009 
p = 0.793 
    --- 
Partial log likelihood (pseudo l.l.) -978.11 -966.99 (-222.26) 
AIC 1972.23 1955.99 486.52 
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Table 9, continued. 
 
Notes: 
Models estimated using a sample of 314 regimes in 125 countries, with 242 regime failures. 
Breslow method for handling ties. RP model is fitted using 4 degrees of freedom for time-constant effects, and 3 degrees of 
freedom for time-varying effects.  
 
RP – Royston Parmar model  
RCS – restricted cubic spline 
ꭞ     0.05 ≤p < 0.1 
*     0.01≤ p < 0.05 
**   0.001 ≤ p < 0.01 
*** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Goodness of fit 
 
Before moving to the discussion of graphical representations of the relationship 
between territorial dispute, oil, and regime failure, it is important to discuss the 
goodness of fit of the models estimated in this chapter. This is done to assess 
whether the models fit the data well, and to compare the model fit of the model 
with no interactions (Model 7) to the fit of a full model that includes the 
interactions (Model 8). This will be done using the Cox-Snell residuals (Cox and 
Snell, 1968). It is  expected  that  if a  Cox  model  fits  the  data  well,  then  the  true 
cumulative hazard function will have an exponential distribution with a hazard rate 
of 1 (Cleves et al., 2010: 219). Figure 7 below presents the results of Cox-Snell test 
for Models 7 and 8 respectively. In Figure 7, the red line is a standard exponential 
distribution with a hazard function equal to 1. The blue line, on the other hand, is a 
Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard function with the Cox-Snell residuals as the time 
variable, and regime change as a failure variable.  
As we can see from the figure below, the model does not fit the data perfectly. 
While at smaller values of analysis time the cumulative hazard function has an 
exponential distribution close to 1, there is some considerable deviation from this 
distribution in the right hand side of graphs for both models.  This is to be expected, 
given that prior failures and censoring reduce the effective sample considerably 
(Cleves et al., 2010: 222). In other words, sizeable variability is quite 
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Figure 7. A cox-Snell residual test for Cox regression Models 7 and 9 
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common for large values of time where the sample gets much smaller, and should 
not be a cause for too much concern (Stata Corp, 2013). While some sources 
interpret even small deviations as bad model fit (Cleves et al., 2010; Abdelaal and 
Zakria, 2015) it is crucial to note that these sources usually refer to the goodness-
of-fit of models estimated using clinical trials and experimental data, and as such 
have very low tolerance to potential variability. Overall, the models fit the data 
relatively well at smaller values of time. The older the regimes are, the less reliable 
the models are at predicting the likelihood of regime failure. This means that it is 
easiest to predict the likelihood of failure of relatively young regimes using variables 
tested in this chapter, but as the regimes get older, factors such as income, 
territorial disputes, or fractionalisation become less likely to explain the likelihood 
of failure. This is natural, given that there are many potential factors which the 
models cannot account for. Some causes of longevity are due to contextual 
variables such as historical events, cultural factors, or the nature of the ideology 
adopted by the leadership. Any model based on quantitative data will be largely 
limited in explaining all aspects of authoritarian survival, especially in the case of 
regimes which survived a particularly long period of time. Finally, the variation on 
the right hand side of the graph is somewhat smaller on the test performed for 
Model 8, suggesting that the addition of interactions makes the model fit the data 
better. This is not surprising, given that the AIC score for Model 8 was lower than 
that for Model 7.  
 
 
 
Graphical interpretations of Model 9 results 
 
Having presented and interpreted the main results of the models in Tables 8 and 9, 
this chapter will now proceed to graphically demonstrate the effects of territorial 
disputes on the survival of autocratic regimes. First, the section will estimate the 
average survival and hazard rates for all regimes based on Model 9 estimates, to 
then proceed with graphically interpreting how territorial dispute involvement 
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impact the survival rate of regimes which are not dependent on oil. Although many 
other relationships between the predictors in Model 9 and regime failure were 
significant, due to time and space limitations, they will not be graphically 
interpreted. Instead, this section will only focus on territorial dispute involvement 
because of its theoretical importance to this thesis. 
 
 
Estimating baseline survival hazard and cumulative hazard functions 
 
 
The baseline hazard, survival and cumulative hazard functions estimate the survival 
and failure statistics of all autocracies over time. They are estimate survival and 
hazard statistics when values of all variables in the models are set at 0, or, as in the 
case of log(GDP) per capita, at their mean scores. The survival and hazard functions 
are therefore estimated for autocracies with mean GDP per capita, no oil 
dependency, no recent history of territorial disputes or political instability, and 
minimal ethnic and religious divisions. The results are shown in Figure 8.  
 
It is apparent from the graph in Figure 8 that when the above conditions are met, 
survival rate of autocracies is relatively low, with only about 32% of all autocracies 
surviving 58 years, or the entire period of the analysis. The probability of surviving 
the first 5 years as a new autocracy in these conditions is very high, at 80%. The 
median survival time stands at about 29 years.  
The second graph in Figure 8 is the rate of transitions within the dataset at a 
particular unit of time, provided that the regime has survived until that particular 
moment in time. It is clear from the graph that the rate of transitions (number of 
regime changes per month) is at its highest in the initial stages of regimes’ 
existence, rising steeply until the regime reaches about 2 years, and then declining 
afterwards. When autocracies reach 7 years the rate of transitions per month 
declines, falling steadily but slowly as regimes become older. The cumulative hazard  
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Figure 8. Baseline survival, hazard, and cumulative hazard functions obtained from Royston Parmar Model 8 
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of transition is also included in Figure 8, and shows that at first, the risk of transition 
is accumulated relatively quickly, to then accumulate at a slower rate past the initial 
2 years of regime’s existence.  
 
The above estimates of regime trajectory are not surprising: it is plausible to expect 
that young, unconsolidated autocracies, even when potential risk factors are 
minimised, should have a higher transition rate in the initial stages of their 
existence. Young regimes are unconsolidated and vulnerable, and the opposition 
might find it easier to call their legitimacy into question. Furthermore, a 
considerable amount of time might pass between the new regime might receive 
endorsement from the most influential groups within the society (i.e. religious 
organisations). These findings are not dissimilar to those presented by the research 
on the key stages of democratic survival. For example, Svolik (2015) has shown that 
democracies are also at a higher risk of transition to a non-democratic regime in the 
initial stages of their existence, with that risk largely reduced as the regimes 
consolidate. The graphs in Figure 8 suggest that when it comes to the struggles of 
regime consolidation, as noted by Göbel (2011), autocratic and democratic regimes 
might be surprisingly similar.  
 
 
Territorial disputes and oil dependency 
 
Having established the hazard of transition faced by autocracies at an average level 
of risk with no recent instances of territorial conflict, it is worth examining how this 
survival rate changes following territorial dispute involvement. Given that the 
impact of territorial disputes was only significant for regimes that were not 
dependent on oil, graphs in Figure 9 show the difference in survival curves for 
states recently involved in territorial disputes at different values of the oil 
dependency variable. As clearly seen below, regimes involved in territorial disputes 
the year before that are not dependent on oil have a much higher survival rate than 
regimes involved in territorial disputes that are oil-dependent, holding everything 
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else constant. The difference is statistically significant (the confidence intervals do 
not include the 0 value), and the difference increases with the age of the regime. 
Overall, the older the regime, the greater the difference between survival rates in 
these two groups. It is worth remembering that the difference between the 
baseline survival (territorial dispute=0 & oil dependency = 0) and both curves in 
Figure 9 were not statistically significant, and they will not be explored graphically.  
 
Having discussed the interaction between oil dependency and territorial dispute, as 
well as their combined effect on regime change, the chapter will now move to 
discussing the main findings of this section in relation to the next two chapters of 
this thesis, as well as the wider literature. 
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Figure 9. A comparison of the territorial dispute variable effects on autocratic regime survival, at different values of oil dependency variable
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Discussion and conclusion 
 
At present, the literature on the effects of external threats is focused solely on the 
duration of autocratic spells, and the impact of international disputes and territorial 
conflicts on democratisation. As a result, other forms of regime change – such as 
autocracy-to-autocracy transitions – have been largely overlooked. This chapter has 
filled the gap in the IR literature by demonstrating that ReSIT assumptions can also 
be applied to regime durability more generally. Given the serious impact regime 
changes have on the political and social lives of their citizens, as well as the 
international arena more generally, this chapter is a key contribution to the field.    
 
The analysis section of this chapter has resulted in a number of crucial findings, 
which have implications for future research on regime stability and durability within 
IR and Comparative Politics. The hypothesis that autocracies that are involved in 
territorial disputes are at less risk of regime transitions has been partially 
confirmed. While in models with no interactions territorial dispute involvement has 
a positive impact on regime stability, making all autocracies more likely to survive, 
the inclusion of an interaction term between oil dependency and territorial disputes 
has revealed that only regimes which do not depend on oil are less likely to fail as a 
result of territorial dispute involvement in the previous year. This is a very 
interesting and novel finding, which has no precedent either in ReSIT or the 
Comparative Politics literature to date.  
 
The finding can be explained in two ways. First, as the literature suggests, the 
advantages of non-tax revenues in the form of oil dependency help stabilise 
autocratic regimes (Morrison, 2009; Wright et al., 2015). The easy access to 
resources can be used to silence potential opposition, to buy elite loyalty, or 
redistribute the spoils to the population without the need to raise taxes. Rentier 
regimes where spoils distribution already helps stabilise the regime, territorial 
disputes might simply have no further stabilising effect. Nevertheless, when regime 
elites do not have access to funds generated by the sale of natural resources, it 
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might be harder for them to prevent the fragmentation of their support network. 
Moreover, when fewer spoils of the office are available, some autocratic 
governments might even choose to use violence as means of suppressing 
opposition, rather than financial incentives (Wintrobe, 1990).  In those 
circumstances, the unifying effects of territorial disputes might be more 
pronounced. 
 
The second potential explanation is that oil wealth has an impact on the perception 
of threat posed by territorial dispute. Wright and colleagues (2015) have 
demonstrated that regimes that are rich in oil tend to have a higher level of military 
spending. It is possible that when territorial disputes happen in oil-rich countries, 
their ability to instantaneously increase defence spending provides the citizens, 
elites and the opposition with much greater degree of security. The smaller the 
perceived threat of a territorial dispute, the less likely the regime is to be affected 
by it.  
 
The above findings have important implications for both the current literature on 
ReSIT within the field of IR and the regime stability literature within the field of 
Comparative Politics. First, it is clear that under certain circumstances, recent 
involvement in territorial disputes decreases the hazard of failure, supporting the 
novel proposition of this thesis that these disputes decrease not only the likelihood 
of democratisation, but decrease the likelihood of transitions more generally. 
Second, these findings provide an important contribution to the field of 
Comparative Politics which only recently begun focusing on regime survival more 
generally (Wright et al., 2013), and rarely considers the potential effect of 
international relations on the likelihood of democratic and/or autocratic transitions. 
In terms of its contribution to the IR literature, this chapter has provided support 
for the thesis that autocratic regimes become more stable as a result of territorial 
disputes – a thesis often proposed by ReSIT studies in relation to democratisation, 
but never before examined empirically.  
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Finally, the likelihood of transition was shown to be affected by a number of 
additional factors. Overall, low levels of wealth, higher levels of both ethnic and 
religious fractionalisation and the presence of political instability in the year before 
have all been shown to increase the likelihood of transitions. While the relationship 
between wealth and transitions was statistically significant in all circumstances, it 
was more likely to lead to regime transitions when the regimes have not 
experienced any political instability the year before. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that there were some issues with the linearity of the wealth predictor used in 
the models of this chapter, with certain tests indicating that the relationship 
between wealth and regime transitions in no-linear. This possibility will be further 
explored in Chapter 6 below, which, by disaggregating authoritarian regimes, will 
provide a better insight into the relationship between wealth and transitions for 
every type of autocratic regime. The disaggregation of autocratic regimes into 
military, monarchic, multiparty and single party regimes will also provide a further 
insight into whether structural features of authoritarian regimes moderate the 
effects of territorial disputes on regime change. While the results of this chapter 
indicate that all autocratic regimes are affected by the predictors discussed above 
in the same manner, it is likely that, as theorised in Chapter 3, significant 
differences between these responses exist depending on the institutional context 
of the regime. These are likely to be dictated by the structural organisation of the 
elite-leader interaction, which has already been shown by many researchers to 
affect the transition rates of autocratic regimes (Geddes, 2007; Hadenius and 
Teorell, 2007; Göbel, 2010). While the current chapter has made an important 
contribution to ReSIT theory, the next chapter will explain in more detail why 
disaggregating autocracies matters for both the field of International Relations and 
Comparative Politics, and investigate the varying effects of territorial disputes on 
military, multiparty, monarchic and single-party autocracies.  
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Chapter 6: Territorial disputes and autocratic regime survival, by 
regime type 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has tested the proposition that territorial disputes stabilise 
authoritarian regimes, and make them less likely to transition to another form of 
regime, both democratic and autocratic. Unlike other tests of the Reversed Second 
Image Theory (ReSIT), the focus of Chapter 5 was on autocratic regime survival, 
rather than autocratic spell survival. This is because the main assumptions of ReSIT 
about the impact of territorial threats on autocratic spell durability often allude to 
factors which are not only likely to decrease the chances of an autocracy 
democratising, but also regime failure more generally. The overall conclusion of the 
previous chapter was that territorial disputes do, in fact, significantly decrease the 
likelihood of autocratic regime failure, demonstrating strong initial support for the 
Reversed Second Image understood in the context of this thesis. Nevertheless, as 
discussed at length in Chapter 3, the International Relations literature focusing on 
ReSIT, but also more generally, often overlooks the significance of structural 
differences between different types of autocracies, and how these differences 
might affect the relationship between territorial threats and autocratic regime 
survival. In fact, most autocratic regimes are usually treated within the IR literature 
as similar to one another purely by virtue of not being democratic. In order to 
address this shortcoming and demonstrate the importance of accounting for 
structural features of autocracies, the following chapter will disaggregate autocratic 
regimes into four distinct types: military, monarchic, multiparty and single party 
regimes. The chapter will demonstrate the theoretical importance of disaggregating 
any analysis of autocratic regime survival, and set the theoretical and analytical 
foundations for the final analytical chapter, which will demonstrate how territorial 
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threats affect the likelihood of democratisation for each of the autocratic regime 
type.   
As explained above, this chapter will address the second research question of this 
thesis, namely: are there significant differences in the way military, multiparty, 
single party and monarchic regimes respond to territorial disputes? In order to 
answer this question, the chapter will first reiterate the main research on different 
types of autocratic regimes discussed previously in Chapter 3, and outline how 
different structural characteristics might impact the relationship between territorial 
disputes and regime failure in each autocratic type. In addition, the expected 
variations in the impact of wealth and oil dependency will be discussed as well. 
Once the theoretical assumptions are outlined and the hypotheses are formed, the 
chapter will then move to discuss how the data analysis in this chapter will differ 
from the analysis in Chapter 5 and reiterate the main procedures undertaken to 
test the hypotheses in the Data and Methods section. The chapter will then 
proceed to analyse the failure data for each autocratic type separately, with a brief 
discussion of results. Once the diagnostic tests and graphical representation of 
results are outlined and analysed, the chapter will move to the discussion of the 
results in relation to the current literature on ReSIT, the hypotheses outlined earlier 
in the chapter, as well as the results of Chapter 5.  
The main findings of this chapter are of great theoretical and analytical importance 
to both the ReSIT literature and the International Relations literature more 
generally.36 Namely, they demonstrate that the results of aggregate analysis from 
Chapter 5 do not correspond to the disaggregated results of analysis in this chapter. 
While Chapter 5 demonstrated that regimes that are not dependent on oil are 
significantly less likely to transition into any other form of regime if they took part 
in a territorial dispute the year before, the following analysis does not support 
these findings. When autocracies were disaggregated into separate sub-samples, 
                                                          
36
 Some sections of this chapter have previously been presented as part of a working paper entitled 
‘Disaggregating Autocracy: International Conflict and the Durability of Authoritarian Regimes’, 
delivered at the Conflict, Security and International Order research workshop at the Department of 
Politics, Languages and International Studies, University of Bath, on 30th of June 2016.  
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only military and single party regimes appeared significantly affected by territorial 
disputes, with no clear effect on multiparty and monarchic regimes. Moreover, 
while in single party regimes, the relationship between dispute involvement and 
transition was only significant for oil dependent regimes, the effects of dispute 
involvement on regime failure in military regimes was significant regardless of oil 
dependency. This has important implications for the IR literature as a whole, given 
that most studies overlook the importance of structural differences between 
autocracies, which are still treated as largely similar purely by virtue of being non-
representative. The analysis has also important implications for the literature on 
ReSIT, as well as literature concerning the longevity of military and single party 
regimes, which will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. In summary, the 
main findings are that military regimes and single party regimes are the only types 
of autocracy that are less likely to fail as a result of territorial dispute involvement. 
 
Theory 
 
Previous Comparative Politics research and theoretical assumptions 
 
Chapters 3 and 5 presented a detailed account of the effects of territorial disputes 
on the likelihood of autocratic regime failure. Territorial disputes were theorised to 
present a particularly salient external threat, whose consequences might be even 
more severe than standard non-territorial militarized disputes often discussed in 
the ReSIT literature (Gibler and Tir, 2014; for examples of this literature see 
Midlarsky, 1995; Gates et al., 1999; Mousseau and Shi, 1999). 
Territorial threats in the form of territorial claims are likely to unite the otherwise 
polarised elites and weaken the opposition who might suspend their anti-regime 
activities until the conflict is over. In addition, the support from the population is 
also likely to increase in the face of territorial threats. All three of the above 
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features are commonly thought to be some of the best predictors of authoritarian 
regime survival in the Comparative Politics literature (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a) 
Nevertheless, it is crucial to recognise that autocratic regimes are vastly different 
from one another in the way their elites and opposition are organised, as well as 
the level of legitimacy commonly enjoyed by the regime among the general 
population (Geddess, 2003; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a). 
As part of the original contribution of this thesis, it is theorised that these 
differences are likely to have a direct impact on the type of effect, if any, territorial 
threats are likely to have on autocratic durability.  
As previously mentioned, the four main types of autocracy considered in this thesis 
and in the current Chapter are military, multiparty, monarchic and single party 
regimes. The following section will briefly outline the literature on the elite and 
opposition status in each of these autocratic types, as well as the potential effect 
territorial disputes might have on their survival trajectories. For a detailed 
explanation of each of the individual assumptions, see Theoretical Chapter 3.  
The first assumption of ReSIT theory is that threats to the domestic territory 
controlled by the regime are likely to unify previously polarised elites, and 
temporarily increase their loyalty, making them less susceptible to defect to the 
opposition. However, the theory should also take into account the fact that 
monarchies and single party regimes have a tendency for particularly strong elite 
support even in absence of foreign threats in the form of territorial disputes. This is 
because in monarchies, the majority of power tends to be centred in the hands of 
the royal family. Blood ties between elite members ensure that the royal family 
remains united in face of major political challenges (Billingsley, 2010: 120). In the 
same manner, elites in monarchies are more likely to work together to ward off any 
threats from regime opposition, and are very unlikely to cooperate with rival 
factions. Any actions taken against the regime are ultimately actions taken against 
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the royal family itself.37 As a result, the elites in monarchies tend to be particularly 
resistant to external influence. The internal cohesion of monarchies is further 
evidenced by the fact that in these type of autocracy, the royal family tends to 
occupy the highest posts in the state, such as the head of security services or the 
military, making an anti-regime coup particularly difficult (Lucas, 2012: 147).  
Secondly, monarchies are characterised by their tight control over state resources, 
allowing them to ‘buy off’ any potentially threatening opposition groups (Gause III, 
1994). The small and unified elites in monarchic regimes such as Bahrain, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are so 
remarkably resilient to external and internal shocks that they were the only type of 
autocracies to survive the Arab Spring without a single one of these monarchies 
transitioning to another form of regime (Yom and Gause III, 2012; Bank, Richter, 
and Sunik, 2015). As a result, it is unlikely that monarchies will be particularly 
susceptible to a unifying effect of territorial threats. This is not because territorial 
threats do not affect the elites or the opposition, but rather because the elites are 
already loyal, and the opposition fractured and weak.  
A similar situation is likely in single party regimes, although for different reasons. 
Generally, single parties are considered relatively stable (Hadenius and Teorell, 
2007; Hess, 2013). Akin to the royal family in monarchies, the party is usually in 
control of the wealth within the regime, and serves as the only source of patronage 
for the elites (Magaloni, 2008). This monopoly on political and economic privileges 
means that elites have very little incentive to defect to the opposition (Hess, 2013: 
3; Brownlee, 2007). Although the elite numbers are much larger in single party 
regimes than in monarchies, the party additionally serves as an arbitrator to all 
internal splits and disputes, ensuring that those who have ‘lost out’ today may 
expect to be rewarded in the future (Brownlee, 2007). The above features mean 
                                                          
37
 It is worth noting that the above does not mean that family members are unlikely to try and oust a 
particular leader in favour of another one. On the contrary, such events might happen regularly in 
monarchic regimes (for examples of succession struggles in Saudi Arabia, see Gause III (2015); for an 
example of members of royal family ousting their relatives from power in Oman, see Owen (1970)). 
Nevertheless, replacing a leader is not synonymous to replacing an entire regime structure. This 
difference is crucial, and has already been discussed in Chapter 3. 
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that factionalism poses significantly less threat to single party autocracies and can 
on occasion even benefit the regime (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a). Strong and unified 
elites that rarely defect to the opposition contribute greatly to the strength of the 
party leaders, allowing them to exert their influence over much longer periods of 
time than in military or multiparty regimes (Brownlee, 2007).  
A different type of relationship is expected in the military and multiparty regimes.  
Military regimes are particularly prone to splits within the elites due to the fact that 
army-led regimes often enjoy very little legitimacy. This is because military juntas 
frequently use the rhetoric of ‘guardianship’ in justifying their rule, presenting it as 
a critical transitory period that restores order and much needed stability (Loveman, 
2004). Given this rhetoric, every additional year in office makes the regime more 
susceptible to the erosion of trust from both the public and the political class (Graf, 
1988). This problem is magnified by the fact that unlike elites in all other types of 
autocracy, military personnel, including the highest ranking members of the junta, 
are primarily interested in the survival of the military rather than remaining in 
power (Geddes, 2003). Both junta leaders and the elites are likely to withdraw from 
power if they perceive the integrity or cohesion of the military as endangered by 
factionalism or internal disputes (ibid.). While the above factors make for weak and 
unstable regimes in times of peace, the conflict is likely to have a stabilising effect 
due to its strong impact on the military elites’ raison d’etre. The ‘guardianship’ 
rhetoric of military autocracies, coupled with their explicit commitment to 
protecting the physical integrity of the state and its borders, mean that the elites 
are likely to be particularly susceptible to rally behind their leadership when a 
threat materialises. Any defections to the opposition are likely to be severely 
punished and perceived as treason. As a result, military autocracies are expected to 
last much longer as a result of armed conflict engagement.   
In multiparty regimes, like in military regimes, elite splits are a particularly frequent 
phenomenon, although for a different reason. Given that regime opposition is 
institutionalised, it is likely to be significantly stronger than in other forms of 
autocracy. Like in democracies, governments change often and tend to be much 
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weaker than in other forms of autocracy (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). Although 
elections do not make multiparty regimes more democratic, they do open the 
political arena to a wide range of actors usually excluded from the political process. 
This has the potential to weaken the coalition government and strengthen the 
opposition. Given that multiple parties are allowed to operate, the elites can, and 
frequently do, change sides. Unlike in other regimes, however, they can usually do 
so openly, and without the fear of retribution. This makes for fractured and weak 
elites, and a very capable, if fragmented, opposition. The strong opposition and 
weak leadership mean that, similarly to military regimes, multiparty autocracies are 
usually short lived and unstable (Ibid.). However, these institutional weaknesses of 
the regime are also what make the effect on territorial disputes more pronounced: 
the centralisation of power in the hands of the leader is possible not because there 
is something inherent in multiparty regimes, but simply because there is a scope for 
it to happen. Leaders are likely to take any opportunity to formalise their new-
found support in case of temporarily stronger bargaining position, and the 
institutional weakness of non-democratic legislatures, being susceptible to frequent 
changes and abuses, makes it easier for it to become formalised. 
In summary, it is expected that monarchies and single party regimes which possess 
the features that make them naturally durable are unlikely to be strongly affected 
by the presence of territorial threats. However, naturally less stable regimes such as 
military and multiparty regimes are expected to be less likely to fail as a result of 
territorial dispute involvement. Hence the two main hypotheses of this chapter 
state that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Military and single party regimes are less likely to fail if they are 
involved in territorial disputes, compared to when they are at peace. 
And: 
Hypothesis 3: The longevity of monarchic and single party regimes will not to be 
affected by territorial disputes.  
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In addition to the above, and as discussed in Chapter 5, additional variables are 
likely to affect the longevity of authoritarian regimes. For example, high GDP per 
capita is likely to make the regime less likely to fail, as the tax revenues are likely to 
be used to buy off potential opposition. Oil wealth in particular, as a form of non-
tax revenue, is likely to result in more stable and strong regimes. This is because oil 
can be used to easily buy support from the general population by engaging in 
widespread redistributive policies. While it is also very likely that these factors 
might be context dependent, and have a different effect depending on regime 
structures, the formulation of these differences is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Instead, this chapter will be more exploratory in nature, and will try to explain the 
potential differences on a case-by-case basis, where appropriate.  
 
Data and Methods 
 
Data 
 
Similarly to Chapter 5, the following chapter employs a combination of all three 
datasets mentioned in the Methods Chapter 4: the ‘Autocracies of the World’, the 
Gibler (2014) dataset, and the Maddison Project dataset, with some additional use 
of the Total Economy Database. The sample size is the same as in the previous 
chapter, comprising of 314 authoritarian regimes across 125 countries. However, 
unlike Chapter 5, the following chapter will not analyse all autocratic regimes in an 
aggregate way. Instead, models will be fitted across four separate samples of 
authoritarianism, as defined by Magaloni et al. (2013): military, monarchic, 
multiparty, and single party regimes. The precise definition of each regime has been 
discussed in Chapter 4, and Table 10 briefly summarizes the main distinguishing 
features of each autocratic type. The regimes are distinguished based on the 
ultimate source of power and rule making within the regime.  
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Unlike the analysis in Chapter 5, the following analysis will be conducted on four 
separate samples, each corresponding to one of the autocratic regime types. Table 
11 briefly summarizes the number of observation-months, countries, regimes, and 
failures by the type of autocratic regime.  
While at least 50% of all regimes in each sample have failed between 1951 and 
2008, it is clear that the very small sample of monarchic regimes is particularly 
problematic. Only 12 monarchies have failed within the observation period, 
meaning that any analysis performed on that particular sample must be treated 
with caution. Given a very small sample size, and the relatively high number of 
predictors expected to be fitted into the models, the MPV scores are expected to 
be too small for multivariate analysis. As a result, only univariate analysis of 
monarchic regimes will be performed, and the results of this analysis will serve as 
guidance only, given the very low reliability of such results.  
 
 
Variables 
 
 
Dependent variable 
 
In each of the four samples, the dependent variable is the time to regime failure. As 
in the previous chapter, a failure constitutes a violent or non-violent regime 
transition and includes both autocracy-to-autocracy changes, as well as instances of 
democratisation. The variable is a dummy variable coded 1 for transition (failure), 
and 0 if no failure occurred in a given month. 
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Table 10. Types of autocracy: military, monarchic, multiparty and single party regimes, as defined 
by Magaloni et al. (2013) 
Autocratic type Definition                              Examples 
Monarchy The incumbent is selected among the members 
of a royal or dynastical family who is in charge of 
principal decision making, including the choice of 
a potential successor. The monarch or the royal 
family must be in effective control of policy 
making and it cannot be delegated to the 
legislature, the party or the military. 
Nepal                 
Saudi Arabia     
Oman                 
 (1951 – 2008*) 
 (1769 – 2006) 
 (1932 – 2008*) 
Military The principal positions of power are controlled 
by the military, and the power is shared through 
the institution of the armed forces, as opposed 
to party or the royal family. It is not sufficient for 
the incumbent to merely have a military 
background or be the leader of the armed forces 
at the same time to classify as a military regime – 
the effective control over positions of power 
must reside with the armed forces in general. 
Argentina         
Somalia            
Myanmar   
(1976 – 1983)  
(1962 – 2008*)  
(1969 – 1990)  
Single party All politics within the state must be conducted 
under the banner of a single, civilian party, and, 
for the most part, the presence of another 
political party must be constitutionally 
prohibited. The legislature must be composed of 
the ruling party members only.  
China 
Malawi 
Tunisia 
(1949 – 2008*) 
(1966 – 1994) 
(1963 – 1987) 
Multiparty The ruling party must allow other political parties 
to compete in the elections. The competition is 
unfair and biased in favour of the ruling party, 
but it is real. More than one party has to be 
represented in the legislature in order for the 
state to be considered ‘multiparty’. 
Bosnia                                 
CAR 
Lebanon 
(1992 – 2008*)   
(1979 - 1981)  
(1975 – 2008*) 
  
Notes: 
*   – Ongoing (right-censored) regimes 
CAR  –  Central African Republic 
Source: Magaloni et al. (2013: 8-9) and Magaloni (2008: 731-33). 
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Table 11. Summary statistics on the four samples used for disaggregated analysis in this chapter 
Regime type 
Total number of 
observations in the 
sample 
(regime-months) 
 
Total number of 
regimes in the 
sample 
Number of 
regimes that 
ended in a failure 
Percentage  of regimes 
that ended in a failure 
 
Military 
 
15,646 
 
104 
 
94 
 
90.40% 
     
Monarchic 6,904 21 12 57.10% 
     
Multiparty 15,504 118 74 62.70% 
     
Single party 16,720 71 62 87.30% 
     
Total 54,774 314 242 77.07% 
 
 
Independent variables and transformations 
 
Given that the current chapter repeats the procedures from the previous chapter 
on a disaggregated sample of autocracies, the same independent variables will be 
fitted in the models. This includes three categorical variables (territorial disputes, oil 
dependency, political instability), and three continuous variables (wealth, ethnic 
fractionalisation and religious fractionalisation). The continuous variable recording 
the GDP per capita of each autocracy has been logarithmically transformed to 
achieve more normal distribution of the variable across the samples.38 The 
histograms for untransformed and transformed wealth variable can be found in 
Figures 10 and 11 respectively. Logarithmic transformation not only reduces the 
skewness of the distribution (see Figure 11), but also makes the relationship 
between time-to-failure and wealth more linear (compare Figures 12 and 13). 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the effect of wealth on regime change in 
Chapter 5 was non-linear. For this reason, this chapter will closely monitor the 
functional form of the log(GDP per capita) variable, and include a transformation of 
the variable where appropriate to account for the non-linearity. 
                                                          
38
 As in Chapter 5, the base of the logarithm was equal to 10. This means that a one point increase in the 
log(GDP per capita) variable signifies a 10-fold increase in the regime’s GDP per capita. 
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Figure 10. A histogram of the untransformed GDP per capita variable, by regime type 
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Figure 11. A histogram of the logarithmically transformed GDP per capita variable, by regime type
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Figure 12. A scatterplot of the untransformed GDP per capita variable, by regime type 
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Figure 13. A scatterplot of the logarithmically transformed GDP per capita variable, by regime type 
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After the Royston Parmar models are fitted for each regime type, and the results 
are discussed, a graphical representation of the survival curves will be presented. 
For the purposes of that analysis, all continuous variables will be centred on their 
means, since baseline hazard functions estimate survival probabilities with all 
coefficients set at 0. Whenever variables are centred, a brief summary of their 
mean values will be given for ease of interpretation.  
 
Methods 
 
Similarly to the procedure in Chapter 5, the analysis will proceed as follows. First, a 
univariate analysis for each of the four autocratic samples will be performed for 
purposes of diagnostic tests described below. Second, a stepwise forward selection 
Cox survival analysis model will be fitted for each regime type.  One variable at a 
time will be added to the models, in order of theoretical importance similar to that 
in Chapter 5. Once all variables are fitted, potential interactions will be taken into 
account. The interactions will only be retained in the final model if they are 
statistically significant, or if they significantly improve model fit.39 Once all variables 
are fitted in the model, and all potential time-varying effects are accounted for, the 
analysis will proceed with fitting a Royston-Parmar flexible model for the purposes 
of graphical data representation and improved model fit where time-varying effects 
are present.  
Once the models have been fitted and discussed, the chapter will proceed with 
graphical representation of the changes in survival probabilities affected by 
independent variables included in the models. Due to time and space limitations, 
only the effects of variables that had a significant impact on the hazard of failure 
will be presented and discussed. Furthermore, for reasons mentioned above, apart 
from a general discussion of baseline functions for each regime type, only survival 
probabilities will be graphed in the further sections of the Data Analysis section. 
                                                          
39
 When interactions are fitted, a Wald test will be used to determine whether the addition significantly 
improves model fit. 
221 
 
Diagnostic tests 
 
A number of tests will be performed on both univariate and multivariate models. 
They are performed to test the proportional hazards assumption (log-log plots, 
graphical and non-graphical Schoenfeld residuals), test the linear relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables (Martingale residual tests, link 
test), and the overall fit of the model (AIC scores, Cox-Snell residuals tests). While 
the results of all tests will be recorded in Appendix C or directly below the models in 
Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14, not all of them will be discussed due to lack of space. 
Instead, they will be discussed when a suspected violation of one of the core 
assumptions of the model or a significant lack of fit are suspected. Similarly to 
procedures employed in Chapter 5, a univariate Cox analysis for each independent 
variable will be performed. It will be followed by a Schoenfeld residuals test, both 
graphical and non-graphical, and the results will be recorded in Appendix C. Given 
that the proportional hazards assumption cannot be tested in the final model,40 a 
separate final Cox model will be fitted, to test (graphically and non-graphically) 
whether the proportionality assumption is still violated when all of the covariates 
are included in the model. This will always be the last Cox model in the analysis.  
If the Schoenfeld residual tests are not satisfactory, the interaction between the 
problematic variable and time will be added to a separate Cox model. If the 
interaction is significant, or if the model fit is improved, then the interaction will be 
retained in the model, and will be included in the final Royston-Parmar model.  
If the continuous variables in the models (log(GDP per capita), ethnic 
fractionalisation and religious fractionalisation) show signs on non-linearity in a 
Martingale residuals test, or the link tests of the multivariate Cox regression 
indicate that the functional form of the predictors might be non-linear, a 
transformation of the problematic term will be added to the model. If the added 
                                                          
40
 Royston-Parmar models do not allow for proportional hazards test, because the models were specifically 
designed to overcome the assumption of proportionality of hazards (Royston and Lambert, 2011). However, 
time-varying effects should only be included in final RP models if the data analysis results suggest that such an 
effect exists. For this reason, Cox models are used before fitting the RP model to test for the presence of time-
varying effects.  
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transformed term has a significant impact on the dependent variable, and the link 
test results are satisfactory (p>0.05), the transformed predictor will be kept in the 
model. Finally, all of the final Cox models will be subject to goodness-of-fit tests 
based on the Cox-Snell residuals test.  
As mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5, Akaike information criteria will be used where 
appropriate to determine the contribution of predictors and their interactions to 
the overall fit of the model (Akaike, 1973; Posada and Buckley, 2004).   
 
Data analysis 
 
While the overall purpose of this chapter is to perform a repetition of the analysis 
from Chapter 5 on four separate samples of autocracies, two new hypotheses have 
been proposed about the effect of territorial disputes on the durability of each type 
of autocracy. In short, the main purpose of this chapter is to test whether military 
and multiparty regimes are indeed more susceptible to the centralising effects of 
territorial disputes than monarchic and single party regimes. The main assumption 
of this chapter is that typically durable regimes, such as monarchies and single party 
regimes, already enjoy a great deal of elite unity and tend to have weak and 
disorganised political opposition. Hence, the effects of territorial disputes will be 
weak or non-existent. On the other hand, regimes particularly prone to elite splits 
and disunity - military and multiparty regimes - will be likely to experience a greater 
degree of stability as a result of territorial disputes. Hence, it is expected that 
military and multiparty regimes will be less likely to fail as a result of territorial 
disputes. 
To test these new assumptions, as well as a set of assumptions about the effects of 
wealth, oil dependency, political stability and ethnic and religious fractionalisation 
from the previous chapter, the following section will proceed as follows. First, a 
brief descriptive analysis of the most theoretically important predictors in the 
model (territorial dispute, wealth, oil dependency) will provide a setting for the 
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multivariate analysis to follow. Given the disaggregation of the sample, we will not 
be able to discuss all of the predictors in much detail. Second, the analysis will 
proceed by discussing the fitting of a model for each type of autocracy, and the 
results will be briefly summarised in four separate sections. Second, a graphical 
representation of the results will be presented and discussed. Finally, and most 
importantly, the results will be compared to the results from Chapter 5, and 
discussed in relation to the hypotheses posed in the current and previous chapter. 
The analysis starts with descriptive statistics concerning all four types of autocracy. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Given that the literature on the survival of various types of regimes broadly agrees 
that military regimes are some the least durable types of autocracy (Geddes, 2003), 
it is perhaps unsurprising that Table 12 indicated that 50% of all military regimes 
have failed within just over 8 years of their existence, confirming the claims within 
the literature discussed in Chapter 3 that military regimes might struggle to 
legitimise their rule, and are particularly prone to elite splits, resulting in frequent 
breakdowns.  
 
Table 12. Duration and transition statistics for each autocratic regime type 
Regime type 
 
Median duration 
(years) 
 
Mean duration 
(years) 
 
Number of 
regimes 
 
% of transitions 
(N) 
 
Military 8.3 12.5 104 95.8% 
(94) 
Monarchic 28.1 27.4 21 57.1% 
(12) 
Multiparty 8.8 11.0 118 62.7% 
(74) 
Single party 19.6 19.6 71 87.3% 
(62) 
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Furthermore, multiparty regimes appear to be equally short-lived to military 
regimes. This finding confirms previous research, which has demonstrated that the 
competitive nature of multiparty regimes affects their stability (Knutsen and 
Nygård, 2015). Although expected, this is a finding with serious implications for the 
literature on party-based regimes, which often group multiparty and single party 
regimes into the same category of longevity (see for example: Geddes, 2003; 
Brownlee, 2007). Table 12 above clearly demonstrates that single party regimes are 
much more durable than multiparty regimes, with 50% of single party regimes 
failing after 19.6 years, compared to 8.8 years for multiparty regimes.  This finding 
signifies a crucial structural difference between regimes that allow competition, 
and those with dominant-party systems that monopolise the political arena. It 
appears that competition and institutionalised elite turnover does not necessarily 
serve the purpose of stabilising autocratic regimes, and that a strong grip on power 
often characterising single party regimes might be a more successful political 
strategy. 
Similarly to single party regimes, and confirming the expectations laid out in 
Chapter 3, monarchic regime is one of the more stable types of regime. 
Furthermore, they are the most durable type of autocracy, exceeding the median 
duration of single party regimes by 8.5 years on average. It is worth noting that 
because of this extraordinary durability, monarchic regimes are particularly likely to 
be censored, with only 57% of regimes in the dataset ending in regime failure. This 
small number of failures greatly limits the validity of the conclusions drawn from 
what might affect the longevity of monarchic governments. This point will be 
reiterated when discussing the monarchy-specific results in later sections of this 
chapter.  
In addition to the regime-specific median duration times, it is worth noting that 
military and single party regimes are particularly likely to result in failure within the 
1951-2008 period of observation, with almost 96% and 87% of regimes ending in a 
transition respectively. This is, however, unlikely to reflect any inherent structural 
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features of the military and single party regimes, but rather the fading popularity of 
these particular types of authoritarianism around the world.  
Given that this chapter treats all regime transitions, democratic or non-democratic, 
as a failure event, it is worth considering the transition statistics for each autocratic 
type. It is evident from Table 13 below that although the greatest proportion 
(31.8%) of all regime transitions does in fact end up in democratisation, this pattern 
is very variable across various types of autocracies. For example, the less durable 
types of autocracy (military and multiparty) have a relatively high proportion of 
democratic transitions as a result of regime breakdown (42.6% and 33.8% 
respectively). However, while most military regime breakdowns end up in 
democratisation, most multiparty breakdown results in a transition to military 
regimes (36.6%). This counters the assumption that multiparty regimes are 
‘transitioning’ regimes that will ultimately democratize. On the whole, military 
regimes, and not multiparty regimes, are most prone to democratisation in the 
event of a breakdown. A more detailed discussion on this point will be made in 
Chapter 7.  
 
Table 13. The most common types of regime transition outcomes, by regime type 
 
 TYPE OF TRANSITION  
Regime type Democracy Military Monarchy Multiparty Single party Total 
Military 42.6% - 0% 47.9% 9.6% 100% 
 (40) - (0) (45) (9) (94) 
       
Monarchy 16.7% 66.7% - 8.3% 8.3% 100% 
 (2) (8) - (1) (1) (12) 
       
Multiparty 33.8% 36.5% 0% - 29.7% 100% 
 (25) (27) (0) - (22) (74) 
       
Single party 16.1% 41.9% 0% 41.9% - 100% 
 (10) (26) (0) (26) - (62) 
       
Total 31.8% 25.2% 0% 29.8% 13.2% 100% 
 (77) (61) (0) (72) (32) (242) 
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The point most evident from Table 13 above, and most relevant for the current 
chapter, is the fact that the more durable autocratic regimes are at the same time 
most likely to transition into another form of autocratic government upon regime 
failure.  In fact, over 83% of monarchies and 84% of single party regimes transition 
into an alternative form of autocracy, rather than a democracy. This is in contrast to 
the more ‘democracy-prone’ military and multiparty regimes, which are also, at the 
same time, relatively short lived. This indicates a potential that factors that stabilise 
certain types of autocratic regimes might also at the same time make it less likely 
for the state to transition into a democracy once the regime disintegrates. Hence, if 
territorial disputes contribute to the longevity of autocratic regimes, they might 
also, by extension, contribute to the lower likelihood of eventual democratic 
transition once the country breaks down.  Although Table 13 does not include any 
significance tests, its contents suggest that the longevity of autocratic regimes 
might not be entirely independent from the longevity of autocratic spells. 
Investigating the effect of territorial disputes on regime longevity is an important 
contribution to the study of democratisation more generally, and this is precisely 
what this Chapter aims to accomplish. 
Finally, before the multivariate analysis begins, it is worth noting that there is a 
considerable number of regimes which last a particularly short, or a particularly 
long amount of time.  Some of them are left or right censored, whilst others are 
particularly short-lasting regimes, which were already briefly discussed in Chapter 3 
in reference to the methodological and data organisation issues. Table 14 lists the 
shortest lasting autocracies by regime type, with the military regime in Benin in 
1963 lasting only 2 months, the monarchy In Cambodia being under observation for 
only the last 4 months of its long rule (delayed entry), the 8-month long multiparty 
regime in the Dominican Republic (1952-1953), and a 7-month long single party-
regime in Iraq (1979-1980).  
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Table 14. Minimum values of regime duration in the dataset, by regime type 
Regime type 
Minimum duration                               
in months 
                Regime 
Military 2                                                                                Benin    (1963) 
Monarchic 4                                                                                Cambodia  (1954/1955†) 
Multiparty 8                                                                             Dominican Republic  (1952-1953) 
Single party 7                                                                               Iraq  (1979-1980) 
 
Notes: 
† - delayed entry cases (regime begun before 1951) 
 
 
 
In contrast, the longest lasting cases in Table 15 below are those regimes that have 
not yet failed by the end of the observation period. They include the military regime 
in Egypt, the monarchies in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, the multiparty regime in 
Malaysia, and the single party regime in China. While Tables 14 and 15 demonstrate 
the longest and shortest lived regimes, there are many more regimes that have 
lasted a similar time span. Both tables present the difficulties that will be faced 
while performing the survival analysis in the later section due to the high number of 
potential outliers. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned in Chapter 4, the 
exceptionally high number of outliers in all autocratic types means that any 
attempts to exclude them from the analysis will result in a failure to properly 
capture the true nature of autocratic longevity. After all, it is natural that some 
factors, such as path dependency, culture, sudden external shocks or ideology that 
are responsible for extreme values of regime duration cannot be captured by 
quantitative analysis. While this is a serious limitation of this Thesis, it is also an 
unavoidable one. Therefore, to exclude extreme cases from the analysis and 
branding them as ‘outliers’ would be to wrongly assume that there is something 
unusual or unexpected about the natural variation in longevity between the 
regimes under analysis.  
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Table 15. Maximum values of regime duration in the dataset, by regime type 
Regime type 
 
Maximum duration in months 
(years) 
 
          Regime  
Military 676 
(56.3) 
Egypt   (1952-2008*) 
Monarchic 696 
(58.0) 
Jordan               
Saudi Arabia 
(1950-2008*†) 
  (1951-2008*†) 
Multiparty 604 
(50.3) 
Malaysia   (1957-2008*) 
Single party 696 
(58.0) 
China   (1951-2008*†) 
 
Notes: 
 
* - right-censored cases (no transition by 2008) 
† - delayed entry cases (regime begun before 1951) 
 
 
 
Finally, when it comes to the distribution of dispute involvement among the four 
autocratic types, the pattern is much less clear. Table 16 below suggests that the 
most durable regimes, monarchies, are also most likely to have ever been involved 
in a territorial dispute, at 71%. Military regimes slightly overtake single party 
regimes when it comes to dispute involvement, with 57% involved in disputes 
compared to 54% respectively. Multiparty regimes, on the other hand, seem to be 
least likely to be involved in territorial disputes, at only 36%. Although no clear 
pattern is visible, it is more likely to emerge within the four groups, and the 
expectation is that within those regime types, those which live longer were also 
more likely to have been involved in a territorial dispute during their lifetimes.  
 
Multivariate analysis 
 
The section below will report on the findings from three separate models fitted for 
military, multiparty and single party regime, and a univariate analysis for monarchic 
regimes. The results will be briefly discussed and a graphical representation of the 
significant effects will be presented. A more detailed discussion of these results will 
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follow in the final section of this Chapter. The analysis starts with the sample of 
failures within military regimes. 
 
 
Table 16. Territorial dispute involvement, by regime type 
Regime type 
Percentage of regimes ever 
involved in a territorial dispute (N) 
Total 
Military 57% 
(59) 
100% 
(104) 
Monarchic 71% 
(15) 
100% 
(21) 
Multiparty 36% 
(43) 
100% 
(118) 
Single party 54% 
(38) 
100% 
(71) 
Total 49% 
(155) 
100% 
(314) 
 
 
Military regimes 
 
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is worth considering the proportionality of 
hazards assumption violations that might potentially affect the reliability of the 
results below, as well as the functional shape of the continuous predictors from 
univariate analysis. In univariate visual Schoenfeld tests, territorial dispute and 
political instability variables show signs of potential violations (Figure A1 in 
Appendix C), but non-visual tests indicate no serious issues (Table A1). Moreover, 
once all tests are performed on predictors from multivariate models, no signs of 
violations are observed (Table A2 and Figure A4, Appendix C). While the log-log 
plots for territorial dispute suggest potential problems, as survival curved cross on 
multiple occasions (Figure A2), these problems disappear upon adjusting the plot 
for the influence of other variables in the final Cox model (Figure A5). Problems 
persist, however, for the oil dependency and political instability variables. Hence, 
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the results for both should be treated with caution. Nevertheless, neither of the 
Schoenfeld residuals tests has indicated serious problems, and the interaction 
between the variables and time was non-significant in both Cox and RP models. As 
a result of potential problems with oil dependency and political instability variables, 
their effects upon regime failure in military regimes will be interpreted with 
caution. 
Univariate martingale residuals tests suggest that the relationship between log(GDP 
per capita) and regime failure is non-linear (Figure A3). Upon including a square 
term of log(GDP per capita) in the model, and the linearity problem disappears (see 
Figure A6). In addition, the square term of log(GDP per capita) is significant in 
Model 3, and thus was retained in further models.  
 
Table 17 presents the results of the forward selection models fitted for a sample of 
104 military regimes, with a 90.4% failure rate. While, at first, territorial disputes do 
not seem to affect the failure hazard of military regimes (Models 1-4), the effects 
become significant (p<0.01) once political instability is included in subsequent 
models (Models 5-11).  This is very similar to the result of the analysis in Chapter 5, 
and most likely happens because of the correlations between disputes, instability, 
and the hazard of failure discussed in Chapter 5. In Model 7 including all of the 
covariates, the likelihood of failure of a military regime involved in a territorial 
dispute decreases by 35% compared to a military regime not involved in a territorial 
dispute, when the effects of all other variables are held constant. However, when 
an interaction between territorial dispute and political instability is included in 
Model 11, it turns out that that the relationship between dispute involvement and 
regime failure changes depending on the political stability of the regime.  
Comparing two military regimes that did not experience instability the year before, 
military regimes experiencing territorial disputes are 60% less likely to fail than 
military regimes not involved in a dispute. However, comparing two military 
regimes that did experience instability the year before, an involvement in a 
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territorial dispute results in a hazard ratio of exp(-0.914 + 0.791) = exp(-0.123) = 
0.884. This means that there is an 11.6% reduction in the hazard of failure, but the 
relationship is not statistically significant. Hence, in military regimes, the stabilising 
effects of territorial disputes are only observed in regimes that experience no prior 
instability.  
As expected, GDP per capita has a negative and significant effect on the hazard of 
military regime failure. However, as mentioned previously, the Martingale residual 
tests in Appendix C has clearly shown that there were some functional problems 
with the wealth variable, similarly to these observed in Chapter 5. The martingale 
residual tests for a multivariate Cox Model 10 in Appendix C, which include a square 
term for the log(GDP per capita), suggest that the addition of the square term was 
sufficient to resolve this issue (Figure A6). The original and the squared term of the 
log(GDP per capita) variable are jointly significant in Model 11 (χ²=10.75, p=0.013). 
Hence, it is clear that the effects of wealth on regime change are non-linear, and 
they also vary depending on the level of the political instability variable. 
In Model 11, comparing two regimes which do not experience any political 
instability the year before, a regime with a tenfold increase in wealth will 
experience an almost 100% reduction in the likelihood of failure, but only until the 
income reaches 3630.78 $ GK41. After the regime reaches this level of income, every 
tenfold increase in wealth will significantly increase the likelihood of failure.  
For two military regimes which have experienced political instability the year 
before, holding everything else constant, a tenfold increase in wealth results in a 
hazard ratio of exp(-13.006 + 0.791) = exp(-12.215) ≈ 0.000005. This means that for 
military regimes that experienced instability recently, the reduction in hazard ratio 
is greater, but also close to 100%.  Once again, this relationship in non-linear, and 
once a certain level of wealth is reached, the risk of transition begins to increase 
                                                          
41
 The coefficient for log(GDP per capita) is -13.006, while the coefficient for squared log(GDP per capita) equals 
1.825. Hence, following the quadratic formula, the turning point is estimated as follows:                                                                           
x = -(-13.006)/(2(1.825)) ≈ 3.56.  
Given that the base for the logarithmic transformation was 10, the GDP value at which the effect weakens is 
calculated:  
103.56 ≈ 3630.78 (GK dollars).  
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with the increase in wealth. When wealth stays at the same level, the effects of 
political instability on regime change in military autocracies are not significant in 
Model 11. This suggests that unlike in aggregate analysis in Chapter 5, in military 
regimes, political instability only increases the likelihood of transition in wealthier 
regimes.   
The effects of both religious and ethnic fractionalisation were close to, or barely 
significant in Models 6 to 10, but only religious fractionalisation has a positive and 
significant effect on the hazard of regime failure in the final model. In Model 11, 
one unit increase on the religious fractionalisation scale makes it over 2.6 times as 
likely that a military regime will fail, holding everything else constant. 
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Table 17. Multivariate Cox and Royston Parmar regression estimates for military regimes 
Variables  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3   Model 4 Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9 Model 10  Model 11 
 
HR        
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
Territorial dispute 0.766    
(0.16) 
0.758    
(0.16) 
0.717    
(0.15) 
0.716         
(0.15) 
0.660*         
(0.12) 
0.659*   
(0.13) 
0.648*    
(0.13) 
0.645*    
(0.12) 
0.381** 
(0.11) 
0.421**  
(0.13) 
0.401**  
(0.12) 
Log(GDP pc)   --- 1.097    
(0.37) 
0.000*** 
(0.00) 
0.000*** 
(0.00) 
0.000** 
(0.00) 
0.000*   
(0.00) 
0.000** 
(0.00) 
0.001       
(0.00) 
0.000** 
(0.00) 
0.000*   
(0.00) 
0.000*** 
(0.00) 
(Log(GDP pc))²  
  --- --- 9.641*** 
(6.17) 
9.950*** 
(6.50) 
5.568** 
(3.64) 
6.361*   
(4.72) 
7.011** 
(4.93) 
3.024ꭞ         
(1.81) 
8.164** 
(5.54) 
4.045*    
(2.68) 
6.201** 
(3.90) 
 
 Oil dependency 
  --- --- --- 0.413*  
(0.15) 
0.731         
(0.21) 
0.751              
(0.22) 
0.642            
(0.20) 
0.732            
(0.22) 
0.631          
(0.19) 
0.752           
(0.22) 
0.622ꭞ           
(0.17) 
Political instability   --- --- --- --- 25.849*** 
(5.87) 
14.273*** 
(6.14) 
15.481*** 
(6.20) 
0.065           
(0.12) 
18.074*** 
(4.77) 
0.073         
(0.14) 
0.235          
(0.45) 
Ethnic fractionalisation.   --- --- --- --- --- 1.006ꭞ             
(0.00) 
1.005ꭞ           
(0.00) 
2.303ꭞ     
(0.98) 
2.561*   
(1.06) 
2.457*   
(1.07) 
2.628*    
(1.11) 
Religious fractionalisation   --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.280*      
(0.84) 
1.213           
(0.54) 
1.159           
(0.55) 
1.144       
(0.52) 
1.206          
(0.52) 
Log(GDP pc) * pol. instability   --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 6.964**  
(4.27) --- 
6.076*      
(3.79) 
4.261*   
(2.67) 
Territorial dispute * pol. instability   --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.357*       
(0.90) 
2.033ꭞ      
(0.78) 
2.205*   
(0.85) 
RCS1 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 5.978*** 
(1.13) 
RCS2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
1.719*    
(0.36) 
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Table 7, continued.            
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
 
HR        
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR         
(S.E.) 
RCS 3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.905     
(0.09) 
RCS 4 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
0.969       
(0.03) 
Constant --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
0.000*** 
(0.00) 
AIC 721.516 723.356 717.139 712.122 528.212 526.009 524.967 523.362 526.999 523.216 110.57 
Proportional hazards test (global) 
χ² = 0.57             
df (1)                    
p = 0.452 
χ² = 1.06            
df (2)           
p = 0.589 
χ² = 0.05         
df (3)            
p = 0.997 
χ² = 0.37      
df (4)            
p = 0.985 
χ² = 3.54         
df (5)                 
p = 0.617 
χ² = 3.12          
df (6)               
p = 0.793 
χ² = 3.33      
df (7)                  
p = 0.853 
χ²=2.81        
df (8)               
p = 0.945 
χ² = 3.90            
df (8)                 
p = 0.867 
χ² = 3.14          
df (9)                     
p = 0.959 
  --- 
Link test --- β = 0.45         
p = 0.971 
β = 0.22                
p = 0.701 
Β = 0.32              
p = 0.292 
Β = -0.21             
p = 0.030 
Β = -0.15             
p = 0.025 
Β = -0.16                  
p = 0.025 
Β = -0.06               
p = 0.407 
Β = -0.10              
p = 0.214 
Β = -0.02           
p = 0.784   --- 
Partial log likelihood -359.758 -359.677 -355.57 -352.06 -259.11 -256.35 -257.11 -253.68 -255.50 -252.61 --- 
 
Notes: 
Models estimated using a sample of 104 regimes in 63 countries, with 94 regime failures. Breslow method for handling ties. RP model is fitted using 4 degrees of freedom for time-
constant effects.  
HR – hazard ratio 
S.E. – standard error 
RP – Royston-Parmar 
RCS – restricted cubic spline 
ꭞ     0.05 ≤p < 0.1         *     0.01≤ p < 0.05       **   0.001 ≤ p < 0.01         *** p < 0.001 
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Monarchic regimes 
 
As mentioned previously, the number of failures is exceptionally low for all 
monarchies between 1951 and 2008. Given that there are only 12 monarchic 
failures, complex models are at a serious risk of over-fitting, producing unreliable, 
and mostly insignificant, results. For this reason, a separate univariate Cox 
regression model has been fitted for each independent variable. The implications 
and interpretation of the results will be more limited, but the analysis itself will be 
more reliable. While the Royston-Parmar model was feasible for univariate analyses 
with no time-varying effects, it was not possible to account for time-varying effects 
in RP models because the initial values in the model were not feasible due to over-
fitting. As a result, no RP models will be fitted for the sample of monarchic regimes.  
Additionally, a separate Cox multivariate model (Model 8, Table 18) has been fitted, 
including a time-varying effect of oil dependency and ethnic fractionalisation, which 
have shown to be problematic in visual Schoenfeld residual tests in Appendix C 
(Figure B1 and Table B1).42 Model 8 was estimated for guidance purposes only, and 
should not be treated as a model which reliably estimates the effects of the 
covariates on the failure hazard of monarchic regimes. The model will not be used 
nor analysed when graphical representation of the predictors on regime failure is 
discussed, and it will not be assessed for goodness-of-fit later on in the chapter. The 
model was mainly fitted to estimate whether the inclusion of political instability 
would make the effects of territorial disputes on regime failure statistically 
significant. Although unreliable, Models 1 and 8 suggest that territorial disputes 
might have no effect on longevity of monarchies. Similarly, oil dependency and 
religious fractionalisation probably do not have a significant effect on monarchic 
regimes, but it cannot be stated with full certainty due to limitations of the 
estimates. Finally, estimates in Model 8 suggest that a one-point increase on 
fractionalisation scale reduces the likelihood of failure by almost a 100%, and a 
history of recent political instability increases the likelihood of failure by almost 280 
                                                          
42
 It is worth noting that the diagnostic tests for monarchic regimes in Appendix C are estimated for guidance 
only, as the scarcity of data points makes the test results very hard to interpret, as even small variations will 
cause considerable ‘wiggles’ in the fit line.   
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times. Unfortunately, a much larger sample of monarchic failures is needed to 
correctly and reliably estimate the effects of these variables on monarchic survival. 
As a result of the above limitations the null hypothesis that disputes significantly 
affect longevity of monarchic regimes cannot be rejected.  
 
 
Table 18. Univariate and multivariate Cox regression estimates for monarchic regimes 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 
HR         
(S.E.) 
HR        
(S.E.) 
HR        
(S.E.) 
HR        
(S.E.) 
HR        
(S.E.) 
HR        
(S.E.) 
HR        
(S.E.) 
HR        
(S.E.) 
Territorial dispute 0.653  
(0.44) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 3.264 
(1.59) 
Log(GDP per capita) --- 0.185** 
(0.12) 
--- --- --- --- --- 0.001 
(0.01) 
Oil dependency --- --- 0.394    
(0.23)    
0.243   
(0.20) 
--- --- --- 3.013 
(5.97) 
Oil dependency * time --- --- --- 1.002  
(0.00) 
--- --- --- 1.010* 
(0.00) 
Political instability --- --- --- --- 11.231** 
(8.51) 
--- --- 279.558* 
(683.98) 
Ethnic fractionalisation --- --- --- --- --- 0.007* 
(0.01) 
--- 0.000** 
(0.00) 
Ethnic fract. * time --- --- --- --- --- 1.029ꭞ 
(0.02) 
--- 1.021 
(0.03) 
Religious fractionalisation --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.977          
(1.21) 
0.208 
(0.25) 
 
 
Proportional hazards test 
(global) 
 
χ²= 1.20           
df(1)            
p = 0.273 
 
χ²= 0.06            
df(1)            
p = 0.801 
 
χ²= 0.22               
df(1)            
p = 0.638 
 
χ²= 0.66               
df(2)            
p = 0.720 
 
χ²= 1.79               
df(1)            
p = 0.181 
 
χ²= 1.86               
df(2)            
p = 0.394 
 
χ²= 0.00              
df(1)            
p = 0.981 
 
χ²= 5.41                
df(8)             
p = 0.713 
Link test --- 
β = -0.02     
p = 0.976 
--- 
β = -1.74     
p = 0.547 
--- 
β = 0.22         
p = 0.290 
β=-11161         
p = 0.490 
β = 0.06 
p = 0.165 
AIC 65.26 59.49 63.58 65.29 56.95 62.08 65.77 51.34 
 
Notes: 
Models estimated using a sample of 22 regimes in 21 countries, with 12 regime failures. Breslow method for handling ties.  
HR – hazard ratio 
S.E. – standard error 
RCS – restricted cubic spline 
ꭞ     0.05 ≤p < 0.1         *     0.01≤ p < 0.05       **   0.001 ≤ p < 0.01         *** p < 0.001 
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Multiparty regimes 
 
The univariate diagnostic visual and non-visual Schoenfeld residual tests for 
multiparty regimes indicate that apart from the log(GDP per capita) variable, all 
other predictors do not violate any of the proportional hazards assumption (Table 
C1 and Figure C1 in Appendix C). Furthermore, although the wealth variable fails 
the test in univariate analysis, when other variables and interactions are included in 
Model 7, the proportional hazards assumption is clearly met in multivariate visual 
and non-visual Schoenfeld residual test (Table C2 in Appendix C). It appears that 
while on its own, log(GDP per capita) is problematic, when its potential correlation 
with other predictors is accounted for in the final Cox model, the proportionality of 
hazards violations no longer hold. In addition, the detailed non-visual Schoenfeld 
residuals test in appendix C (Figure C4) confirms that log(GDP per capita) does not 
violate the proportionality assumption in a multivariate model (χ²=1.01 , df(1), 
p=0.314). 
When it comes to ‘log-log’ tests of proportional hazard for multiparty regimes, it 
appears that for larger values of time, the survival curves for different values of the 
territorial disputes variable cross. This suggests that for older multiparty regimes, 
participating in territorial disputes might actually increase the risk of failure, as 
opposed to decreasing it (Figure C2 in Appendix C). This effect does not disappear 
when other covariates are adjusted for in Figure C5, and therefore it is worth noting 
that this disproportionality might have an impact on the significance of the effect of 
territorial disputes on multiparty regime survival in all of the models in table 19 
below.    
Having discussed the diagnostic tests, this section will now move to discussing the 
results from the forward selection Models 1-8. It was assumed that similarly to 
military regimes, the likelihood or failure in multiparty regimes would be 
significantly and negatively affected by the presence of territorial disputes. 
However, as clearly visible in Models 1 – 8, even when the effects of all other 
covariates, including political instability, are accounted for, territorial disputes do 
not have a significant impact on the hazard of failure in multiparty regimes. This 
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provides strong evidence against hypothesis 1. Nevertheless, as discussed above, 
this lack of significance might be affected by the disproportionality of the effect of 
territorial disputes on regime failure observed in diagnostic tests in Appendix C. As 
a result, no clear conclusions can be drawn, but further research could establish 
whether military regimes might be affected by territorial disputes differently at 
different stages of regime longevity.  
Similarly, oil dependency and ethnic and religious fractionalisation do not have a 
statistically significant impact on the failure of multiparty regimes. Interestingly, 
wealth has a significant negative impact on regime failure in Model 2, but the effect 
disappears once the effects of oil dependency are accounted for in Model 3. 
However, once the effects of previous political instability are taken into account in 
Models 4-6, nether wealth, nor oil dependency, have a significant effect on 
multiparty regime failure.   
It appears that oil dependency, which is positively correlated with wealth, explains 
regime survival better than wealth in multiparty regimes. Nevertheless, it also 
appears that instability, which is negatively correlated with oil and wealth, once 
accounted for, explains this relationship even better in Models 4-6. This suggests 
that wealthy and oil rich multiparty regimes are simply much less likely to 
experience political instability in the first place. When they do, however, neither oil, 
nor wealth had a significant effect on the likelihood of multiparty regime failure.  
Finally, an interaction between wealth and lack of instability has been included in 
Models 7 and 8, which are Cox regression and Royston-Parmar regression models 
respectively. It appears that when a multiparty regime is stable, a tenfold increase 
in wealth results in a (100%-27.3%) = 72.7% reduction in the hazard of failure, 
compared to stable multiparty regimes that do not experience increase in wealth. 
Similarly, comparing two multiparty regimes that did experience instability the year 
before, a tenfold increase in wealth leads to hazard ratio of failure that is equal to 
exp(-1.298 + 2.302) = exp(1.004)= 2.73 for regimes that did experience the wealth 
increase, compared to regimes that did not.  This means that military regimes that 
more wealthy regimes that experience instability are much more likely to fail than 
poorer regimes experiencing instability.  
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Table 19. Multivariate Cox and Royston Parmar regression estimates for multiparty regimes 
This is an important finding given relatively little is known about what makes 
multiparty regimes more stable and less likely to transition to another form of 
regime. More discussion of this particular finding will be provided in relation to the 
findings about the likelihood of democratisation of multiparty regimes in Chapter 7, 
as well as the Conclusion chapter of this thesis. 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Model 8 
(RP) 
 
 
HR 
(S.E.) 
HR 
(S.E.) 
HR 
(S.E.) 
HR 
(S.E.) 
HR 
(S.E.) 
HR 
(S.E.) 
HR 
(S.E.) 
HR 
(S.E.) 
Territorial dispute 
0.871 
(0.21) 
0.823 
(0.21) 
0.849 
(0.22) 
0.759 
(0.17) 
0.758 
(0.17) 
0.771 
(0.17) 
0.695 
(0.16) 
0.716 
(0.16) 
Log(GDP per capita) --- 
0.446* 
(0.17) 
0.529 
(0.21) 
0.676 
(0.25) 
0.673 
(0.25) 
0.664 
(0.25) 
0.261** 
(0.12) 
0.273** 
(0.12) 
Oil dependency --- --- 
0.326* 
(0.18) 
0.404 
(0.21) 
0.404 
(0.21) 
0.408 
(0.21) 
0.445 
(0.22) 
0.412 
(0.20) 
Political instability --- --- --- 
11.059*** 
(2.73) 
11.055*** 
(2.71) 
10.773*** 
(2.66) 
0.002* 
(0.01) 
0.010 
(0.03) 
Ethnic fractionalisation --- --- --- --- 
0.983 
(0.38) 
1.105 
(0.45) 
0.831 
(0.35) 
0.997 
(0.38) 
Religious fractionalisation --- --- --- --- --- 
0.62 
(0.28) 
0.754 
(0.35) 
0.646 
(0.28) 
Log(GDP per capita) 
* political instability 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
14.779*  
(12.07) 
  9.991**      
(8.01) 
RCS 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
4.285*** 
(0.54) 
RCS 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
1.525*** 
(0.16) 
RCS 3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
0.851* 
(0.05) 
RCS 4 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
0.996 
(0.04) 
Constant --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
19.185* 
(26.59) 
 
AIC  598.57 595.57 592.66 525.40 527.40 528.44 520.05 245.15 
Proportional hazards test  
χ² = 0.36                      
df (1)                      
p = 0.547 
χ² = 3.59            
df (2)                       
p = 0.166 
χ² = 4.61             
df (3)                        
p = 0.203 
χ² = 2.23                
df (4)                           
p = 0.694 
χ² = 2.34                  
df (5)                  
p = 0.800 
χ² = 2.06             
df (6)                     
p = 0.914 
χ² = 2.35               
df (7)                        
p =0.938 
   --- 
Link test     --- 
β =  -0.64               
p = 0.609 
β = -0.11            
p =  0.848 
β = -0.22               
p =  0.265 
β =  -0.22            
p = 0.262 
β = -0.16            
p = 0.371 
β =0.02                   
p = 0.804 
   --- 
 Partial log likelihood -298.28 -295.79 -293.33 -258.70 -258.70 -258.22 -253.02    --- 
Notes: 
 
Models estimated using a sample of 118 regimes in 86 countries, with 74 regime failures. 
Breslow method for handling ties.  RP model is fitted using 4 degrees of freedom for time-constant effects, and 3 
degrees of freedom for time-varying effects. 
HR – hazard ratio 
S.E. – standard error 
RCS – restricted cubic spline 
ꭞ     0.05 ≤p < 0.1         *     0.01≤ p < 0.05       **   0.001 ≤ p < 0.01         *** p < 0.001 
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Single party regimes 
 
Before moving to analysing single-party regimes, it is worth noting some of the 
concerns connected to the violation of proportional hazards assumption. In 
appendix C, visual and non-visual Schoenfeld residuals tests have revealed that the 
effects of political instability quite clearly vary over time (Figure D1). Similarly, 
detailed non-graphical tests from univariate analysis show that instability violates 
the proportionality hazards assumption (χ²= 8.85, df(1), p=0.003) (Table D2). When 
included in Model 5, the interaction between political instability and time was 
statistically significant (p<001). It also contributed to the model significantly, with a 
Wald test indicating significant improvement in model fit between Models 4 and 5 
(χ²= 17.97, df(1), p<0.001). As a result, the interaction was retained in the model. 
Figure D4 and Table D2 in Appendix C additionally demonstrate that in a full Cox 
model, once the time interaction is accounted for, political instability no longer 
appears problematic.  
While territorial disputes variable shows weak sign of violation, with the p-value for 
univariate tests i 0.05 (χ² = 6.51, df(1), p= 0.011), the interaction between territorial 
disputes and time was insignificant. Furthermore, the multivariate Schoenfeld 
residual tests indicate that once other predictors in the model are included, 
territorial disputes variable is no longer problematic, and a multivariate non-
graphical Schoenfeld residuals test comes out insignificant (χ² = 0.68, df(1), p= 
0.411) (Table A2 in Appendix C). 
Similarly to monarchic and multiparty regimes, single party regimes do not appear 
significantly affected by territorial disputes when the effects of all other variables 
are held constant in Model 7. This partially confirms the assumption that territorial 
disputes have little effect on elites in single party regimes because their structural 
features already guarantee a high degree of elite cohesion. Nevertheless, it is worth 
noting that while territorial disputes have no effect on their own, they do interact 
significantly with the oil dependency variable in Models 9-11.  
In Model 11, single party regimes that do not depend on oil are not significantly 
affected by territorial dispute involvement. However, comparing two single party 
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regimes which are dependent on oil, participation in territorial disputes while 
holding all other variables constant, yields a hazard ratio equal to  exp(-0.212 + 
1.573) ≈ 3.902. This is an increase of over 290%, and the relationship is statistically 
significant. Finally, unlike other types of autocracy, single party regimes are 
significantly less likely to fail as a result of oil dependency when not affected by 
territorial disputes, with a (100%-50.06%) = 49.04% reduction in democratisation 
rate.  
In addition to the above, political instability has a significant effect on the likelihood 
of single party regimes’ failure, increasing their hazard of transition between 4 and 
5 times in Models 5-9, where the interaction between political instability and time 
variable has been included in the Cox model. In addition, in the Royston-Parmar 
Model 10, where the time-varying effects of instability are accounted for, the 
effects of instability are similar in magnitude to those from a Cox regression in 
Model 4, as the rate of regime failure as a result of recent political instability 
increases almost 20 times.  While the Cox model 10 identifies the interaction 
between time and instability as significant, the RP model 10 does not, which likely 
explains the change in the magnitude of the effect of instability between models 9 
and 10. Given that Royston-Parmar models are more reliable when accounting for 
time-varying effects of independent variables, the RP model predictions are 
considered to reflect the magnitude of the effect more accurately.  
Finally, ethnic fractionalisation has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood 
of failure in single party regimes. The likelihood of regime failure increases almost 
131 times in the Royston Parmar Model 10 for every increase on the ethnic 
fractionalisation scale. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the standard error 
is particularly large, signifying a very large variability in the predicted scores. This 
means that in some instances, the magnitude of the effect of ethnic 
fractionalisation will be very large, whilst in other instances it will be particularly 
low. Hence, the actual magnitude in the regression might not capture the data 
particularly well. The standard error is larger than the actual estimate in Models 8-
10, and even though it is statistically significant, it is considered scientifically 
insignificant. 
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Table 20. Multivariate Cox and Royston Parmar regression estimates for single party regimes 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Model 10    
(RP) 
Model 11 
(RP) 
 
HR           
(S.E.) 
HR           
(S.E.) 
HR          
(S.E.) 
HR           
(S.E.) 
HR          
(S.E.) 
HR           
(S.E.) 
HR          
(S.E.) 
HR           
(S.E.) 
HR           
(S.E.) 
HR              
(S.E.) 
HR          
(S.E.) 
Territorial dispute 0.697    
(0.21) 
0.644                       
(0.20) 
0.617   
(0.19) 
0.704    
(0.20) 
0.786    
(0.24) 
0.829   
(0.25) 
0.878   
(0.26) 
0.962                
(0.28) 
0.720   
(0.20) 
0.869              
(0.24) 
0.809     
(0.24) 
Log(GDP per capita)   --- 0.437*            
(0.16) 
0.389* 
(0.15) 
0.418* 
(0.17) 
0.479    
(0.21) 
0.570        
(0.27) 
0.619   
(0.30) 
9.255*                  
(9.89) 
8.699* 
(9.06) 
7.857*       
(6.60) 
0.546                 
(0.24)    
Oil dependency   --- --- 1.503    
(0.54) 
1.466    
(0.56) 
1.219   
(0.55) 
1.096   
(0.55) 
1.032    
(0.52) 
1.159               
(0.56) 
0.475ꭞ  
(0.18) 
0.599         
(0.26) 
0.506*          
(0.17)    
Political instability    --- --- --- 22.273*** 
(7.52) 
4.392** 
(2.34) 
4.418** 
(2.33) 
4.160** 
(2.15) 
5.105**       
(2.72) 
5.209** 
(2.78) 
19.880*** 
(6.92) 
18.079***         
(6.03)    
Political instability * time   --- --- --- --- 1.012*** 
(0.00) 
1.012*** 
(0.00) 
1.012*** 
(0.00) 
1.012***     
(0.00) 
1.012*** 
(0.00) 
---- --- 
Ethnic fractionalisation   --- --- --- --- --- 1.269   
(0.19) 
1.445*      
(0.26) 
129.571** 
(199.66) 
146.540** 
(227.37) 
130.871*** 
(172.49) 
1.299            
(0.20)    
Religious fractionalisation   --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.364    
(0.20) 
0.262*          
(0.16) 
0.308   
(0.19) 
0.438        
(0.24) 
0.587                   
(0.32)    
Log(GDP per capita) * ethnic fract.    --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.005**   
(0.01) 
0.005**   
(0.01) 
0.006***    
(0.01) 
--- 
Territorial dispute  * oil dependency   --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 3.999* 
(2.63) 
5.192**   
(3.34) 
 4.823**  
(2.65) 
RCS 1   --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 2.894*** 
(0.53) 
2.917***                   
(0.58)    
RCS 2   --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.171         
(0.16) 
 1.178                  
(0.17)    
RCS 3  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.971        
(0.06) 
0.958                   
(0.06)    
RCS 4   --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.032         
(0.04) 
1.038                   
(0.04)    
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Table 20, continued.  
 
           
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Model 10    
(RP) 
Model 11 
(RP) 
 HR           
(S.E.) 
HR           
(S.E.) 
HR          
(S.E.) 
HR           
(S.E.) 
HR          
(S.E.) 
HR           
(S.E.) 
HR          
(S.E.) 
HR           
(S.E.) 
HR           
(S.E.) 
HR              
(S.E.) 
HR          
(S.E.) 
RCS 1  (political instability)    --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.413        
(0.36) 
1.402                   
(0.39)    
RCS 2 (political instability)     --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.856        
(0.16) 
0.788                      
(0.14)    
RCS 3 (political instability)    --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.966            
(0.09) 
0.980                      
(0.10)    
Constant   --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.100         
(1.55) 
2.798                  
(3.87)    
AIC 430.94 432.12 432.12 359.89 349.48   349.42 349.21 344.20 343.462 112.49 114.49 
Proportional hazards test (global) 
χ² =  6.51       
df (1)                   
p =  0.011 
χ² =  7.12    
df (2)              
p = 0.029 
χ² =  8.56         
df (3)                     
p = 0.036 
χ² = 8.51      
df  (4)              
p =  0.075 
χ² =  1.69      
df (5)               
p = 0.890 
χ² =  1.46       
df (6)                 
p = 0.962 
χ² = 1.42        
df (7)                
p =  0.985 
χ² =  2.71       
df (8)              
p = 0.951 
χ² =  2.62        
df(9)             
p = 0.977 
   ---   
 
  --- 
Link test --- 
β =  0.273       
p =  0.929 
β = -0.309      
p = 0.724 
β =  -0.285     
p =  0.083 
β = -.037         
p =  0.661 
β = -0.021   
p = 0.802 
β = 0.006      
p =  0.933   
β = 0.074        
p = 0.252 
β = 0.067            
p = 0.280 
  ---     --- 
Partial log likelihood -215.44 -213.47 -213.057 -175.94 -169.74 -168.71 -167.61 -164.10 -162.73 (-40.24) (-40.25) 
 
Notes: 
Models estimated using a sample of 71 regimes in 64 countries, with 62 regime failures. Breslow method for handling ties.  RP model is fitted using 4 degrees of freedom for time-constant effects, 
and 3 degrees of freedom for time-varying effects. 
HR – hazard ratio 
S.E. – standard error 
RCS – restricted cubic spline 
ꭞ     0.05 ≤p < 0.1         *     0.01≤ p < 0.05       **   0.001 ≤ p < 0.01         *** p < 0.001 
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A similar relationship is apparent when an interaction between log(GDP per capita) 
and ethnic fractionalisation is included in Models 8-10. A tenfold increase in GDP 
per capita, coupled with one point increase on ethnic fractionalisation scale, results 
in a greater likelihood of regime failure. At the same time, a tenfold increase in GDP 
per capita also results in a large increase in the likelihood of failure for every unit 
increase in ethnic fractionalisation scale. However, like above, all of these estimates 
have unusually high standard errors, and will be considered scientifically 
insignificant. The final model (Model 11) will not include the interaction between 
ethnic fractionalisation and wealth.   
 
Goodness of fit 
 
Having analysed the results from models fitted to all four samples, it is important to 
assess the goodness of fit of the model. This will be done using the Cox-Snell 
residuals (Cox and Snell, 1968). It is expected that if a Cox model fits the data well, 
then the true cumulative hazard function will have an exponential distribution with 
a hazard rate of 1 (Cleves et al., 2010: 219). Figure 14 below presents the results of 
Cox-Snell test for each of the regime types for models including interactions and 
excluding interactions. The Model fitted for monarchic regimes in the previous 
section has been omitted, given the obvious unreliability of the estimates as a 
result of low sample size. In Figure 14, the red line is a standard exponential 
distribution with a hazard function equal to 1. The blue line, on the other hand, is a 
Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard function with the Cox-Snell residuals as the time 
variable, and regime change as a failure variable.  
As we can see form Figure 14, the data does not fit the model perfectly, with some 
large variability in the right-hand tail in all three models. This is to be expected, 
given that prior failures and censoring reduce the effective sample considerably 
(Cleves et al., 2010: 222). In other words, sizeable variability is quite common for 
large values of time where the sample is very small, and should not be a cause for 
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Figure 14. Cox-Snell residual tests for the Cox regression models with and without interactions 
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too much concern (Stata Corp, 2013). While some sources interpret even small 
deviations as bad model fit (Cleves et al., 2010; Abdelaal and Zakria, 2015) it is 
crucial to note that these sources usually refer to the goodness-of-fit of models 
estimated using clinical trials and experimental data, and as such have very low 
tolerance to potential variability. 
Overall, the models fit the data relatively well at smaller values of time. The older 
the regimes are, the less reliable the models are at predicting the likelihood of 
regime failure. This means that it is easiest to predict the likelihood of failure of 
relatively young regimes using variables tested in this Chapter, but as the regimes 
get older, factors such as income, territorial disputes, or fractionalisation become 
less likely to explain the likelihood of failure. This is natural, given that there are 
many potential factors that the models cannot account for. Some causes of 
longevity are due to contextual variables such as historical events, cultural factors, 
or the nature of the ideology adopted by the leadership. Any model based on 
quantitative data will be largely limited in explaining all aspects of authoritarian 
survival, especially in the case of regimes that survived a particularly long period of 
time.  
 
Graphical representation of results 
 
Finally, the chapter will now move to graphically represent the relationship 
between dispute involvement and regime failure in military and single party 
regimes, using the Royston-Parmar model estimations. Before this is done, 
however, the baseline hazard, survival, and cumulative hazard functions for all 
regime types will be described and analysed. As noted previously, baseline models 
are estimated for regimes with an average GDP per capita, no oil dependency, no 
recent history of territorial disputes or political instability, and minimal ethnic and 
religious fractionalisation. The log(GDP per capita) variable has been centred for 
each regime type separately, given the discrepancy in the distribution of this 
variable discussed in the Data and Methods section of this chapter.  
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Figure 15. Baseline survival, hazard, and cumulative hazard functions obtained from Royston Parmar models, by regime type 
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It is clear from Figure 15 that at the lowest level of risk, single party regimes have 
the highest rate of survival, while multiparty regimes have the lowest rate of 
survival. For military and multiparty regimes, the survival probability decreases 
fairly steadily thought out the life of the regime, while for single party regimes, the 
decrease in survival probability is most prominent within the first 30 years of their 
existence, and then decreases at a slower rate.  
Where hazard functions are concerned, it is very clear from the second graph in 
Figure 15 above that the functions are not monotonic. For multiparty regimes, the 
hazard is higher than that of other regimes at all times, and is highest in the first 
two years of the regime’s existence. That risk then decreases sharply, and stabilises 
at around 5 years of age. The trajectory is similar for military regimes, where the 
risk of failure is highest within the first two years, and then decreases until around 
11 years of age. However, unlike in multiparty regimes, the risk then increases 
slightly again after 11 years and continues to rise slowly over the regime’s lifetime. 
Finally, single party regimes are at the highest risk of failure within their first year. 
At around 9 years that hazard increases again for 10 years, and past the 19 years of 
age, the risk of failure for single party regimes decreases fairly steadily. The rate of 
hazard accumulation for each regime is additionally reflected in the third graph in 
Figure 15 above. 
Due to limitations of time and space, this chapter will only graphically evaluate the 
impact of the most theoretically important predictor in the models – the presence 
of territorial disputes. The survival curves will only be graphed in instances where 
the impact of territorial disputes, or their interaction with another variable, was 
statistically significant. The results of this analysis are presented below. 
 
Military regimes 
 
Figure 16 examines the difference in military regime survival at different values of 
the territorial dispute variable. This relationship was statistically significant in 
Model 11, with military regimes with no prior instability involved in disputes being 
almost 60% less likely to transition than regimes not experiencing territorial 
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disputes and not experiencing instability, holding everything else constant. Figure 
16 demonstrates that at all times during their existence, military regimes are much 
more likely to survive, with the difference in effect increasing with the age of the 
regime. The more established the regime, the more likely they are to be stabilised 
by territorial disputes, providing no prior experience of instability. The confidence 
intervals in the right-hand graph in Figure 16 indicate that this relationship is 
statistically significant only once regimes reach 5 years of age. Furthermore, in 
Model 11, there were significant differences in the way dispute involvement 
affected regime survival at different values of the political instability variable.  
When affected by territorial disputes, military regimes were 11.6% less likely to 
transition if they were experiencing instability than if they were not experiencing 
instability, holding everything else constant. While Figure 17 confirms that this 
difference in failure hazards also translated into survival probability for military 
regimes, the difference in survival is not statistically significant, with 0 being 
included in the 95% confidence interval. This means that while there are significant 
differences in hazard ratio of failure at different values of political instability for 
affected regimes, this does not translate into a significant difference in survival 
probability over time. 
Single party regimes 
 
Finally, Figure 18 presents the differences in survival probabilities between single 
party regimes that were affected by territorial disputes and are dependent on oil, 
and single party regimes that were affected by territorial disputes and are not 
dependent on oil. While this difference was statistically significant for hazard 
rations in Model 11 (Table 20), this relationship does not translate into survival 
differences over analysis time due to large 95% confidence intervals including the 
value of 0. Hence, while single party regimes were on average 4.5 times more likely 
to fail if involved in disputes and dependent on oil than if involved in disputes and 
not dependent on oil at any given unit of time, this does not mean that they has a  
consistently   higher   probability  of  survival  over  the  entire  analysis  period.  The  
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Figure 16. Military regimes: Differences in survival functions, by past dispute involvement 
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Figure 17. Military regimes: Differences in survival functions by past dispute involvement at different values of the political instability variable 
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Figure 18. Single party regimes: Differences in survival functions by past dispute involvement at different values of the oil dependency variable 
.
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chapter will now proceed with discussing the results of this section in the 
conclusion below.  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
The analysis above aimed to test the hypotheses: that while the duration of military 
and multiparty regimes is likely to be prolonged by their involvement in territorial 
disputes, monarchic regimes and single party regimes are likely to remain 
unaffected. In addition, the analysis aimed to test whether other hypotheses from 
Chapter 6 are also applicable on a disaggregated sample of authoritarian regimes. 
In summary, the analysis has demonstrated that while military regimes are 
significantly less likely to fail as a result of territorial disputes, such conflicts have no 
significant effect on multiparty regimes. It was assumed in Chapter 3 that military 
and multiparty regimes are particularly prone to experience elite splits, and hence 
are able to benefit from the centralising effect of external threats to territorial 
integrity of the state. The finding that military regimes are not influenced by 
territorial conflicts has important implications on the theory outlined in Chapter 3. 
Two potential explanations are offered for the finding that only military, but not 
multiparty regimes, are less likely to fail as a result of territorial disputes.  
First, it is possible that the proneness of multiparty regimes to elite splits was 
overstated in Chapter 3. While much of the literature suggests that multiparty 
states are short lived and unstable, a significant portion of it argues that in fact, 
multiparty regimes are exceptionally resistant to factors that usually lead to 
autocratic breakdown. It is possible that elites in multiparty regimes are stronger 
due to their unique ability to manage and intimidate opposition, as well as increase 
their legitimacy with the use of regular multiparty elections. An example of such 
regimes could be the Russian Federation under the rule of United Russia and 
Vladimir Putin (2000-present), or Mexico under the rule of Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (1929-2000). However, while it is undoubtedly true that some 
competitive autocracies included in the Magaloni et al. (2013) definition of 
254 
 
multiparty regimes are exceptionally durable, their median duration time is very 
short compared to monarchic and single party regimes,43 as shown in the analysis 
section above. Hence, while it is true that elites in certain competitive autocracies 
might use the features of the system to prolong their rule, this and other studies 
have shown that on average, multiparty regimes are considerably less stable than 
other forms of autocracy.44  
Given that multiparty and military regimes are comparably prone to failure, the 
explanation for the divergence in how they are affected by territorial disputes must 
lay somewhere else. It is possible that while elite splits are likely in both autocratic 
types, the presence of institutions significantly changes the scope for power 
centralisation within multiparty regimes. While many scholars consider the 
presence of institutional power turnover in multiparty regimes as a mere tool of 
regime legitimation, it is possible that the presence of institutions genuinely 
prevents power centralisation. It is possible that similarly to democracies, even 
weak and unstable institutions can prevent the ruling elites from establishing a 
stronger grip on the regime infrastructure. Given that power centralisation is the 
key aspect contributing to regime longevity, the inability to centralise in response 
to territorial disputes could explain why multiparty regimes are not affected by 
such conflicts. Nevertheless, it is still possible that multiparty regimes are less likely 
to democratise as a result of territorial conflict. After all, while they might not be 
more likely to survive in such conditions than at peace, it is possible that when a 
transition does happen, multiparty regimes will be more likely to transition to 
another form of autocracy as opposed to a democratic system. 
While territorial disputes had no significant impact on multiparty regimes, it made 
military regimes significantly less likely to fail, thus providing partial evidence for 
Hypothesis 1. The effect was significant and strong, and it likely explains why in 
aggregate analysis, all authoritarian regimes seemed to be affected by territorial 
disputes. This is a particularly important implication of this chapter. It is clear that 
                                                          
43
 8.8 years, compared to 8.3 years for military regimes, 28.1 years for monarchic regimes, and 19.6 for single 
party regimes. See Table 12 of this chapter for more detail.  
 
44
 See Gurr (1974), Epstein et al. (2006), Gates et al. (2006), Hadenius and Teorell (2008); Goldstone et al. 
(2010), and Knutsen and Nygård (2015). The reader should bear in mind, however, that all of the 
abovementioned studies use slightly different definitions of competitive authoritarian regimes.  
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authoritarian regimes should always be disaggregated in quantitative analysis, lest 
the researchers run the risk of drawing false or misleading conclusions from their 
work. Despite results from Chapter 5 indicating that all autocracies are more 
durable as a result of military conflict, it is clear from the analysis in Chapter 6 that 
these effects are only strong and significant for military regimes. Similarly to results 
in Chapter 5, the effects of territorial disputes only become significant when 
political instability is accounted for in the models. This was theorised to be the case 
due to the fact that while territorial disputes are correlated with lower risk of 
transition, they were also correlated with a higher risk of political instability. 45 
Surprisingly, despite the fact that Hypothesis 2 stated that single party regimes will 
not be affected by territorial disputes, the data analysis above has shown that 
under certain conditions, single party regimes are much more likely to fail when 
involved in this type of conflict. More specifically, when their economy is 
dependent on oil, single party regimes experiencing territorial conflict were much 
more likely to fail. This is a very interesting and important finding, which suggests 
that in single party regimes, the access and monopoly over non-tax revenues 
changes the dynamic of the territorial dispute – centralisation relationship. It is 
possible that when oil-rich countries do get involved in territorial disputes, the 
disputes might be more serious in nature, and more likely to lead to war. War might 
be more likely because the territory in question is most likely also oil-rich, and 
therefore more valuable to both warring parties. A war might be more likely than a 
simple dispute to lead to an overthrow of a regime, since they might end up in 
foreign occupation and eventually, an overthrow of a regime. Nevertheless, it is 
unclear why this interaction is only significant for single party regimes but not for 
other types of autocracies, and future research could address these findings in 
more detail. 
In the final stages of the analysis, monarchic regimes appear unaffected by 
territorial disputes, although it is unclear whether this is due to them being 
naturally centralised, as discussed in Chapter 3. The small number of monarchic 
failures in the dataset made building a complex model difficult, and the results are 
                                                          
45
 See Chapter 5 for more details.  
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largely unreliable. Hence, the null hypothesis that territorial disputes do not affect 
monarchic regimes cannot be rejected. As a result of this small sample, monarchic 
regimes will not be a part of the analysis in Chapter 7. Instead, Chapter 7 will focus 
on estimating the likelihood of democratisation for military, multiparty and single 
party regimes only.  
In addition, it is worth noting that when disaggregated, not all regimes were 
affected by the control variables in a similar manner as on an aggregate level in 
Chapter 5. While wealth reduced the likelihood of failure in multiparty regimes, the 
effect was quadratic for military regimes, and non-existent in single party regimes. 
This effect was significant in all regimes in the aggregate model in Chapter 5. 
Similarly, ethnic fractionalisation only increased the likelihood of failure in military 
regimes, while oil reduced the likelihood of failure in single party regimes only. 
These results have strong implications for further research within the field of 
International Relations, where autocratic regimes are usually analysed on an 
aggregate level. This chapter has clearly shown that structural features of autocratic 
regimes have an important impact on their survival and might be affected by 
different types of predictors. Further research ought to focus on establishing a 
theoretical and empirical basis for models built specifically for each of the 
autocratic types.  
Finally, it is crucial to discuss the implications of the findings discussed above for 
the wider literature on ReSIT, as well as regime survival literature within the field of 
Comparative Politics. First, it is apparent that the ReSIT assumptions can be applied 
to military regimes. They appear to be more susceptible than other types of 
regimes to the centralising effects of territorial disputes. It is possible that military 
regimes, which often fail due to the fact that the military rulers find it difficult to 
legitimise continuous rule of a ‘guardian’ or ‘transitory’ regime, find a new source 
of legitimacy in the presence of external threats to the state’s territorial integrity. 
Second, given how little attention has so far been paid to ReSIT within Comparative 
Politics, it is now paramount that more research is done on the importance of 
conflict – territorial or otherwise – on the survival of different types of autocracy.  
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Having discussed the implications stemming from the analysis in this chapter and 
the significance of its findings, the thesis will now turn to testing the assumption 
put forward by the original ReSIT research: that authoritarian regimes are less likely 
to democratise in the presence of territorial disputes. The analysis will be 
conducted on three types of autocracy: military, multiparty and single party 
regimes.  
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Chapter 7: Territorial disputes and democratisation, by regime type 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 tested the proposition that territorial dispute involvement makes 
autocratic regimes more durable. Chapter 6 has demonstrated that the effects of 
territorial dispute involvement varies for different types of autocracies, with 
military regimes being particularly likely to be affected: military autocracies were 
significantly less likely to transition into any form of regime, democratic and 
autocratic, when affected by a territorial dispute the year before. Overall, Chapters 
5 and 6 have provided empirical support for one of the theoretical propositions of 
this thesis, namely, that external existential threats to the regime in the form of 
territorial disputes make autocratic regimes less likely to transition.  
Nevertheless, the scope of analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 was very broad. While there 
was clear evidence that certain types of regimes might be less likely to fail as a 
result of territorial disputes, it remained unclear whether territorial disputes also 
decrease the likelihood of these regimes democratising. This question is of crucial 
importance, given that the original proposition of Reversed Second Image theory 
(ReSIT) states that external threats – especially in the form of territorial disputes 
(Gibler 2010; Gibler and Tir, 2013) – will make democratisation much less likely. 
This is an issue of crucial importance not only to the theoretical and empirical 
literature, but also to policy-makers more generally. First, the efforts to help 
regimes transition into stable democracies have been largely limited to foreign aid 
and external pressure. If the propositions of ReSIT are correct, it will mean that 
more effort needs to be made to mediate between neighbours who have unsettled 
claims to one another’s territory. Second, much of the policy directed at stabilising 
relations in heavily conflicted regions such as the Middle East have focused on 
democracy promotion as means of securing peace (Russett, 2005; Buraczynska, 
2016). If territorial disputes do in fact make democratic transitions more difficult, 
then attempts to provide security to unstable regions should be refocused on 
standard diplomatic solutions, rather than forceful regime change. While this thesis 
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does not focus on democratic survival, it is possible that young democracies might 
find it harder to survive in territorially contested regions, as traditional ReSIT 
research also suggests.  
While Chapters 5 and 6 analysed all types of regime change, the following chapter 
will focus specifically on the impact of territorial threats on democratisation and 
test whether the propositions of ReSIT are still applicable once important 
methodological improvements are made. Hence, the following chapter will address 
two final research questions of this thesis: Are autocratic regimes less likely to 
democratise as a result of territorial dispute involvement? And, are the chances of 
democratising as a result of territorial dispute involvement different in various 
types of autocratic regimes? 
Although the previous empirical literature by Gibler and colleagues has found a 
connection between democratisation and territorial dispute involvement, the 
research is largely limited to studies that rely on problematic measures of the 
independent variable, focusing on the level of democracy within democratic and 
autocratic regimes, rather than discussing democratic transitions more specifically, 
as detailed in Chapter 4. This is a considerable limitation, given that continuous 
measures of democracy face serious methodological and theoretical problems, as 
also discussed in Chapter 4. Moreover, none of the IR literature testing ReSIT 
accounts for the differences in which the unique structural features of authoritarian 
regimes might moderate the relationship in question. This chapter will utilise 
methods commonly used in the well-developed Comparative Politics literature to 
improve the interdisciplinarity of the IR and ReSIT research. By using a dichotomous 
measure of democratic transition, focusing solely on autocracies, and controlling 
for the impact of structural features of different autocratic regime types, the 
chapter will produce results which are robust, reliable, and in line with more recent 
methodological and theoretical development from the field of Comparative Politics.  
The main findings of this chapter partially confirm ReSIT, namely, the argument that 
territorial disputes reduce the likelihood of democratisation. A significant negative 
relationship between territorial dispute involvement and the hazard of 
260 
 
democratisation exists, and the effects are statistically significant even when two 
different measures of dispute involvement are used and all relevant controls are 
accounted for. Furthermore, when the alternative measure of dispute involvement 
is used, the results of a Cox model further suggest that the magnitude of the 
relationship between territorial dispute involvement and democratisation depends 
specifically on the type of autocracy within the state. Nevertheless, further analysis 
is needed in the future to fully confirm the findings below. Moreover, the chapter 
suggests that when preceded by political instability in the regime, wealth has a 
significant positive impact on the process of democratisation. Furthermore, oil-
dependency, as expected, significantly decreases the likelihood of democratic 
transitions in all types of autocracies.  
 
Theory 
 
Previous research and theoretical assumptions 
 
Unlike chapters 5 and 6, the following work focuses on the main theoretical 
assumption of the more recent versions of the ReSIT, namely that territorial 
disputes make autocratic regimes less likely to democratise. This is because ReSIT 
assumes that external threats increase the legitimacy of the current government 
and reduce elite polarisation in autocratic regimes. Hence, the stronger and more 
legitimate the autocracy in the eyes of the elites and the public, the less likely the 
regime is to fail. It is naturally assumed that the less likely a regime is to fail, the less 
likely it is to democratise in line with the original assumptions of ReSIT. The 
presence of external threats such as the threat to territorial integrity of the country, 
is likely to result in country-wide support for the ruling autocratic elites, and any 
anti-regime activity, including pro-democratic endeavours, are likely to be 
suspended. It is assumed that the political elites are unlikely to take any political 
risks at times of potential existential threats to the country’s territorial integrity. 
Hence, in line with the literature, the first hypothesis of this chapter states that: 
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Hypothesis 1: All types of autocracies will be less likely to democratise as a result of 
territorial dispute involvement.  
 
Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, the ReSIT literature, including Gibler’s 
influential research, does not account for structural variations within autocracies. 
These shortcomings emerge as a result of the focus on early state formation 
research within the ReSIT literature, and the use of large temporal domains often 
spanning from as early as the 19th century (see for example Midlarsky, 1995; Gates 
et al., 1999; Mousseau and Shi, 1999; Gibler and Tir, 2013). One of the major 
contributions and original arguments of this thesis is precisely that it is crucial to 
address the possibility that some types of autocratic regimes might be more 
susceptible to territorial threats than others. This is intuitive for a number of 
reasons. First, extensive research in the field of comparative authoritarianism has 
demonstrated that some forms of autocracy are simply more susceptible to the 
popular demand for democratisation, or even foreign pressure for more 
representative regime structure. Second, the legitimising effects of territorial 
dispute involvement are likely to be effective in regimes that base their legitimacy 
around the rhetoric of guardianship and state defence. Chapter 6 has already 
demonstrated that territorial conflicts only affect the survival of military regimes, 
suggesting that accounting for the autocratic regime type is an important 
theoretical and methodological contribution to the study of ReSIT. Furthermore, 
Chapter 3 has outlined in detail the extensive research that suggests that certain 
types of regimes might be more susceptible to the process of democratisation than 
others. In summary, it is expected that military and multiparty regimes are most 
likely to democratise, while single party and monarchic regimes are least likely to 
democratise. This is because monarchic and single party regimes rarely end in 
democratic transitions, and are characterised by particularly high resilience to 
internal conflict even in the absence of territorial conflicts (Geddes, 2007; Hadenius 
and Teorell, 2007; Frantz and Ezrow, 2011a). In contrast, both military and 
multiparty regimes tend to be prone to democratisation due to unstable relations 
between the regime elites, and relatively weak internal legitimacy (Geddes, 2007; 
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Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Magaloni, 2008). Therefore, it is possible that the 
legitimising and centralising effects of territorial disputes will be observed in more 
fragile regimes like multiparty and military regimes, but not in others. Therefore, it 
is expected that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: There are significant differences in the way territorial disputes affect 
the chances of democratisation in different types of autocratic regimes. 
 
Moreover, this chapter will also investigate a range of other explanatory factors 
commonly associated with democratisation in comparative politics and IR research. 
These include economic growth, which is usually assumed to increase the likelihood 
of democratisation, as well as oil dependency and the Cold War period, are typically 
assumed to make democratisation much less likely. They are briefly summarised 
below. 
 
Economic development 
 
Since the main focus of the thesis is on the effect of territorial disputes for 
democratisation, the models in this chapter must account for economic 
development but assume no significant relationship between wealth and 
democratisation. The inclusion is important because wealth is one of the key 
predictors of democratisation according to many important models in the 
literature, as Chapter 3 previously outlined. The relationship between economic 
growth and the likelihood of democratisation is one of the most researched and 
discussed phenomena in the study of democratic transitions and democratic 
survival (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski et al., 2000; Boix and Stokes, 2003). As part of 
modernisation theory research, much of the literature has claimed that higher 
levels of economic growth result in greater likelihood of democratic transition due 
to various micro-economic processes associated with economic expansion. This 
includes higher levels of literacy and political participation, economic 
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industrialisation, and the growth of the middle class (Lipset, 1959; Moore, 1966). 
Nevertheless, the relationship between growth and democratic transition has been 
challenged on many occasions in the past (Przeworski et al., 2000), and while a 
growing body of more recent studies report a significant positive relationship 
between dynamic democratic transitions and economic growth (Epstein et al., 
2006; Gassebner et al., 2009; Boix, 2011), the theoretical assumptions of 
modernisation theory are at odds with the findings in Chapter 5. More specifically, 
it was shown that wealth increased stability of autocratic regimes, rather than 
destabilise them. Hence, the models account for the potential impact of wealth but 
assume, in line with much of the literature, that higher levels of wealth will not 
result in greater risk of democratisation. 
 
Oil dependency 
 
Similarly to the expectations put forward in Chapters 5 and 6, and consistent with 
findings of these two chapters, it is expected that reliance on oil exports make it 
less likely for all types of authoritarian regimes to democratise. This is since 
revenues created from oil extraction make it easier for regimes to ‘buy off’ 
opposition and increase the well-being of their citizens without the need to raise 
taxes. Although some researchers have challenged this proposition, claiming that 
the negative effects of rent-seeking are outweighed by the fact that oil revenues 
contribute positively to the country’s GDP and therefore increase, rather than 
decrease, the likelihood of democratisation (Herb, 2005). Nevertheless, a more 
recent empirical analysis concluded that although oil does have an indirect pro-
democratic effect by raising GDP levels, the direct antidemocratic effects remain 
stronger (Alexeev and Conrad, 2009; 2011). As a result, it is expected that oil 
dependency will have a negative impact on the likelihood on democratisation in all 
types of autocracies.  
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Foreign pressure 
 
Within both the IR and Comparative Politics traditions, indicators of foreign 
pressure on authoritarian regimes have been used in the past to predict the 
likelihood of democratic transitions (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Gibler and Tir, 2013). 
One of the most common indicators of foreign influence is a temporal split between 
the Cold War and the post-Cold War era. In summary, both bodies of research 
suggest that with the advent of unipolarity, Western democracies have withdrawn 
their financial support to autocratic regimes, and instead begun to exert pressure 
on them to develop more democratic structures (Levitsky and Way, 2010; 
Buraczynska, 2016). The financial support enjoyed during the Cold War years had a 
similar effect to that generated by oil-revenues: increasing domestic income 
without the need to raise taxation, making it easier for autocrats to buy the 
portions of elites who were willing to cooperate, and violently repress those who 
were not (Boix and Stokes, 2003: 29-30). Nevertheless, the importance of the 
temporal split between Cold War and post-Cold War period is not merely a 
question of non-tax revenues. Much of the current literature suggests that 
democratisation in the post-1989 era was a combination of withdrawing funds and 
an increase in foreign pressure to develop more representative structures (Levitsky 
and Way, 2010, 2013). Hence, the end of the Cold War is expected to result in a 
higher likelihood of democratisation.  
Finally, a number of additional explanatory and control variables will be included in 
this chapter. First, as in previous chapters, a measure of political instability will be 
included in all models. Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that political instability was 
a very strong and consistently significant predictor of autocratic survival. This 
chapter will aim to determine whether the presence of political instability is also 
connected to the likelihood of democratisation. Second, a number of studies have 
claimed that one of the most important predictors of democratisation is a past 
history of democratic transitions, as well as number of past transitions and 
breakdowns (Przeworski et al., 2000; Smith, 2004). This measure has also been used 
in IR research on ReSIT specifically. Given that past history of transitions and 
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breakdowns is one of the most robust indicators of regime change, it is important 
to include them in this chapter to be able to compare the results generated by 
Gibler and colleagues with the results of this chapter. Both measures are expected 
to have a positive impact on the likelihood of democratisation.  
 
Data and methods 
 
Much of the methods employed in this chapter do not differ from the procedures in 
Chapters 5 and 6. The data sources, the analysis method, and the diagnostic tests 
and procedures remain the same. Nevertheless, there are three important 
differences between this chapter and previous analytical chapters of this thesis 
(chps 5 and 6).  First, this chapter uses a different dependent variable, measuring 
time-to-democratisation, as opposed to the general time-to-regime failure as in 
Chapters 5 and 6. This was done to test the proposition of ReSIT that external 
threats in forms of territorial disputes not only reduce the hazard of regime failure 
more generally (Chapters 5 and 6), but might additionally reduce the hazard of 
democratisation.  
Second, some variables used in Chapters 5 and 6 to investigate the determinants of 
regime survival have been dropped from the models in Chapter 7. This was done 
primarily because some variables that were theoretically important to estimating 
the hazard of regime failure were no longer applicable to establishing the hazard of 
democratisation. Moreover, the models in this chapter will now include a number 
of new variables that are of key importance to estimating the likelihood of 
democratisation, and were discussed in the section above. A discussion of how 
these variables were coded and the methodological implications of the above 
changes will be discussed in the sections below.  
Third, to ensure the robustness of results, this chapter tests ReSIT propositions 
using two separate measures of territorial dispute involvement, as explained in the 
section below. 
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Data 
 
The data used in the following chapter comes from the same sources as the data in 
analytical Chapters 5 and 6. Namely, the ‘Autocracies of the World’ dataset 
(Magaloni et al., 2013), the Gibler (2014) dataset on territorial disputes and the 
Maddison Project dataset on regimes’ economic performance, and some additional 
data from the Total Economy Database to compensate for missing information from 
the Maddison Project dataset.  For this reason, the sample for aggregate analysis of 
autocratic regime survival remains at 314 autocracies across 121 countries in the 
period between 1951 and 2008. It is crucial to note that the change in the 
dependent variable from ‘time-to-regime-failure’ to ‘time-to-democratisation’ 
meant that the number of failure events has significantly decreased. While there 
were 242 failure events in Chapters 5 and 6, there are only 77 failure events in this 
chapter. This poses some important methodological challenges to the main aims of 
this chapter. 
First, as demonstrated in Table 21 below, the number of instances of 
democratisation varies widely across the different regime types. While this strongly 
supports the main propositions of this thesis, that these differences must be 
accounted for when testing ReSIT, it also makes the procedures undertaken in 
Chapter 6 very difficult to replicate. For example, only 2 monarchic regimes in the 
sample have democratised in the 1951-2008 period.46 Similarly, only 10 single party 
regimes did. This means there are not enough cases to divide autocratic regimes 
into separate samples in order to perform the analysis. This was previously carried 
out in Chapter 6 due to concerns that hazard ratios for various regime types would 
violate the proportional hazards assumption crucial to the Cox survival analysis 
regression used in this thesis. This chapter instead investigates the effects of 
territorial disputes on autocratic regimes while accounting for structural differences 
between them. To do so, a categorical regime type variable will be included in all 
                                                          
46
 Both instances of monarchies democratising occurred in Nepal. The first instance of a monarchy 
replaced by democracy occurred in in 1991. The democracy then collapsed in 2002 to give way to 
monarchy. The monarchy lasted until 2006, with Nepal undergoing yet another democratic 
transition. Interestingly, Nepal is also the only country in the sample where a country has ever 
reverted back into monarchy.  
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models of this chapter, and potential problems with proportional hazards 
assumption violation will be closely monitored and reported.   
 
Table 21. Summary statistics of the sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable 
 
As stated above, the dependent variable is this chapter is time-to-democratisation. 
It was discussed in Chapter 4 that for the purposes of this thesis, democratisation is 
understood as a zero-sum process: regimes either undergo a complete process of 
democratisation, or are considered fully autocratic. Many past studies have seen 
democratisation as a process rather than an outcome (Epstein et al., 2006). This is 
particularly the case in the IR tradition of regime change studies (Gates et al., 1999; 
Mousseau and Shi, 1999; Gibler, 2010; Gibler and Tir, 2013). Instead, one of the 
main original contributions of this thesis is to use of dichotomous measure of 
democratisation The importance of this particular methodological choice is outlined 
in detail in section 3.1.2 of Chapter 4. In order to classify as democratic, the new 
regime must include the following features (Magaloni et al., 2013: 6): 
a) A civilian government as the main source of policy making; 
b) Competitive political parties that interact and run the government through a 
legislature; 
Regime type 
Total number of 
observations in the 
sample 
(regime-months) 
 
Total number of regimes 
in the sample 
Number of failures 
(democratisation) 
 
Military 
 
15,646 
 
104 
 
40 
Monarchic 6,904 21 2 
Multiparty 15,504 118 25 
Single party 16,720 71 10 
    
Total 54,774 314 77 
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c) An executive that is institutionally constrained or checked by other parts of the 
government; 
d) Largely open, competitive, fair and free elections, which are used to select the 
political leadership.  
Finally, regimes are classified as democratic if they fulfil all of the above criteria 
even in absence of power alteration (Magaloni et al., 2013). This means that that a 
regime is be coded as democratic even if the incumbent leader has not yet had the 
chance to lose power in popular and competitive elections. The democratisation 
variable is coded as 1 if a transition to full democracy occurred and 0 if no 
democratisation has occurred in a given month. Instances of other regime 
transitions (for example, from a military to multiparty regime) are also coded as 0.  
 
Independent variables 
 
A number of categorical variables included in models in Chapters 5 and 6 are also 
theoretically important to understanding the process of democratisation. These 
variables include oil dependency and political instability variables. For a discussion 
on how these variables were coded, see Chapter 4, as well as the Methods sections 
in Chapters 5 and 6. Additionally, one continuous variable used in previous chapter 
– wealth – has also been retained due to its theoretical importance. As discussed 
previously, wealth is operationalised as yearly GDP per capita measured in 
international Geary-Khamis dollars, and adjusted for purchasing power parity (Bolt 
and van Zanden, 2014).  
Like in Chapters 5 and 6, GDP per capita was logarithmically transformed to reduce 
the left-skewness of its distribution and making the relationship between time-to-
democratisation and wealth more linear. For details of this transformation, see 
Chapter 6, and especially Figures 10, 11, 12 and 13.  
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New independent variables 
 
In addition to the variables used in previous chapters, four more important 
predictors of democratisation have been considered, including an alternative 
measure of territorial dispute involvement discussed later in the thesis. These are 
listed in Table 22 below, along with the coding procedure for each of the new 
variables.  
 
Limitations 
 
It is worth noting that the number of previous transitions in the country and history 
of democracy variables cannot fully account for historical occurrence of democracy 
and regime transitions within 314 autocracies and 147 autocratic spells in the 
sample given that the observation period begins in 1951. This means that even if a 
country has experienced a period of democratisation before 1951, but this 
democracy failed before it could be observed, it cannot be accounted for in the 
analysis. Similarly, some countries that existed before the observation period begun 
could have undergone multiple regime transitions that could not be observed and 
recorded. Due to space, time and data availability limitations, this issue could not 
be addressed has to be taken into account when conclusions are drawn about the 
impact of these predictors on the likelihood of democratisation. 
 
 
Methods and diagnostic tests 
 
The analysis section of this chapter is split into two sections. The first section uses 
the time-varying measure of lagged yearly involvement in a territorial dispute by 
the regime in power, as used in Chapters 5 and 6, and explained  in  Chapter  4.  The 
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Table 22. Summary of additional independent variables used in this chapter 
Variable Description Variable type Coding procedures 
 
Territorial dispute history 
 
 
 
 
A variable indicating 
whether the regime 
was ever involved in a 
territorial dispute 
during its lifetime 
 
 
Indicator 
 
Coded 1 if the regime 
has even been 
involved in a territorial 
dispute since its 
inception, and coded 
0 if the regime was 
not involved in a 
territorial dispute.  
 
Cold War A variable indicating 
the presence of the 
Cold War 
Indicator Coded 1 for all months 
between January 1951 
and December 1989, 
and 0 for all months 
between January 1990 
and December 2008. 
 
Sum of past transitions Number of previous 
regime transitions in 
the country (including 
non-democratic 
transitions) 
 
Continuous A variable ranging 
between 0 and 9, 
indicating the total 
number of previous 
transitions that took 
place in the country 
between 1951 and 
2008.  
 
History of democracy variable indicating a 
history of democracy 
in the country 
 
 
 
Indicator A variable indicating 
whether the country 
has a history of being 
a democracy at any 
point between 1951 
and 2008. Coded 1 if 
the country has been 
a democracy at any 
point before the 
current regime took 
power, and 0 if this is 
not the case.    
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second section, on the other hand, will perform the analysis on the same sample of 
autocracies, but will use an indicator variable measuring whether the regime has 
ever been involved in a dispute in its lifetime (see Table 22 above). This is done to 
increase the robustness of the results, and ensure that the relationship between 
territorial disputes and democratisation exists across different measures, and is not 
merely a statistical artefact of this chapter.  
In both sections, univariate analysis of the effects of all predictors on the 
dependent variable will be performed for the purposes of diagnostic tests. In 
Section 1, this will be followed by an aggregate stepwise forward selection model 
using Cox survival analysis regression. In Section 2, due to limitations in time and 
space, only full models will be fitted and discussed. Finally, in Section 3 interactions 
between regime type and predictors will be performed on a full sample, as well as 
on a limited sample of military and multiparty regimes for reasons of data 
limitations discussed above. Once all models are fitted in both sections, 
multivariate diagnostic tests will be performed and the results will be included in 
Appendix D.47 For details on the exact methodological procedures and the tests 
used in all of the chapters, see methods sections of Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
Data analysis 
 
The following analysis section will investigate the two hypotheses of this chapter in 
the following manner. First, a summary of the new variables introduced in this 
chapter for the first time – history of democracy, the sum of past transitions, and 
Cold War – will be briefly outlined, and their relationship with democratic regime 
change will be discussed. This will provide a setting for the multivariate analysis, 
where models with and without interactions will be fitted for all autocracies in the 
sample. Next, a separate analysis section will fit a similar model, but using an 
alternative measure of territorial dispute involvement. While the standard measure 
                                                          
47
 Due to the very limited sample, Royston-Parmar models could not be fitted for all of the final 
models in this chapter. However, where RP models could be fitted, the results will be briefly 
discussed for comparison. The models will not be included in the regression tables in this Chapter.  
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is a time-varying indicator of territorial dispute involvement in the past year, the 
new measure is a dummy indicator of whether the regime has ever been involved 
in a territorial dispute during its lifetime. A graphical representation of the most 
important predictors is offered in the final section of data analysis, along with the 
discussion of the Cox Snell residual test results. Finally, and most importantly, the 
results of this chapter will be discussed in relation to the wider literature on ReSIT 
and democratisation.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 23 presents the distribution of the failure events (democratisation) among 
four types of autocracy analysed in this chapter: military, multiparty, monarchic, 
and single party regimes. As expected based on previous discussions in Chapters 3 
and 6, monarchic and single party regimes are the least likely types of regime to 
transition to democracy, with less than 10% of all monarchies and only 14% of 
single party regimes in the sample undergoing a transition. This is unsurprising, 
given that these two forms of regime also tend to be most stable, as discussed 
throughout the thesis. On the other hand, military and multiparty regimes are most 
likely to transition to democracy upon regime failure, with a fifth of all multiparty 
regimes, and over a third of military regimes becoming democratic.  
 
Table 23. The distribution of democratisation events in the sample, by regime type 
Regime type Number of regimes 
% of transitions ending in 
democracy (N) 
Military 104 38.5% 
(40) 
Monarchic 21 9.5% 
(2) 
Multiparty 118 21.2% 
(25) 
Single party 71 14.1% 
(10) 
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The differences in the proportion of regimes that eventually democratise during the 
observation period (Table 23) have important implications for further analysis. First, 
it is clear that not much can be known about the reasons for democratisation in 
monarchic regimes, given only two instances of regime transition. Similarly, the 
sample size of democratic failures in single-party regimes is equally concerning. This 
information will be particularly relevant when discussing the validity of the findings 
later in the data analysis section. Nevertheless, some preliminary conclusions can 
be drawn from Table 23. The differences in the instances of democratisation 
between multiparty and single party regimes reiterate the need to distinguish 
between these two types of autocracy. This is important, given that the literature 
on elections in autocratic regimes often does not make this distinction, often 
arguing that elections have the effect of making autocracies more, rather than less, 
stable (Ghandi and Lust Okar, 2009).  Nevertheless, it is evident that when genuine 
competition is permitted in multiparty regimes, the regime might become more 
vulnerable to potential democratisation, as some of the more recent literature 
suggests (Howard and Roessler, 2006; Donno, 2013).  
Figure 19 below shows the distribution of the instances of democratisation within 
the sample by decade. The bar graph on the left suggests that the number of 
democratic transitions has been steadily increasing since the 1950s, but has sharply 
decreased again in 2000s. Nevertheless, the instances of democratisation as a 
proportion of all regime changes has actually been more frequent in the 1980-2007 
period than in the 1951-1979 period, with the highest proportion of 
democratisation in the past decade (2000-2008).  These statistics confirm much of 
the speculation in the literature that a much higher rate of democratisation has 
occurred since the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the 
changes begun to take place much earlier – since the beginning of the 1980s – and 
an arbitrary split between the Cold War and post-Cold War era might not fully 
reflect the third wave of democratisation. This is also important given that the 
definition of democracy in this thesis is relatively strict. Much of the literature 
speculates that the effects of Cold War were superficial, and resulted in a high 
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proportion of hybrid, or multiparty, regimes (Levitsky and Way, 2010). While this is 
certainly true to a certain extent the withdrawal of financial and political support 
for authoritarian regimes at the end of the 1980s has also clearly resulted in a 
greater rate of democratisation around the world. This data further highlights the 
importance of including the Cold War variable into the models built in Tables 26 
and 27 of this chapter.  
In addition to the above, it is important to account for the fact that regime history 
and the likelihood of democratising might be correlated, as suggested by much of 
the literature reviewed earlier in this chapter. The descriptive tables below 
demonstrate the median time to democratisation depending on whether the 
country has previous experience with democracy (Table 24), and the mean sum of 
past transition in the country (Table 25). It is evident from Table 24 that autocratic 
regimes in countries with a prior experience of democracy had a median duration 
time that was much lower than autocracies with no prior experience of democracy, 
with the difference of almost five years. The above duration time comparison 
strongly suggests that the likelihood of democratisation in autocratic regimes might 
be associated with previous regime experiences. Nevertheless, it is important to 
also note that this association is not entirely reliable, given that no knowledge of 
past transitions is available for regimes which entered the sample in 1951, but 
originated before this date. 
The relationship visible in Table 24 might simply reflect the fact that there were 
fewer instances of democratisation in the 1951-1979 time period than in the 1980-
2008 period (see Figure 19). Nevertheless, very few countries outside of the 
European continent had a history of representative parliamentary democracy prior 
to 1951, and many of the countries in the sample did not exist until the post-
colonial era which begun in the 1960s. Hence, it is still likely that prior experience of 
democracy might be genuinely associated with the duration of autocratic spells 
within authoritarian regimes. In a similar manner, it is likely that inherent lack of 
stability measured by sum of past regime transitions has an impact on median 
duration of autocratic regimes and spells.   
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Figure 19. Democratic transitions by decade, 1951-2008 
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Table 24. Median regime duration, by history of democracy in the country 
Experience of democracy Median regime duration 
(years) 
N 
 
 
History of democracy 
 
7.2 
 
32 
 
No history of democracy 
 
11.9 
 
282 
 
Total 
 
12.5 
 
314 
 
 
 
Table 25. Median regime duration, by sum of past regime transitions in the country 
Sum of past regime transitions Median regime duration 
(years) 
N 
 
Transition N < 3 
 
17.8 
 
127 
Transition N ≥ 3 6.4 187 
 
Total 
 
12.5 
 
314 
 
 
Table 25 demonstrates that similarly to the results for history of democratisation, 
autocratic spell and regime duration times are affected by their transition history. 
Given that the mean number of past transitions in sample was 2.9, the threshold for 
comparison of the two groups was set at 3 past transitions. Overall, regimes in 
countries with fewer than three transitions at the moment of transition have a 
median duration time that is over 11 years higher than that for regimes with a 
transition history equal to or greater than 3. This provides an initial confirmation 
that the sum of past transitions might have a significant impact on the hazard ratio 
of democratisation later on in the analysis. The more often a regime changes, the 
more likely it is to democratise at a given time period. This finding corresponds with 
much of the comparative politics literature previously demonstrating that the 
number of prior regime changes is a powerful predictor of democratisation 
(Przeworski et al., 2000; Simth, 2004).  Furthermore, it demonstrates tentative 
support for some of the speculation made in the conclusion of Chapter 6. Namely, it 
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provides evidence that more stable autocracies might also be less likely to 
democratise, even in the event of eventual regime change. Hence, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that some of the most durable autocratic regimes in the Middle East 
and North Africa region such as Egypt or Libya did not actually transition into 
democracies as a result of the Arab Spring, but became multiparty regimes instead. 
Spells of genuine democracy are more likely to be observed in countries such as 
Turkey and Thailand, which undergo frequent regime change in relatively short 
periods of time. The measure of the sum of past transitions can be considered a 
proxy measure of the overall stability within the country. Clearly, it is possible that 
stability of autocracy in a country is negatively associated with the hazard of 
democratisation.  
The next section will report on the findings from a number of models investigating 
the hazard ratio of democratisation in authoritarian regimes. These models provide 
the basis for testing the theoretical claims presented in Chapter 3, as well as the 
wider proposition of ReSIT, that external threats – here in the form of territorial 
disputes – make democratisation more likely to occur. The results of these models 
will determine whether the theoretical claims of this thesis are supported by 
empirical evidence, or whether alternative explanations should be explored. 
Following a discussion of initial diagnostic tests, two sets of models will be fitted for 
two different measures of territorial dispute involvement.  
 
Results of univariate diagnostic tests 
 
Before discussing the results of multivariate analysis, it is important to consider 
whether any of the predictors included in the models are likely to violate the 
proportional hazards assumption.  
The univariate visual Schoenfeld residual tests indicate that the territorial dispute 
and political instability variables might violate the PH assumption (Figure A1, 
Appendix D). While the issues are unlikely to be serious for the time varying 
territorial disputes variable because non-visual tests indicate no PH violations in 
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(χ²=0.04, df(1), p=0.850), there is a significant violation for the political instability 
variable (χ²=8.44, df(1), p=0.004) (Figure A3, Appendix D). This is unsurprising, given 
that political instability has caused similar violations in Chapters 5 and 6. For this 
reason, an interaction between the time variable and political instability will be 
automatically included in all models that investigate the impact of instability on the 
likelihood of democratisation. Multivariate PH tests (visual and non-visual) when 
such interaction is included report no PH violations in the models in further analysis 
(see Table A2 and Figures A6 and A7 in Appendix D).  Additionally, all Royston 
Parmar (RP) models will control for the time-varying effects of the political 
instability variable to ensure the PH violation is not skewing the results.  
In unadjusted log-log plots for all variables included in the model, significant 
problems are observed for territorial disputes, and regime type variables (Figure A3, 
Appendix D). After adjusting for other variables included in further models, only the 
regime type variable still poses challenges to the PH assumption (Figure A4, 
Appendix D). While most variables were adjusted for all of the predictors included 
in the final model in table 26 below, the plot for the regime type variable could only 
be adjusted for territorial dispute and log(GDP per capita). Including any further 
independent variables in the adjusted log-log plot was causing over-adjustment due 
to the very small failure rate of monarchic and multiparty regimes, resulting in no 
observations. While the plots for military and multiparty regimes were proportional 
and parallel even after full adjustments (Figure A4), the problems in calculating 
appropriate plots for monarchic and single party regimes suggest that the analysis 
of the causes of democratisation for these two types of autocracy might be very 
limited. Due to this very small sample size, the interactions between independent 
variables that include autocratic regime type might not produce valid or reliable 
results. For this reason, the interpretation of the factors increasing the hazard of 
democratisation for monarchic and single party regimes will be treated with 
caution.  
Finally, univariate Martingale residual tests have indicated no linearity problems for 
either the Log(GDP per capita) variable, nor for the sum of past transitions variable 
(Figure A5, Appendix D). Further multivariate Martingale, Link and Schoenfeld tests 
279 
 
will be performed on fitted models throughout the chapter to ensure that linearity 
and hazard proportionality assumptions are not violated. The results of these tests 
are included in Tables 26 and 27 underneath the models. The details of all of the 
tests mentioned above have been outlined in Chapter 5. 
 
Multivariate data analysis 
 
Table 26 presents the results of the forward selection models fitted for a sample of 
314 autocratic regimes with a democratisation rate of 24.5% (N=77). The territorial 
dispute variable is a time-varying variable lagged 1 year. This means that when the 
variable is coded as 1 for a particular year, the regime was involved in a territorial 
dispute in the year before. This is a variable originally coded by Gibler and Miller 
(2014), and such a measure is commonly used in the tests of ReSIT.  
The models start with the inclusion of regime type as a control variable in Model 1, 
and the introduction of the most important independent variable – territorial 
dispute – in Model 2.  Contrary to what was expected based on theoretical 
consideration in Chapter 3, the territorial dispute variable appears to have no 
significant impact on the hazard ratio of democratisation in any of the Models 1-6 
which exclude interactions, and its effects only become significant once history of 
democracy is accounted for in Model 7. This is an interesting finding, especially 
given that history of democracy and territorial disputes are not highly correlated, 
and a separate model fitted to investigate whether the interaction term between 
them is statistically significant  returned no significant relationship (p=0.998). 
Furthermore, the p-value for territorial disputes changes relatively suddenly from 
p=0.143 in Model 6 to p=0.045, which means that the results did not become 
significant due to very minor changes in the p-value.  
The results remain statistically significant, or close to statistical significance (p<0.10) 
in all of the other Cox models in Table 26. Territorial dispute involvement has a 
negative and statistically significant impact on the hazard of democratic transition 
in any given month, with an average impact of regimes being only 60% as likely to 
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transition to democracy when involved in a territorial dispute the year before. This 
initially confirms the assumptions of ReSIT theories that autocracies have smaller 
chances of democratising after facing external threats to their existence. However, 
it is important to note the novelty of the findings. All ReSIT studies to date which 
used survival analysis find this relationship to exist when assessing spell, not 
regime, duration. Hence, this chapter makes a significant contribution to the 
literature by demonstrating that territorial threats also have an impact of regime 
duration, even when other important factors, such as structural type of autocracy, 
past history of transitions, oil dependency or other factors are accounted for.  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that this relationship ceases to show up when 
a different type of survival analysis is used. The Royston-Parmar model (Model 10), 
despite being said to usually produce comparable results to these returned by Cox 
analysis (Royston and Lambert, 2011) shows results with no significant impact on 
the hazard ratio of democratisation (p=0.104). This suggests that the results are not 
robust, and that the relationship between territorial disputes and democratisation, 
is unlikely to be very strong. This change in the significance of the relationship is 
most likely caused by the fact that RP models are better at accounting for time-
varying effects of problematic variables, in this case, political instability. As reported 
in Chapters 5 and 6, the political instability variable is correlated with the territorial 
dispute variable, and it is likely that this effect partially explains why a better fitting 
model accounting for time-varying effects, reduces the significance of the dispute-
democratisation relationship.  This chapter will return to this finding later on in this 
section, where an alternative measure of territorial dispute involvement will be 
tested in separate models.  
Unsurprisingly, other predictors were also very important in explaining the hazard 
ratio of democratisation. Single party regimes were consistently less at risk of 
democratisation than military regimes, being only 44% as likely as military regimes 
to democratise. The differences between other types of regimes also existed, but 
became insignificant in later, more complex models.  
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                Table 26. Multivariate Cox and Royston Parmar regression estimates with a time-varying measure of dispute involvement 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7    Model 8    Model 9   
Model 10 
(RP) 
 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
 HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
 HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
Military  (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) 
Monarchic 0.105* 
(0.10) 
0.106* 
(0.1) 
0.083* 
(0.09) 
0.102* 
(0.11) 
0.108* 
(0.1) 
0.129* 
(0.11) 
0.188* 
(0.16) 
0.199 
(0.17) 
0.282 
(0.23) 
0.368 
(0.32) 
Multiparty 0.605ꭞ 
(0.16) 
0.571* 
(0.15) 
0.510* 
(0.14) 
0.448** 
(0.13) 
0.894 
(0.25) 
1.032 
(0.3) 
1.226 
(0.36) 
0.925 
(0.28) 
0.956 
(0.30) 
0.88 
(0.23) 
Single party 0.222*** 
(0.07) 
0.213*** 
(0.07) 
0.208*** 
(0.07) 
0.178*** 
(0.06) 
0.293** 
(0.13) 
0.348* 
(0.16) 
0.411* 
(0.18) 
0.393* 
(0.17) 
0.414ꭞ 
(0.19) 
0.438*   
(0.16) 
Territorial dispute --- 0.803 
(0.20) 
0.764 
(0.19) 
0.815 
(0.2) 
0.676 
(0.18) 
0.607* 
(0.15) 
0.558* 
(0.14) 
0.633ꭞ 
(0.16) 
0.498*   
(0.14) 
0.699 
(0.15) 
Log(GDP per capita) --- --- 2.474* 
(0.94) 
3.303*** 
(1.18) 
2.776*** 
(0.73) 
2.436*** 
(0.56) 
3.188*** 
(0.79) 
3.808*** 
(0.98) 
1.032 
(0.64) 
1.174 
(0.68)  
Oil dependency --- --- --- 0.266* 
(0.14) 
0.533 
(0.26) 
0.58 
(0.27) 
0.651 
(0.31) 
0.529 
(0.28) 
0.010*** 
(0.01) 
0.017*** 
(0.02) 
Political instability --- --- --- --- 14.820*** 
(6.89) 
13.982*** 
(6.5) 
11.806*** 
(5.68) 
12.402*** 
(5.88) 
0.024 
(0.06) 
0.162 
(0.39) 
P. Instability * time --- --- --- --- 1.013** 
(0.00) 
1.013** 
(0.0) 
1.014** 
(0.00) 
1.013** 
(0.00) 
1.013**  
(0.00) 
--- 
History of democracy --- --- --- --- --- 2.410*** 
(0.63) 
1.511 
(0.43) 
1.213 
(0.32) 
1.301 
(0.39) 
1.123 
(0.28) 
Sum of past transitions --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.218*** 
(0.07) 
1.205*** 
(0.07) 
1.205**  
(0.07) 
1.145*   
(0.06) 
Cold War --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.491* 
(0.15) 
0.142*** 
(0.08) 
0.132*** 
(0.07) 
Cold War * Instability --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 4.568*   
(3.29) 
3.017ꭞ 
(1.95) 
Log(GDP pc) * Instability  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
5.667*   
(4.30) 
4.522*   
(3.39) 
Cold War * Oil  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
16.902*** 
(14.23) 
11.874*   
(12.37) 
Sum of transitions * Oil  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
1.666*** 
(0.22) 
1.497** 
(0.23) 
RCS 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
3.277*** 
(0.94) 
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Table 26, continued.  
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Model 10 
(RP) 
 
HR                   
(S.E.) 
HR                   
(S.E.) 
HR                   
(S.E.) 
HR                   
(S.E.) 
HR                   
(S.E.) 
HR                   
(S.E.) 
HR                   
(S.E.) 
HR                   
(S.E.) 
HR                   
(S.E.) 
HR                   
(S.E.) 
RCS 2 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
1.591* 
(0.37) 
RCS 3 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
0.871 
(0.08) 
RCS 4 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
1.007 
(0.04) 
RCS 1 (Political instability)  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
1.792ꭞ 
(0.58) 
RCS 2 (Political instability)  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
0.794 
(0.20) 
RCS 3 (Political instability) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
1.024 
(0.13) 
Constant --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
0.063 
(0.11) 
Proportional hazards test χ² = 6.62     
df(3) 
p = 0.085 
χ² = 6.83         
df(4) 
p = 0.145 
χ² = 6.16         
df(5) 
p = 0.291 
χ² =  8.70         
df(6) 
p = 0.191 
χ² = 1.97         
df(8) 
p = 0.982 
χ² = 2.17         
df(9) 
p = 0.989 
χ² = 3.10        
df(10) 
p = 0.979 
χ² = 4.43      
df(11) 
p = 0.956 
χ² = 359 
df(15) 
p = 0.999 
--- 
Link test 
--- 
 
β = -0.304 
p = 0.34 
β = 0.159 
p = 0.377 
β = 0.097 
p = 0.467 
β = 0.002 
p = 0.955 
β = -0.014 
p = 0.685 
β = - 0.021 
p = 0.554 
β = - 0.021 
p = 0.300 
β = 0.016 
p = 0.562 
--- 
 
AIC 718.61 719.6689 714.1466 703.9862 450.7973 445.991 440.21 437.59 422.68 121.92 
Log likelihood (pseudo log l.) -356.30 -355.834 -352.073 -345.99 -217.399 -213.996 -210.11 -207.79 -196.34 (-37.96) 
Wald test for equality of HR:           
Monarchy = multiparty χ² = 3.23 
p = 0.072 
χ² = 2.91 
p = 0.088 
χ² = 2.86 
p = 0.091 
χ² = 1.94 
p = 0.164 
χ² = 5.28 
p = 0.022 
χ² = 5.69 
p = 0.017 
χ² = 4.99 
p =  0.026 
χ² = 3.12 
p =  0.077 
χ² = 1.98 
p =  0.160 
χ² = 0.92 
p =  0.337 
Multiparty = single party χ² = 8.42 
p = 0.004 
χ² = 8.14 
p = 0.004 
χ²  = 6.99 
p = 0.008 
χ²  = 7.31 
p = 0.007 
χ²  = 6.20 
p = 0.013 
χ²  = 5.82 
p = 0.016 
χ² = 6.09 
p =  0.014 
χ² = 3.19 
p =  0.074 
χ² = 2.51 
p =  0.113 
χ² = 3.17 
p =  0.075 
Monarchy = single party χ² = 0.58 
p = 0.447 
χ² = 0.50 
p = 0.479 
χ²  = 0.73 
p = 0.394 
χ² = 0.28 
p = 0.600 
χ² = 1.33 
p = 0.250 
χ² = 1.52 
p = 0.218 
χ² = 1.12 
p =  0.290 
χ² = 0.85 
p =  0.355 
χ² = 0.27 
p =  0.604 
χ² = 0.04 
p =  0.848 
 
Notes:  Royston Parmar models estimated using 4 knots for the main model, and 3 knots for the time dependent model using default settings for knot locations. Breslow method 
for handling ties.        
  RCS – restricted cubic spline              HR – hazard ratio              S.E. – standard error 
ꭞ       0.05 < p < 0.1           *      0.01 < p < 0.05              **    0.001 < p < 0.01            ***  p < 0.001 
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Throughout models in Table 26, wealth was a strong and significant positive 
predictor of democratisation. Regimes were between 2.4 to 3.8 times as likely to 
transition to democracy with every 10-fold increase in GDP per capita in the year 
before. These findings are surprising, given that wealth has a stabilising effect on 
some autocratic regimes in Chapter 6. The findings of this chapter are in line with 
these presented by the Modernisation Theory scholars, who suggest that 
development and democratisation are strongly correlated (Epstein et al., 2006; 
Boix, 2011).  
Three other important predictors of democratisation are political instability, sum of 
past transitions, and Cold War. As expected based on the literature overview 
presented earlier in this chapter, sum of past transitions and a post-Cold War era 
were both positive and strong predictors of democratisation. With every additional 
past regime transition, autocratic regimes were over 20% more likely to 
democratise. Autocracies in the Cold War era were only 50% as likely to 
democratise in a given month as autocracies in the post-Cold War era (Model 8, 
Table 26)  
Given the strong and positive impact of instability on regime transition in Chapters 
5 and 6, it is not surprising that political instability has a similar effect of the hazard 
ratio of democratisation. In fact, the experience of political instability in the year 
before, with the time varying effects of it included, makes autocratic regimes more 
than 12 times more likely to transition into democracy in the final model without 
interactions (Model 8). The interaction between political instability and time remain 
significant through all Cox regression models (Models 5-9). In addition, the effects 
of oil dependency on the hazard of democratisation were also significant in Model 
4, but they become insignificant when the effects of political instability are 
accounted for in Model 5.  
Finally, this section will discuss all of the significant interactions between the main 
predictors in the model. First, although it was expected that interactions between 
the regime type variable and other indicators will be statistically significant, no 
interactions were significant on the neither full nor limited sample of autocratic 
regimes, and the null results are not reported. More importantly, the interaction 
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between regime type and the territorial dispute variable was also not significant. 
This means that null hypothesis of no moderation effect of regime type on the 
dispute-democratisation relationship cannot be currently rejected. 
Nevertheless, Table 26 includes a number of other significant interactions. While 
the main effects of oil were not statistically significant in Model 8, the interaction 
between oil dependency and Cold War period has a strong statistically significant 
effect. In the post-Cold War era, autocracies which depended on oil for their 
revenues were only about 6% as likely to transition do a democracy as autocracies 
that did not rely on oil in the same time period. It appears that the effects of oil 
dependency are strong and statistically significant in the post-Cold War era, but 
were not during the Cold War itself.  
Furthermore, the effects of instability on the hazard ratio of democratisation also 
have a more pronounced effect in the Cold War period. Instances of political 
instability during the post-Cold War period were only 20% as likely to lead to 
democratisation as those which occurred during the Cold War. This means that 
during the Cold War, bouts of domestic instability were more likely to result in 
democratisation compared to the post-Cold War period. This could be explained by 
the fact that instability was a major cause of transitions to democracy when they 
were still relatively infrequent in the Cold War period, but became less important as 
an explanation when a host of other factors came into play after 1989. These 
include external pressure, withdrawal of funding for autocratic regimes by Western 
powers, or the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War period, instability 
was simply less important for explaining democratic regime change.  
Finally, the interaction between oil dependency and the sum of past transitions was 
also statistically significant. The negative impact of oil dependency on the likelihood 
of democratisation increased with every additional instance of past regime change 
in the country. Comparing two regimes with no oil dependency, every increase in 
the sum of past transitions while all other variables are held constant yields a 
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hazard ratio equal to exp(0.186) = 1.204.48 Thus, the rate of failure is increased by 
20.4% with an increase of 1 in the sum of past regime changes in the country. This 
relationship is statistically significant (see Model 10, Table 26). Comparing 2 
subjects that do rely on oil for their income, every increase in the sum of past 
transitions while holding all other variables constant, yields a hazard ratio equal to 
exp(0.186 + 0.510) = exp(0.696) = 2.006. Hence, for regimes that relied on oil, every 
additional regime change in their history made them twice as likely to democratise. 
This is a surprising finding, given that presence, rather than absence of oil revenue, 
was expected to stabilise autocracy and prevent democratisation. Nevertheless, it 
appears that the more frequently regime changes occur in a country, the more 
likely oil dependency is to lead to democratic transitions. Lack of stability in oil-
wealthy countries seems more likely to result in democratisation than lack of 
stability in countries with no oil. It is possible that where oil revenues failed to 
strengthen the regime, they increase the chances of democratisation because they 
contribute to the overall level of wealth. As it is widely believed, and as shown 
previously in this section, wealth increases the chances of democratisation.  
The interaction term between wealth and instability was also statistically 
significant. Overall, Model 10 in Table 26 suggests that the effects of instability 
increase with the increase in wealth. Comparing two regimes which did not 
experience any instability the year before, an tenfold increase in GDP per capita 
while all other variables are held constant yields a hazard ratio equal to exp (0.031) 
= 1.031, and therefore the rate of democratisation is increased by only 3% with a 
tenfold increase in income. Thus, the rate of democratisation stays relatively 
unchanged for regimes with no instability, because a value of 1.030 is very close to 
1.000. Comparing two regimes which did experience instability the year before, a 
tenfold increase in income while holding all other variables constant, yields a 
hazard ratio equal to exp(0.186 + 1.735) = exp(1.921) = 6.826. This is an increase of 
almost 700%, meaning that autocracies which experienced instability become 
almost 7 times more likely to transition into democracy with a tenfold increase in 
                                                          
48
 The raw coefficients discussed in this section are obtained from the same models as these 
reported in tables 6 and 7, but due to space limitations they are not reported here. Tables 6 and 7 
report hazard ratios instead, which are exponetiated version of the coefficients reported here.  
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wealth. This result suggests that the alternative modernisation story outlined by 
Przeworski et al. (2000) could also be correct. Regime transitions occur as random 
events due to many internal and external occurrences, but wealthier contexts make 
it more likely that these exogenous or endogenous shocks will ultimately end in 
democratisation.  
 
 
Multivariate data analysis with an alternative measure of territorial dispute 
involvement  
 
 
Although the theory in Chapter 3 stated that the chances of democratisation should 
be lower in the year following involvement in a territorial dispute, the models in 
Table 26 produce inconsistent results, suggesting that the relationship between 
territorial disputes and democratisation varied depending on the choice of 
regression method and could be a statistical artefact caused by the time-varying 
effects of political instability. In order to ensure that the results in this chapter are 
robust, and that all possible alternative connections between territorial disputes 
and democratisation have been captured, the section below will consider an 
alternative predictor of territorial dispute involvement (see Table 27).  
Instead of a time-varying dichotomous variable reflecting regime’s involvement in a 
dispute the year before, Models 11 to 18 in Table 27 will include a measure of 
whether the regime has ever been involved in a territorial dispute during its tenure. 
It is worth noting that this is a measure of whether a particular regime, and not a 
country or an autocratic spell, has been involved in a dispute. For example, the 
single party regime in Equatorial Guinea (1969-1979) has been involved in a 
territorial dispute in 1973. Therefore, the dummy variable indicator is coded as 1 
for the entire duration of the regime. However, the following military regime in 
Equatorial Guinea (1979-1992) has never been involved in a dispute, and as a result 
the indicator variable is coded as 0.  
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The assumption is that while dispute involvement the year before has an 
immediate effect on the likelihood of regime transition in certain cases (see for 
example its effect on military or single party regimes in Chapter 6), it might not 
have an immediate effect on the hazard of democratisation. For example, unlike 
autocracy-to-autocracy transitions,49 the process of democratisation might require 
a much slower pace of change, and any changes to the likelihood of 
democratisation as a result of territorial conflict might not be immediately 
observable.  
Hence, the hypothesis of this chapter which stated that territorial dispute 
involvement will make democratic transitions less likely remains unchanged. 
However, the way in which territorial dispute is measured is altered to check 
whether  the results presented in Table 26 are robust and applicable across many 
different measures of territorial dispute involvement. 
Before proceeding, it is worth mentioning, that the new measure of dispute 
involvement history does not violate the proportional hazard assumption. While a 
small non-linearity can be observed in visual Schoenfeld residuals test (Figure A9), 
non-visual tests, and adjusted log-log plots show no signs of any serious problems 
(Figure A9 and Figure A10). Finally, no violations (visual or non-visual) are observed 
for tests performed on multivariate models in Figures A11 and A12, and Table A3 in 
Appendix D. The section below will analyse the findings presented in Table 27 
below.  
It is evident that in all models in Table 27 that, holding everything else constant, 
having ever been involved in a territorial dispute lowers the hazard of 
democratisation relative to regimes which never took part in a territorial conflict. 
These results are also statistically significant in both Cox and Royston Parmar 
models. In a full model that includes all interactions, having a history of territorial 
                                                          
49
 Autocracy to autocracy transitions might often happen as a result of violent takeovers or military 
coups, while this is not common in regards to democratisation. While it is possible for democracy to 
come about as a result of violent protests or revolutions, these are assumed to take much longer to 
mature than a military coup performed by a small clique within the elite or opposition.  
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disputes decreases the hazard of democratisation by 60% (HR = 0.405). These 
results are highly significant with p-values in all Cox models including the main 
effects only being lower than 0.001. What is more important, however, is the fact 
that unlike in the previous section, the interaction between territorial disputes and 
regime types is statistically significant (Model 13). In a full sample that includes all 
regime types, monarchic and single party regimes are more likely to be affected by 
territorial disputes than military regimes. Monarchic regimes that were involved in 
a territorial dispute were only about 2% as likely to democratise as military regimes 
involved in a territorial dispute.  
Similarly, single party regimes were only 19% as likely to democratise as military 
regimes under the same conditions. There were also near-significant differences 
between multiparty and monarchic regimes (p=0.068), with multiparty regimes less 
likely to have the hazard of democratisation negatively affected by disputes than 
monarchic regimes. These results, although providing support for Hypothesis 2 that 
different types of autocracy respond differently to external threats, do not confirm 
the assumptions made about which types of regimes will be most likely to be 
affected. First, military regimes were not more likely than other types of autocracy 
to be affected by territorial disputes. This suggests that even though immediate 
external threats in the form of past year are territorial dispute involvement made 
them less likely to fail in general (Chapter 6), it did not make them any less at risk of 
democratising. 
Nevertheless, it is worth bearing in mind that while the hazards were proportional 
for military and multiparty regimes, this was not the case for neither monarchic, 
nor single party regimes. Therefore, analysis on a limited sample of autocracies 
whose hazards are proportional to one another (military and multiparty regimes) 
can increase the validity of the results by demonstrating that the results of the 
analysis are not misleading due to assumption violations. Moreover, it is important 
to remember that there were only two instances of democratisation among 
monarchic regimes in the dataset. If monarchies, for example, were 
disproportionately affected by a history of territorial disputes, the relationship 
between territorial disputes and democratisation for monarchic regimes might 
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skew the results for all types of autocracies.  A similar phenomenon was already 
observed in the case of regime failure and military regimes, where the analysis of all 
regime types in Chapter 5 has shown a significant effect for all regimes, but upon 
more detailed analysis in Chapter 6, the relationship was significant only in military 
regimes. To test this possibility, a separate analysis has been conducted on a limited 
sample of military and multiparty regimes only using Cox regression (Model 14) and 
the Royston Parmar regression (Model 16).The limited sample includes 222 regimes 
and 65 instances of democratisation. In both models, history of territorial dispute 
involvement still has a negative and significant impact on the hazard of 
democratisation. There were no statistically significant differences in the way 
military and multiparty regimes responded to territorial disputes using the new 
measure. While the significance of the results has decreased, they are still 
statistically significant at the p<0.05 level even in a Royston Parmar model. 
Therefore, it is safe to reject the null hypothesis that territorial disputes have no 
impact on the likelihood of democratisation.  
The final Royston Parmar model (Model 17) includes the full sample, but only these 
predictors which were statistically significant, excluding history of democracy, 
which had no statistically significant effects on democratisation in any of the full 
models, and the interaction between political instability and Cold War variables.  
While this interaction is statistically significant in Cox models, an RP model taking 
into account the time-varying effects of instability has rendered this interaction 
non-significant. This final model will be used for the purposes of graphical 
representation of the results in the section below. 
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Table 27. Multivariate cox and Royston Parmar regression estimates with a dummy measure of 
past territorial dispute involvement 
Variables Model 11  Model 12  Model 13  Model 14  Model 15  Model 16        
(RP) 
Model 17           
(RP) 
   HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
  HR                   
(S.E.) 
Military (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) 
Monarchic 0.256 
(0.23) 
0.366 
(0.32) 
1.490 
(1.15) 
--- 0.413    
(0.37)    
--- 0.383    
(0.35)    
Multiparty 0.949 
(0.27) 
1.006 
(0.31) 
1.130 
(0.41) 
1.082 
(0.33) 
0.909    
(0.22)    
0.999 
(0.25) 
0.926    
(0.23)    
Single party 0.403* 
(0.17) 
0.446 
(0.21) 
0.732 
(0.44) 
--- 0.440*   
(0.16)    
--- 0.370**  
(0.13)    
History of  dispute 0.437*** 
(0.11) 
0.405*** 
(0.10) 
0.537 
(0.17) 
0.509** 
(0.13) 
0.595*   
(0.12)    
0.616* 
(0.14) 
0.591*   
(0.13)    
Log(GDP) 3.889*** 
(0.99) 
1.097 
(0.68) 
1.081 
(0.70) 
0.900 
(0.56) 
1.196    
(0.69)    
1.154 
(0.66) 
1.031    
(0.61)    
Oil dependency 0.578 
(0.29) 
0.012*** 
(0.01) 
0.013*** 
(0.01) 
0.037*** 
(0.04) 
0.019*** 
(0.02)    
0.044** 
(0.04) 
0.018*** 
(0.02)    
Political instability 11.309*** 
(5.31) 
0.030 
(0.07) 
0.037 
(0.09) 
0.008 
(0.02) 
0.189    
(0.45)    
0.058 
(0.15) 
0.101    
(0.24)    
Pol. Instability * time 1.014** 
(0.00) 
1.013** 
(0.00) 
1.015** 
(0.00) 
1.011* 
(0.01) 
--- --- --- 
History of democracy 1.297 
(0.34) 
1.368 
(0.41) 
1.316 
(0.38) 
1.148 
(0.34) 
1.130    
(0.28)    
0.997 
(0.24) 
--- 
Sum of past transitions  1.243*** 
(0.07) 
1.236*** 
(0.07) 
1.231*** 
(0.07) 
1.267*** 
(0.08) 
1.167**  
(0.06)    
1.212*** 
(0.07) 
1.166**  
(0.06)    
Cold War 0.535* 
(0.16) 
0.157** 
(0.09) 
0.153** 
(0.09) 
0.189** 
(0.10) 
0.142*** 
(0.08)    
0.180** 
(0.10) 
0.319*** 
(0.08)    
Instability * Cold War --- 4.362* 
(3.10) 
4.446* 
(3.22) 
5.216* 
(3.72) 
2.978    
(1.93)    
2.933 
(1.93) 
--- 
Instability * Log(GDP) ---- 5.163* 
(3.92) 
4.756* 
(3.74) 
7.401* 
(6.13) 
4.313    
(3.24)    
5.493* 
(4.43) 
6.075*   
(4.35)    
Oil * Cold War --- 15.825*** 
(12.51) 
16.681** 
(15.20) 
7.854** 
(6.15) 
11.639*   
(11.95)    
8.948 
(10.01) 
11.613*   
(12.51)    
Oil * Sum of past trans. --- 1.648*** 
(0.22) 
1.611*** 
(0.20) 
1.487** 
(0.20) 
1.474**  
(0.22)    
1.314 
(0.23) 
1.481**  
(0.22)    
Monarchic * dispute history --- 
--- 0.017*** 
(0.02) 
--- --- --- --- 
Multiparty * dispute history --- 
--- 0.769 
(0.41) 
--- --- --- --- 
Single party * dispute history --- 
--- 0.191* 
(0.13) 
--- --- --- --- 
RCS1 --- --- --- --- 3.332*** 
(0.97)    
4.071*** 
(1.53) 
3.425*** 
(1.01)    
RCS2 --- --- --- --- 1.583*   
(0.36)    
1.616 
(0.43) 
1.554    
(0.36)    
RCS3 --- --- --- --- 0.867    
(0.09)    
0.847 
(0.10) 
0.858    
(0.09)    
RCS4 --- --- --- --- 1.004    
(0.04)    
0.991 
(0.04) 
1.003    
(0.04)    
RCS1 (pol. Instability) --- --- --- --- 1.821    
(0.60)    
1.740 
(0.73) 
1.745    
(0.57)    
RCS2 (pol. Instability) --- --- --- --- 0.781    
(0.19)    
0.803 
(0.23) 
0.801    
(0.20)    
RCS3 (pol. Instability) --- --- --- --- 1.029    
(0.13)    
1.059 
(0.15) 
1.036    
(0.14)    
Constant --- --- --- --- 0.056    
(0.10)    
0.039 
(0.07) 
0.068    
(0.13)  
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Table 27, continued. 
 
Variables Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
(RP) 
Model 7 
(RP) 
Proportional hazards test χ² = 3.18 
df(11) 
p = 0.988 
χ² = 3.38 
df(15) 
p = 0.999 
χ² = 4.92 
df(18) 
p = 0.999 
χ² = 2.84 
df(13) 
p = 0.998 
--- --- --- 
Link test 
β = -0.020 
p = 0.517 
β = -0.012 
p = 0.656 
β = -0.014 
p = 0.596 
β = -0.025 
p = 0.528 
--- --- --- 
AIC 431.92 418.60 420.02 368.26 119.70 136.80 115.82 
Log likelihood / (pseudo log l.) -204.96 -194.30 -192.01 -171.13 (-36.85) (-47.40) (-36.91) 
 Monarchy = multiparty 
χ² = 2.06 
p = 0.152 
χ² = 1.22 
p = 0.270 
χ² = 0.12 
p = 0.729 
--- χ² = 0.72 
p = 0.401 
--- χ² = 0.65 
p = 0.419 
 Multiparty = single party 
χ² = 3.33 
p = 0.068 
χ² = 2.21 
p = 0.137 
χ² = 0.42 
p = 0.516 
--- χ² = 3.28 
p = 0.070 
--- χ² = 3.43 
p = 0.064 
 Monarchy = single party  
χ² = 0.32 
p = 0.573 
χ² = 0.06 
p = 0.811 
χ² = 0.60 
p = 0.438 
--- χ² = 0.00 
p = 0.947 
--- χ² = 0.00 
p = 0.966 
 
Wald test for equality of HR: 
    
   
 
Monarchy = multiparty 
  
χ² = 9.90 
p = 0.002  
   
Multiparty = single party 
  
χ² =3.28 
p = 0.070  
   
Monarchy = single party  
  
χ² = 4.25 
p = 0.039 
    
 
Notes: 
 
Royston Parmar models estimated using 4 knots for the main model, and 3 knots for the time dependent model 
using default settings for knot locations. Breslow method for handling ties.                        
HR – hazard ratio 
S.E. – standard error 
RP – Royston Parmar 
RCS – restricted cubic spline 
ꭞ       0.05 < p < 0.1           *      0.01 < p < 0.05              **    0.001 < p < 0.01            ***  p < 0.001 
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Goodness of fit 
 
Similarly to procedures employed in Chapter 5, the section below will discuss the 
goodness of fit of models estimated in Tables 26 and 27 where different measures 
of dispute involvement have been used. This will be done using Cox-Snell residuals 
(Cox and Snell, 1968). As discussed in Chapter 5, if the models fit the data well, the 
true cumulative hazard function will have an exponential distribution with a hazard 
rate of 1 (Cleves et al., 2010: 219). Figure 20 below demonstrates the test for four 
models: Models 8 and 9 using the standard measure of territorial dispute, and 
Models 11 and 12 using the new measure of territorial dispute. The reason for using 
Model 12 instead of Model 13 with regime type – dispute interactions was the 
intention of comparing two models that included exactly the same predictors, but a 
different measure of territorial dispute involvement. The use of Model 13 rather 
than Model 12 could bias the results in favour of the new measure of territorial 
disputes where model fit is considered.  
In Figure 20 below, the red line represents a standard exponential distribution with 
a hazard function equal to 1, and it is against the red like that the Nelson-Aalen 
distribution of the models will be tested against. First, it appears that models 
estimated using a dummy indicator variable for a history of dispute involvement 
(Table 27) provide a slightly better fit, with less variability in the right-hand side of 
the graphs. While the models seem to fit the data much better at smaller values of 
analysis time, this is not surprising, and is expected, given that censoring and prior 
failures reduce the effective sample considerably (Cleves et al., 2010: 222). 
Moreover, large variation in data for small samples is quite common for large 
values of time (Stata Corp, 2013). Hence, the conclusion of the Cox-Snell residual 
tests is that models in Table 27 fit the data better, but are still mainly useful for 
estimating the hazard of democratisation al smaller values of analysis time, or when 
autocratic regimes are relatively young. As regimes get older, factors such as 
income, dispute involvement, or sum of past transitions become less useful in 
explaining democratisation. This is, once again, not surprising given the wealth of 
potential contextual and path dependency causes of democratic transitions.  
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Figure 20. Cox-Snell residuals tests of Model 11 and Model 13, with and without interactions 
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Graphical analysis 
 
Finally, this section will analyse the graphical representation of the effects of two 
most important predictors in the model – dispute involvement history and regime 
type.  All of the baseline survival functions have been estimated at zero values of all 
predictors.  The log(GDP per capita) variable has been centred for the purposes of 
estimating these functions, meaning that the baseline function is estimated at 
mean value of wealth for all autocratic regimes. Overall, the survival and hazard 
functions in Figure 21 are estimated using the limited Royston Parmar Model 17 
which only includes statistically significant predictors, unless specified otherwise. 
The survival and hazard functions are estimated for regimes which were never 
involved in a dispute, have an average income per capita, have no oil dependency, 
no recent instances of instability, have no past instances of regime change, and 
exist in a post-Cold War era.  As evident from Figure 21, the baseline probability of 
survival falls sharply in the first 5 years of regimes’ existence, after which the rate of 
decreasing probability of survival slows down but continues to fall steadily, with 
only over half of all autocracies democratising by the time they reach 58 years of 
age. The vulnerability to democratisation in the early years is also visible in the 
baseline hazard function, with the hazard rate rising sharply within the first 3 years, 
and falling sharply afterwards, and decrease slowly thereafter. Just like the survival 
and hazard functions estimated in Chapter 6 for regime failures, autocracies are 
most at risk of democratising in their very early years. 
Figure 22 demonstrates the difference in survival and hazard rates for regimes 
which were involved in territorial disputes at some point (dispute history = 1), and 
those that were not (dispute history = 0). While it appears that a history of dispute 
involvement increases the hazard of democratisation and decreases the probability 
of autocratic survival, these confidence intervals for the differences between the 
functions suggest much variation in the effects of territorial dispute involvement.  
The differences between survival functions appear to be statistically significant only 
after regimes reach about 25 years of age, while the differences in hazard functions 
not appear significantly different from one another at any age of the regimes. 
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Therefore, while most regimes are at the highest risk of transitioning to democracy 
in the early stages, territorial disputes only affect the rate of survival for regimes 
which have already survived a certain amount of time – here, about 25 years.  
Although the Royston-Parmar Model 17 did not include the interactions between 
regime type and history of territorial dispute involvement due to computational 
issues of estimating a regression model on a very small sample of failures, a visual 
representation of what such a relationship would look like is presented in Figure 23. 
The calculations are based on the Cox regression model using the same variables as 
those included in Model 17 for comparability, and the results are comparable to 
those in Model 13.  
Form Figure 23, it is clear that the difference is survival rates for different values of 
the territorial dispute measure are most pronounced for monarchies. If they were 
affected by a territorial dispute in the past, monarchies were at almost no risk of 
democratising. The differences were less pronounced form military and multiparty 
regimes, which confirms the findings from Model 13. Nevertheless, it is worth 
remembering that even in a model estimated on a limited sample of military and 
multiparty regimes, the effects of territorial disputes were still statistically 
significant (Model 14). Once again, it is visible in Figure 5 that the older the regime 
is, the more likely the likelihood of democratisation is to be affected by territorial 
disputes. To conclude, it appears that hypothesis two also finds empirical support in 
this analysis, given that democratisation process in monarchic and single regimes is 
significantly more likely to be affected by territorial dispute history than the 
democratisation process in military and multiparty regimes. 
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Figure 21. The survival and hazard functions for a limited Royston Parmar regression estimates 
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Figure 22. Difference in survival functions, by past dispute involvement 
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Figure 23. Differences in survival rates for different values of the territorial dispute measure, obtained from a Cox model 
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Discussion and conclusion 
 
The data analysis of this chapter aimed at testing two hypotheses: that regimes 
affected by territorial disputes have lower chances of democratisation, and that 
there are important and significant differences in the way different autocracies are 
affected by territorial disputes when it comes to their chances of democratisation.  
It was assumed in Chapter 3 that multiparty and military regimes will be more 
affected by territorial disputes relative to monarchic and single party regimes, and 
the finding that he hazard of regime failure in military regimes is significantly 
affected by territorial disputes in Chapter 6 further suggested that military regimes 
in particular will be less likely to democratise when under salient external threat. 
Overall, the analyses above have demonstrated that all types of autocratic regimes 
are significantly less likely to democratise when involved in a territorial dispute the 
year before. Moreover, the findings were more robust, and of higher statistical 
significance, when an alternative measure of territorial dispute involvement was 
used. In both types of analysis, autocracies were on average only about half as likely 
to experience democratisation as autocracies which were peaceful, everything else 
being constant. Various robustness checks were performed to ensure the findings 
apply to all types of autocracies, and are not just a result of a particularly strong 
association for one sub-type of autocratic regime. A limited sample analysis of 
military and multiparty regimes, where the number of instances of democratisation 
was much higher than for single party and monarchic regimes, has confirmed that 
the relationship was still statistically significant, although to a lesser extent. Hence, 
the results of this chapter provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
territorial dispute involvement lowers the chances of democratisation in all types of 
authoritarian regimes. This relationship was observed even though the analysis was 
only performed on autocratic regimes, and the process of democratisation was 
conceptualised in a very strict manner, counting only fully successful and complete 
transitions into representative democracy. Hence, the methodological 
improvements of this chapter did not result in null results. On the contrary, the 
results confirm all of the major assumptions of ReSIT even though a more 
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methodologically strict approach was taken in the analysis above. This suggests not 
only that the Reversed Second Image Theory ought to be reconsidered by the IR 
research community, but also that its propositions should be seriously considered 
by the Comparative Politics literature concerned with the study of democratisation.  
A second important finding of this chapter was that the magnitude of the 
relationship between territorial dispute involvement and the hazard of 
democratisation was dependent on the type of autocratic regime type, providing 
support for the second hypothesis. However, two important aspects of this 
relationship need to be considered. First, the moderating effect of regime type was 
only present when an indicator variable of territorial dispute was used in later 
analysis. The same interaction was not observed when the original measure of 
territorial dispute involvement was used. Hence, the results are not very robust, 
and should be treated with caution. Second, contrary to expectations, the regimes 
which were most affected by territorial disputes were single party and monarchic 
regimes, rather than military and multiparty regimes. This is particularly surprising, 
given that military regimes were least likely to fail as a result of territorial disputes 
in Chapter 6. While this finding is interesting, it is important to consider that it only 
applied to an indicator measure of past conflict involvement, rather than the time-
varying measure of dispute involvement. Hence, it is likely that the type of measure 
had an influence of the result in this respect. For example, given that monarchic 
and single party regimes last longer on average than military or multiparty regimes 
(see Chapter 6), they might have simply had more time and opportunities to 
become involved in a dispute at some point in their lifetime. This would explain why 
the moderation effects are only observed for one type of dispute involvement 
measure, but not the other. Hence, more research into the interaction between 
regime type and dispute involvement when explaining democratisation is need in 
future. A potential solution to the small sample size of monarchic and single party 
regimes would be a creation of a dataset that extends the observation period 
further back than 1951. However, such an extension does not guarantee a greater 
number of monarchic failures that end in democratic transitions specifically 
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because monarchies are unique in their ability to resist change and decentralisation 
of power, as mentioned in Chapter 3.  
Finally, it is worth noting the effect of the control variables included in the models 
on the likelihood of democratisation. As expected, and in line with much of the 
quantitative literature testing the propositions of modernisation theory, in increase 
in GDP had a positive and statistically significant impact of the likelihood of 
democratisation. This is an important finding, given there some controversy still 
remains about whether wealth and democracy are barely correlated, or whether an 
increase in wealth actually contributes to an increase in the likelihood of transition. 
Overall, this chapter has demonstrated that controlling for other factors, an 
increase in wealth makes all types of autocratic regimes more likely to democratise.  
What is more, when coupled with instances of recent political instability within the 
regime, the relationship was even more pronounced, indicating that when they are 
relatively affluent, regimes experiencing domestic problems are even more likely to 
experience democratic regime change. This suggests empirical support for both 
Przeworski’s (Przeworski et al., 2000) and classic version of modernisation theory 
(Lipset, 1959). Oil dependency had a negative and significant impact on the hazard 
of democratisation,  and a higher degree of internal regime instability measured by 
the sum of past regime transitions had a positive and significant effect on the 
hazard of democratic transitions.  
The findings of this chapter are important, because they provide empirical support 
for the claim that territorial disputes do in fact hinder democratisation, even when 
all of the other important predictors of democratisation are included. This means 
that significant efforts to help countries in conflict ridden areas such as the Middle 
East should focus on territorial dispute resolution. It also means more efforts need 
to be made to solve territorial disputes even in the absence of militarised conflict. 
Stabilising border relations in South East Asia might help some regimes transition 
into a more democratic form. It is also possible that new democracies might also 
benefit from increased territorial stability, although more research needs to be 
conducted to find if the assumptions of this thesis also hold for young democracies.  
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 Having discussed the findings of this chapter, the thesis will now move toward a 
more general conclusion which will address the findings from all three analytical 
chapters. The conclusion will relate them to the theoretical assumptions put 
forward in Chapter 3 and discuss them in relation to the wider literature on ReSIT 
and Comparative Politics. The conclusion will outline the main contributions and 
limitations of this thesis will be discussed in detail, and make recommendations for 
further theoretical and empirical research in the field. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
 
Summary of the thesis 
 
The main purpose of this thesis was to test the assumptions of Reversed Second 
Image Theory (ReSIT) in the context of major theoretical and methodological 
advances in the field of Comparative Politics. More specifically, the dissertation 
investigated whether involvement in territorial disputes makes autocratic regimes 
more stable and less likely to democratise. The distinction between autocratic 
stability and democratisation was important, because many influential Comparative 
Politics studies demonstrated that these two phenomena are not synonymous. For 
example, many non-democratic spells may last a long time and project an image of 
internal stability, but in reality they often contain a number of distinct and short-
lived autocratic regimes within them. If territorial disputes result in power 
centralisation, then it is important to show that they not only hinder democratic 
transitions, but also other types of transitions as well. This is a crucial contribution 
to the field, because the current ReSIT literature, in line with much of other IR 
research, is still focused on states rather than regimes as their main unit of analysis. 
This thesis demonstrated that a shift of attention from states to regimes can yield 
important results, and increase our understanding of what happens in autocracies 
in regions where hard borders between neighbours remain a heavily contested 
issue. The thesis also demonstrated, for the first time, how different types of 
autocratic regimes might react to territorial disputes. This is important because the 
IR literature still considers all non-democratic regimes to operate in a similar 
manner. As shown in this thesis, this is a very problematic approach because 
different autocracies are affected by territorial disputes, oil dependency, wealth, 
and a host of other variables in strikingly different ways.  
One of the most important findings of this thesis was not only that regime stability 
and democratisation are separate phenomena, but that even when such a 
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distinction was made, the main assumptions of ReSIT were still supported: external 
threats in the form of territorial disputes make autocracies both more stable and 
less likely to democratise. Nevertheless, the distinction was still an important one 
to make. As Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrated, territorial disputes affect autocratic 
stability only in some of the autocratic regime types while the process of 
democratisation is affected in all types of autocracies. This is an important and 
original finding. First, because it demonstrates that causal mechanism is different 
for each of these processes, as suggested in Chapter 3. Second, it because it 
highlights the importance of controlling for autocratic regime type in statistical 
models estimating regime stability and democratisation.  
 
Findings of the thesis 
 
As shown in Chapter 5, if regime type was not accounted for, territorial disputes 
had a significant stabilising effect on all types of autocracies that depended on oil 
extraction for their income. However, when regime type was included as a control 
variable in Chapter 6, it became clear that treating all autocracies in the same 
manner, as it is often done in IR literature, can produce unreliable results and 
should be avoided where possible. In Chapter 6, it became clear that all military 
regimes experienced the stabilising effects of territorial dispute involvement in the 
previous year, regardless of oil dependency, while only those single party regimes 
that were not dependent on oil for their income did. Multiparty regimes remained 
unaffected, while the small sample size of monarchic regime transitions proved too 
unreliable to confidently judge the effects of territorial disputes. This is an 
important finding. It suggests that military regimes are particularly prone to 
centralise and stabilize as a result of territorial threats. This is likely due to the type 
of legitimizing rhetoric they often employ. One of the most often cited reason for 
military regime instability is the fact that they are often presented as ‘temporary’ or 
‘transitional’ regimes that are geared at restoring order in an unstable 
environment. It is therefore likely that the presence of territorial disputes can be 
framed by military leaders as a destabilising and threatening context that demands 
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further penetration of the political and public sphere by the military. Further 
qualitative studies could focus specifically on uncovering the relationship between 
territorial disputes and the strength of military dictatorships. This is an important 
step for ReSIT: a shift in focus from International Relations to an explicitly 
comparative framework would help establish it as a free-standing and independent 
theory of regime change.  
Unexpectedly, single party regimes did experience stabilising effects of territorial 
disputes, despite all expectations. This finding is especially interesting given that 
only single party regimes that were not rentier states were significantly affected by 
territorial disputes. As mentioned in the conclusion of Chapter 6, this is most likely 
because oil rents provide an easy way to fund a large military that can counteract 
the territorial threat posed by a neighbouring state. It could also mean that richer 
regimes that can fund larger and stronger militaries might be the ones to also 
initiate the dispute. Unfortunately, given that the data in this thesis could not 
investigate the initiator or target of the territorial dispute, there was no way to test 
this possibility. Future research on the military behaviour of oil dependent 
countries – especially single party regimes – could provide some useful insights into 
this proposition.  
Additionally, the fact that multiparty regimes were not affected by disputes was 
also unexpected. The strong standing of the political opposition in multiparty 
regimes was assumed to leave scope for power centralisation as a result of 
territorial disputes. Nevertheless, it is possible that the increased role of institutions 
in multiparty regimes makes it harder for regime elites to perform quick power 
grabs, even if outside threats present an opportunity to do so. It is possible that 
while inherently unstable and short-lived, with a high chance of both democratising 
and transitioning back into a different form of authoritarianism, multiparty regimes 
might be more resilient to power centralisation thanks to their unique institutional 
design. However, as shown in Chapter 7, multiparty regimes were at a smaller 
hazard of democratisation when they had a history of territorial disputes. Hence, it 
is possible that while they do not become more stable as a result of dispute 
involvement, when they do transition, that transition might be into an autocratic, 
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rather than democratic regime. This is an interesting possibility, and of particular 
importance given the growing popularity of competitive authoritarianism since the 
end of the Cold War. Future large-N quantitative studies could explore this 
proposition further, and investigate whether unstable border relations with 
neighbours might be the factor that decides about the future success of 
democratisation in multiparty regimes.  
Finally, the fact that all autocratic regimes were significantly less likely to 
democratise as a result of territorial disputes is very promising for the future of 
ReSIT research. Surprisingly, all types of autocracy were affected, and the hindering 
effects of dispute history were particularly pronounced in monarchic and single 
party regimes. Nevertheless, the small sample of democratic transitions in 
monarchic and single party regimes calls for a great deal of caution when 
interpreting the moderating effects of regime type.  
In addition to the main results discussed above, a further interesting finding relating 
to the relationship between wealth and regime change should be highlighted. While 
increases in per capita income made some regimes more stable, this effect varied 
depending on other variables included in the model - such as political instability or 
ethnic fractionalisation - or was non-linear. This further highlighted the importance 
of looking at each type of autocratic regime separately, as their specific structural 
characteristics are likely to have a very unique way of interacting with an increase in 
wealth. Curiously, despite wealth being more likely to stabilise certain regimes, it 
was also more likely to lead to democratisation in regimes experiencing political 
changes. This is an interesting and important finding given the current discussion on 
modernisation theory within the Comparative Politics literature. In Chapter 7, 
higher levels of wealth significantly increased the hazard of democratisation for 
regimes that were experiencing institutional changes, but not in stable regimes. 
This supports Przeworski et al.’s (2000) version of modernisation theory: while 
wealth can help regimes democratise, it will only do so while the country is already 
undergoing a process of changes that in itself is not necessarily caused by wealth. 
This is an interesting finding that warrants further inquiry into the relationship 
between democratisation, political instability, and per capita income.  
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Limitations of the thesis 
 
Having discussed the main findings of the thesis, it is important to outline its main 
limitations. This section will first outline methodological limitations, and then 
suggest some ways in which the theoretical framework of the thesis could be 
improved upon in the future.  
The first important limitation of the thesis was related to the proportional hazards 
assumption of the models used to test the hypotheses. While survival analysis is in 
many ways superior to other regression techniques due to its ability to reduce bias 
caused by censored cases, the method is very sensitive to model specifications. 
When estimating the hazard of failure (in this thesis, regime transition or 
democratisation), the hazard for each value of the independent variable had to be 
proportional over time. While this thesis took great care to ensure that appropriate 
measures were taken to reduce these biases, certain concerns still remain. For 
example, in each chapter, a number of diagnostic tests have been perform to 
ensure that problematic variables were appropriately dealt with either by including 
their interaction with time (Cox models) or by specifying a separate effect by using 
Royston-Parmar analysis. However, certain variables could not be treated this way. 
For example, hazard ratios for different types of autocracies were very different, 
and hence disproportional. While the disaggregation of analysis into sub-samples of 
autocratic regimes in Chapter 6 solved this problem for the issue of regime stability, 
a similar measure could not be taken when investigating the hazard of 
democratisation. This is mainly because in Chapter 7, the sample of democratic 
transitions was very small, with only 77 cases in total. This meant that for certain 
regime types such as monarchies or single party autocracies, this amounted to only 
3 and 12 instances of democratisation respectively. Given that the differences 
between these regimes were theorised precisely because of their disparate 
structural features, disproportional hazards are not surprising. However, the small 
number of events meant that the sample in Chapter 7 could not be disaggregated in 
a similar manner to that in Chapter 6. While a separate analysis performed on 
military and multiparty regimes (whose hazards were proportional), has still 
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confirmed the assumption that territorial disputes make democratisation less likely 
in certain autocratic regimes, the findings are much less reliable and robust for 
monarchic and single party regimes. One solution to this problem would be to 
perform qualitative research that would help expand the temporal domain of 
existing datasets to before 1951 and increase the number of democratisation 
events. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that democratic regime change was very 
rare before 1950s, and especially so among the more stable regimes such as 
monarchies and single-party regimes. It would also be very difficult to properly 
estimate the nature of regime structures in countries before 1950s, which is 
partially the reason for so many regime typologies dating to 1946 at the very 
earliest, as mentioned in Chapter 4. As mentioned above, a qualitative investigation 
into the relationship between territorial dispute involvement and democratisation 
in single party and monarchic regimes could be performed to overcome the issue of 
small sample size encountered in this thesis.  
The second important limitation of this thesis was the fact that the regime typology 
used in this thesis does not include personalist regime category. This is a 
considerable limitation that should be addressed by further studies that could use 
an alternative typology to test the impact of external threats on autocratic regime 
change. As explained in Chapter 4, the rise of multiparty regimes around the world 
meant that a dataset which controlled for competitive and non-competitive party 
regimes was of crucial importance. Unfortunately, while Magaloni et al. (2013) 
account for this crucial distinction, they do not include a category for personalist 
regimes. However, such inclusion could add an important contribution to our 
understanding of power centralisation. For example, future research could explore 
whether non-personalist regimes are more likely to transition into a personalist 
regime as a result of territorial dispute involvement. The theory outlined in Chapter 
3 suggests that this is likely to be the case. Unfortunately, the time and space 
constraints of this thesis as well as emphasis on multiparty regimes meant that this 
possibility could not be explored here. A further criticism of the typology used in 
this thesis could be that it did not distinguish between dynastic and non-dynastic 
monarchic regimes. Nevertheless, this distinction is more useful for qualitative 
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rather than quantitative studies, because a further disaggregation of monarchic 
regimes would make the analysis of democratisation in these regimes even more 
challenging. 
The third important limitation of the thesis was that it could not explore all aspects 
of territorial dispute involvement. For example, it remains unknown whether 
territorial disputes are equally threatening to both regimes that were affected by 
them. This is an important limitation because it is likely that targets of territorial 
disputes might be more likely to feel threatened than their initiators. Nevertheless, 
monadic datasets – especially useful for regime change studies – make the 
distinction between target and initiator very difficult: if a regime is involved in more 
than one territorial dispute in a single year, monadic regimes make it very hard to 
record information on who was the target or initiator of these disputes. 
Furthermore, territorial disputes are very dynamic and rarely one-sided. It is likely 
that disputes are initiated by one party, only to be settled and then re-initiated by 
the previous target of the dispute. Hence, it is often impossible to confidently state 
which side was more to blame for the dispute. One way to potentially account for 
the magnitude of such threat in the future would be to control for relative military 
capabilities of each side in the dispute, but as mentioned above, monadic datasets 
make collection of such data very difficult.  
 
Implications of the thesis 
 
While the thesis has limitations that warrant further replication studies, using 
alternative methods and sources, some preliminary implications of the findings can 
still be discussed. In summary, the thesis demonstrated that border security is an 
extremely important factor when explaining the successes and failures of autocratic 
regimes. It is worth remembering that foreign policy efforts that aim to secure 
international peace in conflict-ridden areas are still largely focused on democracy 
promotion, whether by peaceful or non-peaceful means. These efforts usually 
include foreign aid, market liberalisation to increase economic growth, and even 
forceful regime change. Yet, this was done with relatively little success (Downes 
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and Monten, 2013). The focus on internal, rather than external, drivers of regime 
change could explain why some regimes do not transition despite international 
efforts to secure free and fair elections in places like Afghanistan or Egypt. The 
results of this thesis suggest that in order to help countries liberalise, more efforts 
should be made to help them stabilise and normalise their border relations with 
neighbours rather than interfering with their domestic affairs. As suggested by 
Gibler (2007), this might also apply to regions that are at a fist glance regions low in 
international conflict, but where borders remain a contested issue. However, as 
mentioned before, such an approach should be taken with caution. After all, stable 
security environments also have the propensity to destabilise autocratic regimes, 
but do not necessarily lead to democratisation. It is possible that such approach 
could be detrimental to regions with a history of violent regime change. After all, a 
more stable security environment could strengthen the opposition, and lead to a 
violent turnover of power that would not benefit the regime’s population.  
Finally, the findings of this thesis could have implications on the current research on 
democratic breakdown in Central and Eastern Europe. While there is no evidence 
that young democracies are more likely to break down as a result of territorial 
threats, it is undeniable that the rhetoric promoting illiberal democracy in Hungary 
and Poland has coincided with the emergence of serious territorial threats from the 
Russian Federation after its invasion of Crimea. However, the inability to quantify 
such threats provides yet another limitation of quantitative ReSIT studies. 
Territorial threats can exert real influence on domestic policies of states even in the 
absence of explicit claims to another country’s territory.   
 
Future research agenda 
 
This thesis has investigated the claim that involvement in territorial disputes makes 
autocratic regimes more stable and less likely to democratise. One of its main 
contributions was the explicit theoretical and methodological distinction between 
autocratic stability and democratisation – two phenomena typically seen as 
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synonymous in the IR literature. This is an important crucial contribution to the 
field, which will hopefully result in more research being devoted to the study of 
regime survival in the context of international organisation of states. A further 
contribution of the thesis was its explicit focus on autocratic regimes, which 
allowed it to distinguishing between various forms of autocratic structures, and 
developing a more specific theoretical framework that explains their responses to 
international events.  
Nevertheless, while the explicit focus on autocratic regimes was necessary to 
understand the process of autocratic regime change and democratisation, the 
effects of territorial disputes on regime survival in democracies remain unclear. As a 
result, future studies should aim to uncover whether territorial dispute involvement 
has a significant impact on the likelihood of democracy-to autocracy transitions, or 
the quality of democratic governance in affected regimes. This is especially 
important when investigating the likelihood of autocratic reversals in 
unconsolidated democracies which might be more vulnerable to institutional 
changes. As this thesis has demonstrated, the presence of multiparty competition 
in autocratic regimes might render them less prone to be affected by territorial 
disputes, and a similar relationship may be observed in young democracies. Hence, 
it is important to establish whether ReSIT applies to all types of polities, or only 
those which are autocratic.   
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Appendix A: Supplementary materials for Chapter 4 
 
Table 1A. List of all regimes contained in the sample 
Country Regime type Regime beginning Regime end 
Afghanistan Monarchic January  1951 June  1973 
 Military July  1973 December  1979 
 Multiparty January  1980 March  1992 
 Military April  1992 May  2002 
 Multiparty June  2002 December  2008 
Albania Single party January  1951 April  1991 
 Multiparty May  1991 March  1992 
Algeria Single party July  1962 May  1965 
 Military June  1965 April  1999 
 Multiparty May  1999 December  2008 
Angola Single party February  1976 August  1992 
 Multiparty September  1992 December  2008 
Argentina Military January  1951 April  1958 
 Multiparty May  1958 February  1962 
 Military March  1962 September  1963 
 Multiparty October  1963 June  1966 
 Military July  1966 September  1973 
 Military March  1976 November  1983 
Armenia Multiparty December  1991 December  2008 
Azerbaijan Multiparty January  1992 December  2008 
Bahrain Monarchic August  1971 December  2008 
Bangladesh Multiparty January  1972 October  1975 
 Military November  1975 May  1981 
 Multiparty June  1981 March  1982 
 Military April  1982 August  1991 
Belarus Multiparty January  1992 December  2008 
Benin Single party August  1960 September  1963 
 Military October  1963 December  1963 
 Single party January  1964 November  1965 
 Military December  1965 April  1970 
 Multiparty May  1970 October  1972 
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 Military November  1972 November  1975 
 Single party December  1975 March  1991 
Bolivia Multiparty January  1951 October  1964 
 Military November  1964 September  1982 
Bosnia Multiparty March  1992 December  2008 
Botswana Multiparty October  1966 December  2008 
Brazil Military March  1964 February  1985 
Bulgaria Single party January  1951 November  1990 
Burkina Faso Single party August  1960 December  1965 
 Military January  1966 November  1990 
 Multiparty December  1990 December  2008 
Burundi Monarchic July  1962 November  1966 
 Military December  1966 May  1993 
 Military August  1996 May  2003 
 Multiparty June  2003 December  2008 
Cambodia Monarchic November  1953 February  1955 
 Multiparty March  1955 March  1975 
 Single party April  1975 May  1993 
 Multiparty June  1993 December  2008 
Cameroon Multiparty January  1960 August  1966 
 Single party September  1966 March  1992 
 Multiparty April  1992 December  2008 
Cape Verde Single party July  1975 March  1991 
Central African Republic Multiparty August  1960 November  1962 
 Single party December  1962 December  1965 
 Military January  1966 August  1979 
 Multiparty September  1979 August  1981 
 Military September  1981 October  1993 
 Military March  2003 May  2005 
 Multiparty June  2005 December  2008 
Chad Multiparty August  1960 March  1962 
 Single party April  1962 March  1975 
 Military April  1975 May  1984 
 Single party June  1984 November  1990 
 Military December  1990 March  1997 
 Multiparty April  1997 December  2008 
Chile Military September  1973 February  1990 
China Single party January  1951 December  2008 
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Colombia Multiparty January  1951 October  1951 
 Single party November  1951 May  1953 
 Military June  1953 July  1958 
Comoros Military June  1975 February  1990 
 Multiparty March  1990 April  1999 
 Military May  1999 May  2002 
 Multiparty June  2002 February  2004 
Congo Brazzaville Multiparty August  1960 November  1963 
 Single party December  1963 July  1968 
 Military August  1968 August  1992 
 Multiparty September  1992 December  2008 
Congo Kinshasa Multiparty July  1960 November  1965 
 Military December  1965 February  2001 
 Multiparty March  2001 December  2008 
Cuba Military March  1952 October  1954 
 Multiparty November  1954 December  1958 
 Single party January  1959 December  2008 
Cyprus Multiparty August  1960 January  1983 
Czechoslovakia Single party January  1951 May  1990 
Djibouti Multiparty July  1977 December  1981 
 Single party January  1982 November  1992 
 Multiparty December  1992 December  2008 
Dominican Republic Military January  1951 May  1961 
 Single party June  1961 November  1962 
 Multiparty December  1962 August  1963 
 Military September  1963 July  1966 
 Multiparty August  1966 July  1978 
Ecuador Multiparty November  1961 June  1963 
 Military July  1963 October  1966 
 Multiparty November  1966 January  1972 
 Military February  1972 July  1979 
 Military January  2000 November  2002 
Egypt Monarchic January  1951 July  1952 
 Military August  1952 December  2008 
El Salvador Military January  1951 May  1984 
Equatorial Guinea Single party January  1969 July  1979 
 Military August  1979 April  1992 
 Multiparty May  1992 December  2008 
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Ethiopia Monarchic January  1951 February  1975 
 Military March  1975 May  1991 
 Multiparty June  1991 December  2008 
Gabon Multiparty August  1960 March  1964 
 Single party April  1964 September  1990 
 Multiparty October  1990 December  2008 
Gambia Multiparty February  1965 July  1994 
 Military August  1994 March  1997 
 Multiparty April  1997 December  2008 
Georgia Multiparty January  1992 January  2004 
Germany East Single party January  1951 December  1989 
Ghana Single party March  1957 January  1966 
 Military February  1966 July  1969 
 Military January  1972 September  1979 
 Military January  1982 November  1991 
 Multiparty December  1991 December  2000 
Greece Monarchic January  1951 March  1967 
 Military April  1967 May  1975 
Guatemala Military July  1954 June  1966 
 Multiparty July  1966 February  1970 
 Military March  1970 December  1985 
Guinea Single party October  1958 March  1984 
 Military April  1984 September  1995 
 Multiparty October  1995 December  2008 
Guinea-Bissau Single party September  1974 October  1980 
 Military November  1980 July  1994 
 Multiparty August  1994 June  1999 
Haiti Military December  1951 December  1962 
 Single party January  1963 January  1985 
 Multiparty February  1985 January  1986 
 Military February  1986 November  1990 
 Multiparty December  1990 September  1991 
 Military October  1991 October  1994 
 Multiparty November  1994 December  2008 
Honduras Single party January  1951 September  1956 
 Military October  1956 November  1957 
 Multiparty December  1957 September  1963 
 Military October  1963 January  1982 
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Hungary Single party January  1951 April  1990 
Indonesia Multiparty January  1951 February  1966 
 Military March  1966 September  1999 
Iran Monarchic January  1951 January  1979 
 Single party February  1979 December  2008 
Iraq Monarchic January  1951 June  1958 
 Military July  1958 June  1979 
 Single party July  1979 February  1980 
 Multiparty March  1980 September  1984 
 Single party October  1984 April  2005 
 Multiparty May  2005 December  2008 
Ivory Coast Single party August  1960 May  1990 
 Multiparty June  1990 December  1999 
 Military January  2000 November  2000 
 Multiparty December  2000 December  2008 
Jordan Monarchic January  1951 December  2008 
Kazakhstan Multiparty January  1992 December  2008 
Kenya Single party December  1964 March  1966 
 Multiparty April  1966 October  1969 
 Single party November  1969 November  1992 
 Multiparty December  1992 January  2003 
Korea North Single party January  1951 December  2008 
Korea South Multiparty January  1951 July  1960 
 Military May  1961 February  1988 
Kuwait Monarchic February  1963 December  2008 
Kyrgyzstan Multiparty January  1992 December  2008 
Laos Military April  1960 May  1962 
 Multiparty June  1962 November  1975 
 Single party December  1975 December  2008 
Lebanon Multiparty June  1975 December  2008 
Lesotho Multiparty October  1966 November  1984 
 Single party December  1984 December  1985 
 Military January  1986 March  1993 
 Multiparty April  1993 December  2008 
Liberia Single party January  1951 March  1980 
 Military April  1980 November  1990 
 Multiparty December  1990 December  2005 
Libya Monarchic December  1951 August  1969 
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 Military September  1969 December  2008 
Madagascar Multiparty July  1960 April  1972 
 Military May  1972 June  1977 
 Single party July  1977 August  1991 
 Multiparty September  1991 July  1993 
Malawi Multiparty July  1964 June  1966 
 Single party July  1966 April  1994 
Malaysia Multiparty August  1957 December  2008 
Mali Single party October  1960 October  1968 
 Military November  1968 March  1991 
 Single party April  1991 January  1992 
Mauritania Single party December  1960 June  1978 
 Military July  1978 April  2007 
 Multiparty May  2007 July  2008 
 Military August  2008 December  2008 
Mexico Multiparty January  1951 June  1997 
Mongolia Single party January  1951 April  1990 
 Multiparty May  1990 June  1992 
Morocco Monarchic March  1956 December  2008 
Mozambique Single party July  1975 October  1994 
 Multiparty November  1994 December  2008 
Myanmar (Burma) Military October  1958 January  1960 
 Military March  1962 December  2008 
Namibia Multiparty March  1990 December  2008 
Nepal Monarchic January  1951 May  1991 
 Monarchic June  2002 April  2006 
Nicaragua Multiparty January  1951 June  1979 
 Single party July  1979 December  1984 
 Multiparty January  1985 April  1990 
Niger Single party August  1960 March  1974 
 Military April  1974 May  1993 
 Military February  1996 December  1999 
Nigeria Military January  1966 September  1979 
 Military January  1984 May  1999 
 Multiparty June  1999 December  2008 
Oman Monarchic January  1971 December  2008 
Pakistan Military December  1958 May  1962 
 Multiparty June  1962 March  1969 
340 
 
 Military April  1969 July  1973 
 Military July  1977 November  1988 
 Military October  1999 April  2008 
Panama Multiparty January  1951 December  1954 
 Military October  1968 November  1989 
Paraguay Single party January  1951 July  1954 
 Military August  1954 April  1993 
 Multiparty May  1993 March  1996 
Peru Military January  1951 June  1956 
 Military July  1962 June  1963 
 Military October  1968 April  1980 
 Multiparty April  1992 May  2001 
Philippines Multiparty December  1965 January  1987 
Poland Single party January  1951 May  1989 
Portugal Single party January  1951 April  1974 
 Military May  1974 June  1976 
Qatar Monarchic September  1971 December  2008 
Romania Single party January  1951 May  1990 
    
Rwanda Multiparty July  1962 February  1965 
 Single party March  1965 June  1973 
 Military July  1973 December  2008 
Saudi Arabia Monarchic January  1951 December  2008 
Senegal Single party August  1960 February  1978 
 Multiparty March  1978 March  2000 
Serbia and Montenegro / Serbia Multiparty May  1992 September  2000 
Sierra Leone Military April  1967 March  1971 
 Multiparty April  1971 May  1978 
 Single party June  1978 April  1992 
 Military May  1992 March  1996 
 Multiparty April  1996 April  1997 
 Military May  1997 February  1998 
 Multiparty March  1998 April  2002 
Singapore Multiparty August  1965 March  1968 
 Single party April  1968 September  1981 
 Multiparty October  1981 December  2008 
Somalia Military October  1969 December  1990 
South Africa Multiparty January  1951 April  1994 
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Spain Single party January  1951 May  1977 
Sri Lanka Multiparty March  1983 January  1989 
Sudan Military November  1958 May  1965 
 Military May  1969 April  1974 
 Single party May  1974 March  1985 
 Military April  1985 March  1986 
 Military July  1989 December  2008 
Swaziland Monarchic September  1968 December  2008 
Syria Military January  1951 August  1955 
 Multiparty September  1955 January  1958 
 Military March  1962 December  2008 
Taiwan Single party January  1951 June  1987 
 Multiparty July  1987 February  1996 
Tajikistan Multiparty January  1992 December  2008 
Tanzania Single party December  1961 October  1995 
 Multiparty November  1995 December  2008 
Thailand Military January  1951 September  1973 
 Multiparty October  1973 February  1975 
 Military November  1976 March  1979 
 Multiparty April  1979 February  1980 
 Military March  1980 September  1992 
 Military September  2006 January  2008 
Togo Single party May  1960 December  1966 
 Military January  1967 January  1994 
 Multiparty February  1994 December  2008 
Tunisia Multiparty March  1956 December  1962 
 Single party January  1963 October  1987 
 Multiparty November  1987 December  2008 
Turkey Multiparty May  1954 May  1960 
 Military June  1960 September  1961 
 Military March  1971 September  1973 
 Military September  1980 October  1983 
Turkmenistan Single party January  1992 December  2008 
USSR / Russia Single party January  1951 December  1991 
 Multiparty January  1992 December  2008 
Uganda Multiparty April  1966 November  1969 
 Single party December  1969 January  1971 
 Military February  1971 March  1979 
342 
 
 Multiparty April  1979 July  1985 
 Single party August  1985 February  2006 
 Multiparty March  2006 December  2008 
United Arab Emirates Monarchic December  1971 December  2008 
Uruguay Military February  1973 February  1985 
Uzbekistan Single party September  1991 December  1994 
 Military January  1995 December  2008 
Venezuela Multiparty January  1951 November  1958 
 Multiparty April  2002 December  2008 
Vietnam North / Vietnam  Single party July  1954 December  2008 
Yemen North /Yemen  Military January  1951 September  1962 
 Monarchic October  1962 May  1990 
 Military   
Yugoslavia Single party January  1951 December  1991 
Zambia Multiparty November  1964 November  1972 
 Single party December  1972 October  1991 
 Multiparty November  1991 October  2008 
Zimbabwe Multiparty November  1965 December  2008 
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Table A2. The original coding (regime-years) for Sierra Leone between 1992 and 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date Regime ID Country Regime type Transition Transition date GDP 
1992 10 Sierra Leone Military 0 
 
845 
1993 10 Sierra Leone Military 0 
 
855 
1994 10 Sierra Leone Military 0 
 
865 
1995 10 Sierra Leone Military 1 
 
766 
1996 11 Sierra Leone Multiparty 1 03.29.1996 569 
1997 12 Sierra Leone Military 1 05.25.1997 454 
1998 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0 03.10.1998 441 
1999 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0 
 
404 
2000 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0 
 
409 
2001 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0 
 
458 
2002 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 1 05.14.2002 553 
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Table A3. The new coding (regime-months) for Sierra Leone between 1996 and 1999 
Date Regime ID Country Regime type Transition Transition date GDP 
Mar-96 10 Sierra Leone Military 1 03.29.1996 569 
Apr-96 11 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   569 
May-96 11 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   569 
Jun-96 11 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   569 
Jul-96 11 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   569 
Aug-96 11 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   569 
Sep-96 11 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   569 
Oct-96 11 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   569 
Nov-96 11 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   569 
Dec-96 11 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   569 
Jan-97 11 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   454 
Feb-97 11 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   454 
Mar-97 11 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   454 
Apr-97 11 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   454 
May-97 11 Sierra Leone Multiparty 1 05.25.1997 454 
Jun-97 12 Sierra Leone Milityary 0   454 
Jul-97 12 Sierra Leone Milityary 0   454 
Aug-97 12 Sierra Leone Milityary 0   454 
Sep-97 12 Sierra Leone Milityary 0   454 
Oct-97 12 Sierra Leone Milityary 0   454 
Nov-97 12 Sierra Leone Milityary 0   454 
Dec-97 12 Sierra Leone Milityary 0   454 
Jan-98 12 Sierra Leone Milityary 0   441 
Feb-98 12 Sierra Leone Milityary 1 03.10.1998 441 
Mar-98 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   441 
Apr-98 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   441 
May-98 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   441 
Jun-98 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   441 
Jul-98 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   441 
Aug-98 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   441 
Sep-98 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   441 
Oct-98 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   441 
Nov-98 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   441 
Dec-98 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   441 
Jan-99 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   404 
Feb-99 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   404 
Mar-99 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   404 
Apr-99 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   404 
May-99 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   404 
Jun-99 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   404 
Jul-99 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   404 
Aug-99 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   404 
Sep-99 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   404 
Oct-99 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   404 
Nov-99 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   404 
Dec-99 13 Sierra Leone Multiparty 0   404 
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Table 4A. List of multicollinearity statistics for Chapter 5 estimated using ordinary least 
squares regression (independent variable: time to regime change) 
 
Independent variables tested  VIF score 1/VIF 
   
Log(GDP) per capita 1.27 0.786034 
Oil dependency 1.25 0.800792 
Ethnic fractionalisation 1.14 0.873657 
Religious fractionalisation 1.06 0.943019 
Territorial dispute 1.02 0.982436 
Political instability 1.00 0.996412 
   
Mean  1.12  
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Table 5A. List of multicollinearity statistics for military regimes in Chapter 6, estimated 
using ordinary least squares regression (independent variable: time to regime change) 
 
Independent variables tested  VIF score 1/VIF 
   
Log(GDP) per capita 1.49 0.673384 
Oil dependency 1.28 0.782312 
Ethnic fractionalisation 1.15 0.871487 
Religious fractionalisation 1.12 0.892737 
Territorial dispute 1.09 0.919503 
Political instability 1.02 0.985198 
   
Mean  1.19  
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Table 6A. List of multicollinearity statistics for monarchic regimes in Chapter 6, estimated 
using ordinary least squares regression (independent variable: time to regime change) 
 
Independent variables tested VIF score 1/VIF 
   
Oil dependency 1.55 0.643608 
Log(GDP) per capita 1.51 0.663180 
Religious fractionalisation 1.06 0.941316 
Territorial dispute 1.06 0.945909 
Ethnic fractionalisation 1.04 0.961736 
Political instability 1.00 0.997667 
   
Mean 1.12  
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Table 7A. List of multicollinearity statistics for multiparty regimes in Chapter 6, estimated 
using ordinary least squares regression (independent variable: time to regime change) 
 
Independent variables tested  VIF score 1/VIF 
   
Ethnic fractionalisation 1.22 0.816741 
Log(GDP) per capita 1.21 0.829477 
Religious fractionalisation 1.09 0.915429 
Oil dependency 1.07 0.938825 
Territorial dispute 1.03 0.973087 
Political instability 1.01 0.988456 
   
Mean  1.10  
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Table 8A. List of multicollinearity statistics for single party regimes in Chapter 6, 
estimated using ordinary least squares regression (independent variable: time to regime 
change) 
Independent variables tested  VIF score 1/VIF 
   
Ethnic fractionalisation 1.31 0.761303 
Log(GDP) per capita 1.24 0.807027 
Oil dependency 1.17 0.851086 
Religious fractionalisation 1.17 0.853378 
Territorial dispute 1.09 0.914128 
Political instability 1.01 0.994658 
   
Mean  1.17  
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Table 9A. List of multicollinearity statistics for Chapter 7, estimated using ordinary least 
squares regression (independent variable: time to democratisation) with the time-
varying measure of territorial dispute involvement 
Independent variables tested  VIF score 1/VIF 
   
Monarchic regimes 1.55 0.647039 
Multiparty regimes 1.78 0.560979 
Single party regimes 1.68 0.596655 
Territorial dispute 1.07 0.932936 
Log(GDP) per capita 1.36 0.737984 
Oil dependency 1.27 0.78445 
Political instability 1.03 0.969177 
History of democracy 1.26 0.795863 
Cold War 1.22 0.817825 
Sum of past transitions 1.54 0.649121 
   
Mean  1.38  
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Table 10A. List of multicollinearity statistics for Chapter 7, estimated using ordinary least 
squares regression (independent variable: time to democratisation) with the dummy 
measure of territorial dispute involvement history 
 
Independent variables tested  VIF score 1/VIF 
   
Monarchic regimes 1.55 0.646124 
Multiparty regimes 1.77 0.565012 
Single party regimes 1.66 0.601848 
Territorial dispute history 1.1 0.907371 
Log(GDP) per capita 1.35 0.738847 
Oil dependency 1.29 0.773194 
Political instability 1.03 0.969417 
History of democracy 1.25 0.79869 
Cold War 1.23 0.811907 
Sum of past transitions 1.55 0.645435 
   
Mean  1.38  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
352 
 
Appendix B: Chapter 5 diagnostic tests  
 
 
Table A1. Non-visual univariate Schoenfeld residuals test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables RHO χ² value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value 
Territorial dispute -0.089 2.31 1 0.129 
Log(GDP per capita)  -0.103 4.53 1 0.033 
Oil dependency  0.051 0.65 1 0.421 
Instability 0.244 18.51 1 0.000 
Ethnic instability 0.080 2.51 1 0.113 
Religious instability 0.043 0.60 1 0.439 
353 
 
Figure A1. Univariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests for all variables.  
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Figure A2. A ‘log-log’ plot of the categorical predictors, obtained from univariate analysis 
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Figure A3. Univariate Martingale residual test for continuous predictors  
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Table A2. Multivariate Schoenfeld residuals test results (Model 8) 
Variables RHO χ² value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value 
Territorial dispute -0.003 0.0 1 0.961 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.050 0.8 1 0.372 
Oil 0.086 2.3 1 0.127 
Instability 0.045 0.7 1 0.399 
Instability * time -0.081 2.0 1 0.162 
Ethnic instability -0.045 0.4 1 0.525 
Religious instability 0.010 0.0 1 0.888 
Rel. instability * time -0.008 0.0 1 0.910 
Global test  4.0 8 0.856 
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Figure A4. Multivariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests for all variables (Model 8) 
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Figure A5. A ‘log-log’ plot of categorical predictors from multivariate analysis (Model 8) 
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Figure A6. A plot of Martingale residuals for all continuous covariates from multivariate analysis (Model 8) 
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Appendix C: Chapter 6 diagnostic tests  
 
 
 
 
 
A. Military regimes 
 
 
 
Table A1. Military regimes: Univariate Schoenfeld residuals test results 
 
 
 
Variables RHO χ² value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value 
Territorial dispute 0.08030 0.58 1 0.448 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.05196 0.33 1 0.566 
Oil -0.02159 0.04 1 0.834 
Instability 0.16854 2.65 1 0.103 
Ethnic instability 0.03839 0.13 1 0.714 
Religious instability 0.13790 1.75 1 0.186 
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Figure A1. Military regimes: Univariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests for all variables in the model without interactions 
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Figure A2. Military regimes: Unadjusted log-log plots for categorical variables  
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Figure A3. Military regimes: Univariate Martingale residual test for continuous predictors in the final Cox model  
 
 
 
 
 
364 
 
Table A2. Military regimes: Multivariate Schoenfeld residuals test results (Model 10) 
Variables RHO χ² value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value 
Territorial dispute -0.056 0.21 1 0.649 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.058 0.23 1 0.635 
Log(GDP per capita)² 
 
0.055 0.20 1 0.657 
Oil 0.050 0.16 1 0.690 
Instability 0.018 0.02 1 0.890 
Ethnic fractionalisation -0.097 0.91 1 0.339 
Religious fractionalisation 0.093 0.51 1 0.474 
Log(GDP per capita) *                  
political instability 
-0.003 0.00 1 0.978 
Territorial dispute *                     
political instability 
0.052 0.2 1 0.652 
Global test  3.14 9 0.959 
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Figure A4. Military regimes: Multivariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests for all variables in the model, including interactions (Model 10) 
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Figure A5. Military regimes: Log-log plots for categorical variables (Model 10) 
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Figure A6. Military regimes: Multivariate Martingale residual test for continuous predictors (Model 10) 
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B. Monarchic regimes 
 
Table B1. Monarchic regimes: Univariate Schoenfeld residuals test results 
 
Variables RHO χ² value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value 
Territorial dispute -0.26136 0.92 1 0.337 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.08794 0.08 1 0.775 
Oil 0.16518 0.29 1 0.593 
Instability 0.38148 1.88 1 0.170 
Ethnic instability 0.52351 3.37 1 0.066 
Religious instability 0.00831 0.00 1 0.980 
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Figure B1. Monarchic regimes: Univariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests for all variables in the model without interactions 
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Figure B2. Monarchic regimes: Unadjusted log-log plots for categorical variables  
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Figure B3. Monarchic regimes: Univariate Martingale residual test for continuous predictors in the final Cox model  
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C. Multiparty regimes 
 
 
Table C1. Multiparty regimes: Univariate Schoenfeld residuals test results 
Variables RHO χ² value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value 
Territorial dispute 0.07496 0.43 1 0.513 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.21751 3.60 1 0.058 
Oil 0.04666 0.16 1 0.691 
Instability 0.05416 0.23 1 0.632 
Ethnic instability 0.08918 0.68 1 0.409 
Religious instability -0.04599 0.15 1 0.701 
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Figure C1. Multiparty regimes: Univariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests for all variables in the model without interactions 
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Figure C2. Multiparty regimes: Unadjusted log-log plots for categorical variables  
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Figure C3. Multiparty regimes: Univariate Martingale residual test for continuous predictors in the final Cox model  
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Table C2. Multiparty regimes: Multivariate Schoenfeld residuals test results (Model 7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables RHO χ² value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value 
Territorial dispute 0.04864 0.17 1 0.682 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.13001 1.01 1 0.314 
Oil 0.08396 0.34 1 0.562 
Instability -0.05199 0.25 1 0.618 
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.07232 0.32 1 0.571 
Religious fractionalisation -0.05333 0.15 1 0.695 
Log(GDP per capita) *               
political instability 
0.0506 0.23 1 0.629 
Global test  2.35 7 0.938 
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Figure C4. Multiparty regimes: Log-log plots for categorical variables (Model 7) 
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Figure C5. Multiparty regimes: Multivariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests for all variables (Model 7) 
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Figure C6. Multiparty regimes: Multivariate Martingale residual test for continuous predictors (Model 7) 
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D. Single party regimes 
 
 
 
 
Table D1. Single party regimes: Univariate Schoenfeld residuals test results  
Variables RHO χ² value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value 
Territorial dispute -0.3073 5.66 1 0.017 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.0274 0.05 1 0.824 
Oil 0.0376 0.08 1 0.771 
Instability 0.3909 8.14 1 0.004 
Ethnic instability -0.0224 0.03 1 0.864 
Religious instability -0.0658 0.32 1 0.569 
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Figure D1. Single party regimes: Univariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests for all variables in the model without interactions 
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Figure D2. Single party regimes: Unadjusted log-log plots for categorical variables  
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Figure D3. Single party regimes: Univariate Martingale residual test for continuous predictors in the final Cox model  
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Table D2. Single party regimes: Multivariate Schoenfeld residuals test results (Model 9) 
Variables RHO χ² value Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value 
Territorial dispute -0.1088 0.68 1 0.411 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.0585 0.23 1 0.630 
Oil 0.0436 0.04 1 0.849 
Instability 0.0076 0.00 1 0.953 
Instability * time 0.0393 0.04 1 0.835 
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.1161 0.84 1 0.360 
 
Religious fractionalisation -0.1004 0.59 1 0.444 
 
Log(GDP per capita) * ethnic 
fractionalisation 
 
-0.1163 
 
0.76 
 
1 
 
0.385 
 
Dispute * oil dependency 0.0314 0.05 1 0.828 
Global test  2.62 9 0.977 
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Figure D4. Single party regimes: Multivariate graphical Schoenfeld residual tests (Model 9) 
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Figure D5. Single party regimes: Log-log plots for categorical variables (Model 9) 
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Figure D6. Single party regimes: Multivariate Martingale residual test for continuous predictors (Model 9) 
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Appendix D: Chapter 7 diagnostic tests  
 
 
 
Table A1. Univariate non-visual Schoenfeld proportional hazards tests 
Variables RHO χ² value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value 
Military regimes --- --- --- --- 
Monarchic regimes 0.028 0.06 1 0.807 
Multiparty regimes 0.024 0.04 1 0.832 
Single party regimes 0.336 7.52 1 0.006 
Territorial dispute -0.071 0.40 1 0.526 
History of territorial dispute -0.042 0.14 1 0.709 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.069 0.37 1 0.545 
Oil -0.164 2.09 1 0.148 
Instability 0.283 6.31 1 0.012 
History of democracy -0.088 0.59 1 0.443 
Sum of past transitions 0.043 0.13 1 0.719 
Cold War 0.084 0.54 1 0.463 
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Figure A1. Visual univariate Schoenfeld residual tests 
 
390 
 
Figure A2. Visual univariate Schoenfeld residual test: regime categories 
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Figure A3. Unadjusted log-log plots for all categorical predictors (Table 6 only) 
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Figure A4. Adjusted log-log plots for all categorical predictors (Table 6 only) 
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Figure A5. Univariate Martingale residuals test 
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Figure A6. Visual multivariate Schoenfeld residual tests (Model 9) 
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Figure A7. Visual multivariate Schoenfeld residual tests: regime categories (Model 9) 
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Table A2. Multivariate non-visual Schoenfeld proportional hazards tests (Model 9) 
Variables RHO χ² value 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-value 
Military regimes --- --- --- --- 
Monarchic regimes -0.114 1.45 1 0.229 
Multiparty regimes 0.112 1.27 1 0.259 
Single party regimes -0.045 0.20 1 0.656 
Territorial dispute 0.013 0.02 1 0.893 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.025 0.05 1 0.827 
Oil 0.003 0.00 1 0.983 
Instability -0.037 0.11 1 0.742 
Instability * time -0.022 0.06 1 0.799 
History of democracy -0.068 0.32 1 0.572 
Sum of past transitions 0.030 0.08 1 0.779 
Cold War 0.069 0.60 1 0.438 
Instability * Cold War -0.059 0.49 1 0.484 
Instability * Log(GDP pc) 0.045 0.16 1 0.687 
Oil * Cold War 0.087 0.55 1 0.459 
Oil * Sum of past transitions -0.066 0.22 1 0.641 
Global test  3.59 15 0.999 
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Figure A8. Multivariate Martingale residuals test (Model 9) 
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Figure A9. Univariate visual Schoenfeld residual test for the new measure of territorial disputes 
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Figure A10. Log-log plots for the new measure of territorial disputes, adjusted and unadjusted 
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Figure A11. Visual multivariate Schoenfeld residual tests (Model 13) 
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Figure A12. Visual multivariate Schoenfeld residual tests: regime categories (Model 13) 
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Table A3. Multivariate non-visual Schoenfeld proportional hazards tests (Model 13) 
Variables RHO 
χ² 
value 
Degrees 
of 
freedom 
p-value 
Military regimes --- --- --- --- 
Monarchic regimes -0.034 0.05 1 0.830 
Multiparty regimes -0.010 0.01 1 0.924 
Single party regimes -0.058 0.28 1 0.594 
History of territorial dispute 0.026 0.06 1 0.809 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.016 0.02 1 0.881 
Oil -0.113 0.56 1 0.455 
Instability 0.020 0.03 1 0.857 
Instability * time -0.022 0.06 1 0.807 
History of democracy -0.107 0.55 1 0.457 
Sum of past transitions -0.007 0.00 1 0.958 
Cold War 0.114 0.80 1 0.372 
Instability * Cold War 0.063 0.57 1 0.448 
Instability * Log(GDP pc) -0.006 0.00 1 0.954 
Oil * Cold War -0.119 1.17 1 0.280 
Oil * Sum of past transitions 0.000 0.00 1 0.998 
 
Military regimes * territorial dispute 
history 
-0.052 0.22 1 0.642 
 
Monarchic regimes * territorial dispute 
history 
0.015 0.01 1 0.912 
 
Multiparty regimes * territorial dispute 
history 
0.085 0.59 1 0.443 
 
Single party regimes * territorial 
dispute history 
--- --- --- --- 
Global test  4.96 18 0.999 
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Figure A13. Multivariate Martingale residuals test (Model 13) 
 
 
 
